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The papers in this volume, except for the concluding papers, were presented to an interdisciplinary colloquium arranged by the African Studies Center, University of California, Los Angeles, and held in the spring of 1966. They deal with the nature and social consequences of pluralism, and with problems of social cohesion and change in plural societies. The contributions have been arranged in four parts: Part I is introductory and consists of theoretical papers; Part II presents case studies in pre-colonial, white settler, colonial, and independent African societies; Part III is a discussion of general perspectives; and Part IV presents our conclusions in regard to theories of pluralism and conceptual approaches. While the case studies deal with pluralism in African societies, the theoretical interest extends beyond the boundaries of Africa to a general concern with the relations between groups under conditions of structural, social, and cultural pluralism.

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Chapter 4  Pluralism in Precolonial African Societies

M. G. Smith

Pluralism has been identified in my preceding paper \(^1\) by the differential incorporation of two or more collectivities within the same society. It has been argued that such differential incorporation generally presumes significant antecedent differences of institutions, culture, and ethnicity between the collectivities concerned; and further, that it restricts assimilation by preserving or promoting the institutional distinctness of these structurally segregated collectivities. It is possible and useful to test these general ideas by reviewing the ethnographic materials on precolonial Africa. Ideally, even a limited test of these hypotheses would seem to require a comprehensive survey of the continental ethnography; but nothing so ambitious is attempted here; and indeed it is doubtful whether such inquiries would be fruitful without preliminary development of the appropriate concepts, typologies, hypotheses, and procedures. This paper is thus in part designed to illustrate a conceptual framework and method for such comparative analyses.

I

SOCIETY AND CORPORATIONS

In studying social pluralism we are directly and continuously concerned with the conditions, problems, and modes of social cohesion, structure, and development. Following Radcliffe-Brown, Nadel, and others, we can distinguish societies as the widest continuing collectivities bound by common and distinctive forms of social structure.\(^2\) As Fortes says,

Social structure is not an aspect of culture, but the entire culture of a given people handled in a special frame of theory . . . culture certainly in most of

\(^1\) I should like to thank Theodore Ravetz for his comments on this paper.
Africa . . . has no clear-cut boundaries. But a group of people bound together within a social structure have a boundary, though not necessarily one that coincides with a physical boundary or is impenetrable. . . . Culture is a unity insofar as it is tied to a bounded social structure. In this sense . . . the social structure is the foundation of the whole social life of any continuing society.  

Particularly instructive and discriminating analyses of these issues in African tribal societies are given by Nadel and Goody for the Nuba and the LoDagaa, respectively. In both areas of great cultural and social intermixture, these writers independently find collectivities distinguished as societies by reference to structural differentiae, namely, relations of kinship, marriage, and descent.  Notably, the critical units that serve to differentiate these geographically intermingled peoples, both analytically and in their own eyes, are mutually exclusive frameworks of corporate organization. Nuba clans may be “symbiotic” or “simple”; and among LoDagaa and Nuba alike, differences in the incidence and form of patriliney or matriliney distinguish societies based on corporate kinship groups of differing constitution.

As Evans-Pritchard says, “By social structure we mean relations between groups which have a high degree of consistency, and constancy. The groups remain the same irrespective of their specific content of individuals at any particular moment, so that generation after generation of people pass through them.” Such enduring, closed, and interlocking groups are always corporate units; but corporate groups are only one species of corporation, and, in specifying and analyzing the social structure of any given aggregate, it is equally essential to treat alternative forms such as corporate categories (e.g., the Nuer age-set), commissions (e.g., the Nuer leopard-skin chief), or offices and colleges where these exist.  

Evidently corporate constitutions vary with the type, bases, and articulation of their components, and these units and their relations define the social structure and set its boundaries. This being so, if pluralism involves the differential incorporation of collectivities within a common inclusive society, it should always distinguish such structures from systems of uniform or equivalent incorporation in which all units have identical or equivalent modes of articulation in the wider system. It is such differences in the modes of corporate organization and articulation within an inclusive collectivity which generate problems of social integration, cohesion, and solidarity, and serve to distinguish pluralities from other societies, whether the latter are institutionally homogeneous or heterogeneous in kind.

Clearly, in studying the modes, conditions, and correlates of differential association, we are dealing with features and problems that charac-
Pluralism in Precolonial African Societies

Pluralism characterizes many human societies, traditional and modern alike. It was in part the generality and variety of these conditions which led Herbert Spencer to declare that social evolution proceeded through the progressive compounding of collectivities, in whole or in part. Comparative analysis of pluralism and its alternatives consists very largely in the study of these societal compounds, their varying composition and form, properties, requisites, and modes of development. Such inquiries merit serious study by social scientists of differing disciplines, separately and in cooperation; but to pursue these problems fruitfully in precolonial African societies, we have first to distinguish varieties of collective accommodation and societal structure.

Modes of Collective Accommodation

Proceeding typologically, we can identify several significantly different levels and modes of collective association between the polar extremes of total societal segregation and social assimilation. Total segregation denotes a condition in which societies have no direct relations with one another; total assimilation involves socialization under uniform or equivalent corporate conditions and structures. Between these poles we can distinguish several intermediate structures of association. For convenience these are presented below in approximate order of increasing assimilation.

Societal segregations may be intermittent or continuous, total or segmental, as societies or their segments engage in intermittent external relations of war, diplomacy, trade, or the like, with one another. Such intersocietal relations presume societal boundaries and normally reinforce their mutual exclusions. Individual associations across such boundaries are structurally significant only insofar as they presuppose, establish, or modify corporate structures or links, whether societal or segmental. For example, Azande blood brotherhood imposed corporate obligations on the clansmen of blood brothers.

In the old days, because of the legal nature of the bond, and because the rest of a man's kin were involved, no man would exchange blood without the permission of his father or the head of his homestead, and without consulting the oracles. A Zande is not restricted to making the pact only with other Zande. Blood brotherhood was the only means by which private trade between distant parts could be carried on before European administration.

Funeral friendship, marriage, and joking relations are other standardized modes of collective action which link men of different corporate groups or categories; and though in most cases such relations held between descent groups of the same society, this was not always so.

Intermittent segmental interaction of collectivities incorporated in dif-
different societies is common in decentralized or acephalous politics, but it is by no means restricted to such situations. When two societies engage as units in collective relations, whether of war, alliance, negotiation, or trade, their political centralization is presumed. In such cases societal interaction merely reinforces collective boundaries and accentuates the representative roles of regulative corporations in either collectivity. Here also corporate differentiations are enhanced rather than reduced by such intersocietal transactions.

Symbiosis, a complementary association of interdependent elements which presupposes their difference, permits the intermittent or continuous accommodation of societally segregated groups, in whole or in part. Symbiotic relations are often also encapsulated within the boundaries of a single society. Indeed, Indian and other forms of caste institutionalize and exploit this principle in differing ways. Between societies or segments thereof, stable symbiotic relations generally presuppose marked differences of ecology and geographical mobility, as for example between the nomadic Fulani, Shuwa, and other pastoral groups of Northern Nigeria and the sedentary Kanuri or Hausa cultivators around them, or between Bambuti Pygmies and Bira or Amba Bantu speakers of the Ituri forest. Since symbiosis presumes complementarity, it is often unstable as well as unequal. To preserve its autonomy the weaker party must often withdraw physically and terminate one unsatisfactory relation by substituting another. Perhaps the most important instance of societally segmental symbiosis in African history is the slave trade by which Europeans established their economic domination of the West African coast and thus the bases for later penetration. Though these intercontinental relations should be considered in any comprehensive study of precolonial Africa, they are mentioned here only to illustrate the varied forms, conditions, and outcomes of societal symbiosis. Some African units engaged in this trade are mentioned briefly below.

When two societies or segments thereof join together as equal and autonomous collectivities in a distinctive common polity that surpasses alliance in its scope, content, and intensity, while preserving their internal distinctness, we may describe their union as a consociation, reserving this generic term for associations of separately constituted corporate collectivites as equal and internally autonomous partners in a common society. Confederation is a mode of consociation which characteristically establishes a common college to regulate the common civil affairs of the confederate segments; in Europe, Switzerland, and, in Africa, the Ga townships, the Egbas and Fanti, Old Calabar, and other Ekiti commercial states represent confederacies of differing heterogeneity, complexity, and form. Federations, another consociational form characterized by trans-
fer of autonomous jurisdiction over certain collective interests to the central organ, are perhaps best represented in Africa by the Ashanti Union in its later phase. 17

Though reserving various rights of veto or disassociation to their members, confederations normally regulate a wider range of common affairs than do such acephalous consociations as the Terik-Tiriki 18 or the Bulibuli-Bwezi of Bwamba. 19 As indicated below, both these unions remained acephalous, secular, and restricted in content and scope. Like the Ga and Egba townships, the Terik-Tiriki union emerged as a conscious response to external threats; but the more complex and segmental Bulibuli-Bwezi consociation was directed primarily toward societal coexistence. However, neither combination manifests any general scheme of ritual unification. We should therefore distinguish these secular acephalous consociations from others that are ritualized, such as the Tallensi and Kagoro, 20 and from other unions with symbolic or executive centers, whether secular or ritualistic, such as the confederations and federations mentioned above. The essential characteristics of all types of consociation are the preservation of their corporate components as structurally distinct, internally autonomous, and politically equal members of the societal unit. Often these corporate segments remain culturally distinct in different ways as, for example, in Bwamba or among the Ga, Egba, and Terik-Tiriki. However segmental equality is not restricted entirely to jural verisimilitude. Symmetrical complementarity at the ritual level, or equivalence at the secular, assures substantive parity by institutionalizing complementary interdependence.

Such consociations as Kagoro and Tallensi represent amalgams produced by the union of two or more ethnically distinct collectivities. Such amalgamations may be usefully distinguished from other forms of consociation by the identical inner organization of their corporate components as well as the uniformities, complementarity, or equivalence of their articulation with one another in the wider society. Consociations may thus be usefully classified by the internal differences of their component parts. For example, after two centuries of close association, Terik and Tiriki still differ sharply in language, social organization, ecologies, and cults. Bulibuli and Bwezi, having amalgamated, now appear to differ solely in language. In Kagoro and Tallensi societies the associated parts still differ in certain ritual and secular qualities. Ga segments differ primarily in cult, Egba in organization and speech. 21

Assimilation denotes that condition in which uniformities of internal organization and external articulation are sufficiently general and intense for a single corpus of law and custom to have equal validity for all types of social relation in all groups. In this condition individual freedoms of
association and contract are uniform, and social integration at the normative or ecological level is in theory high.

Differential incorporation obtains when the structure of the inclusive collectivity prescribes differences in the modes of articulation of particular corporate components. Generally, systems of differential incorporation segregate some units by jural, political, and/or ritual disabilities, while reserving control of public resources and policy for other units. Being explicitly corporate in their base, form, and reference, structures of differential incorporation proscribe individual and collective changes of status and relation in affairs of critical interest. Their order and continuity accordingly require the maintenance of a uniform and rigid scheme of relations between corporate collectivities distinguished as units of differing status, rights, and autonomy. Such regimes minimize individual mobility and collective assimilations by harnessing their resources, material, ideological, and social, to block or suppress conditions or tendencies that seem to threaten their structure. Under such conditions individuals derive their personal and public rights exclusively from their status identification with one or another of the differentially articulated corporate units. Normally such societies owe their maintenance to a central regulatory organization which is prescriptively reserved for the dominant corporate group; but in Africa, as elsewhere, political centralization is not always present.

Collectivities differentially incorporated in a given society may or may not differ sharply in their constitutions, cultures, provenience, or languages. Where differentially articulated collectivities differ antecedently in social organization, language, and culture, the plural characteristics of the ensemble are most obvious and its cohesion is correspondingly weak; but, under differential incorporation, even institutionally similar collectivities will develop differences of organization and procedure in consequence of their differing structural situations, resources, autonomies, societal responsibilities, status, and rights. The collectivity that exercises corporate responsibility for societal order and policy must then specialize procedures and arrangements to administer these societal affairs as well as its own. Other collectivities, denied participation in the inclusive public domain, will lack the corresponding political and jural structures; and, unless directly administered by members of the ruling group, they must therefore develop distinctive procedures and arrangements to handle their own internal affairs. In such differing contexts, collectivities that were once similar in institutional and corporate organization develop important structural differences over time. Nonetheless, where the structurally differentiated collectivities share such common institutions as
kinship, property, or cult, the prospects are probably better for increased assimilation and social cohesion.

This typology indicates the principal modes of interethnic accommodation and societalization of immediate interest. However, these alternatives represent states and processes of accommodation rather than mutually exclusive structural types. Consociations and amalgamations are often hard to distinguish; and any mode of collective accommodation from segregation to amalgamation can be converted into a system of differential incorporation by the subordination of some components to the domination of others. Further, in many societies, such as the Ngwato, Tswana, or Lozi, differential incorporation and amalgamation are employed together to accommodate differing collectivities. In Bonny and Old Calabar, the commercial oligarchy resembled a confederation of autonomous and rival "houses" that cooperated to dominate a larger slave population and to exploit the hinterland and the European trade. In these cases oligarchic unity was prerequisite for collective domination.

By concentrating on alternative corporate forms of collective accommodation, we give structural priority to collectivities and their corporate relations. The mere presence of culturally distinct individuals within a social unit does not establish pluralism unless they are corporately identified and segregated as distinct units, whether categorical or group. This is so because institutional communities or differences are collective facts. Metics or resident aliens are merely a residual category of nonsocietalized persons whose local residence is optional and structurally indifferent. In short, to analyze and compare the corporate organization of different societies, the appropriate units are corporations whose members are organized as distinct aggregates. At the present level of analysis, individuals are separately significant only as members or representatives of corporate units, unless by their acts and relations they initiate structural change or modifications in the corporate organization.

**Types of Society**

Inevitably in the preceding discussion we have dichotomized African societies as acephalous and centralized, following general practice. This dichotomy is neither so self-evident nor so simple as it appears. Such societies as the Hausa, Nyakyusa, or Tswana remain acephalous or uncentralized despite their internal organization in a number of centralized and mutually independent states. Other societies such as the Ngonde or Shilluk, though having titular chiefs, were hardly less "anarchic" than the Nuer or Tiv who had none, and considerably more so than...
the Yakö or Kipsigi who relied on associations of differing base and type for internal order and cohesion. Perhaps the traditional dichotomy between states and stateless societies confounds two different meanings of the term “polity”; nonetheless we can still employ it to classify African societies, so as to study the distribution of pluralism and its alternatives among them.

Following Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, Paula Brown, Barnes, Southall, Bernardi, and others, we may first distinguish certain pure forms of acephalous society by differences in the type of corporate units on which they are based. As relatively pure types, societies differ structurally as they are based on corporate bands, on corporate descent groups of varying type, on an inclusive series of age-sets, or on inclusive or exclusive corporate associations whose members are heterogeneous as regards age and descent. These four modes of corporate organization represent alternative bases for certain pure forms of acephalous society. In most empirical cases, however, we do not deal with pure types. Normally the society is distinguished by its specific combination of some of these corporate forms, often with chieftainship also. Excluding band organization, these varieties of corporate grouping are equally compatible with centralized direction by a chief or by a regulative college; indeed, in many African societies, descent groups, age-groups, or corporate associations furnish the highest regulative units and the machinery for administration. Following Weber, we should also distinguish self-regulating corporate groups from units of similar form which are subject to the direction of a higher external authority, whether chiefly or collegial.

To develop this corporate taxonomy, we must reexamine the notion of band organization, since this term has several meanings. A “band” is a mobile residential group, regarded by its members and others as a distinct continuing unit. Thus, structurally, band organization distinguishes a societal type in which bands are the sole or largest corporate groupings, linked through their members by individual ties of friendship, kinship, or affinity, but without any wider collective framework. Ecologically, the term is generally reserved for the residential organization of mobile societies, and its application is thus often restricted to peoples who depend solely or primarily on hunting and gathering for subsistence. For ecological reasons collectors are generally mobile, and most mobile peoples do move about in small groups most of their lives. Thus for some anthropologists, band organization is synonymous with the residential groupings of all mobile peoples, while for others it describes the structural level of hunters and gatherers.

These equations are misleading because they assimilate two distinct sets of criteria, the ecological and the structural. Despite their collecting
ecologies, neither the Eskimo nor the Indians of northwestern America (Nootka, Kwakiutl, Bella Bella, etc.) were residentially organized in bands; nor apparently were the Australian aborigines, since another term, "horde," was used to distinguish their local groups. Australian aboriginal societies were integrated on various corporate principles that aligned the members of different hordes together for certain purposes, while differentiating the members of each horde. In these societies, bands or hordes were neither the only nor the most important collective unit; and even their corporate status remains ambiguous. Even so, despite their common dependence on collecting economies, the native societies of Australia and the American Northwest differ structurally from one another and from such societies as the Shoshone or Nambikuara which lacked any collective organization beyond their bands. Many other mobile societies, such as the pastoral Fulani of Northern Nigeria or the militaristic Ngoni of Fort Jameson in Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), also have social organizations that differ radically from band organization, though their residential groupings take that form. Moreover, if mere mobility of residential units is sufficient to distinguish band organization, then we must recognize it also among the plateau Tonga and other swidden cultivators of Central Africa, grouped in small shifting villages. However, neither among Kwakiutl, Australians, Fulani, Fort Jameson Ngoni, or Tonga are "bands" the maximal units of collective organization, nor are their local groups independent of wider and crosscutting corporate alignments. Fort Jameson Ngoni owed their unity to an inclusive age-regimental organization and central chiefship. Fulani and Tonga societies are organized around clanship and lineage which crosscut and align local groups. While Cheyenne and Australian aborigines are collectors, Fulani are cattle herders, Tonga are cultivators, and Ngoni were primarily raiders. In sum, while most mobile societies share similar modes of residential grouping, many, and especially those of pastoral nomads, are incorporated on bases quite different from simple "band organization." One has merely to consider the Bedouin, Kazak, Mongols, Cheyenne, Crow, Somali, Tuareg, and Turkana to appreciate this point. It is necessary then to accommodate our taxonomy to these conditions by distinguishing mobile societies that are organized in bands merely for residential purposes from others in which bands are the sole or major units of corporate organization. As our examples indicate, since the ecological coefficients of these structural categories vary widely, our distinctions should center on their differences of corporate organization.

To summarize, besides acephalous and centralized societies, we must distinguish mobile and sedentary ones; and within the mobile category we should distinguish those that are residentially organized in bands
from others in which band organization is virtually synonymous with the collective form and level of social organization. Clearly, mobile societies may be either centralized or acephalous; but all mobile peoples organized solely in bands lack centralization.

With such problematic exceptions as the Ga, Efik, and Yakö, centralization in sub-Saharan Africa has been generally identified with the chiefly regulation of public affairs through differentiated and specialized administrative staff. By such structures, Fortes and Evans-Pritchard initially distinguished societies having government from those without; but clearly these writers did not assume that the mere presence of a titular headman or chief, as for instance in Anuak or Ndembu villages or in pastoral Fulani or Bushman bands, constitutes "a government" or a "centralized authority." The administrative staff is at least of equal importance; and among Kipsigi, Kikuyu, and Yoruba, or in Old Calabar, its structural priority is suggested by the absence or executive nullity of the chief. On the other hand, the mere presence of an administrative staff, however effectively organized, does not guarantee the stability of the political aggregate as a continuing unit of central administration. Among Azande, Nyakyusa, Alur, Shambala, Tswana, Fort Jameson Ngoni, and other peoples having centralized authority, chiefdoms split frequently and in certain cases almost ritually at each generation. In yet other societies of varying stability, the central chiefship was predominantly ritual and symbolic. To classify African chiefdoms by reference to their durability and by the secular or ritual symbolic character of their regimes would ignore several important dimensions such as the character, functions, and differentiation of the administrative staff, the scale of the political unit, its number of organizational levels, its ecological and demographic situation, ethnic heterogeneity, and the constitutional character and composition of its ruling councils.

Further, though this gross classification of African chiefdoms may serve us well, we should distinguish lesser chiefdoms from such imperial states as Mali, Songhay and Dahomey, Benin, Ethiopia, Kanem-Bornu, Sokoto, the old Wolof state, Ashanti and the Zulu under Shaka and Dingane. In terms of the common contrast between centralized and uncentralized polities, effective imperial systems seem to be overcentralized, since their effective administration presumes unusual concentration of administrative and political power at the center by appropriation of decisive autonomy from the administered units. With few exceptions, empires are always pluralities of varying degree, composition, and structure. The imperial order presupposes central control of greater resources, including force and intelligence, than can be marshaled against it by any single subjugated component. However, emperors, like others, depend on
their administrative staff for loyal and efficient enforcement of their orders; in consequence imperial systems are constantly subject to secessions by territorial officials, to palace coups and usurpations, to foreign invasion and popular revolt. However spectacular their careers or spread, they are accordingly rather less stable than lesser chiefdoms that include more intensively societalized populations.

We emerge then with an operational scheme based on dimensions of acephaly and centralization and mobility and sedentarization. Societies in each of these categories are structurally distinguished by the type of corporation on which they depend for their boundaries and integration. As alternative bases for pure forms of corporate structure, we have distinguished bands, descent, age, association, and chiefship, classifying chiefdoms by their stability and ethnic character. However, neither are all mobile societies structurally based on bands, nor is age-organization restricted to acephalous societies, nor are all chiefdoms equally sedentary or centralized. In general we shall have to deal with mixed conditions and with combinations of corporate models rather than with societal examples of pure forms.

Some typology of African precolonial societies based on criteria of corporate structure is essential to any comparative review of interethnic accommodations within or among them. This is especially so because societies and ethnic accommodations of differing type are distinguished by their corporate organization, as was shown in the two preceding typologies. In short, our attempts to distinguish societal types, boundaries, and structures of ethnic accommodation emphasize the corporate nature and bases of these units, as well as their differences.

This feature of the conceptual framework has important values for our comparative review. Lacking the resources necessary for an exhaustive survey of African ethnology, we can still undertake a systematic comparative analysis of the differing forms of interethnic accommodation in traditional African societies by combining these typologies of societal forms and of accommodative structures. Since they share a common corporate framework, they have many close and direct connections. Being separately comprehensive, together they may also furnish an adequate framework for a discriminating comparative analysis of traditional societies selected for their typological relevance.

Differences of ecology might seem to offer a superior basis for classification of precolonial African societies. However, as we have seen in discussing band organization, an ecological taxonomy is relatively indiscriminate in its categories and problematic in its relevance to societal boundaries, structures, and institutions for the accommodation of differing units. By gross ecological criteria, besides "nomadic" and sedentary
societies, we can distinguish only those that derive their subsistence from hunting, gathering, or fishing, from pastoralism, from agriculture or mixed husbandry, from commerce, manufactures, or war. It is evident that no direct correspondences between differing forms of social structure or interethnic accommodation and such gross differences of ecological or economic system can be adduced or inferred. Some consociations combine collectivities of differing ecological adaptation; others combine units of identical ecological type; and in both cases the corporate structures are influenced by many nonecological factors. Bearing in mind these alternative modes of livelihood, we need also to examine the demographic, historical, and structural contexts of these collective accommodations to isolate the significance of the ecological factor in any individual case.

One central problem of sociological theory concerns the various possible bases of social order and correlative conditions of social cohesion. In treating pluralism and its alternatives we are explicitly concerned with this question; but since societies vary in their composition and type, to seek a general answer we must undertake a systematic comparative analysis of differing patterns of interethnic accommodation which appear in societies of differing type. By employing corporate criteria to typologize societies and patterns of consociation, we simplify the problems of comparative analysis in this inquiry.

The typology of interethnic accommodations presented above represents a series of feasible alternatives to and structures of social and cultural pluralism. To determine their relative congruence with societies differentiated by structural type, we need, however cursorily, to examine representative cases drawn from the ethnographic materials on each societal category. In this way we may perhaps perceive relations of necessity, exclusion, or relative consistency between differing types of interethnic accommodations and differing types of corporate structure. Alternatively we may see how social systems of similar type can develop and sustain differing modes of inter-ethnic accommodation. For such comparative inquiries the structural framework adopted here has obvious values.

**Indices of Diversity**

We need further to distinguish within the collectivities we shall survey those differences of race, ethnicity, provenience, language, ecology, social organization, cult, and other institutional patterns that may facilitate or promote pluralism. Only in this way can we refine and develop the study of societal responses to cultural diversity beyond the position reached by Fortes and Evans-Pritchard more than twenty-five years ago.
Having distinguished acephalous segmentary societies with a lineage base from centralized units, Fortes and Evans-Pritchard noted that all the centralized societies described in their volume “appear to be an amalgam of different peoples, each aware of its unique origin and history.” They accordingly inquired “to what extent cultural heterogeneity in a society is correlated with an administrative system and central authority.” On the data available, they remarked that

centralised authority and an administrative organisation seem to be necessary to accommodate culturally diverse groups within a single political system, especially if they have different modes of livelihood. A class or caste system may result if there are great cultural, and especially, great economic divergences. But centralised forms of government are found also with people of homogeneous culture and little economic differentiation, like the Zulu. It is possible that groups of diverse culture are the more easily welded into a unitary political system without the emergence of classes, the closer they are to one another in culture. A centralised form of government is not necessary to enable different groups of closely related culture and pursuing the same mode of livelihood, to amalgamate, nor does it necessarily arise out of the amalgamation. Nuer have absorbed large numbers of conquered Dinka, who are pastoral people like themselves with a very similar culture. They have incorporated them by adoption and other ways into their lineage systems; but this has not resulted in a class or caste structure, or in a centralised form of government. Marked divergencies in culture and economic pursuits are probably incompatible with segmentary political systems such as that of the Nuer or the Tallensi. We have not the data to check this.32

Despite numerous monographs and comparative studies of African politics published since 1940, I know of no general attempt to investigate and to develop these important suggestions of Fortes and Evans-Pritchard. To advance their analysis, besides discriminating typologies of societies and interethnic accommodations, we also need to discriminate conditions and degrees of cultural and ecological diversity within and between collectivities. To this end we should distinguish consociations of differing content and form by objective and by folk differences of language, ethnicity, race, culture, history, economy, cult, kinship, and other social institutions, thereby enabling us to assess the relative significance of differing cultural and racial conditions in promoting institutional accommodations of differing basis and type in societies distinguished by differing modes of corporate organization. In this paper we cannot undertake to detail all the institutional and cultural correspondences or divergences among the various peoples whose accommodations are mentioned below. Rather the reader is asked to assume that unless specific differentiae are mentioned, the collectivities concerned are of similar culture, language, and ethnic stock.

“Ethnicity” here denotes common provenience and distinctness as a
unit of social and biological reproduction; it accordingly connotes internal uniformities and external distinctness of biological stock, perhaps of language, kinship, culture, cult, and other institutions. Collectivities entering into the institutional accommodations listed below are typically distinct ethnic units or segments thereof. Thus social units formed by combinations of elements from the same ethnic group—for example, the Kikuyu rugongo (community, ridge), the Ibo village group, or the Ashanti confederacy—do not directly concern us, since no interethnic unions are directly involved. In studying social and cultural pluralism, ethnic combinations are clearly strategic.

Often ethnicity simultaneously connotes distinctions of descent and race; however, biologically closed communities of the same cultural, linguistic, and racial group are ethnically undifferentiated, though segregated as units of marriage and descent. In short, ethnic, racial, and communal units differ, though all are based on descent. In the African ethnographies from which our data are drawn, differences of tribal name, origin, and identity are generally taken as evidence of “ethnic” difference; yet even here, as Nadel and Goody show, caution is advisable in translating tribal designations into ethnic, cultural, and social units or boundaries. As a working rule, we can ignore those situations in which the historical and cultural correlates of tribal differentiations are indeterminate, as, for example, among the various Yoruba, Ibo, or Kikuyu collectivities. Unless the data indicate otherwise, it seems wiser to treat such peoples as distinct ethnic stocks whose internal differentiation, though worthy of note, does not obscure their unity or difference from adjacent groups.

In a society that contains a plurality of ethnic stocks, as defined here, perhaps the most significant index of ethnic closure is extent and form of common connubium. Even under structures of corporate amalgamation, ethnic groups of identical racial and linguistic stock may perpetuate their distinctness indefinitely, provided that each restricts connubium to its own members. Conversely, symmetrical connubium between ethnic groups facilitates their mutual assimilation in proportion to its relative frequency. Some examples are cited below. These considerations apply equally to groups differentiated by objective criteria of race.

Adjacent ethnic groups, though objectively and historically of common stock, often represent their differences in racial terms. Such folk ideologies must be distinguished from objective distinctions of racial type, as defined by genetic characteristics, in order that we may isolate the racial factor for direct analysis.

For various reasons, both historical and analytic, relatively few monographic studies of African societies give equal attention to the internal
organization and cultural distinctness of the various tribally or ethnically differentiated segments of composite societies. Perhaps Nadel's study of the Nupe remains the outstanding attempt to provide the ethnographic data necessary for detailed analysis of the conditions of social cohesion within an African society of this composition and complexity.\textsuperscript{54} Faced with such situations, anthropologists have generally restricted their intensive investigations to specific local units having high degrees of internal homogeneity and corresponding external distinctness. Thus Fortes described the Tallensi society as a separate, self-contained system, though historically it seems to have been subject to the Mamprussi chiefdom of Nalaragu.\textsuperscript{55} Alternatively, anthropologists concerned to study ethnically and culturally heterogeneous chiefdoms have concentrated their attention almost exclusively on the culture and organization of the ruling group and on its system of administration. Schapera’s studies among the Tswana, Gluckman’s among the Lozi, and mine on Zaria may be cited as illustrations. For methodological reasons, such restrictions and concentrations of field investigation are often unavoidable. The anthropologist who undertakes to study several cultures in equal detail during one or two years of fieldwork often fails to study any unit adequately at all.

Facing such problems among the Nuba of Kordofan, Nadel selected ten tribes as representative units by certain strategic criteria. Of these ten, he devoted one year to three adjacent groups—Heiban, Otoro, and Tira—and two months apiece on average to the others.\textsuperscript{56} This example indicates why detailed anthropological studies of all the culturally differentiated groups within a common aggregate remain rather rare; but, in consequence, we are often ill-informed about the specific nature and extent of the institutional and other differences that distinguish the various segments of a heterogeneous group.

Where the accommodation of culturally dissimilar peoples within a common society forms the principal object of study, as in Nadel’s work on Nupe, Southall’s on the Alur, or Maquet’s on Ruanda,\textsuperscript{57} the relevant ethnography is generally presented with variable completeness and stress. Alternatively we can sometimes combine ethnographic studies from two or more sources to furnish a reasonably detailed picture of cultural and social differences within the wider aggregate. Thus we can supplement Maquet’s account of the Hutu in Ruanda by Edel’s work on the independent Chiga belonging to the same ethnic and cultural stock.\textsuperscript{58} Likewise we may employ C. K. Meek’s ethnographic surveys of certain subject tribes in Zaria Province to fill out my picture of the Hausa emirate.\textsuperscript{59} For the Terik and Tiriki mentioned below, we can draw on the ethnographies of Wagner and Huntingford which describe the two pa-
rental stocks. Yet even with such extrapolations, our information on the concrete cultural and social differences of ethnically segregated units within a common inclusive society remains uneven and often sketchy. Under such conditions, we have often to use the grossest differentiae—population figures, local distributions, tribal designations, differences of language, connubium, economy, and kinship or cult—to illuminate reported differences or equivalences of political status and organization. In effect, anthropological concentration on the inner cohesion of relatively homogeneous and distinct collectivities deprives us of much needed data on the differences and relations of ethnic divisions in a wider society.

With these qualifications and typological categories we can nevertheless review interethnic associations reported in African societies of differing type, beginning with the simplest units and, where the material permits, undertaking limited comparisons of differing structures and situations among societies of identical type. Our review is organized by the preceding societal typology. It deals only with sub-Saharan Africa and is far from complete. It consists simply in reporting the differing formations found in societies of each category with summaries of their central features. However, these societal types are not all mutually exclusive. They do serve to organize the data and to facilitate comparative analysis in structurally consistent terms, but, where appropriate, I have not hesitated to cite cases out of this order; for example, it is convenient to discuss different types of mobile society together. Lineages and age-sets are found as well with chiefship as without. It is neither necessary nor possible to set up a system of mutually exclusive societal types; we need merely note the important particulars of corporate organization in each instance.

In conclusion, we may try to summarize the data from three points of view: first, we may try to determine what situational factors and ranges of cultural or “ethnic” diversity seem to be linked with institutionalized differences of incorporation or other types of interethnic association; second, we may inquire into the relationships between differences in the structures of interethnic accommodations and in the structures of the societies concerned; third, we may try to determine how far, and under what conditions, differential incorporation presupposes, preserves, or generates the institutional and social differences that constitute pluralism.

II

MOBILE SOCIETIES

In Africa the pure form of band organization is found among Bushmen, Pygmies, Twa, Bergdama, Hottentots, and Wandorobo. Despite
Jeffries, it seems that at least some of the people loosely described as Twa or Batwa are pygmoids encapsulated in other societies. It is also possible that some Twa are of Bushmanoid (Khoisan) stock, others of Pyg­moid stock, and still others, such as the Swamp Twa, of “Bantu” stock.
By all criteria the best examples of band-organized African societies are the Kalahari Bushmen and the Pygmies of the Ituri forest; and for these we have fine data.

Few Bushmen in Bechuanaland or Southwest Africa retain their communal independence from adjacent tribes, Bantu or Hottentot. Schapera estimates that among the Ngwato, a Tswana tribe of approximately 100,000 (in 1946?) there were approximately 10,000 (Sarwa) Bushmen; and among the nearby Tawana another 4,000. By contrast, the !Kung, one of the few Bushmen tribes to retain independence by withdrawal to the desert, are estimated at about 1,000.

Among the Tswana, Bushmen (Sarwa) formerly lived as serfs (malata), parcellled out in local groups among the [Tswana] chiefs and other leading tribesmen. They and their descendants were permanently attached to the families of their masters, to whom they paid special tribute, and whom they served in various mental capacities; such property as they acquired was at their masters’ disposal; if oppressed, as they often were, they had no access to the tribal court; and they lacked many other civic rights, including participation in the political assemblies [of Tswana communities and tribes].

Evidently Sarwa still remain in substantive serfdom despite its formal abolition under European rule; and having no connubium with their Bantu superiors they form an endogamous caste in Tswana society. So do the Pyg­moid Twa in such lacustrine polities as Ruanda, where, being politically useful to the traditional Tutsi rulers, they enjoyed certain privileges. Nowhere outside the Kalahari are Bushmanoids entirely autonomous. Wherever found, they are always subjugated as a caste of endogamous serfs. By contrast, the Wandorobo, surrounded by Masai, though segregated as dependent and endogamous communities despite their adoption of Masai language and Masai age-set organization, were neither incorporated in Masai society nor reduced to serfdom.

Bambuti Pygmies of the Ituri forest, probably the largest and least affected Pygmy group that remains, preserve their cultural and social autonomy from forest-dwelling Bira, Lese, Mangbetu, and other Bantu-speaking peoples by withdrawal to the forest, by symbiotic accommoda­tions which the Bantu regard as subordination, by periodic relocation, and by other means. Though, like the Wandorobo, they have adopted the languages of the people around them, these Bambuti preserve their cultural and social distinctness and integrity by segmental symbiosis with differing Bantu groups, receiving bananas, metal tools, weapons, and other Bantu products in return for meat and forest wares. To illustrate
the current situation, among the Bantu-speaking Amba, “the Pygmies are also drawn into this political system. Pygmy bands are tied to specific maximal lineages and here again the system of alliance is stated in terms of exogamy ... even though in actual fact there is but little intermarriage.” As among IKung bushmen, so among the Bambuti, individuals can easily shift their band affiliations; and bands, being mobile, can disengage from unsatisfactory collective relations. Thus associations between Bantu and Pygmies are segmental and symbiotic, these accommodations serving to demarcate societal boundaries. No single acephalous society includes both groups.

South of the Sahara, nomadic pastoralists organized in migratory bands predominate in the Horn, in Ethiopia, throughout the Sudan, and along the Rift Valley as well as in Southwest Africa. Many of these peoples maintain societal segregation, for example, the Somali, Galla, Karimojong, Turkana, Nuer, Pokot, Samburu, and most Masai. Such groups do not immediately concern us. Other pastoralists, who have subjugated local cultivators, as in Ankole, Toro, Ruanda, Sukuma, or Northern Nigeria and Niger, are discussed below. Still other pastoral populations have nomadic routines that entail their continuing symbiotic accommodations with sedentary peoples in whose territory they graze their stock. In these conditions many pastoral groups have been formally incorporated as distinct segments in such traditional states as Ethiopia or Kanem-Bornu. These pastoral units normally retain their internal autonomy, though recognizing the suzerainty of the local chief and his rights of supervision. In the central Sudan, the pastoral Fulani studied by Stenning, Hopen, and Dupire provide nice examples of these intersocietal accommodations.

Numbering several millions, Fulani pastoralists are now scattered across the Sudan and Sahil from Futa Toro in Senegal to Sennar in the Sudan. Their society is complex and stratified in a hierarchy of castelike divisions, some of which are occupationally specialized, while all are segmented into agamous patriclans and lineages in which descent lines are differentiated by seniority and rank. Local bands consist mainly of agnates, their wives and dependents, under the direction of an active man, the ardo or ruga, belonging to the senior generation and descent line. Each band operates as a separate social and pastoral unit under its headman, moving in seasonal cycles from wet- to dry-season pastures. While stressing their social separateness, these pastoralists maintain mutually rewarding relations of economic symbiosis with the farming communities around them. Often these seasonal migrations recurrently crossed the boundaries of territorial states.

In Hausaland pastoralists resident in a given state during the wet
season were required to render allegiance and cattle tithe (zakka) as ordained by Muslim law to its ruler through their headman, his superior, the Fulani chief, and the supervising official (hakimi) who administered the unit on behalf of the chief. During dry seasons the nomads could move freely within and between adjacent chiefdoms, such as Katsina, Zamfara, or Kano, whose rulers had agreed to recognize one another’s extraterritorial rights over migrating bands normally resident in their chiefdom. This administrative pattern, known as bin kanu (following heads) or bin Fulani (following Fulani), prevailed from the eighteenth century, when the Hausa states were mutually autonomous, and was probably developed from the older model of the Bornu chima jeribe, the Sultan’s officer placed in charge of a particular pastoral “clan” wherever they moved. This flexible administrative arrangement, which was evidently devised to accommodate pastoral transhumance while ensuring continued official control of the nomads, presumed and preserved those differences of language, ethnicity, cult, internal government, stratification, ecology, connubium, and kinship which distinguished the pastoralists from the agricultural peoples. The administrative arrangement provided a framework for continuing the economic symbiosis of these groups, subject to political regulation by the state. Thus though formally incorporated in territorial states under their own headman, the pastoralists were structurally segregated from the agricultural population; and, to facilitate official control, they were systematically subdivided under differing official jurisdictions. These arrangements combined elements of symbiosis, segmental attachment, and subordination.

Evidently during the eighteenth century these pastoralists had reason for dissatisfaction with their lot; and after one or two abortive revolts, between 1804 and 1810 they rallied to the jihad proclaimed by Usman dan Fodio, an outstanding Muslim leader of the settled Fulani, and overthrew their former rulers, except in Bornu. However, this conquest did not eliminate or transform the earlier societal segregation and symbiosis of pastoralists and farmers; and although the pastoralists thereafter enjoyed improved political and administrative conditions, their segmental subordination under bin kanu jurisdiction persisted even in those states with a settled Fulani ruling class.

In certain respects unstable local groups of shifting cultivators such as the plateau Tonga and Ndembu of Northern Rhodesia or the mobile “residential segments” of militaristic Ngoni approximate an organization based on bands. In consequence of their fragile and miniscule organization, these Tonga peoples were unable to offer effective defense to slave raiders or to expanding chiefdoms nearby, for example, the Lozi or the Ngoni. Even the Ilu, who developed communes numbering up to 3,000,
weakened by divisions and feud, were incapable of resisting Lozi dominion or raids by slavers.54

In its pure form, band organization, whatever its ecological basis, appears to have a limited capacity for incorporating segments of other collectivities as units. In Africa only those mobile peoples who subsist solely by hunting and gathering lack wider frameworks of corporate organization. Stratification enables some pastoralists to incorporate individuals into their bands as slaves or serfs. Without it, lineage adoptions, clientage, and social and cultural assimilation are likely alternatives, as among the Nuer, Mandari, and Arusha Masai. At Arusha, local Masai, having forcibly absorbed large numbers of Bantu-speaking Meru cultivators, through interbreeding, association, and mutual acculturation, by assimilation developed a unique amalgam of Meru and Masai customs which marks them off as a genuine hybrid group, equally distinct from other Masai and Meru.55 Other pastoralists, notably Tuareg, settle their slaves and serfs in discrete communities, visiting them periodically to levy tribute and administer their affairs; Tuareg also maintain comparable relations with vassal Tuareg clans who render service and tribute in kind.56 Thus pastoralists may adopt agriculture upon assimilation, as at Arusha, or they may incorporate individuals or family groups of the same or alien stock as slaves, clients, allies, or serfs. Larger subordinate collectivities are generally set apart as dependent communities, whether or not they belong to a common ethnic stock, as, for instance, the Masai Dorobo or the Tuareg imghad. Alternatively a pastoral society may incorporate one or more servile endogamous castes of occupational specialists who move from band to band, as do the smiths and barber-doctors among the Tuareg,57 or these servile castes may be attached to particular lineages and bands, as are the Yibir, Midgaan, and Tumaal bondsmen (sub) among the Somali.58

Excluding such complex developments beyond the level of band organization among pastoralists, band-organized collectors face alternatives of decimation by external assaults as among Bushmen; encapsulation and subordination by surrounding societies as among the Masai Dorobo and the Ruanda Twa; serfdom as among Sarwa; or withdrawal to freedom in such refuge areas as the Kalahari or the Ituri Forest. Where the band persists as an internally autonomous and institutionally distinct unit after formal incorporation in a wider society, its subordination by caste or serfdom is general. Alternatively, it may remain distinct through residential segregation and specialized symbiotic relations, as Wandorobo do among Masai. Evidently band organization can rarely accommodate an institutionally distinct group without changes of struc-
Pluralism in Precolonial African Societies

**Descent Systems**

Corporate groups based on descent are widespread in Africa. They vary greatly in constitutive principles and in form. Besides patriliney and matriliney we find some systems of cognatic descent, for example, among Mambila (and perhaps Mende), and others of double unilineal descent such as the Yakö, Mbenbe, Lodagaba, Herrero, Nyaro, and Tullishi. It is necessary also to distinguish categorical clans from corporate descent groups, segmentary from rank-differentiated lineages, dispersed from localized groups, and exogamous from endogamous and agamous units.

Many African societies formerly depended for their inner coherence and external boundaries wholly or primarily on their organizations as closed systems of interdependent descent groups of specific form, interrelations, and span; this is especially clear in such acephalous or stateless societies as the Somali, Tonga, Nuer, Tallensi, and Tiv.

It is often assumed that societies organized wholly or primarily on the basis of corporate descent groups cannot easily accommodate large numbers of aliens. To discuss this question clearly we need first to distinguish between the degree and condition of “statelessness” and the structure of corporate kinship groups. It is not immediately evident that the Shilluk, for example, achieved a higher degree of internal “centralization” than the nearby Nuer or Dinka; likewise the Tuareg, while recognizing drum chiefs (Amenokal), remained without effective central organization. Nonetheless, their society incorporated Negro slaves (iklan), hybrid serfs (haratin), vassal clans (simghad), and servile castes (meceden), all differentiated by specific lineage attachments as well as by occupation and by biological, jural, and political status.

Materials published since 1940 on lineages in acephalous and centralized societies of different kinds show that acephalous societies based on unilineal descent may incorporate aliens of similar or different culture with varying thoroughness and by various means. These mechanisms of accommodation may also prevail among lineages in state-organized societies. Here we can only consider some modes of incorporation current in acephalous societies with unilineal bases.

Among the Gusii of Kenya “stranger groups which are not strong enough to rank as clans seem to be faced with the same alternative as confronts individual strangers; if they do not go ’home’ they must (outside Getutu) somehow achieve assimilation.” This is generally done “by means of genealogical fictions, and a deliberate disregard of totemic and
other anomalies; or, in Getutu, by means of a purely political relation­ship.” Unlike other Gusii tribes, all of whom claim common agnatic descent from MoGusii—as Tiv and Lugbara claim descent from their tribal ancestors—the “Getutu tribe does not pretend to be a lineage. . . . It is a political grouping (of stranger groups) arranged around one dominant lineage—the clan of Nyakundi.” 60 In this respect Getutu is structurally similar to the typical Nuer tribe in which the dominant clan (diel) has aristocratic status, other lineages being attached to it, with or without genealogical fictions, and at various levels of segmentary organiza­tion.61 Dinka modes of affiliating newcomers through their lineage structure differ mainly in lack of single lineages that serve as tribal spines.62

Among the acephalous Amba of western Uganda, the consociation is more complex. Amba are organized in exogamous agnatic lineages, each occupying a separate village. Their country, Bwamba, contains four distinct speech communities: Bulibuli or “Amba proper” whose Bantu dialect is similar to that of the Ituri Bira; Bwezi whose speech is cognate with Toro; Vonoma, a smaller Bantu-speaking group; and Mvuba who speak a Sudanic tongue.63 Winter says that “beyond this linguistic differentia­tion” he “was never able to discover the slightest cultural trait which might be used as a criterion for separating these . . . groups.” 64 As we have seen, even the forest Pygmies are attached to particular maximal lineages.

Since each maximal lineage occupies a distinct village, and the society contains four separate speech communities, the Amba have developed a system of lineage linkages by alliance and by exogamy which systemati­cally attaches specific Bwezi and Bulibuli groups as allies, these two accounting for four-fifths of the population. “The system of linked lineages is related to the major linguistic division in the society, that between the Bulibuli and the Bwezi. . . . Each Bwezi lineage is linked to a Bulibuli lineage.” 65 Linked lineages are obliged to support one another at rituals, by marriage, and by mediatory action or fighting in the frequent feuds that distinguished Bwamba as a separate social system. Needless to say, this population, committed by its corporate organization to perpetual divisions and internal struggle, was incapable of mobilizing an effective defense against the expanding Toro to the east; and when the British pacified Uganda, its incorporation by Toro was well advanced.

Among the Kagoro of Northern Nigeria and the Tallensi of northern Ghana we find consociations of different quality and form. The original Kagoro, organized patrilineally and by mutually exclusive modes of marriage relation—exogamy (bin), wife stealing (nendwang), and inter-
marriage (*niendi*)—called themselves Ankwei. These Ankwei owed their independence from Muslim conquest to their location on the Kagoro rock, after which they were generally known. During the past century nearby peoples of similar linguistic and cultural stock, but of different tribal groups, fled from the Muslim Hausa-Fulani armies to the rock. Probably the earliest of these refugees were ancestors of the present Kadau clan who came from Katab. As the refugees increased in number and heterogeneity, Ankwei clan heads classified them together as Munzaram, Kadau retaining precedence. For a while Kagoro contained two incipient moieties, Ankwei and Munzaram. When further immigrants appeared, following new raids, they were initially segregated in a third section known as Kpashan; but, probably because Ankwei society, founded on a system of two mutually exclusive types of marriage relations between corporate lineages, could more easily accommodate a moiety organization than a trichotomy, Munzaram and Kpashan were assimilated into an immigrant moiety within which intermarriage was forbidden, though intercommunity wife stealing among them was legitimate. Meanwhile Ankwei maintained their old relations of exogamy, wife stealing, and intermarriage, but, under Kpashan exogamy, the moieties intermarried systematically. Nonetheless, except for Kadau, their oldest local elements, these Kpashan-Munzaram were excluded from direct participation in the earth ritual (*ci*) through which Ankwei priests and lineage heads traditionally pursued community well-being. Ankwei had no ancestral cult; and by 1950 neither had Kpashan. Consequently, being defined by their exclusion from ritual as a secular exogamous moiety, Kpashan specialized institutions of secular chiefship, thus establishing social complementarity with the ritually dominant Ankwei. Today slightly the larger moiety, Kpashan hold almost all Kagoro chiefships, including the tribal office, and Christianity has further undermined Ankwei ritual dominance. Long before this, however, tribal unity was established by Kpashan and Ankwei intermarriage under the Kpashan exogamy rule.66

Among Tallensi similar patterns of complementary consociation were established between the indigenous Talis of the Tong hills in northern Ghana and immigrant Mamprussi whose chiefs at Mamparugu evidently exercised dominion over Taleland before the Anglo-French occupations.67 Descendants of these Mamprussi immigrants now form the large section known locally as Namoos, among whom the Mosuorbiis are the senior clan in which the ritualized local "chiefship" vests. Mosuorbiis are divided into four large localized lineages, each having separate linkages and alliances with particular Tale lineages and clans.68 Indeed, "Namoos and non-Namoos frequently form constituent lineages of the same clan,
holding complementary ritual offices, divided by the same structural cleavages as separate Talis and the Tongo Namoos, but inseparably joined by equally strong structural ties and common interests.”

As among Kagoro, besides their ritual interdependence, Namoos and non-Namoos in Taleland are integrated through intermarriage, local community ties, and other common interests. Segments of these two contraposed categories are bound together by particular alliances and ties of clanship which enjoin mutual support as mediators or participants in feud, ritual, and secular affairs. Though initial cultural differences between the ancestral Talis and immigrant Mamprussi remain obscure, they certainly include chiefship, language, and perhaps other social institutions as well. Though some social and cultural differences persist, these now serve as symbols of corporate identity, complementarity, and membership in the common inclusive society. By selective conversion of certain cultural differences into ritualized symbols of corporate identity and complementarity, Namoos and “real Talis” have used them to create a wider society and a more complex integration.

Among the Nuha of Kordofan, another area settled by refugees of differing linguistic and cultural stock, Nadel reports a situation that “precludes a sharp division admitting of no overlapping in groups whose cultural makeup would differ in every detail.” Though the average Nuba tribe asserts its cultural homogeneity, several tribes, such as Otoro and Moro, are internally quite diverse. However, employing local self-identifications, Nadel distinguished these tribes “by the system of reckoning descent,” by the “nature of the clan organisation,” and by the “presence or absence of a certain shamanistic spirit-possession cult” — that is, by three “pivotal features,” two of which identify forms of corporate grouping which organize and segregate each tribal society. As in Taleland, so too in Nuba, Nadel identified complementarity as a pervasive and important feature of the amalgamations and coalescence of differing groups as tribal units. “The clans hang together, as it were, by two hinges, one is biological necessity—clans depend on each other for marriage . . . ; another is spiritual necessity—the knowledge that the welfare of each clan depends on supernatural help in the possession of the other. Segments are indispensable to each other and thus to the existence of the society as a whole.”

Persisting differences of ethnicity, culture, and cult were thus institutionalized in these amalgams as social complementarity and ritual symbiosis, perhaps most clearly among the Dilling Nuba. Such mechanisms and conversions enabled various refugee communities in these hills to organize themselves as symbiotic unions into bounded tribal societies characterized by jural equivalence, internal solidarity, and common ex-
ternal distinctness. As tribes differ in their cultural and social composition, they differ also in structure and inner cohesion.

Among the Nilotic Mandari, client lineages were attached to leading members of localized landowning clans, organized under petty headmen or "chiefs" who administered the common affairs of their local communities in consultation with clan elders. Here the explicitly secular relation of clientage provided a uniform basis for the social and political attachment of hosts and immigrants, whether drawn from similar or differing ethnic and linguistic groups. These immigrants were separately linked to local lineages, which, by preserving their genealogical distinctness, emerged as the "aristocratic" elements of these weakly structured segmentary chiefdoms. As among the Tallensi, Nuba, Kagoro, Amba, and Nuer, these Mandari clients, though diverse, were neither culturally nor ethnically too remote to prevent assimilation or amalgamation. Among the Tuareg, Somali, and pastoral Fulani, certain differences of ecology, culture, language, and race may underlie the differential incorporation of particular ethnic groups; but most imghad or vassal clans in Tuareg society are simply Tuareg groups reduced by force; and at Arusha, sharp differences of race, language, ecology, and culture between Meru and Masai were no barrier to their total coalescence.

The most thorough social incorporation that unilineal descent permits involves adoption of outsiders into the host lineage as members with full rights. This is more easily done for individuals than for groups. Among Mandari, accessory lineages were perpetually segregated by attachment to landowning lines as clients, though enjoying favorable situations in return for special services.

The absorption of individuals into unilineal descent groups may proceed by genealogical fictions, by adoption, or by complementary, usually uterine, filiation. The latter at best permits an incomplete and conditional attachment under systems of agnatic descent, and is excluded by matriliney; in contrast, genuine adoption ensures full juridical equivalence of the adopted member, as among the Yakö, a Cross River people in southeastern Nigeria who practice a system of double unilineal descent. Yakö patrilineages and matrilineages alike regularly recruit members by purchasing children from nearby tribes, these children being brought up as full members of the purchasing lineages. In this area Yakö are not unique in pursuing lineage expansion by such means.

The Ibo institution of ohu slavery shows that acephalous unilineal organization is quite consistent with differential incorporation of culturally similar or alien groups. Under this system, corporate patrilineages purchased or captured slaves whom they settled in discrete communities, as among Tuareg, and held as corporate property. Ohu slaves were
defined as chattels by their lack of jural and political rights.\textsuperscript{76} As shown below, the Efik and Ijaw practiced similar institutions.\textsuperscript{77}

In the Congo the matrilineal Lele also recruited captives and transferred free persons by contract as “pawns” for personal or collective ends.\textsuperscript{78} Lele society seems to have revolved around the institution of pawnship by which non-Lele were often assimilated; Douglas suggests that such pawnship is a characteristic institution of other Central Bantu with a matrilineal organization.\textsuperscript{79} Certainly the modes of “slavery” reported among Luvale and Suku correspond closely to the pawnship Douglas describes.\textsuperscript{80} Notably, despite its collective bases, forms, and contexts, this institution of pawnship generally attached individuals to one another as lord and pawn, whereas the \textit{ohu} system of slavery was a relation between corporate groups similar to helotage. However, Lele corporate groups could also hold pawns, while individual Ibo could own slaves.

Simple correspondence of kinship organization neither guarantees assimilation and symmetrical incorporation nor precludes differentiation by caste, as can be seen among the Ndebele, Ruanda, Tuareg, Wolof, Fulani, or Somali.\textsuperscript{81} On the other hand, differences in kinship organization and practice either demarcate societal boundaries, as among the Nuba or the Lowiili-LoDagaba, or reinforce collective segregations in structurally heterogeneous units, as among Terik-Tiriki or between the Bahima and Ba’iru in Ankole.\textsuperscript{82}

\textbf{Age Organization}

In its most developed form, age organization consists in a series of corporate sets instituted at regular intervals, each of which enrolls all men of the same social unit and age. Sets are thus ranked as senior and junior in a timeless order, and, being societal in span, define the societal boundaries by their limits. This mode of social organization, which is characteristic of many acephalous societies in East Africa, seems to be structurally inconsistent with matrilineal organization, especially in its dispersed form. Age-sets may form an autocephalous or self-regulating series, in which case one or more senior sets generally exercise directive functions over the others on behalf of the total collectivity or its local divisions, as, for example, among the Galla, Kipsigi, or Masai. Alternatively the structure may be heterocephalous and subject to external direction, whether by such colleges as the Yakö Yabot and Yakambam, the Kikuyu Kyama, and the Yoruba Ologboni, or by a local chief as in the age-regimental organizations of centralized southern Bantu, such as the Tswana, Zulu, Swazi, Ndebele, or among the northern Ngoni.

In patrilineally organized acephalous societies, age organization is
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either restricted by lineage boundaries, as among the Gusii, or by personal and local factors, as among the Tiv, or it may be rendered totally ineffective by the lineage organization, as among the Nuer. Rarely do we find age organization and segmentary lineages flourishing together as equally significant structures without some distinct supervisory body, whether this is collegial as among the Ibo, Yakö, and Kikuyu, or chiefly as among the southern Bantu.

Where age organization is both the dominant corporate form and the basis of societal integration, as in many acephalous East African societies, aggregates that differ in the structure of their age systems constitute distinct societies, irrespective of continuities in other institutional spheres such as kinship, language, cult, or economy. This is illustrated by tribal differentiations within the Karimojong cluster and among the Nandi-speaking peoples.\textsuperscript{83} It is evident also among Galla, Ibo, Meru, and Masai.\textsuperscript{84} Differing in formal details and in the ceremonial organization by which they institute their age-sets, such ethnic clusters divide into distinct tribes, many of which are further broken down into smaller aggregates which average approximately 40,000 persons, apparently the widest units within which age-ceremonials are celebrated and age-sets are routinely instituted together.

Although necessary wherever this type of organization prevails, formal identities of age organization, including the synchronization of the age-sets in parallel series, are not in themselves sufficient to create a society out of people who differ in other institutional spheres, unless expressly agreed upon by the collectivities. The Siuei Dorobo, though adopting Samburu language and age-set organization, remain beyond the limits of Samburu society, having differing patterns of marriage, kinship, and ecology.\textsuperscript{85} Likewise the irrigation-based Sonjo, though replicating the age organization of the Masai around them, are segregated as a distinct group by kinship, economy, language, and cult. Indeed, Sonjo copied Masai age organization as an essential instrument for their own defense.\textsuperscript{86}

An illuminating example of consociation based on deliberate adoption of a common system of age organization is provided by the Tiriki, a branch of the Bantu Kavirondo, and the Terik, a small tribe of Nandi-speaking Nilo-Hamites.\textsuperscript{87} Tiriki, an agricultural people organized in exogamous segmentary patrilineages, are now distinguished from other Abaluyia, their parental tribe, by consociation with the Nandi-speaking Terik who lack segmentary lineages and remain predominantly pastoral in their ecology and orientation.\textsuperscript{88} Though forming a common society, the two collectivities are separated by sharp differences of culture, ecology, and social structure.

The Terik-Tiriki association probably began around 1750, when Terik,
having recently split from the Nandi with whom they were then at feud, came under intense military pressure from the Nilotic Luo due south and, lacking the Nandi support they had previously enjoyed, were in urgent need of allies.

According to tradition, about eight generations ago the need for numerical reinforcements led the Terik to offer asylum to wandering or refugee segments of Abaluyia lineages, on condition that the menfolk would become incorporated into the Terik warrior group; that is, become initiated into Terik age-groups. These groups provided the organisational structure for Terik military regiments; thus every Abaluyia immigrant was obliged to undergo initiation into an age-group of military age. Initiation converted the Abaluyia immigrants into full-fledged members of the Terik tribe. Differences of opinion and belief concerning female initiation proved to be an effective deterrent to intermarriage between Terik and Teriki, and probably in large measure have been responsible for the Terik and Teriki maintaining discrete linguistic and cultural identities through the generations, in spite of their intense military, political and ritual interaction.

Tiriki still retain their distinctive language, agricultural economy, ancestor cult, segmentary lineage system, and multilinear community organization. They also observe clanship prohibitions with their Abaluyia kin nearby: “The Tiriki-Terik alliance is a case of a bicultural society where both groups have over a considerable period of time continued to interact with and view each other on a basis of social equality.” At Arusha the union of Masai and Meru, though not initially consensual, produced a thorough social and biological hybrid, a structurally distinct “tribe”; but Kipsigi, another Nandi-speaking tribe, also incorporated and assimilated a Gusii group who had been cut off from its stock without any changes in their own organization.

The use of heterocephalous age divisions to incorporate and control large aggregates is best illustrated from the southern Bantu, where its various forms among the Tswana, Zulu, Swazi, Ndebele, and other groups illustrate vividly the flexibility and accommodative capacities of this structural form. By means of their inclusive age-regimental organizations, Zulu and Swazi achieved high degrees of chiefly centralization and tribal amalgamation. In nearby Tswana chiefdoms, such as the Ngwato, control over local regimental segments was dispersed throughout a hierarchy of hereditary headsmen of local communities, many of which were distinct in language, customs, and civic status from their Ngwato rulers. The Ndebele state, formed by a Nguni group that broke away from Shaka, illustrates yet another pattern.

These Ndebele (Matabele) Nguni increased their numbers by receiving Sotho immigrants and allies whom they renamed Enhla. The Ndebele enrolled the Enhla within their age-regiments under Ngoni com-
manders. Together the two groups overthrew the large chiefdom of Mambo north of the Limpopo and made that territory their own. The “people of Mambo,” already a heterogeneous lot, were categorized as Lozwi or Holi in contradistinction to the Zansi or ruling Ngoni and their Enhla or Sotho affiliates. Like Enhla and Zansi, Lozwi were enrolled in the Ndebele age-regiments, which were organized as separate towns under Zansi commanders.93 Despite this common participation in the age-regimental system, Ndebele society was organized as a hierarchy of three endogamous castes, in which the Zansi or “Ngoni proper” represented about 15 percent; the Enhla, mainly Sotho and Tawana, about 25 percent; and the subjugated indigenous people, Lozwi or Holi, about 60 percent. "Interrmarriage was forbidden and ... political power lay in the hands of Zansi." 94 Both the Zansi and Lozwi castes were segmented by older tribal, linguistic, and cultural divisions, Zansi being either Shangana or Swazi Nguni, while the Lozwi included Venda, Kalanga, Nyai, Shankwe, and other tribes. By contrast, the Enhla lacked internal tribal divisions.

Though one age-regiment contained only Lozwi, all others were caste-heterogeneous and under direct command of resident Zansi princes or nobles: “Virtually all the important officials and regimental chiefs were drawn from that [Zansi] caste.” 95 Enhla, whose ancestors were originally “used for all manual work, and were treated as a separate group,” 96 came to occupy an intermediate status after Ndebele conquest of the Mambo chiefdom.

Within the Ndebele area proper, the Lozwi seem to have had no direct political power. . . In the central area, no Lozwi could be placed in authority over any group containing a single member of either of the immigrant castes. Many seem to have “belonged” to some Zansi or Enhla in the sense that these could claim their services, and it was Lozwi who did all the manual work except in the case of the poorest upper-caste households.” 97 “Interrmarriage between members of different castes . . . was completely forbidden. In the last decades of the kingdom extramarital intercourse was equally unlawful.” 98

Zansi employed the term “Holi” to denote inferior or servile groups within or beyond the Ndebele chiefdom. To insult Enhla, Zansi frequently addressed them as Holi. These differences of corporate status persisted despite enculturation within the age organization. In the regiments Lozwi and Enhla were trained in Ndebele customs, organization, and language; nonetheless, the Lozwi maintained their Shona customs and language for internal intercourse throughout much of the Ndebele chiefdom until and after 1893, when the state was overthrown. 99 Though dependent on farming, the ruling Ngoni (Zansi) identified themselves as
warriors, cattle herdsmen, and rulers, while Lozwi were classified as hunters, farmers, laborers, and craftsmen. Even in 1950, Lozwi differed from Zansi in certain features of language, kinship, and ritual, as well as in social and political status.

By combining monopoly of office with caste prescription and compulsory enrollment in common age-regiments, the Ndebele instituted a structure of social and political inequality based on the systematic differential incorporations of affiliated Sotho and conquered Shona. As shown below, other caste-stratified conquest states in the Great Lakes region, lacking age-regimental organization, subjugated their servile castes equivalently by differing means.

The Ndebele state differs in structure, stability, and scale from nearby conquest states founded by other Nguni segments which, like the original Zansi, had broken out of Shaka’s kingdom. It is instructive to compare briefly the Ngoni societies of Nyasaland (Malawi) and Zambia with the Ndebele of (Southern) Rhodesia, paying special attention to differences in the structure and roles of their age organizations.

In Malawi, the Ngoni founded nine separate chiefdoms, two of which were moderately large. These Ngoni devoted themselves here, as elsewhere, to cattle herding, to cultivation—primarily a woman’s task—and to extensive raiding for loot, land, and captives, most of whom the Nyasa Ngoni exported as slaves, retaining a few to serve in royal courts and households. These latter were numerically and structurally unimportant, being jurally excluded as chattels from free Ngoni society, despite their enculturation. The Nyasa Ngoni evidently made no attempt to incorporate captive or conquered peoples in their age-regiments; and, having no alternative structures capable of accommodating and socializing large numbers of non-Ngoni to their society, these Ngoni slaughtered or sold defeated groups into slavery, without even seeking to occupy their lands.

In Zambia (Northern Rhodesia) the Fort Jameson Ngoni, another roving militaristic group, organized first in societally extensive age-regiments and then in regimentally heterogeneous “residential segments” or bands, under nonhereditary lieutenants, systematically incorporated all captives in their age-regiments, thereby continually expanding their numbers and strength by successful raiding.

The Ngoni depended largely on the efficiency of their army for the continual inflow of captives, on which the strength and continued existence of the state depended. The age-set system provided them with an efficient army, and in addition was a means whereby the centrifugal tendency in the segmentary system was partly checked. Each major [residential] segment had members in each regiment, and each regiment was drawn from every major segment.
This unifying effect of the age-set system applied particularly to the recent captives. It appears to have been through the regimental system that recent captives, both men and women, were indoctrinated into Ngoni ways and made to feel that they, too, were Ngoni. In the residential system, recent captives were dependents rather than lords. In the age-set system there was no such distinction. Men captives were drafted into the regiment appropriate to their apparent age, and boys were enrolled with their coevals. They were called upon to fight in the same way as their aristocratic comrades, and were offered the same prospects of promotion, both within the age-set system and in the segmentary organisation, as the result of successful fighting. Many of the well-remembered segment heads who achieved rapid promotion after capture, are described as being successful warriors.\textsuperscript{192}

Barnes estimates that at various times the paramount chief of the Fort Jameson Ngoni probably commanded about 10,000 warriors.

Thus, while the Ndebele employed their age-regimental organization to subordinate their affiliates and subjects and to constitute a plural society based on differential incorporation by caste, the Fort Jameson Ngoni employed the same institution to expand their society by assimilating defeated and captive peoples, thereby creating a perpetually fissile and expanding “snowball state” based on intensive assimilation and universalistic achievement orientations. By contrast, the Nyasa Ngoni excluded all free outsiders from their society; as conquerors and raiders, they left themselves little alternative to wholesale slaughter and slave trading. Since these three Ngoni peoples all shared common origins, social organization, and ethos, their contrasting structural developments provide a nice study of the relationships between differing modes of societal exclusion or incorporations and changes in societal structure.

\textbf{Associations}

Besides bands, lineages, and age systems, we can distinguish two categories of corporate associations, both of which are heterogeneous, at least as regards age and descent, and often residence as well. Some associations are both compulsory and societally comprehensive, as, for example, the Poro in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the Ogoni or Oshugbo among the Yoruba, Egbo or Ekpe among the Efik of Calabar, Ekine in Bonny, and so on.\textsuperscript{193} Such inclusive associations that incorporate all adult male members of the community are internally stratified in several grades, the senior of which forms an inner college that regulates the association’s affairs, and often those of the community also.

Associational politics vary widely in structure. Where chiefship is found with these graded inclusive associations, as among the Yoruba, Mende, Kpelle, or Temne, whether secular or sacred, the chief generally depends on the association for political support; \textsuperscript{194} and sometimes, as in
Old Calabar or among the Western Ibo, the senior grade of these communal associations directed civic life in chiefless societies.\textsuperscript{105}

Alternatively, a community may contain one or more corporate associations with restricted memberships recruited on the basis of differing combinations of principles such as seniority, descent, occupational and economic status, and cooption by current members. Where a community contains several associations, these are usually differentiated by function, jurisdiction, membership, and relative status; and either one unit, the most senior, then regulates the community’s affairs independently or through the other associations, or a loose hierarchic structure of overlapping memberships enables the most senior and exclusive association to enforce its decisions indirectly through others. These different patterns are found without chiefs among the Ibo,\textsuperscript{106} Yakö, and Mbembe,\textsuperscript{107} and with chiefs in Liberia, Sierra Leone, the Central Cameroons, and among the Sukuma of Tanganyika.\textsuperscript{108} In some Central Cameroons societies, these variably specialized and exclusive associations provide rulers with flexible and effective instruments for routine government and for control of incorporated communities.

Here we are concerned only with corporate associations under conditions of interethnic accommodation. It is clear that these structures may promote or obstruct the assimilation of alien individuals or groups. Where such associations are central to societal regulation, then, whether exclusive, or inclusive and graded, the degree and conditions of assimilation of alien individuals or groups correspond with their opportunities for active membership in the senior associations or grades thereof. Thus, though the Efik of Calabar enrolled their slaves in the inclusive Egbo, these slaves rarely if ever advanced beyond the lowest grade.\textsuperscript{109} By contrast, among the nearby Yakö, men adopted into a lineage were eligible, on achieving appropriate status, to represent it on those associations in which it had corporate membership.\textsuperscript{110}

In associationally regulated societies, social pluralism presumes effective exclusion from these organizations as, for instance, the exclusion of \textit{ohu} slaves among the Ibo, or slaves among Efik. Notably, in these cases the jurally excluded category consists of aliens drawn from different ethnic and linguistic groups.

Another distinct associational pattern involves the confederation of distinct and internally autonomous collectivities, as, for instance, the Egba confederations at Ibadan (1829) and at Abeokuta (1830).\textsuperscript{111} Prior to their settlement at Abeokuta as mutually distinct, internally autonomous groups, each under its own hereditary chief and officials, the three Egba collectivities differed somewhat in language, organization, and culture.\textsuperscript{112} They were in fact forced to confederate, however loosely, by
common external threats; but their association was marked by divisions and rivalries. To this day, at Abeokuta, “each of the three Egba sections and Owu has its distinct dialect, and intermarriage between persons of different sections is not common—though certainly not unusual. Each township endeavours to retain its own individuality and importance.”

Setting aside this Egba confederation and certain others, such as the Ashanti or Fanti, which brought together collectivities of common ethnic and linguistic stock, we find similar consociations in Ga townships, formed by the amalgamation of immigrant and indigenous peoples of differing language, culture, and ethnic stock. Each Ga town includes Adangme-speaking immigrants and aborigines whose language was Kpesi, a dialect of Twi. These Ga municipal confederations developed in the late seventeenth century on Fanti and Akwamu models, under military pressure from slave raiders. As the earliest local occupants, and thus “landowners,” the aborigines retained ritual leadership in each confederation; but each component group retained internal autonomy under its own head or council of elders.

Each of the Ga “towns” was a confederation of a varying number of Houses or patrilineages—whose members traced their descent back to the founder of the House. Membership of a patrilineage may be acquired by adoption as well as by birth. When numbers become too great the Houses break up into sub-Houses—but no new set of names are created. Public offices, both religious and secular, are vested in the lineages: each Ga “town” is managed and run by its “big people” who are all representatives of lineages and sublineages. The lineage is collectively responsible for the behaviour of its members.

There has never been any political confederation of the “towns.” Each “town” today consists of several so-called “quarters” (akutso), each representing a separate party of colonists which attached itself to the original group of settlers, preserving many of its own customs and the worship of its own gods, but acknowledging the supremacy of the senior god of the “town” and its priest, who was head of the “town.” The “quarter” was essentially a military unit, the “town” itself being a military confederation which would never have united except for military ends.

To symbolize its unity, each town appointed a Mantse as ritual figurehead. A college of senior priests (wulomet) drawn from its various quarters adjudicated complaints arising between them. The principal organization involving all townsmen was the asafo or militia under officials in each quarter, chosen for their abilities. The asafo was responsible for maintaining internal law and order as well as external defense. Since at each level of Ga township organization, corporate units of the same order and type had equal representation, despite ethnic and cultural differ-
ences, all elements had an equal voice in the common government and responsibility for it. Although this uniform distribution of collective rights and duties was restricted to such matters of common interest as communal rituals, defense, and internal peace, by instituting these egalitarian conditions, and by preserving the integrity of each component unit, the communes created favorable circumstances for cultural and social assimilations which, though incomplete, have steadily increased through ritual and social interactions, until today the aboriginal Kpesi dialect has all but disappeared in favor of Ga. Here the constitutional framework of "federation" created a structure of amalgamation which, given the economic similarities and relatively compact settlement pattern of the component groups, facilitated and perhaps ensured their mutual assimilation. These Ga consociations had many parallels with the Egba unions at Abeokuta and with the various Akan confederacies, despite their lack of executive chiefship and their greater initial heterogeneity.

Among the Efik and nearby Ijaw, townships were also formed by confederate associations of "houses," which were internally stratified corporations based on prominent patrilineages. Though some Efik states had hereditary "monarchs," their weak authority was subject to councils of senior oligarchs, the heads of leading "Canoe Houses." At Calabar the senior Yampai grade of the Egbo Society "constituted the actual executive government of the Efik. It enforced its laws by capital punishment or fines, ... and by trade boycotts against European traders or other Efik towns." Like Abeokuta and the Ga communities, these Efik and Ijaw commercial ports of southwestern Nigeria were heterogeneous units composed of immigrant groups and local settlers.

Each Canoe House was an internally autonomous corporate unit, simultaneously a trading firm, a military unit for slave raiding by canoe, and an economic and social unit, holding exclusive corporate properties and political rights. However, unlike the Ga townships, these coastal Nigerian trading states were highly stratified, explicitly oligarchic, culturally mixed, and structurally pluralistic.

Being actively engaged in slave raiding and trading, Canoe Houses recruited and retained militarily effective slaves drawn from nearby communities, mainly Ibo, Ibibio, Eko, and other Cross River "Semi-Bantu." Many of these lineage slaves were permanently located in farming settlements outside the town under the exclusive direction of their "Canoe House." Others resided with the house group in town.

At nearby Bonny these town slaves were fully assimilated into the lineage structure, and between 1836 and 1852 more than half the new heads of houses were slaves "adopted" as sons. Bonny lacked an inclusive stratified association like the Calabar Egbo, through which the
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oligarchs directed community affairs. At Calabar masters treated their slaves as chattels, and slaves and widows were slaughtered at their funerals. Though enrolled in Egbo, these Calabar slaves were always restricted to its lowest grade; and though by 1840 outnumbering the free men of Calabar, under this regime they had no individual alternative to submission.

However, in 1850-51 slaves settled on lineage farms outside the town constituted themselves into a corporate group known as the Blood Men through a collective oath “to resist the encroachment and oppressions of the Duke Town gentry and to preserve themselves from being killed on all occasions according to the old customs.” This movement “was not organised by slaves to secure their freedom, but was an assertion of their rights.” It succeeded in abolishing human sacrifice, although the oligarchs directed Egbo against them; having extorted this major concession, in 1861 the Blood Men withdrew their pressure, leaving Egbo as the “centralising legislative, political, and executive body, but with gradually diminishing authority” as European control of the area increased.

At Calabar and other Efik trading towns, these oligarchies had emerged from heterogeneous immigrant aggregates through competition in a favorable economic context. The Egbo and Ekine societies provided powerful men with effective instruments for joint communal control; and the peculiar military and economic specialization of these townsfolk encouraged their acquisition of slaves for cultivation, trade, war, and, if surplus, for sacrifice. As trade and wealth increased, so did the number of alien slaves localized on lineage estates outside the republican ports. By 1850 these culturally and socially alien slaves outnumbered their masters, whose ritual exercises in conspicuous consumption had increased steadily as export markets for slaves declined. Finally, as their personal risks of ritual slaughter mounted, the slaves were constrained to unite in protest.

CHIEFDOMS AND CHIEFTAINCIES

To avoid problems of distinguishing chiefship from such priestly or symbolic offices as the Ga Mantse, Tallensi “chiefs,” Meru Agwe, Masai Laibonak, or Anuak “nobles,” it is convenient to isolate chiefdoms as politically discrete aggregates of varying complexity, composition, scale, and duration, distinguished also by the ritual, symbolic, or secular character of their headship, and by its effectiveness and stability. Our present purpose being merely to isolate alternative conditions and modes of ethnic incorporation in African chiefdoms, we need only employ two crosscutting classifications. First, we should distinguish segmentary, segmenting, and other weak or labile polities such as the Mandari, Jukun, Azande, Mende, Shilluk, Sukuma, Ngonde, Northern Ngoni, Shambala,
or Alur from durable, relatively centralized aggregates such as Nupe, Ankole, Buganda, Lozi, Ruanda, Dahomey, Zulu, Swazi, Benin, or Yoruba. Though overlapping somewhat, these categories differ importantly. Our second classification distinguishes plural from relatively homogeneous states. In these terms, Ruanda, Ankole, the Barotse, Toro, Alur, Zande, Ngonde, Ndebele, Nupe, and some Hausa and Tswana units differ from Ashanti, Shilluk, Jukun, Mende, Buganda, Bunyoro, nuclear Benin, Nyakyusa, and Yoruba, which were predominantly homogeneous in ethnic and cultural composition. Perhaps such societies as the Swazi, Sukuma, Zulu, Ganda, or Fort Jameson Ngoni which assimilated alien elements rather extensively represent a distinct group or a subclass of the "homogeneous." By special institutions of perpetual kinship and positional succession the southeastern Lunda were also able to incorporate aliens as internally autonomous units linked through their own headmen to the Lunda chief by unique perpetual relations. Such amalgams also belong in our "homogeneous" group. Finally, the historic empires—Ethiopia, Bornu, Songhay, Mali, Macina, Dahomey, Sokoto, and others—being pluralities of greater or less degree, form a subclass of plural polities. This dual classification of African chiefdoms or states should satisfy our present interests.

The traditional anthropological contrast between ritual and secular chiefship has limited value in this inquiry, given the variable combinations that we encounter. Though the Shilluk Reth, the Jukun Aku, the Yoruba Obas, and the rulers of Benin, Buganda, Ruanda, Ngonde, and Nyakyusa were emphatically ritual figures, while the Mende, Temne, Lozi, Mambwe, Shambala, Tswana, Swazi, Nyoro, Tuareg, and Nupe chiefs were primarily secular, ritual and secular features are combined so variously in Alur, Zulu, Ankole, Ashanti, Bornu, Ruanda, Mossi, and Buganda that these mixtures defy casual treatment.

We need here note only one direct implication of a strictly ritual chiefship. Where this defines the basis and scope of political authority, the polity necessarily excludes all persons of differing culture until they have been socialized to the ideology by indoctrination. Such polities as the Shilluk, Jukun, Benin, or Yoruba, identified by sacred kingships, are inherently exclusive, and can accommodate or affiliate culturally distinct collectivities only by tributary relations, enslavements, serfdom, or other modes of differential incorporation. In Ngonde, Nyakyusa immigrants, already familiar with divine chiefship, readily accepted the divinity of the Ngonde Kyungu as a sacred chief, after which they were locally segregated under their own headmen. Among Nyakyusa, being status equals, divine chiefs opposed one another by secular means, notably war,
and where successful, incorporated the defeated within their own units. 25

Ritualized chiefships in pluralistic states of the segmentary and centralized types may be illustrated by Shambala, Alur, and Ruanda. In these societies the ruling group first established itself in the area by infiltration. Following this, in Ruanda, Tutsi domination was based on conquest, but not so in Shambala, Sukuma, or among the Alur, where Luo-speaking Nilotes imposed their rule on acephalous collectivities of different language and stock. 26 Though Alur now form rather more of the society they dominate than do the Kilindi clan whose Shambala chiefdom is strikingly similar in growth and type, the latter have achieved greater assimilation and executive control over the local people; 27 but in both societies chiefship proliferates by dispersion of segments of the royal clan. Evidently, both Alur and Shambala chiefdoms were established peacefully by immigrant groups over larger aboriginal populations, primarily, it seems, because, as strangers, the immigrants could provide a relatively unbiased mediation and settlement of disputes among the local feuding lineages. In nearby Sukuma, immigrant “Hamites” also established similar chiefship over Bantu-speaking cultivators without any evidence of conquest. 28 In these segmentary states, chiefly power is weak, stratification restricted, and jural equivalence general within and between the associated ethnic stocks. While these societies retain this general form, their structures of chiefly authority and political integration are labile and fragile. Ngonde represents another variant of this type. 29

In Ruanda, by contrast, the Tutsi rulers established a regime of caste, reduced Bantu-speaking Hutu to serfdom, virtually forbade intermarriage, denied Hutu political office and rights, organized Tutsi armies for conquest, taxation, and internal police, and concentrated antecedent Hutu religious conceptions of “divine chiefship” in the Tutsi Mwami (king) who normally delegated his ritual functions to official priests. Hutu acceptance of Tutsi domination evidently varied regionally within Ruanda. In 1959 the state contained 2.6 million, of whom 16 percent were Tutsi, 83 percent Hutu, and 1 percent Pygmoïd, Twa, retained by Tutsi as spies and informants. 30 Various writers have asserted that Hutu regarded Tutsi as innate superiors, and thus accepted their subjugation. Political developments in Ruanda following on the introduction of universal suffrage effectively discredit this view. 31

In nearby Burundi, which has a similar racial and cultural constitution and history, the dominant Tutsi, representing about 12 percent of 2 million people, had further stratified themselves into two ranked endoga-
mous castes, the noble Tutsi-Banyarugum and the inferior Tutsi-Hima. As in Ruanda, so in Burundi, the Mwami, or king, was represented as a divine figure; and by these means the ruling Tutsi sought to sacralize their regime and legitimate its inequalities. In nearby Ankole, another caste-stratified society composed of agricultural “Bantu” serfs under immigrant pastoral “Nilotes,” the Mugabe (king), though not explicitly sacralized, was invested with magical objects and qualities. Given recent developments in Ruanda and Burundi, it is reasonable to doubt whether the Mugabe of Ankole, the Mukama of Toro, and their peers in Zinza, Haya, and similar adjacent states, however heavily ritualized their persons, positions, or regimes, are any more acceptable to their “Bantu” serfs.

In adjacent Bunyoro and Buganda, where immigrant “Hamitic” pastoralists intermarried extensively with the Bantu cultivators, though differences of civil and political status are prominent and pervasive, these no longer distinguish recognizable racial or cultural divisions. Whereas differential incorporation of ethnic sections was basic to the social structures of Ruanda, Burundi, Ankole, Toro, Zinza, and Haya, in Bunyoro and more so in Buganda and Busoga, social and cultural assimilation proceeded through the progressive amalgamation of the differing ethnic stocks; and in Buganda, on the eve of its colonization by the British, centralizing despots, having rooted out hereditary lineage claimants to territorial office, instituted an open monocratic officialdom recruited primarily by merit and by royal favor. In this respect assimilation and universalism in Buganda offer instructive parallels with Fort Jameson Ngoni patterns.

Rigid stratifications marked by jural and social exclusions of various types are widespread in traditional polities established and maintained by the forcible domination of one ethnic stock over others. Besides the racially complex interlacustrine kingdoms we may cite the Ndebele, the Lozi before and since Lewanika, Nupe, Zande, Tswana, Dahomey, Wolof, Tuareg, and most Hausa-Fulani emirates. Imperial states inevitably magnify these structural and cultural differences and segregations of rulers and ruled, and are typically administered through systems of multiple domination.

Several of these ethnically stratified traditional polities are highly fissile, for example, Azande, Tswana, and Fort Jameson Ngoni. Despite intensive assimilation of alien elements, the Ngoni state split repeatedly under stresses generated by its own militarized political organization. On the other hand, such plural states as Barotse, Hausa-Fulani, Nupe, Ruanda-Urundi, and Ndebele show considerable stamina and resilience; even more so do those heterogeneous societies that instituted the gradual
progressive amalgamation of their diverse ethnic elements, for example, Swazi, Buganda, Bunyoro, Yoruba, Mende, and Lunda. Empires being notoriously fragile and superficial structures, their dissolution or overthrow need not detain us.

Anthropological studies of African conquest states and native pluralities rarely examine the situation, experience, attitudes, and institutions of subject peoples in adequate detail. Faced with such complex structures of cultural and social divergence, anthropologists tend either to plead lack of historical data or, on grounds of varying validity, to argue that the subjugated are adequately socialized to their situation and accept the regime as necessary or beneficent. Sometimes the anthropologist asserts that the subjugated accept their subordination as normatively valid; on other occasions the symbolic features of chiefship and state are invoked as sufficient unifying or legitimating factors. Sheer lack of feasible alternatives, and routine habituation to subordinate status, may thus be translated as evidence of institutional assimilation or structural indifference.

In studying centralized states, anthropologists are generally obliged to rely on the rulers’ support; in consequence they are often excellent apologists for the stability and justice of the traditional regime. Also guided by Durkheimian notions of sacred chiefship, collective representations, and social solidarity, they often interpret political strife or its absence as equal proof of normative consensus. Perhaps for Africa, Nadel provides the most sensitive and sustained analysis of the conditions and reactions of a subjugated people in his account of the Fulani conquest state of Nupe. Unfortunately Nadel chose to rest his analysis on Toennies’ inappropriate contrast between community and state. Having defined “the state” as “inter-tribal or inter-racial,” he concludes that its “political co-ordination calls into being a co-ordination of interest—actual interest-units—which in certain respects overcomes heterogeneity of tribe, or culture, and even class, and includes the whole people.” As integrative factors, Nadel lists “self-enhancement that . . . sublimates the humiliating experience of political dependence and inferiority, . . . the appeal of [the] mystic and supernatural, . . . [and] the appeal to an historical (or quasi-historical) turn of mind.” The significance of these impressionistic and inspecific psychological states for the integration of the plural society of Fulani Nupe remains problematic; and though Nadel was himself a highly trained psychologist, he made no attempt to measure the strength or integrative effects of the sentiments he invoked to support his metaphysical finding of a “new proud consciousness of unity which embraces the whole kingdom” in Nupe. Neither do his appeals to the values of Islam nor to the symbolic collective character of
the local kingship carry conviction, since in this state, Islam and the Fulani kingship are both identified by history and doctrine with the Fulani conquest and domination of Nupe. Indeed, despite his initial stress on the Islamic acculturation of the Nupe, in his monograph, *Nupe Religion*, Nadel shows that its Islamic proselytization is at best imperfect and casual.\(^{142}\)

Ruanda, Ankole, Toro, Ndebele, and Zande were conquest states, and in each the rigid stratifications consisted in the uniform subjugation of conquered peoples by collective exclusions from political and administrative rights. Among Lozi, Tswana, Kanuri of Bornu, Mossi, Baganda, and Banyoro, as in Dahomey, we are confronted with centralized polities which vary most significantly in the extent to which their particular distributions of jural and political rights coincided with cleavages of ethnic and cultural identity. In some of these archaic states, differential incorporation took the form of occupationally distinguished endogamous castes, notably among the Wolof, Ndebele, Burundi, and Tswana; of vassalage, as in Tuareg, Ankole, and Hausa; of slavery and quasi-caste, as in Hausa, Dahomey, and Nupe; or of amalgamation and assimilation in varying degrees, as among Basuto, Swazi, Baganda, Zulu, Mossi, and Mende. In each case the rigor, uniformity, and span of the social stratification indicate the measure, form, and scope of the prevailing differential incorporation of initially distinct ethnic and cultural groups; and in each case it appears that the modes and degrees of cultural and social assimilation or exclusions correspond closely with the structure of incorporation, differential or other. Where access to political office and jural institutions is differentially distributed, whether by age-sets, clientage, serfdom, or by corporate associations of either type, sectional barriers segregate the associated units correspondingly; and this structure of ascriptive collective exclusion impedes enculturation and assimilation alike, insofar as it divides the collectivity into a series of closed perpetual categories, whose members are by birth or personal condition immutably identified with particular units. Some Swazi, Tswana, Lunda, and others have incorporated immigrant or conquered peoples as local communities directly under their own headmen, or under representatives of the ruling group. In the former case, segmental autonomies and tribal allegiances were simultaneously assured; in the latter, the domination of the acceding group was achieved by its conquerors or hosts. Since structural disassociations were instituted variably, institutional assimilations varied also. Where, however, as in Bornu, the Sokoto Empire, or Ethiopia, large segments of acephalous tribes or conquered chiefdoms were attached as subordinate but self-administering units owing tribute and allegiance to the ruling group, the perpetuation of social boundaries and cultural
differences was simultaneously prescribed. In general, such societal attachments do not extend beyond the norms of external relations between two political groups. At most they represent consociations characterized by the symbiosis incidental to indirect subordination. Where the dominant peoples are acephalous they can rarely maintain such accommodations without specializing institutions such as Tuareg caste, Somali bondage, or the Ibo system of corporate obu slavery. Evidently, as the Sukuma, Shambala, and Alur cases show, not all polyethnic units that depend on a common hereditary chiefship need be centralized or explicitly inequalitarian.

By virtue of its history as a major center of trade, communications, learning, and government, the city of Timbuktu presents unusual patterns of social and cultural pluralism, which Horace Miner has elegantly described. During the sixteenth century, Timbuktu was perhaps the leading city of the western Sudan. On the fall of Songhay in 1592, it was overrun by Moors, and never recovered its former prosperity or influence. Subject variously to Tuareg, Bambara, and to the Arma, its hybrid elite, descended from Moroccan soldiers and local women, in 1940 the township contained some 3,500 Arma and their Songhay (Gabibi) serfs, approximately 1,500 Arabs and their slaves, and some 1,000 Tuareg slaves known as Bela, each group distinguished by language, status, occupation, kinship, local distribution, age organization, ritual practice, and by separate connubium.

Each of these social sections ranks as a unit uniformly in the city structure, Bela having the lowest status and the Arabs the highest, while Arma and their Gabibi serfs dominate the town.

For centuries these collectivities have lived in the city without social assimilation, despite considerable illicit interbreeding. Sectional boundaries are presumed and reinforced by institutionalized patterns of collective dissociation, conflict, and interaction. As in Furnivall’s model, the market provides the major meeting place for the city’s plural stocks, the mosque, the minor. As in our other examples, pluralism at Timbuktu antedated European colonialism by generations, and under chronic if unstable Arma domination, other ethnic groups within the city suffered enough for them to invite or welcome Bambara and Tuareg attackers.143

Mere differences in the number, population, language, and culture of the associated groups evidently do not directly account for the particular form and stability of their common society. Under Moshesh and his successors, the Koena Sotho developed the Basuto chiefdom unchallenged by local aborigines, Phetla and Phuthi, or by immigrant Natal Nguni. In 1934 these non-Sotho elements represented only 13.5 percent of the chiefdom’s population, while Koena were less than 30 percent.144
Though Bemba and Bisa share common culture, language, and traditions of origin, Bisa, who numbered 42,000 in 1933, had long since split off from the Bemba, their former rulers, who were then about 114,000 strong. Among the Swazi, "one-fifth were 'true Swazis,' one-seventh were 'prior' inhabitants, and the remainder were migrants," or defeated peoples. The ruling Swazi "did not seek to impose their customs and tolerated the cultural peculiarities of others." The Swazi aristocracy integrated this heterogeneous population through hereditary local chiefships, many (75 of 169) held by Swazi princes, the majority by leading commoner lineages of Swazi or of localized ethnic groups, linked to the dynasty by uterine and affinal ties. In addition, the Swazi employed their age-regimental organization to incorporate and assimilate these aboriginal and immigrant aliens to their society and political order.

In various Tswana "tribes" or chiefdoms, the nuclear or ruling group forms less than one-fifth of the total population, for example, among the Tawana and in Ngwato. In the territorial hierarchy, the basic units are local wards, "outlying villages," and sections or districts in the larger tribes. Traditionally the headmen of wards and sections alike were leading members of dispersed branches of the tribal ruling clan. In addition, where ... outlying villages were made up mainly of foreigners of the same stock who have come into the tribe, their hereditary ruler would be recognised by the Chief ... as the headman of the village where they settle. The headmen of these outlying villages, if they and their people belong to a foreign community, often have the privilege of receiving sehuba (hunting tribute) from their followers, and of having a lesotla (official farm) ploughed for them. They cannot however, although they sometimes attempted to, claim dik-gafela (grain) tribute, or organise their own initiation ceremonies, summon a lesotho (council meeting) or keep stray cattle. These are the prerogatives of the tribal chief.

Thus, although aliens of approved stock were allowed to administer their internal affairs, their subordination and amalgamation were pursued by an administrative organization that fragmented them. Such political institutions preserved and enhanced differences of ethnic identity, custom, language, connubium, and collective status. Moreover, besides amalgamated aliens, other peoples "of inferior stock or defeated in war were reduced to collective servitude in subject communities ... under the care of special district headmen ... Any property owned by these people could be taken at any time by their overlords." In short, political institutions in the larger Tswana tribes combined structures of amalgamation and of differential incorporation alike, each applied to discrete collectivities. The Lozi organization of their commoners, subjects, and tributary peoples was rather similar. In Barotse, as in Ruanda, the
kingship and government were identified as organs of the ruling group; in Barotse only the Aluyi conquerors were “true Lozi.” Likewise in Norman and Angevin England, the monarchy and political institutions, though territorially effective, remained the distinctive organization and property of the Norman and Angevin nobles.

**HISTORY AND STRUCTURE: A BRIEF COMPARISON**

In closing this survey it is useful to compare briefly certain Hausa and Fulani emirates of Northern Nigeria and Niger which, in consequence of their differing corporate organizations, differed correspondingly in their cohesion and development. These polities—Zaria, Kano, Katsina, and the independent state of Maradi—might also be compared with Nupe, as described by Nadel, and Adamawa, as described by Kirk-Greene, all units of the same region and cultural bloc. This comparison may also illustrate the complex historical processes through which divergent or similar social structures emerge.

Until 1807, Maradi, an area peopled mainly by patrilineally organized pagans (azna), formed the northernmost district of the Muslim Hausa chiefdom of Katsina. Between 1804 and 1807 the Hausa states of Katsina, Kano, and Zaria were all overrun by Fulani followers of the Sheikh Usman dan Fodio, who launched a general jihad against the Hausa chiefdoms in 1804. Fulani emirs and conquering aristocracies replaced the old Hausa ruling strata in all three states; and, having defined the conquered as heathen (kahirai), and thus beyond the pale of Islamic law, Fulani imposed severe burdens of labor, taxation, and arbitrary levies upon them, especially in Katsina and Kano, where the struggle had been harsh and long. At Maradi, the local pagans, resenting oppression, revolted in 1815–1817, surprising the Fulani and summoning the Hausa chief of Katsina, Dan Kasawa, then settled near Zinder, to return to rule and lead their resistance. Supported by many Muslim Hausa, Dan Kasawa drove back the Katsina Fulani, liberated Maradi and a wide surrounding area, and established there the successor state of Hausa Katsina, leaving his heirs an effective base from which to pursue reconquest of their ancestral chiefdom. For the rest of the nineteenth century Maradi waged continuous war on Fulani Katsina, with substantial success.

Kano was conquered in 1805–1807 by a combination of leading local Fulani clans which, having partitioned the territory, administered it collegially for two years until the Shehu appointed an emir to represent him. During their conquest the Kano Fulani had been helped by certain dissident Hausa, including some members of the old Kutumbawa Hausa dynasty. In return, besides rewarding these Hausa allies with fiefs and offices, the ruling Fulani distinguished them as Hausawa from other
Hausa who had either resisted or remained aloof from the struggle. The latter were classified as Habe, a generic Fulani term for serfs, free subjects without political rights, or outsiders of “inferior stock.” At Kano, to this day, these Hausawa have retained many privileges as minor partners in the Fulani regime. Habe, classified as heathen in consequence of their initial opposition or indifference to the Fulani jihad, were denied benefit of Muslim law and subjected to punitive taxation (jizya), to corvée, and to other forms of subordination. As in Katsina, the Fulani appropriated for themselves all territorial and political offices, thereby reconstituting the defeated people as a subject category excluded from political and jural institutions in equal measure.

At Zaria also the Fulani conquest was achieved by a combination of clans and factions, some local, others immigrant, each under its own leader and pursuing its own ends; but whereas at Kano the Shehu did not appoint anyone to command his supporters until the country was won, in Zaria the Fulani jihad was waged under the Shehu’s delegate, Musa, a Fulani from Mali. On Musa’s death, his chief assistant, Yamusa, of different lineage, succeeded; and over the next fifty years Zaria developed four competing Fulani dynasties. At Kano also the second Fulani emir, Dabo, founded a second dynasty, but thereafter all subsequent emirs were Dabo’s issue. Only at Zaria were the Hausa divided in their response to the Shehu’s summons for strict observance of Islam. The Fulani were thus the more easily able to overthrow them. Musa, the new ruler, appointed several local and immigrant Hausa to high offices in his state; and though Musa’s successors, driven by dynastic rivalries, appropriated most of these positions for their Fulani clients and kin, in Zaria, Hausa continued to share in the government as territorial officials (hakimai), village chiefs (dagatai), courtiers (fadawa), executive agents (jekadu), and also as clients (barori). On occasion, Hausa were appointed even to such senior positions of state as Galadima, for example, in 1883-1904.

By 1843 the rulers of Maradi were sufficiently strong to organize a general revolt of Hausa within Katsina against the Fulani dominion. This was harshly suppressed by the Fulani emir Sidiku with assistance from Kano and nearby Fulani states. Shortly afterward, in 1848-49, at Kano, certain Hausa clerics protested strongly against Fulani oppression. When summoned by the emir they fled southward among the Ningi pagans, whom they organized into a powerful force and directed against Kano with marked success over the next forty years. Faced with Habe (Hausa) revolt and threats of revolt, in Katsina and Kano, the local Fulani increased their pressure on the conquered people, systematically excluding them from political office and due process and rights under Muslim law. In Katsina, Sidiku, having suppressed the great revolt of
1842-43, first concentrated an enormous slave force around the throne; thereafter his successors made increasing use of slave staff and forces in their administration and campaigns. At Kano, where the ruler also relied on slaves, by firmly identifying the Fulani aristocracy with his regime, he sought to secure his power against slave subversion and Habe threats together. At Zaria slaves lacked power as a function of the multidynastic political structure; and occupational offices, which carried substantial income and prestige, were allocated to Hausa by 1850, thereby explicitly associating them with the Fulani regime. At Katsina these occupational offices, vested with powers of taxation and special jurisdictions, were allocated by the ruler to his slave staff. At Maradi, as at Zaria, the occupational offices were predominantly allocated to freemen. In Kano they had little place, territorial taxes being increased instead.

Maradi was a plural society composed of the ruling Muslim Hausa minority and a pagan majority administered under their own local headmen, whom the chief formally appointed and protected against his Hausa supporters. The Katsina successor state at Maradi had been founded by pagan initiative and revolt on their invitation to Dan Kasawa. It was thus explicitly consensual in its base and character, and its cohesion was continuously reinforced by military opposition to nearby Fulani. Besides their long historical connection, the Muslim and pagan collectivities at Maradi were united by military and political symbiosis in their common struggle against the Fulani of Katsina, Zamfara, and Sokoto. Thus, despite pluralism, explicit in the cultural and social segregation and institutional divergence of these two collectivities, the Muslim Hausa and pagans of Maradi were bound together by common history, territory, leadership, opposition to Fulani, and by a carefully devised political structure which fostered consensus, segregation, and mutual loyalties. Despite its hierarchic form and asymmetrical complementarity, the plural society of Maradi was clearly consensual in its character, origin, and base.

Plural structures that differed sharply from Maradi in type developed at Katsina and Kano. There the Hausa (Habe) majority were systematically denied jural and political rights, or relations of clientage and protection. They were never formally and categorically accepted or treated as Muslims. Differential taxation, corvée, and Fulani monopoly of military, political, and jural resources were pervasive and uniform. Habe were identified by corporate disabilities in political, civil, religious, and economic spheres as a leaderless category, the subject people, likely to revolt, and thus to be suppressed. Nonetheless Fulani males, while reserving their kinswomen in marriage for themselves, recruited harems of Hausa concubines whose offspring, under Fulani patriliny and Islamic
law, had their father’s status. Thus the Fulani aristocracy increased rapidly in number in proportion to the total population.

At Zaria, in consequence of the continuing association of local Hausa with Fulani in the government of the state, a condition that increasing dynastic rivalry for supporters sustained, Fulani and Hausa, though distinguished by descent, were increasingly assimilated by interest, intermarriage, and institutions. Neither was there any serious threat of Hausa revolt at Zaria, nor were its Hausa subject to the differential justice, taxation, and military exclusions that characterized Katsina and Kano. Nonetheless, the Zaria emirate was also clearly a plural society, its major division falling between the Muslim Hausa-Fulani settled in the north and the large pagan population of southern Zaria which included some thirty-three tribes divided by language, culture, and territory into units, few of which could resist Hausa pressure effectively. At Zaria, then, the Muslim Fulani and Hausa amalgamated to exploit and dominate this human reservoir, and with it, the territory. These differing histories and modes of corporate organization together account for the significant differences in social cohesion and cultural assimilation which distinguish these four states today as in the past.  

III

Conclusions

To reduce to order these comparative materials on indigenous African societies, we need to consider the incidence and cultural or structural correlates of each relevant variable—race, ethnicity, demographic ratios, language, ecology, and territorial organization. In doing so, we need only ask whether units sharing identical or equivalent conditions exhibit corresponding cultural and structural similarities, and whether units that differ in each of these conditions differ also in their social organization and cultural diversity.

First, we should note that with the sole exception of band organization in its pure form, each societal type provides examples of all modes of interethnic accommodation, namely, segmental segregation, symbiosis, symmetrical or complementary consociation, amalgamation, assimilation, and differential incorporation. If the category of band organization is extended to all mobile societies such as the Tuareg, Fulani, Somali, Masai, and Fort Jameson Ngoni, we would find all alternative forms of interethnic accommodation among people organized in nomadic bands. This extension has little to recommend it on analytic and structural grounds; however, it shows that neither nomadism nor ecological type precludes interethnic accommodations of differing character and form,
including those variable modes of symbiotic attachment and subordina-
tion which often link band-organized and sedentary peoples. Thus, our
societal typology neither excludes nor prescribes particular modes of
consociation in any structural category.

Proceeding then to seek uniformities of covariation, we may consider
racial factors first.

Race evidently has no invariant implications in societal accommo-
dation. Masai and Meru, Kipsigi and Gusii, Hamites and Bantu in Bu-
ganda, Bunyoro and Busoga, Arama, Arab, and Negro in Timbuktu, and,
perhaps most instructively, Tuareg, Arabs, and Negroids in the Central
Sudan, though objectively of differing race, have hybridized by marriage
and concubinage, and at Timbuktu without them, and with differing
results. Typically, men of the dominant stock beget children on subject
women; and wherever agnation prevails, the children are then directly
affiliated to their father's lineage and stratum, though socialized to their
mother's culture and often to her language. In consequence, Hamites
have adopted Bantu language and culture in Buganda, Sukuma, and
Arusha; Fulani have adopted Hausa; Mamprusi, the Mole-Dagbane
speech of Talis; Kpisi, the language of Ga, and so on. However, among
the matrilineal Tuareg, a man's offspring by his slave concubine are
excluded from his lineage by the rule of uterine descent; and, since their
mothers had no place in the Tuareg lineage structure, such hybrids were
segregated as buzaye apart from their father's kin in autonomous com-
unities of their own as privileged serfs. Thus besides Tuareg, divided
into noble and vassal clans, the society incorporated Negro slaves and
hybrid serfs. Tuareg serfdom derives in part from the structure of Tuareg
lineage groups.

We have already cited several instances of endogamous caste insti-
tuted within racially homogeneous groups, for example, the Ndebele, the
matrilineal Wolof, the Tutsi in Burundi, and some Ibo. Thus connubial
closures may be instituted irrespective of racial community. Conversely,
connubium may prevail despite racial difference. The dissimilar respon-
ses to similar situations of Ndebele, Nyasa, and Fort Jameson Ngoni on
the one hand, and of the Hamitic and Nilotic rulers of Ruanda, Buganda,
Burundi, Bunyoro, Ankole, Sukuma, and Busoga on the other, show that
racial and ethnic amalgams of equivalent diversity may develop in dia-
metrically opposed ways, biologically, culturally, and structurally. Evi-
dently, mere identities or differences of race have no uniform implica-
tions for the modes of consociation in such mixed societies.

The same conclusion emerges when these materials are analyzed to
isolate uniform patterns of consociation linked with particular conditions
of ethnic composition. We need merely mention here the persisting
division between Egba groups at Abeokuta; between the affiliated Emhla and Zansi castes; in the Tswana, Swazi, and Lozi societies; in Bwamba, Zande, and Alur; or among the Karimojong tribes. Clearly, where institutional or spatial factors obstruct connubium, an ethnically homogeneous population becomes progressively segregated into distinct groups, as, for example, among Karimojong. Conversely, where symmetrical connubium prevails, racially or ethnically heterogeneous populations become correspondingly assimilated at biological, cultural, and structural levels. The presence, mode, and conditions of connubium are evidently structural and cultural facts.

Essentially the same negative conclusion emerges when linguistic communities or differences are isolated for comparative study. Linguistic differences prevail in Timbuktu, Bwamba, and the Terik-Tiriki communities, and among the Egba, the Lozi, Tswana, and Ndebele, despite diverse interethnic structures and the use of local lingua francas. In the interlacustrine kingdoms, the Hausa-Fulani emirates, Azande, Ga, Kagoro, Tallensi, among the Samburu and Masai-Dorobo, Tuareg, Wolof, Arusha, Mandari, Shambala, Alur, at Calabar, Bonny, and in the Pygmy-Bantu symbiosis of the Ituri Forest, initial differences of language have disappeared in very different structures of continuing association.

As Fortes and Evans-Pritchard have emphasized, ecological communities or differences are clearly important in ethnic accommodations; but these also do not have any invariant connotations for the resulting societal structures or their development. Thus Terik and Teriki have retained their differing ecologies within a common wider society, while at Arusha and among the Kipsigi, accommodations of dominant pastoralists and subjugated cultivators have produced very different results. At Arusha pastoral Masai sedentarized as hoe farmers. Among Kipsigis the agricultural Gusii became converted to pastoralism.

Tuareg and Fulani ecological patterns are of interest here. Fulani themselves are divided into a sedentary population and nomadic pastoralists; the “noble” Tuareg based their economy on pastoral services of vassal Tuareg clans, on agricultural income from serf and slave settlements, on services from servile castes, and on the returns of desert transport, commerce, and raiding. Vassal Tuareg herd beasts, nobles, men; and Tuareg society includes all.

The remarkable difference found among interlacustrine communities of Hamitic or Nilotic pastoralists and Bantu cultivators also show the flexibility of these ethnic ecological frontiers; clearly such variations and changes both proceed structurally.

At Timbuktu also the ecological specializations that distinguish its major “ethnic” segments, or “castes,” as Miner calls them, are clearly
effects rather than antecedents of their specific accommodations. Likewise at Calabar and Bonny, ecological specializations in slave raiding and commerce emerged in response to a specific historical situation, thereby differentiating some tribesmen as mercantile communities from others on whom they preyed. The differing local situations of Pygmy and Bushmen groups as serfs in Tswana, political spies in Ruanda, symbiotic associates in Masai and the Ituri areas, or as independent refugees in the forest and desert also reveal the influence of differing structural contexts on ecological adaptation. Perhaps this is most pronounced among the Ndebele and Fort Jameson Ngoni, who specialized institutions to train their captives in the social ecology of war.

It goes without saying that mere similarities of ecology do not in themselves entail specific patterns of association. Among the Barotse, Tswana, Basuto, Ndebele, Zande, Mende, Ga, Egba, and the various Hausa-Fulani or Ngoni units we find considerable divergence in the forms of societal organization and interethnic accommodation despite relatively uniform ecological conditions in each aggregate. Mandari attach immigrants as clients, while Nuer affiliate them by genealogical fictions. Yak6 purchase and socialize outsiders as lineage members, while northeastern Ibo place them in ohu slavery. Evidently mere similarity or difference of strictly ecological adaptations has no direct or uniform implications for societal structures of interethnic accommodation.

Demographic differences in the ethnic composition of these precolonial societies do not correspond uniformly either with differences in their degrees of cultural diversity or with their forms of social structure. Indeed, these ethnic proportions are themselves often effects of structural conditions. Thus, the Efik merchants, the northeastern Ibo, Tuareg, Fulani, and others increased the populations of their societies by the capture or purchase of adults or, in Umor, of children. Whether these aliens were enslaved and segregated as at Calabar, or assimilated by the age organization as among some Ngoni or in Canoe Houses at Bonny, or socialized to serfdom as in Timbuktu, is clearly a function of the social and cultural organization, context, and history of the dominant group. Likewise, whether and how the relative numbers of institutionally distinguished strata persist or change over time under constant external conditions depends indirectly on conditions of social structure. So does the social significance of these ethnic or stratum ratios. Samburu outnumber Dorobo but do not subordinate them. At Timbuktu the dominant Arni and their Gabibi serfs outnumber other townsmen; at Calabar slaves outnumbered freemen only after 1840; at Arusha, where mutual assimilation was most complete, in due course the Murn outnumbered their Masai captors.
Among Ndebele, the Zansi ruling caste represent 15 percent; in Burundi and Ruanda, Tutsi castes represent between 12 and 16 percent. Inevitably caste minimizes the capacities of ruling groups for disproportionate demographic increases by restricting polygamy among them. Even hypergamy hardly affects this position. In like fashion the system of matrilineal descent has denied Tuareg the capacity for disproportionate demographic expansion by excluding children of Tuareg men and their concubines from the matrilineages essential for individual incorporation in free Tuareg society. By contrast, since 1807 the adjacent Fulani have steadily increased their numbers and proportions relative to their Hausa subjects. Fulani demographic expansion derives in part from their privileged political position which assured them an almost unlimited supply of concubines by purchase or capture, from slave estates and by other means; but Fulani demographic expansion also depended on their own patrilineal descent system reinforced by prescriptions in Islam. In consequence, unlike Tuareg, who are also Muslims, Fulani have increased disproportionately through reproduction by slave concubines. In the interlacustrine region, Hamitic rulers, following similar patterns, increased progressively in numbers and demographic ratios, and in assimilation with the subject Bantu in Sukuma, Bunyoro, and Buganda, unlike the Nilotes in Ankole, Toro, Ruanda, or Burundi. Evidently, demographic ratios are more likely to reflect specific conditions of social structure within the dominant group than to determine independently the patterns of interethnic accommodation.

We are thus left with two interdependent but analytically separate categories: cultural diversity and the structures of “interethnic” accommodation. It is clear that these conditions are linked closely and consistently among all the societies discussed here. They vary together, directly and equally. Further, on our evidence the decisive factor in this covariance appears to be structural. Cultural differences among societalized collectivities depend for preservation or dissolution on the structure of interethnic accommodation itself. Where accommodative structures prescribe or encourage assimilation, as in Buganda, among the Fort Jameson Ngoni, Ga, Yakó, Kipsigi, Mandari, Nuer, Arusha, Samburu at Bonny, or in Zaria, cultural and institutional differences are correspondingly transformed into institutional, biological, linguistic, and structural community. Insofar as the structure establishes symmetrical or complementary associations, as for example among Terik and Tiriiki, Namoos and “real Talis,” Ankwei and Kpashan in Kagoro, Egba, Bwamba, Ga, at Maradi, or within the various Nuba tribes, institutional and cognate differences, biological, linguistic, and other, persist insofar as the context permits or enjoins. Even such symbiotic structures as bin kanu or the various Ban-
tu-Pygmy, Masai-Dorobo, or Tutsi-Twa relations illustrate this primacy of accommodative mode in promoting collective segregation or its converse, assimilation. So do the various institutions of slavery, caste, regimental socialization, clientage, adoption, and the like illustrated here. So far as our data extend, the only variable that correlates uniformly with these distributions of cultural and ethnic difference is the structure of accommodation; and clearly, as these examples show, it is this accommodative structure that sets the conditions, limits, forms, and rate of enculturation and interaction across corporate boundaries. It appears then that differential incorporation preserves or promotes cultural pluralism in spheres and degrees that reflect its particular form and scope. Conversely, the extent to which institutionally diverse ethnic groups are uniformly incorporated within an inclusive society sets the conditions and scope of their assimilation, at least by the corresponding removal of collective differences from the public to the private domain where individual and group affiliations and practice are optional and labile. Likewise, collectivities consociated as equivalent or complementary units within a common society are correspondingly free to modify, develop, or maintain their distinctive institutional structures within limits set by the specific conditions and contexts of their union. Whether these relations between the levels of cultural divergence and the modes of incorporation are illusory or tautological requires attention. If they are neither, then our conclusion opens the field for further study. It also illustrates the merits of the comparative method in social anthropology.

NOTES

1 M. G. Smith, "Institutional and Political Conditions of Pluralism."


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Barnes, op. cit.

Elizabeth Colson, "The Plateau Tonga of Northern Rhodesia," in Colson


71 M. V. Breulsford, The Tribes of Northern Rhodesia (Lusaka: Government
Pluralism in Precolonial African Societies


45 Schapera, The Tswana, p. 37.


53 J. R. Patterson, "Report on Borsari District, Bornu" (Provincial Office, Bornu; unpublished MS, 1918), p. 16, §46; M. G. Smith, "The Two Katsinas" (unpublished MS).


Ibid., p. 246. See also Fortes, "Ritual and Office in Tribal Society."


Ibid., p. 9; see also p. 13.

Ibid., p. 207.

Ibid., p. 423. For more intensive analysis of institutional diversity among adjacent populations, see Goody, *Social Organization of the LoWiili*; Goody, *Death, Property and Ancestors*.

Buxton, "The Mandari"; Buxton, *Chiefs andStrangers*.


Paul Spencer (*op. cit.*), pp. 281-289 contrasts their position with that of the Masula phrathy and Rendille tribe.


LeVine and Sangree, *op. cit.*; Sangree, “The Bantu Tiriki.”


Ibid., p. 105.


Hughes, Kin, Caste and Nation, p. 56. These alternative spellings of Ngoni (Nguni) are established north and south of the Limpopo, respectively. I follow the spelling of my sources.

Kuper, Hughes, and Van Velsen, op. cit., p. 73.

Ibid., p. 78.

Hughes, Kin, Caste and Nation, p. 56.

Kuper, Hughes, and Van Velsen, op. cit., p. 74.

Ibid., pp. 93-94.


Barnes, op. cit., p. 39.

Ibid., p. 40.


Jones, “Political Organization of Old Calabar”; Simmons, op. cit.; Meek, Law and Authority in a Nigerian Tribe, pp. 68-69.


215 Ibid., p. 231.
216 Manoukian, op. cit., pp. 73, 81.
217 Ibid., pp. 81–83.
219 Simmons, op. cit., p. 16.
221 Hope Waddell, cited in Jones, “Political Organization of Old Calabar,” p. 149.
222 Jones, loc. cit.
223 Ibid., p. 157.
228 Cory, op. cit., pp. 1–3; Malcolm, op. cit., pp. 20–21.
229 Godfrey Wilson, Constitution of Ngonde.


Oberg, op. cit., pp. 121-163.

Ibid., pp. 1-40; Margaret Chave Fallers, The Eastern Lacustrine Bantu (London: International African Institute, 1960).


Martin Southwold, Bureaucracy and Chiefship in Buganda (Kampala: East African Institute of Social Research, 1960); Andrey Richards, ed., East African Chiefs (London: Faber and Faber, 1960), pp. 41-77; for Soga, Nyoro, Toro, Ankole, Haya, Zinza, and Ha, see ibid., pp. 78-228.


Nadel, Black Byzantium, pp. 69, 138; see also pp. 12-26; and Nadel, “Nupe State and Community.”

Nadel, Black Byzantium, p. 139.

Nadel, Nupe Religion.


Kuper, African Aristocracy, p. 18.

Ibid., pp. 54-71, esp. 57-58.

Ibid., pp. 117-133.

Schapera, Handbook of Tswana Law and Custom, pp. 4-11, 19-28, 91-103, 118-124.

Ibid., p. 95; see also p. 63.

Ibid., p. 121; see also pp. 118-121.
