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PLURALISM, POLITICS
AND IDEOLOGY
IN THE CREOLE CARIBBEAN

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This is an expanded and revised version of a paper entitled 'Pluralism in the Non-Hispanic Caribbean' that I wrote in July 1984 for a conference on 'New Perspectives on Caribbean Studies: Towards the 21st Century'. The conference was held at Hunter College, New York, from August 28 to September 1, 1984 under the joint sponsorship of the Research Institute for the Study of Man and the City University of New York. Although much has happened since July 1984 in the countries discussed in this paper, and although more has been published about them and about the Caribbean in general, those developments and publications do not materially affect my review and conclusions, but rather confirm them. Accordingly, in revising this essay for publication, instead of updating the case studies to cover the last six years, I have chosen to direct attention to its significance by comparing briefly its results with those that could be expected from other approaches to the analysis of Caribbean society. In July 1990 when I reread the essay shortly before its publication, despite the many important developments since 1986, I again decided to let it stand as first written, and made minimal change.

Special thanks are due to Professor David Lowenthal of University College London for a thorough critique of the semi-final draft of this essay. While adopting many of his suggestions, I have set aside others, for which I am also grateful.

M.G.S.
ERRATA

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p. 7  para 2, line 7
Replace "institution organization" by "institutional organization."

p. 21  para 1, line 3
Replace "in fact of" by "in face of."

p. 26  para 1, line 8
Sentence beginning "According to…" should read "According to the census that year, besides whites, who represented one-fortieth of the population, 1 percent had Chinese descent, 35 percent were Indian or 'East Indians' as they are called, 46.8 percent were black, and 14 percent colored or mixed (M.G. Smith 1965a: 11)."

p. 69  para 1, line 21
Replace "dissimilarities" by "similarities."
PLURALISM, POLITICS
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1. INTRODUCTION

In this essay I initially set out to see whether, given their specific circumstances, the social compositions and plural structures of independent Caribbean Creole societies provide a fuller and more detailed understanding of their recent political and ideological developments than such alternatives as dependency or world system theories, plantation society models, structural-functionalism, modernization theory or Marxism. The paper therefore begins with a brief discussion of the concepts of pluralism and plural society. This is followed by a sketch of the Caribbean that distinguishes its Hispanic and Creole societies. The chief structural varieties of the latter group are then described, and such factors as size, location, resources or history that differentiate them further are briefly noted. The main body of the paper consists of six case studies of developments in Haiti, Suriname, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad that summarize their political and ideological histories over periods of thirty to fifty years preceding July 1984. These accounts are followed by a comparative discussion of the likely development of these countries in the near future and the likely reactions of the U.S.A. The relationships of recent ideological and political developments to the social compositions and structures of these six countries are then reviewed to see whether and how
they support or disconfirm the plural theory of Caribbean society. In an attempt to assess the relative utility of the various competing frameworks for studies of the region, the essay concludes with a summary discussion of problems that beset explanations of these developments provided by alternative theories of Caribbean society.

The essay accordingly pursues several closely related goals. First, it seeks to determine by comparative analysis whether the major political and cultural developments in Creole Caribbean societies over the past thirty to fifty years display any significant common trends and conditions, and if so to identify these and examine their interrelations, paying special attention to the relative influence of endogenous and exogenous factors in generating and shaping them. Secondly, following summary outlines of the recent history of selected states, I sketch the likely course of their future developments in order to show how social analyses may generate specific predictions which the flow of time and events will prove to be true or false, more or less adequate or imprecise, and more or less useful as guides to political action. Thirdly, having reviewed major recent social and cultural developments in six representative Creole states, I try to determine whether, how and, if so, to what degree these developments directly or indirectly reflect the social and cultural composition and plural structure of their societies. In conclusion, I try to test the most influential current approaches to the study of Caribbean societies by applying those paradigms to the case studies. I do so on the assumption that the capacity of any theoretical statement to account coherently, consistently and cogently for diverse developments in units of the kind to which it refers, should provide a decisive demonstration of its analytic value and validity.

Given its combination of case histories and comparative analysis on the one hand, and its theoretical and methodological aims on the other, the complex structure of the essay is not surprising. However, I have tried to simplify the exposition and to clarify the argument by presenting its various components in their logical sequence.

**Types of Plural Society**

The term pluralism has widely different meanings (Kuper 1969, 1980). As used here, following the lead of J. S. Furnivall (1948), it denotes those conditions in which the members of a given society are divided on grounds of race, religion, language, culture, ethnicity, history, ecology and social organization, separately or together. Thus the term applies to various social situations and conditions that may differ significantly from one another.

Culture being the universal criterion and distinctive condition of humanity, cultural pluralism expressed in institutional differences is the most general basis and mode of plural division. This is so since culture includes and subsumes language, religion, conceptions of race, ethnicity, kinship, ecology, community and normative models of social organization and conduct. It thus pervades all spheres of social life that exhibit differences of institution organization. Just how significant such differences or commonalities of culture may be in structuring collective relations depends primarily on whether they are relevant criteria for participation in the public domain.

As noted long ago by Fortes (1959), societies consist of two complementary levels of organization and action, namely, their public and private domains (M.G. Smith 1969a). The public domain consists of those corporate relations and units that regulate and organize the collectivity by constituting and articulating its components and authorizing them to recruit, regulate and represent their members. In short, the public domain corresponds with the societal macrostructure of corporate units and relations to which every population owes its coherence and capacity to cope with environmental and other exigencies. All else - that is, all those activities, relations, resources and interests that do not fall within the public domain, and do not directly affect its organization and operation - belong to the private domain of social life in which, within limits laid down by custom or law, differences of practice and idea are expected and open to all, being regarded as structurally equivalent. For example, in New York or Paris, differences of domestic language, religion, cuisine, family patterns, gender concepts and relations, etc., are equivalent within the limits set by national law, and do not differentiate the rights and duties of their adherents in the common public domain (M.G. Smith 1984). Under such conditions of universalistic incorporation, insofar as cultural pluralism obtains among the members of a common society, it lacks institutional significance in the public domain. Under those conditions, cultural pluralism exists without corresponding social or structural pluralism (M.G. Smith 1969b, 1984).

When two or more culturally diverse collectivities operate as mutually exclusive segments of equivalent or complementary status in the public domain of a common society, their cultural differences are institu-
tionalized as social pluralism by their incorporation as equivalent parts or segments of the whole, which then has consociational form. The basic components of consociations may or may not be culturally diverse, and consociations may or may not be states. For example, the precolonial Nuer, Tallensi and Tiv, though stateless and socially homogeneous, all had consociational form. However, the equivalent incorporation of culturally distinct segments establishes a consociational plurality, as illustrated by Switzerland, by Nigeria from 1960 to 1966, and by Lebanon before and despite its civil war. While the Swiss, and the Nigerian population at that date, were constitutionally organized in mutually exclusive and equivalent divisions, namely, the Swiss cantons and the federated Nigerian regions, before the civil war in Lebanon the various religious congregations shared power by agreements and traditions which, though always upheld, had no place in law. Thus, like Switzerland, Nigeria from 1960 to 1966 was a consociation de jure, while the Lebanon, lacking a legal base, was such de facto. In either case, under the mode of equivalent incorporation the rights and status of individuals as citizens in the inclusive public domain are mediated by the requirement of their prior membership of one or other of its basic components. When the equivalent or complementary social segments that constitute them are simultaneously contraposed by mutually exclusive differences of culture, community and social organization, such societies exhibit social pluralism, de facto or de jure.

When the members of a common society who differ in culture, race, ethnicity, religion, social organization or language also differ at law and in the polity, de jure and/or de facto, as citizens and non-citizens, free and unfree, privileged and disprivileged, their differential incorporation establishes the society as a hierarchic plurality based on structural pluralism. Under slavery and colonial rule the British Caribbean territories were clearly such, having differentially incorporated their culturally distinct components by restricting rights of political participation to the ruling whites and a few wealthy non-whites. Being thus hierarchically ordered by differential status rather than segmentally contraposed, the basic components of these hierarchic pluralities are best distinguished as social sections from the social segments of equivalent status that constitute the segmental or consociational pluralities. While consociational organization neither requires nor entails cultural diversity of its basic segments, the differential incorporation of two or more collectivities never occurs apart from differences of culture and social organization. This is so because however homogeneous in culture the units may have been initially, their differential incorporation inevitably generates fundamental differences in their culture and social organization (M. G. Smith 1969b: 442-444, 1984).

Many plural societies combine hierarchies of differentially incorporated social sections with structures of equivalent or complementary segments. For example, South Africa combines a hierarchic order of white, Indian, colored and black social sections with segmental divisions among whites between Boers, Britons and Jews, among Indians between Hindus and others, and among blacks between Zulu, Sotho, Swazi, Xhosa and others. Among independent contemporary states such combinations of hierarchic and segmental plural organization may well outnumber pure instances of either type together. As they are more complex than the alternative structures they coordinate, I shall refer to such combinations hereafter as complex or mixed pluralities, if the hierarchic and segmental principles are equally pervasive and important in their structure. When the segments of a plural society are politically unequal, I shall describe the society as modally segmental, even if one or more of its segments is a hierarchy of social sections.

Before universal suffrage and decolonization, Belize, Suriname, Guyana and Trinidad were perfect examples of complex pluralities, their colonial masters being differentially incorporated from the subject populations, who were themselves divided into exclusive segments by culture, race, religion, language, social institutions, education, ecology, and in some cases by party organization. In each territory the Creole segment comprised a plural hierarchy of ranked social sections. On the introduction of universal suffrage under colonialism, their differential incorporations lost legality and became de facto rather than de jure conditions of social life, since resident citizens of the imperial state continued to enjoy differential rights and power despite the formal equalities of universal suffrage, while subordinate social segments and sections provided the de facto groupings within and through which the colonized exercised their political rights. At independence, three main structural options were open to these complex Caribbean pluralities. They could either reconstitute their plural units as equivalent segments; or one of their segments might establish its de facto domination, as occurred in Guyana under Burnham and in Suriname under Desi Bouterse; or the complex plurality might persist de facto despite universal suffrage, formal independence and universalistic constitutions, if any collectivity, the old rulers or some other grouping, differentially incorporated others who were aligned segmentally.

A complete societal typology would include, besides these pluralities, those homogeneous societies in which everyone practises the same culture and social institutions. There are also many heterogeneous societies
whose members display cultural features that manifest their differing occupations, education, wealth, rank or social class, although they share such basic institutions as language, marriage and kinship, government, economy, law, religion and education, and so lack the institutional differences that constitute pluralism. Thus, besides such culturally homogeneous and heterogeneous societies, we should distinguish those that institutionalize cultural pluralism as social or structural pluralism by segmental or differential incorporation in the public domain, and those that do not. This typology rests on two sets of conditions, namely, on the cultural similarity or diversity of members of a common society, and on the modes of their incorporation. Together, these conditions distinguish culturally homogeneous and heterogeneous societies from one another and from those that display cultural pluralism without segmental or differential incorporation, as well as the segmental, hierarchic and complex pluralisms described above. As either of these categories may contain societies of differing scale, type of political organization and economic level, societies of similar scale, economy and polity may belong to different categories (M. G. Smith 1984).

CREOLE CARIBBEAN SOCIETIES

Most Caribbean societies fall historically and sociologically into two distinct groupings, the Hispanic and non-Hispanic. The former consists of Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico, while, besides Haiti and the remaining Antilles, the latter includes such Creole or mixed units on the mainland as Belize, Guyana, Suriname and French Guiana. Given the divergent political, cultural and economic conditions and histories of the Hispanic and non-Hispanic Caribbean, or Creole societies in my usage, it is appropriate to consider the latter by themselves.

With the possible exception of Belize, all non-Hispanic Caribbean societies can be described as Creole societies, if the term Creole is used to denote natives descended from other European and/or African ancestors. While biracial Caribbean societies have that biological basis, those that include large numbers of East Indian, Javanese and other racial stocks may also be described as Creole, given their Creole speech and the cultural domination of their Creole populations.

There may be nearly fifty Creole Caribbean societies (Lowenthal 1960). Many of these are miniscule in size and population, for example, Saba, the Turks and Caicos Islands, the Cayman Islands, La Désirade, St. Barthélémy, Bequia, Carriacou, Providencia and the like, all being dependencies of dependencies throughout their history. Some of these miniscule units contain people of a single racial stock, while others include both blacks and whites, the two Old World races that together, but in highly unequal relations and numbers, peopled the Caribbean and replaced its aboriginals. Whether of common race or not, some of these small communities are socially homogeneous while others are not, though notably less split and less hierarchic than the larger, better known Caribbean societies (Keur and Keur 1960, M.G. Smith 1962, Wilson 1973, Naish 1982).

Though several magnitudes larger than these miniscule units, all other Creole Caribbean societies are of modest population and size. Sociologically they fall into two main groups, those which are modally biracial in history and composition, and others which, besides blacks and whites, now include comparably large populations of differing race and culture, such as East Indians, Mestizos, Javanese or Amerindians (Lowenthal 1972: 76-212, M.G. Smith 1974). Some historically biracial Caribbean societies, for example, Haiti, Dominica and St. Lucia, have lost most or all of their white populations, and may be described by visitors as racially homogeneous. Such designation overlooks locally significant distinctions of race and color between their black and colored populations. Historically, and substantially today, those groups provide the cores of two hierarchically ranked social sections, namely, the small, culturally distinct, educated and propertied stratum which, though modally colored, includes many blacks and some Creole whites, and a far larger, predominantly black section of different culture that includes many hybrids and small East Indian populations. Besides differences of language, religion, mating, family and kinship, education, property forms and ecology, the ranked social sections of these Creole hierarchic pluralities differ also in aggregate and average wealth, in occupation, numbers, history and external affiliation. Where, as in Barbados, Martinique, Guadeloupe or Jamaica, the society includes white communities that still exercise disproportionate power in the country's affairs, there are three ranked social sections whose respective cores are racially white, brown and black, with cultural identities and differences that correspond broadly.

In the third class of Caribbean Creole societies, the typical amalgam of native whites, blacks and browns, with or without other racial and ethnic minorities such as Chinese and Portuguese, forms one of two or more social segments, though always historically the first, to which the rest were later attached. Belize, Trinidad, Guyana and Suriname all belong in this category. The Creole segments of those societies differ racially and culturally from
one or more others of comparable size, such as East Indians, Javanese, Amerindians or Mestizos, and may include such ethnic groups as Portuguese, Syrians, Lebanese or Jews.

Though modally segmental, the Creole segments of Guyana, Suriname, Trinidad and Belize are hierarchic like the biracial Creole societies. Thus even without their imperial masters, and despite their basically segmental organization, these multiracial units remain de facto complex pluralities, especially when the ruling Creole segment de facto differentially incorporates the rest.

In numbers, resources, distinctness and organization, the political positions and economic prospects of the residual white sections of these post-colonial multiracial societies vary in their resources, political regimes, economic prospects, and other factors. Thus in Guadeloupe and Martinique whites have increased since World War II, following the incorporation of these units as overseas departments of France in 1946. Perhaps the same was true of Suriname and the Dutch Antilles before their independence. In the former British West Indies the reverse occurred, and, excluding Barbados, at decolonization few whites of British descent remained in those countries. In Haiti, by 1804 Dessalines had virtually eliminated the white population.

Thus Caribbean Creole societies may be grouped in three classes: (1) as miniscule racially homogeneous or biracial units; (2) as modally biracial and de facto hierarchic pluralities of greater population and size, which may or may not contain two or three social sections that differ in wealth and power inversely with their numbers and color; and (3) units containing three or more racial stocks, cultures and languages, incorporated as equivalent segments, though now de facto dominated by the Creole group or one of its sections.

Besides their differences of plural structure and social composition, Creole Caribbean societies differ also in area, population size, density and structure, in their metropolitan affiliations, location, climate, terrain, language and dominant religion, and in their histories of slavery, colonial rule and plantation agriculture. They differ also in such mineral resources as bauxite, asphalt or oil, in their economies, average annual per capita income, trade patterns and export products, illiteracy and unemployment ratios, political regimes and economic dependence on emigration and remittances, shipping and fishing, agriculture, manufactures, tourism, forestry, mining and military facilities.

THE GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION

Given the recent withdrawals of British and Dutch imperial power from the region, and Cuba's alliance with the U.S.S.R. as a socialist state, it is necessary to look with care at the changing political situation and prospects of these Caribbean communities, and particularly at their relations with the United States. Besides their differences of plural culture and structure, among the many factors that differentiate these Creole Caribbean societies, the most important are their proximity to the U.S.A., Cuba's socialism and dependence on the U.S.S.R., and the global struggle of the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. for dominance as champions of opposing social and economic systems.

Before World War II, despite the Monroe Doctrine, the U.S.A. made no move to dispossess Britain, France or Holland of their Caribbean territories. Till then the United States had restricted its interventions in Caribbean affairs to Haiti and the Hispanic societies. However, following the fall of France and Holland in 1940, the U.S. government viewed the developing political vacuum in the Caribbean with increasing concern. Since 1942, when the Anglo-American Commission for Caribbean Affairs was established in San Juan, Puerto Rico, U.S. involvement in the region has steadily grown, primarily to assure its military and political security, but also to control and exploit the region for political and economic ends. As decolonization proceeded in the British and Dutch territories, their geopolitical positions changed correspondingly, reorienting them to the U.S.A. as potential dependencies. After World War II the English-speaking countries were increasingly swept by radio, television and other U.S. mass media into new relations of cultural dependence on the U.S.A., at first most strongly in the northern territories, least in those farthest south.

When Fidel Castro finally overthrew the Cuban dictator Batista, the U.S. government rejected his overtures and so helped to direct the Cuban revolution into the socialist camp (Gonzalez 1974: 60-76). Since then U.S. political action in the Caribbean has intensified in order to negate or limit the danger of Cuban threats to U.S. security in the area and the Central and South American mainlands. In 1961 the U.S. government supported an abortive invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. In 1962 it blockaded the island to forestall the installation of Soviet missiles capable of destroying Washington. Since then U.S. political interest in Cuban affairs has rarely flagged, and the U.S. has intervened covertly to eliminate Cuba's allies in Guyana in
1963-64, overtly in the Dominican Republic in 1965, covertly in Jamaica 1976-80 (Manley 1982), and overtly in Grenada in October 1983 on the formal invitation of Barbados, Jamaica and Grenada's immediate neighbors in the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS). These were by no means the only American interventions in the region after World War II.

From 1946 onwards the U.S. government has tried to promote the economic development of Puerto Rico by liberal policies that furnished some guidelines for President Reagan's recent Caribbean Basin Initiative. In 1960, following a campaign by the Trinidadian Chief Minister, Eric Williams, to recover Chaguaramas, then under a lease to the U.S.A. made by Britain during World War II, the U.S. government moved to return the concession to Trinidad (Brereton 1981: 241-243); and in 1970 when Eric Williams' government was threatened by public protests and a mutiny, it provided discreet and useful support. In Haiti, despite the anti-American postures of François Duvalier, and his well-known abuse of human rights, from 1966 till 1986 the U.S.A. steadfastly supported and protected the Duvalier regime.

On June 14, 1980, Walter Rodney was assassinated in Georgetown, Guyana by a remote-control device. Five days later Maurice Bishop, the Prime Minister of the People’s Revolutionary Government of Grenada, his cabinet colleagues, the Governor-General and the Cuban ambassador, escaped destruction by another remote-control device at a public meeting in St. George’s, Grenada (Searle 1983:40, Payne, Sutton and Thorndike 1984: 51 but see Sandford and Vigilante 1984: 131). Three days later the Jamaican Prime Minister, Michael Manley, escaped assassination by a conspiracy that involved civilian and military personnel. Given the sympathetic political relations of Forbes Burnham, Maurice Bishop and Michael Manley with Fidel Castro, and the state of the U.S. presidential election campaign at that time, to many it seemed unlikely that this combination of apparently unrelated events in that extraordinary week was pure coincidence.

U.S. initiatives have not been restricted to manifest intervention, whether overt or covert. In 1981, while the CIA planned covert operations against Grenada, including an economic offensive (O'Shaughnessy 1984: 112), the U.S. directed Ocean Venture 81 in the Caribbean against “Amber and the Amberines”, code-names for Grenada and the Grenadines, as also in November 1982 (Ambursley and Dunkerley 1984: 11-12). In January 1983 the CIA deliberated whether and how to invade Suriname (Dew 1983: 29). By contrast, following the incorporation of Martinique and Guadeloupe as overseas departments of France in 1946, the U.S. government has remained aloof from their affairs, despite the riots of 1959 in Martinique and 1967 in Guadeloupe, and the continuing social tensions in both countries (Bléerald 1983).

Various European initiatives of decolonization in the region since 1945 account for recent U.S. interest in the Creole Caribbean. Following the riots of 1935 in St. Kitts, in 1937-38 there were spontaneous and uncoordinated labor protests in the British colonies of Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad and Guyana. These were duly followed by the visit of a Royal Commission whose report was published in 1944, when Allied victory was close at hand. Thereafter the British proceeded to decolonize their territories, though at different rates and by different steps. After World War II a reconstituted France summarily incorporated Martinique and Guadeloupe as overseas departments, thereby precluding the likelihood of their early decolonization. In 1948 Holland began to decolonize, and redefined the Kingdom of the Netherlands to include Suriname and the Dutch Antilles of Curacao, Bonaire, Aruba, St. Eustatius, Saba and St. Maarten, thus implicitly increasing their internal autonomy. Unlike the Dutch, Britain initially sought to incorporate its Caribbean colonies as a federation; but, following a referendum in Jamaica in 1961, the federation terminated in 1962, thus obliging Britain to confer independent statehood on Jamaica, Trinidad and Barbados separately, while retaining ultimate responsibility for its Leeward and Windward colonies as Associated States, until they too for the most part became independent.

Guyana's position at this time was quite anomalous. On receiving universal suffrage, in the first general election in 1953 the country voted overwhelmingly for the People's Progressive Party (PPP) under Cheddi Jagan and Forbes Burnham. Jagan, the elected head of government and a Marxist, disturbed the British by his methods and measures. Accordingly, within 133 days of the election, Winston Churchill’s government in London revoked the new Guyanese constitution and sent in troops to repress public protests. Crown Colony government was reimposed on Guyana and prevailed until 1957, when the constitution was restored, followed by a new general election. By then the original PPP alliance of East Indians under Cheddi Jagan and Afro-Guyanese under Forbes Burnham had splintered, and Burnham had formed the People's National Congress (PNC) as a separate party. In the elections of 1957 and 1961 Jagan's East Indian segment of the PPP won handsomely and formed the government. In 1960, following Castro's leftist turn, Jagan visited Cuba to establish friendly relations and indirect links with the U.S.S.R. Noting these developments, and having already classified Cuba as an enemy, the U.S. took new interest in Jagan and Guyana.
In 1963-64 the CIA organized strikes of black Guyanese civil servants and other workers in Georgetown, the Guyanese capital. Intentionally or otherwise, this conflict gave rise to widespread violence in which large areas of Georgetown and other communities were burnt. On official report, over one hundred persons were then killed in racial strife between Indians and Negroes. Having lost control of the country, Jagan was obliged to accept the decision of London to hold yet another election before Guyana became independent. However, on this occasion, on American advice, Britain altered the Guyanese electoral regulations to institute proportional representation instead of the prevailing majority vote (R.T. Smith 1971, 1976). The ensuing elections of 1964 were duly won by a coalition of the PNC led by Forbes Burnham and the United Force led by Peter D'Aguiar, a Portuguese businessman who had the support of commercial and property people in Georgetown. By 1966 when Guyana achieved independence, Burnham had shed D'Aguiar and his colleagues from the government; and in 1967, having introduced new electoral regulations, he was re-elected with an increased majority, despite the numerical preponderance of Indians over Creoles in the population of Guyana.

In 1974, despite local protests by many who dreaded the prospect under their Prime Minister, Eric Gairy, Britain granted independence to the 'Associated State' of Grenada, which had enjoyed internal autonomy with British Treasury support since 1967. That event signalled Britain's intention to withdraw from the Caribbean as soon as possible. On November 25th 1975, following the flight of nearly one-third of its population, Suriname also received independence, together with a most substantial grant-in-aid from Holland, and for the next five years its citizens were allowed to settle in Holland without restraint.

In the charged and labile context of global cold war, these regional developments inevitably stimulated interest in the U.S.S.R. as well as the U.S.A. During this period the U.S.S.R. established diplomatic relations with Cuba, Jamaica, Grenada and Guyana, and subsidized and armed Cuba and Grenada; but to my knowledge, it has neither sponsored violence nor provided military assistance to any Caribbean group that wanted to establish socialism by violent means. Its chief socialist rival, the People's Republic of China, has been even more cautious in its relations with Caribbean countries.

Given these data, it should be clear that until 1989-90 when the Cold War suddenly began to thaw, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. posed the principal threats to the integrity and independence of Caribbean countries, Hispanic or other. The U.S. government may justify its policies by reference to U.S. national security. The strategic implications and differential significance of Caribbean territories to the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. are obvious. From 1960 when it adopted Cuba as a satellite, the U.S.S.R.'s stake in the region has been clear for all to see; and from 1961 when it sponsored the Bay of Pigs invasion, the U.S.A. has left no room for doubt as regards its preferences and aims in the Caribbean. Thus Caribbean leaders of all persuasions can reasonably be expected to appreciate their situation and to avoid provoking U.S. hostility and intervention, whether covert or overt. That has not always been the case.

2. SOME REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

NOIRISME AND ITS FORERUNNERS

It is in this changing geopolitical context that the various Creole Caribbean societies have had to struggle over the past fifty years to identify and resolve their basic problems of poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, overcrowding, political, economic and cultural dependence, and to reduce the inequalities and tensions inherent in their historic and continuing pluralism. To understand fully the factors and forces that have generated and shaped their political development during these decades, we need always to look closely within these societies at the plural conditions and structures that are their source.

In the nineteen-twenties, Marcus Garvey advocated racial pride and unity to black Americans as an essential first step towards the redemption of blacks in the Americas after centuries of slavery and servitude to whites (Garvey 1968). Garvey's teachings on race and Africa express his repudiation of racial and social conditions in his Jamaican homeland (Garvey 1973). When deported from the U.S.A. in 1927 he returned to Jamaica where he continued to promote the United Negro Improvement Association and to call for radical change in Jamaican society. Due to its restrictive property franchise, Garvey's political campaigns for change in Jamaica were doomed to failure. Nonetheless, his outspoken calls for the racial pride and independence of black people in Jamaica struck all sections of the society and had
At about the same time Aimé Césaire first put forward in his native Martinique the poetic concepts and doctrine of négritude (Coulthard 1962, 1970) which drew heavily on the ethnological studies of Jean Price-Mars (1928) in Haiti, then occupied by U.S. troops and under U.S. administration. Césaire's ideas of négritude won the support of Leopold Senghor and other Africans, and in Haiti it stimulated the independent development of the ideology of noirisme by François Duvalier and the Griots, who steered themselves in Haitian history and ethnology in order to understand and address the country's problems (Nicholls 1979: 153-172). In that context, Duvalier and his associates insisted on the validity of vodun, the Creole patois, plaçage unions, and other cultural institutions of the large black majority of Haitians, and rejected white alternatives, whether French or American, together with the mulatto elite, their local champions, whose pride in their white ancestry and French culture alienated them from the blacks (Leyburn 1941).

When the Americans withdrew from Haiti in 1934, the mulatto elite once again assumed control of the state and economy. In reaction to noirisme and other pressures, including the long American occupation, the new rulers actively sought to increase Haiti's cultural links with France through the Roman Catholic Church and other means. A sustained campaign against the vodun folk religion was waged for several years and helped to forge a strong alliance between the exponents of noirisme and vodun cult leaders. Popular dissatisfaction with the pro-mulatto government of President Lescot mounted steadily until he was removed by a military junta in January 1946, following which a moderate noiriste, Dumarsais Estimé, was elected president in August that year. By 1950 Estimé's conciliatory policies and moderate noirisme had alienated important groups of blacks and mulattos. Following another military coup a black colonel, Paul Magloire, was elected president with substantial support from the mulatto elite, the Roman Catholic church, and the French community in Haiti. In June 1950 vodun was banned by military decree (Nicholls 1979: 193), and under Magloire the mulatto section resumed their cultural and social hegemony. However, by 1956 Magloire had lost the support of critical segments of that stratum as well as the depressed black population for whom Duvalier spoke. When he fell in December 1956, the scene was set for a direct contest between the black and brown sections of Haitian society for decisive power. During the next few months Haiti was severely shaken by the political struggle, which included a pitched battle in Port-au-Prince between rival groups in the armed forces (Nicholls 1979: 208).

In September 1957 François Duvalier won a handsome majority over his chief rival, Louis Déjoie, a mulatto businessman, and proceeded to implement his noiriste beliefs and goals. Over the next few years, French clergy were replaced by Haitians, and the Catholic Church had to recognize vodun as the religion of the Haitian folk. The Creole language received official status, and the "liberal" political institutions so dear to mulattos were swept away when Duvalier was re-elected president for life in 1961 and succeeded ten years later by his son and personally nominated successor, Jean-Claude (or "Baby Doc"). While the state organization increasingly assimilated the vodun religion and its priesthood, paramilitary groups of the president's tontons macoutes disciplined opponents of the regime and harassed suspected dissidents. By these and other means François Duvalier implemented his noiriste ideology and program without materially improving the economic conditions of the black section he claimed to represent. Nonetheless, by the end of his reign Duvalier had won the support of the American government, which continued until 1986 to protect and assist his successor. These Haitian developments represent the political victory of the black majority over its historic rivals, the mulatto elite, under the impetus of François Duvalier's leadership and noirisme. The plural structure of differentially incorporated black and brown sections that generated these developments is transparent throughout their course.

Rastafari and Black Power

Of the three ranked sections in Jamaican society, the minute minority of dominant whites, the overwhelming majority of disprivileged blacks who only received the vote in 1944, and the middle ranking colored section of mixed race, culture, economic and political status, the latter assumed the leadership of the nationalist and labor movements in 1938 and retained it despite periodic challenges until the late seventies.

In the thirties Marcus Garvey had campaigned vainly for election as Mayor of Kingston, the capital, against impossible odds, given the franchise and his political program; but that campaign gave Garvey's racial critique and message the local publicity he wanted. Following his defeat and departure to Britain, Garvey's doctrine first bore unexpected fruit in the Rastafari religion (Simpson 1955, Smith, Augier and Nettleford 1960). The Rastafari brethren identified the Ethiopian emperor Haile Selassie as the returned Messiah, virulently rejected Jamaica and the white man's works as...
Babylon, and demanded repatriation to Africa.

During the early postwar years when Jamaica was preoccupied with such new public institutions as trade unions, political parties, a stock exchange, many statutory corporations and a university, Rastafari religious doctrines seemed rather remote from social realities to both elite sections, white and brown. However, in 1960 the island was threatened by an armed uprising planned and led by Jamaicans from New York, who hoped to sweep to power on the wave of dissatisfaction and unrest which the government's policies of economic development had provoked. Following a sympathetic report on the aims, beliefs and organization of the Rastafari movement by a University team (Smith, Augier and Nettleford 1960), the Brethren proselytized freely, combining sharp criticism of Jamaica's racial and social order with religious denunciation, prophecy and exposition. Some Brethren also campaigned against Jamaica's participation in the West Indian Federation which the government advocated, and helped to ensure the country's withdrawal when that issue was put to a national referendum in 1961 (M. G. Smith 1965a: 314-321). By then a Rastafari delegation had visited Africa on behalf of the Jamaican people and government to explore the practical prospects for 'repatriation'. Following the national vote against federation, the Jamaican legislature approved a new constitution and negotiated political independence from Britain. In the succeeding election the People's National Party (PNP) led by Norman Manley was defeated and replaced in government by the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) under Alexander Bustamante.

For that election Millard Johnson revived the People's Political Party (PPP) that Garvey had founded in 1935 and identified it squarely as the black man's party. But its candidates all lost their deposits when the PPP received less than one per cent of the total vote (Norris 1962: 57-60, Munroe 1983: 86). Evidently, despite the massive black majority under adult suffrage, Jamaican electors sympathetic to the Rastafari categorically ejected the PPP's candidature. As the Rastafari movement grew, the government's policies of economic development had provoked. Following a sympathetic report on the aims, beliefs and organization of the Rastafari movement by a University team (Smith, Augier and Nettleford 1960), the Brethren proselytized freely, combining sharp criticism of Jamaican society, and doctrines of radical cultural, economic and political change had captured the imagination of many frustrated black professionals and scholars at the university, who founded the extreme and increasing inequality of Jamaican society under its PNP and JLP governments intolerable. However, in fact of the explicitly racial protests and programs of the Black Power movement, both Jamaican mass parties, the JLP, who were in office, and the PNP under Norman Manley, joined together to oppose the movement, having long ago committed themselves to the ideal of an open multiracial society.

At the university, Black Power spokesmen founded a journal, Abeng, to publicize their views, and continued to discuss the country's problems among themselves (Nettleford 1970). By combining racial protest and Marxist theory, their analyses and ideology racialized Marxism for application to the Jamaican context and harnessed racial critiques and models to those of Marx. In doing so, the Black Power advocates of the late 1960s differed sharply from those Marxists who later founded the Workers' Liberation League and Workers' Party of Jamaica, and refused to confute race ideologies with Marxism, but analyzed the society strictly in terms of class, without reference to race (Munroe 1983). They differed also from Marcus Garvey (Garvey 1968), and from their Rastafari predecessors, who had consistently given priority to religious aspects and interpretations of the social structure, as well as from François Duvalier, whose noirisme gave primacy to African culture over race.

Black Power doctrines spread rapidly from the Jamaican campus to other branches of the UWI in Barbados and Trinidad. In Trinidad, as local leaders emerged, university students and faculty at the St. Augustine campus became increasingly involved in confrontations with the authorities in 1969. In February 1970 a situation arose that encouraged Black Power leaders at the university to launch public demonstrations, protests and marches in an effort to mobilize the black and East Indian working classes against the elite-dominated Creole government of Eric Williams, who had ruled since 1956. However, having long learnt to distrust the political appeals and promises of Creole leaders, the island's East Indians refused to respond, as for the most part did black workers (Nicholls 1971), who realized that by opposing Eric Williams and his government, they would merely open a path for East Indian politicians to achieve power. Thus, as in Jamaica, the Black Power attempt to change the social order in Trinidad failed. The prevailing plural structures of both countries served to defeat those challenges. Trinidad's segmental structure ensured that its East Indians refused to support the Black Power movement as a Creole program, and also ensured that the black working class remained aloof from so radical a movement, to avoid dividing their Creole segment and assisting...
the East Indians to power. Lacking such segmental divisions, in Jamaica both political parties closed ranks against the Black Power movement to preserve the country's hierarchic sectional structure and multiracial ideals, of which they are the guardians.

Neither the teachings and effort of Marcus Garvey, the doctrines of négritude, noirisme and Black Power, nor the Rastafari religion are intelligible outside of the socio-racial contexts and plural cultures that produced them and to which they were directly addressed (Lowenthal 1972: 280-292). Neither Marxism, functionalism as expounded by Lloyd Braithwaite (1953, 1954, 1960) or Raymond T. Smith (1967, 1970), nor theories of dependency (Williams 1944, Frank 1969) or the plantation society (Beckford 1972) can account for the differing contents, goals and structures of these racist ideologies, or their sources and histories, without detailed study of the plural contexts and conditions in which they emerged. Neither have all practitioners of Black Power expounded its doctrines, nor have they always sought to realize identical goals and values by the same means. To a surprising degree their differing ideas and practices have been shaped by their differing plural situations and experience.

Grenada, 1967-1983

In Grenada, for instance, without ever adopting the ideology, Eric Gairy, like Maurice Bishop who overthrew him in 1979, both personified and sought to establish Black Power, though in radically different ways. Following Tubal Uriah Butler's example in Trinidad, in his early days as labor leader and prime minister, Gairy participated publicly in Shango cult meetings at the Grand Etang (M.G. Smith 1963), and by other means identified himself with the 'African' culture and section of the Grenadian people (M.G. Smith 1965: 262-303, Singham 1968). As soon as possible he established diplomatic ties with François Duvalier of Haiti, and modelled his Mongoose Gang of habitual criminals on Duvalier's tontons macoutes. Gairy's hostility to the liberal political institutions Grenada had enjoyed before and after 1967 is well documented (Grenada 1975, Ambursley and Dunkerley 1984: 19-30, Searle 1983: 6-32, O'Shaughnessy 1984: 35-54). The number of voters registered in 1984 indicates the extent to which the electoral rolls were padded in 1976 when Gairy's party defeated the People's Alliance at the last general election (Daily Gleaner 1984). Gairy's regime also resembled that of Duvalier in its motives and implications, though differing in form.

Maurice Bishop first entered West Indian politics at a meeting "on Rat Island off the coast of St. Lucia in 1970 to discuss Black Power and talk of the prospects for political change in the Eastern Caribbean" (O'Shaughnessy 1984: 45). However, Gairy's reaction to the Black Power demonstration that Bishop led in St. George's in May 1970 was to assume emergency powers and create the Mongoose Gang (Searle 1983: 15-16, Payne, Sutton and Thornapy 1984: 8, Jacobs and Jacobs 1979: 95-96). Gairy's idea of Black Power differed radically from those of Maurice Bishop and his associates. In March 1973, in view of the island's impending political independence, Bishop and others formed the New Jewel Movement (NJM) to protest against Gairy's oppressive regime. In November that year Bishop and other NJM leaders were very roughly handled by Gairy's policemen and Mongoose Gang, an event that precipitated the general strike of January-March 1974. In February 1974 Grenada became independent, and in 1976 Gairy was re-elected on a dubious poll. Thereafter both Gairy and his opponents began to prepare for the confrontation that finally came on March 13th 1979, when the NJM seized power in a pre-dawn coup by scattering Gairy's small 'army', and proclaimed the People's Revolutionary Government (PRG) (EPICA 1981, Jacobs and Jacobs 1979: 121-141).

Despite hostility from the U.S. and from its South Caribbean neighbors, the PRG managed to convert the economic crisis of Gairy's last years into modest growth. In rural areas, estates acquired by Gairy and held by his government were reorganized and recapitalized by the PRG as experiments in state farms, worker participation, and land reform. From 1980 to 1983 the PRG pursued the path of a mixed economy, although eschewing parliamentary democracy and the rule of law. It encouraged businessmen to expand their activities under government protection, while consulting the people extensively on the budget and other matters, in place of the Legislative Council it had abolished (Hart 1984, Munroe 1984, Ambursley 1983a).

By the summer of 1983 a group of Marxist-Leninists within the NJM Central Committee had become dissatisfied with Bishop's leadership, with the PRG program, and with NJM organization, performance and policies. They demanded that Bishop and Bernard Coard, the deputy prime minister and leading Marxist in the NJM, should share the leadership. As the discussion proceeded, division deepened between the Marxist-Leninists who backed Coard and those who either supported Bishop or questioned how the joint leadership would actually work. Following allegations that he had initiated rumors that Coard and his wife planned his assassination, the Central Committee placed Bishop under house arrest on October 13th 1983. On October 19th, after being freed by a spontaneous demonstration, Bishop and several supporters, including Unison Whiteman, with whom he had founded the NJM in 1973, were executed at Fort Rupert, St. George's by members of the People's Revolutionary Army (PRA) (O'Shaughnessy 1984: 124-138, Manley 1983: 45). Along with the governments of Barbados and Jamaica, the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) then invited President Reagan to send U.S. troops into Grenada to eliminate the military regime that had replaced Bishop's government and 'restore democracy' (Ambursley and Dunkerley 1984: 12-16, O'Shaughnessy 1984: 103-150, Ambursley 1983a, Hart 1984, Diederich 1983, Caribbean Review 1983: 10-11, 14-15, 48-58, Munroe 1984: 70-71, 132-140, Sandford and Vigilante 1984: 163-165).

After less than ten years, Grenada lost its independence when its revolution destroyed itself. The Marxist-Leninists responsible for the deaths of Maurice Bishop, Unison Whiteman, Einstein Lewison, Jacqueline Creft and others hailed like them from that lower stratum of the Creole middle section which a generation earlier had rejected the ascensive orientations of the white top section and their colored supporters, and demonstrated a desire for change, mobility and greater rewards for individual achievement (M.G. Smith 1965b).

Once news of Bishop's execution reached the people, the new NJM directorate imposed a three-day curfew, following which Grenadians warmly welcomed the American invaders for apprehending those who had killed their leader and clearly intended to rule by force. Having initially put Gairy in power, the Grenadian folk, who are overwhelmingly black, twenty years later first divided their loyalties between Gairy and Bishop, and then progressively took the latter to their hearts. The Marxist-Leninists who destroyed Bishop had no idea of his popular support, but in any event they were not prepared to subordinate their own inclinations to those of the people in whose name they had proclaimed the revolution, being convinced that as an 'elite vanguard' they knew best. However, while Bishop, a lawyer and former champion of democracy, the rule of law, and human rights, erred gravely in repudiating them after the seizure of power in 1979, Bernard Coard and those who removed Bishop also erred in assuming that the people's will and love of Bishop mattered less than their own adherence to Marxist-Leninist principles, and that they could silence and subjugate the people by force (Diederich 1983). The elitist orientations and backgrounds of Bishop and Coard are evident in these differing but equally mistaken conceptions of the people's values and likely reactions, and in their attitudes to the 'black masses'. Being culturally, socially and educationally removed from the Grenadian folk, the NJM leaders had differentially incorporated themselves by monopolizing political direction of the island's affairs. But Coard's faction lacked the rapport and public concerns that guided Bishop's pragmatism and leadership style. Thus, having excluded popular participation, they had either to suspend their dispute or to resolve it, peacefully or otherwise, by themselves.
TRINIDAD, 1946-1983

In 1946 the British government conferred universal adult suffrage on the people of Trinidad and Tobago (T.T.). Till then, as a Crown Colony, those islands had been governed together by British executives responsible to Whitehall despite a token legislature partially elected on restrictive property franchise but primarily filled with the Governor's officials and nominees, most of whom were 'French Creoles' or local whites. According to the census that year, besides whites, who represented one-fourth of the population, 1 percent were black, and 14 percent colored or mixed (M.G. Smith 1965a: 11). Of the blacks, East Indians and most of the colored population, very few had any political rights. Thus until 1946 the colonial society differentially incorporated de jure local whites and other property natives on one hand, and most East Indians, blacks and brown people on the other.

Despite their shared political status, the East Indians and Afro-Creoles differed sharply in their social situations, economic pursuits, geographical distribution, social and cultural institutions, and relations with the British and other dominant whites (Braithwaite 1952, Rubin 1962, LaGuerre 1974, Ramesar 1976). While most East Indians were Hindu, many were Muslim and some were Christian. Descended from indentured immigrant workers, most Indians lived on or near the sugar plantations on which they worked, while others farmed nearby on their own. Few lived in Tobago. By contrast, most Afro-Creoles lived in urban areas, avoided agriculture and pursued other occupations. Perhaps the simplest, most revealing indicators of the radically different status and situations of Trinidad's East Indians and Afro-Creoles are the 1946 census data on their literacy ratios. While less than 10 percent of the black population and 8.5 percent of the colored could not read, more than one-half of the East Indians and rather more East Indian adults were illiterate (M.G. Smith 1974: 306). Finally, in 1946 when the country's population growth rate was roughly 3 percent per annum, that of the East Indians was so much greater than the Afro-Creole rate, that under universal suffrage it seemed merely a matter of time before the East Indians would outnumber the Afro-Creoles and have a permanent electoral majority. Till then their larger population ensured Afro-Creole predominance vis-à-vis the East Indians, provided they united and took political power from the British and local whites.

While East Indians were either Hindu, Christian or Muslim, Afro-Creoles were divided between two relatively closed and culturally distinct social strata, "the lower class and the middle class" as Braithwaite (1953: 122) called them, the former being predominantly black, poor and unskilled, while the latter were predominantly brown, more prosperous, and better educated. The brown "middle class" also felt much closer culturally to the whites than to the large modally black 'lower class' whose social exclusion expressed their de facto differential incorporation and status within the Afro-Creole community. Thus in marked contrast with Tobago, Trinidad society in 1946 was a complex plurality which differentially incorporated de jure its large Afro-Creole and East Indian populations, who lived apart, interacted little, had differing cultures and religions, and were organized and administered by the whites as distinct social segments with differing requirements and needs. Moreover in Trinidad especially, the Afro-Creole segment divided culturally into two hierarchically aligned social sections or strata, a small modally brown "middle class" and larger modally black "lower class." (Braithwaite 1953, 1954, 1960.)

With the introduction of universal suffrage the labor leader Tubal Uriah Butler formed a political party based on an Afro-Indian working class alliance which won several seats in the 1946 and 1950 elections with little positive effect. From 1946 to 1956 as Trinidad learnt the forms of representative government under the Westminster system, the British gradually transferred responsibility and power to the elective assembly which was dominated by opportunistic white and brown elite under the leadership of Albert Gomes, a Creole white of Portuguese descent. Throughout this period, party groupings, programs and policies had little place in the country's government since the legislature hesitated to demand greater political independence but waited on initiatives from Whitehall. In 1954, the East Indian leader, Bhadase Maraj, established the People's Democratic Party (PDP) with the support of the Hindu Maha Sabha. Thus despite its name, from the start the PDP appealed primarily to East Indians, and especially Hindus. In 1955 an outstanding scholar, Eric Williams, founded the People's National Movement (PNM), mobilized most of the Afro-Creole vote and despite challenges won a majority in the 1956 General Election and took power from the foreign and local whites who had hitherto ruled the country.

As its name reveals, Williams probably modelled the People's National Movement on the People's National Party (PNP) which his friend Norman Manley had founded in Jamaica in 1939. As national parties both the PNP and PNM were elite led and multi-class, but whereas till 1953 the PNP was socialist as well as nationalist, despite his Marxist-sounding rhetoric (Williams 1944, 1957, 1981: 210-216) and long association with
C.L.R. James, on pragmatic grounds as well as principle, Williams established the PNM as a liberal nationalist party and rejected socialism as its guide or goal. As we shall see, that ideological choice had important implications for the party and the emergent nation-state.

As Chief Minister, Eric Williams pressed for greater local autonomy, but was diverted by the decision to establish a federation of British West Indian colonies. Following federal elections which the PNM lost heavily to the rival East Indian PDP, renamed the Democratic Labour Party (DLP), until 1962 when the Federation terminated following Jamaica's secession, T.T.'s march to independence was compromised by its federal involvements and uncertain future. Nonetheless in those years the PNM government launched its first Five-Year Development Plan to reduce unemployment, repair and improve the infrastructure and social services inherited from the colonial regime, and to foster economic development by attracting investment on the Puerto Rican model through tax incentives, factory provisions and other concessions. In 1961 when the country had its second General Election under universal suffrage, the proportions of votes cast for the PNM and the DLP respectively corresponded closely to the Afro-Creoles and East Indian ratios in the 1960 population census (M.G. Smith 1974:279). By then most Afro-Creoles, and especially the large black 'lower class', had aligned themselves under the PNM while most East Indians voted for the DLP. The political polarization of these two racial and cultural blocs, and their de facto incorporation as social segments, was by then complete. As for the once dominant French Creoles, the British administration having withdrawn, they had accommodated to the PNM administration and policies, which they could not oppose openly and sometimes supported (James 1962).

With this greatly increased electoral support, when the West Indies Federation collapsed in 1962, Eric Williams and the PNM demanded political independence at the earliest date, re-wrote the country's constitution to guarantee its citizens fundamental rights, and pressed ahead with their plans and programs for its development as swiftly as human and material resources allowed. Convinced that reduction of unemployment was the most immediate priority, the PNM tried to attract investments locally and from overseas by tax incentives and other provisions, while further increasing employment by road repair and building, housing and other government programs. In 1964 the PNM government launched its Second Five-Year Plan to build on the first and accelerate the country's development by the same broad program of job-creation, incentives to induce investment, improvements of infrastructure and the workforce, educational expansion and reform. That year the nation's population growth rate fell from 3 to 2 percent and seemed likely to fall to 1 percent per annum by 1980, thus promising an end to the unemployment problem. In 1966 in its third General Election the PNM once more severely defeated its chief opponent, the East Indian DLP, though with a diminished poll and share of the popular vote.

By then Stokely Carmichael and others in the U.S.A. were advocating Black Power as the best alternative to black subordination and dependence and most promising solution to its interracial conflicts and problems. In 1968 the Guyanese historian Walter Rodney, the region's leading Black Power spokesman, was refused permission to re-enter Jamaica to resume his duties at the UWI campus there. That decision provoked student protests and demonstrations and led to riots, after which the Jamaican government declared a State of Emergency, called out its troops, and surrounded the university. Having already adopted Black Power, the UWI campus at St. Augustine in Trinidad was disturbed and agitated by those Jamaican developments, which also seemed to threaten the UWI. To coordinate and guide the local Back Power movement a National Joint Action Committee (NJAC) was formed at St. Augustine, following which some extremists organized the National Union Freedom Fighters (NUFF), and over the next few months made desultory raids on such 'enemy' targets as banks, during which several people were killed, and the Afro-Creole community became increasingly insecure.

In June 1969, introducing the Third Five-Year Development Plan, Eric Williams responded to Black Power critiques of the PNM's policies by denying that racial discrimination was responsible for the lack of blacks among Trinidad's business leaders (Williams 1981:34). To increase black participation in commerce Williams proposed to encourage cooperatives, small businesses and farms and to distribute shares in government enterprises to their workers and the public. Having identified the primary source and concern of Black Power protests with the perennial unemployment problem, Williams committed the Third Five-Year Development Plan to further reduce unemployment levels by accelerating the country's economic growth through heavy capital investments in tourism, agriculture and industry and increased government expenditures on education, agriculture, roads, housing, water and other infrastructure, while extending local ownership and control of major economic resources. The PNM government having with difficulty negotiated acceptable accommodations with local and foreign capitalists and treated labor harshly, Williams failed to recognize the central Black Power thesis that in their economic policies
and relations with labor the PNM cabinet had identified themselves as the agents of capital. To those who regarded white capital as the oppressor of blacks, the PNM government was therefore a corrupt 'comprador bourgeois administration'.

As Carnival approached in February 1970, students from the university began to demonstrate for Black Power in Port of Spain, and later that month clashed with police. Arrests were made and a trial set for March 5th. The day before there was a large demonstration at Shanty Town outside Port of Spain in support of the accused students, and on the trial day there was a riot and rampage in the city. To increase their support Black Power leaders at the UWI appealed to East Indians to march with them to San Juan on March 12th without success. The East Indian community remained aloof, leaving the Black Power movement to confront the PNM government on its own (Best 1973, Nicholls 1971, Ryan 1972).

During the following weeks there were further demonstrations as Black Power leaders sought for support. On April 13th the deputy prime minister resigned. On the 19th the sugar workers, who were overwhelmingly East Indian, went on strike. According to Eric Williams (1981: 168), "the sugar workers and the workers in water were to march on 21 April, link up with the transport workers, to be followed on Wednesday 22 April by some action in the oil industry." After consulting the cabinet Williams had the Acting Governor declare a State of Emergency which triggered a mutiny among the soldiers who controlled the island's arsenal at Teteron, thus obliging the Government to negotiate privately with those leading the mutiny and avoid any action to excite further conflict, while seeking weapons abroad as quickly as possible. With the arrest of some officers in early May, the mutiny and Black Power 'February Revolution' came to an end; but their implications and effects continued to dominate the political life of the country for many years, and still exercise great influence.

Though it survived the crisis, the PNM government had lost so much support and credibility that it seemed likely to lose the General Election due in 1971. However, before agreeing to participate, the opposition parties, including the DLP, insisted on various electoral reforms. When the government rejected their demands they boycotted the elections, thus giving the PNM all 36 seats in the elected house, though only a third of the electorate voted (Ryan 1972).

By their abstentions, the electors and opposition parties had discredited the PNM government and denied its legitimacy. To defuse the situation and reassert its authority, the government appointed a commission to review the political constitution and recommend changes appropriate for T.T.'s future as a self-governing republic. Meanwhile the PNM pursued its economic program to reduce unemployment, develop and expand its economy, extend and diversify the public sector, and increase the country's independence by enhancing local control of the economy. The Third Five-Year Development Plan was duly revised with these goals as priorities in an attempt to meet the economic critique of Black Power (Williams 1981: 171-179). By expanding and reforming the educational system to provide vocational training, by increasing its house-building program, distributing shares in various state firms to workers and others, and by levying extra taxes to finance special employment programs, the government's National Reconstruction effort accelerated the drift of youth from country to town and the creolization of younger East Indians in school and other sectors of public education. Following the sharp rise in oil prices initiated by OPEC in 1973, as its oil revenue steadily increased, so did the government's investments in public utilities, institutions, and enterprises to produce petro-chemicals, ammonia, fertilizers and steel, designed to reduce the country's dependence on oil and lay the basis for its future as a diversified industrial economy. In consequence from 1974 to 1982 Trinidad and Tobago enjoyed unprecedented prosperity, thanks primarily to OPEC's price hikes. Unemployment levels fell as the government poured surplus oil revenues into one project after another in a frenzied effort to generate an independent economic 'takeoff' while oil prices were high. In the process the PNM government and public administration exposed their managerial shortcomings and inefficiencies, and were widely accused of corruption.

Following the adoption of a republican constitution with a lower voting age and other minor constitutional reforms, the country prepared for its fourth General Election under PNM rule in 1976. By then the people of Tobago, who are overwhelmingly Afro-Creole, had broken away from the PNM under local leaders and formed a separate party, the Democratic Action Congress (DAC). In 1976 the PNM's major rival was the United Labour Front (ULF), a new party based on the strategic alliance of the two trade unions that represented the sugar workers, who were predominantly East Indian, and the oil workers, who were overwhelmingly Afro-Creole. Though an alliance of those trade unions, as the campaign wore on the public increasingly saw the ULF as an Indian-based and dominated party, and a much greater challenge to the PNM than the ineffect DLP. In consequence on poll day, to keep the country's government in Afro-Creole hands, many Afro-Creoles who might well have voted otherwise rallied to the PNM as the only Creole party capable of defeating the ULF
success (James 1962). In this context of continuing segmental conflict of one kind or another, and agitated by persons whose future hung on their in periodic contests fuelled by suspicions, rumors, allegations and incidents and economy while seeking independence (Oxima 1968).

displayed little hostility to one another (Rubin 1962, Ramesar 1976, Creole elite won power and set about reforming and developing institutions under rival political parties, the two racial and cultural blocs were mobilized by foreign and local whites, under Eric Williams and the PNM, the Afro-Creole elite by their black 'lower class' failed to topple the government or change the regime. When electoral politics resumed in 1976 after the futile boycott of 1971, despite their disillusion (Ryan, Greene and Harewood, 1976), when confronted with the prospect of a radical working class government, to exclude the possibility of East Indian domination under the ULF, most Afro-Creoles voted for the PNM as the lesser of two evils. The leadership struggle that soon split the ULF and set George Weekes of the Oil Workers Union against his former ally, Basdeo Panday, and the East Indian sugar workers, demonstrated once more that when they clashed, the segmental solidarities and interests of race and culture had priority over those of ideology and class in Trinidad. By then Tobago's Afro-Creoles who formerly voted PNM had disassociated themselves and established their own party to pursue their island's interests, whether in alliance with the ULF as in 1976 or with the ULF and other parties of either racial bloc.

On March 29th 1981 Eric Williams, the PNM's founder and leader, died in office, having ruled Trinidad and Tobago for 25 years and transformed its social economy. Under the leadership of his successor, George Chambers, the PNM won another term of office later that year with 52 percent of the popular vote, promising among much else to rid itself of corruption and inefficiency while accelerating economic development. Unfortunately the new prime minister failed to track down and root out corruption in the party, the government and public service, and failed to improve the efficiency of state run enterprises. With the downturn of oil prices in late 1983, the economy lost its buoyancy and faced increasing debt service charges with dwindling foreign incomes. As adversity increased the PNM staggered on without new policies, while its leading political opponents, the ULF, DAC, and other mainly Creole parties, tried to sort out their differences and form a coalition to contest the coming General Elections. In the coalition they created, groups that had formerly represented the segmental interests of Afro-Creoles and East Indians joined forces with one another and with others representing working-class interests and constituencies, since only thus could they hope to defeat the PNM.

As this story shows, there were significant evolutions in the polity and society of Trinidad and Tobago between 1946 and 1983. Initially ruled by foreign and local whites, under Eric Williams and the PNM, the Afro-Creole elite won power and set about reforming and developing institutions and economy while seeking independence (Oxaal 1968). Until then, living apart within their diverse cultures, Afro-Creoles and East Indians had displayed little hostility to one another (Rubin 1962, Ramesar 1976, LaGuerre 1974, 1976); but, as one election followed another after the birth of the PNM, under rival political parties, the two racial and cultural blocs were mobilized in periodic contests fuelled by suspicions, rumors, allegations and incidents of one kind or another, and agitated by persons whose future hung on their success (James 1962). In this context of continuing segmental conflict between numerically unequal groups of disparate culture, race and education, sometimes at the expense of organized labor, the PNM's elite leaders negotiated accommodations with local capitalists, 'French Creole', Syrian and East Indian, as well as foreign investors, and promoted the country's development by capitalist rather than socialist means. Those policies and accommodations provoked the Black Power protests of 1968 to 1970. For lack of support from the large East Indian bloc, that challenge to the PNM and Afro-Creole elite by their black 'lower class' failed to topple the government or change the regime. When electoral politics resumed in 1976 after the futile boycott of 1971, despite their disillusion (Ryan, Greene and Harewood, 1976), when confronted with the prospect of a radical working class government, to exclude the possibility of East Indian domination under the ULF, most Afro-Creoles voted for the PNM as the lesser of two evils. The leadership struggle that soon split the ULF and set George Weekes of the Oil Workers Union against his former ally, Basdeo Panday, and the East Indian sugar workers, demonstrated once more that when they clashed, the segmental solidarities and interests of race and culture had priority over those of ideology and class in Trinidad. By then Tobago's Afro-Creoles who formerly voted PNM had disassociated themselves and established their own party to pursue their island's interests, whether in alliance with the ULF as in 1976 or with the ULF and other parties of either racial bloc.

In 1976 for the first time it seemed as though Trinidad and Tobago might soon find a viable alternative to the prolonged segmental conflict of East Indians and Afro-Creoles which, coupled with the oil boom and Eric Williams' leadership, had guaranteed the PNM thirty years of office and the Afro-Creoles prolonged political dominance. Ten years later in the National Alliance for Reconstruction, created as a multi-party coalition to defeat the PNM and to govern by compromise, it seemed once more as if the society would soon break with its past and replace the old segmental molds of racial politics by some less rigid framework for political alignment and action. That prospect raised great hope.

SURINAME, 1948-1984

Within a year of the NJM coup in Grenada, Desi Bouterse and other non-commissioned officers in the Suriname army seized power by a military coup and overthrew the government, having failed to win its support in an industrial dispute with their commanding officers. By then the civilian
government of Henck Arron and the parliamentary regime in Suriname were so discredited that their removal was welcomed rather than protested. To indicate how this disillusion developed, I shall sketch its background briefly.

In 1948, following the introduction of universal suffrage and a measure of internal autonomy, Surinamers of different race and religion established political parties to pursue and defend their distinct group interests. Thus Hindu and Muslim East Indians formed separate parties, as did Catholic and Protestant Creoles, while Javanese, the smallest of these racial and cultural segments, formed a single party, being all Muslim (Dew 1978, Hira 1983: 172-176). Creole denominational parties competed for support from the two Creole sections known locally as mulatta and nengre, which correspond to the modally colored and black lower sections of Jamaica, Haiti and Grenada, with due allowance for Dutch cultural and social influence, Suriname's ecology, and the high urban ratio of its Creole population. In those respects the Creole segments of Suriname and Guyana are most alike, followed by the Creoles of Trinidad. As in Guyana and Trinidad, in Suriname the great majority of East Indians or Hindustani live in the country, and few Javanese, Bush Negroes or Amerindians are found in the towns.

Under an outstanding black politician, Pengel, Suriname at first developed consociational patterns of government based on coalitions of various ethnic and religious parties. However, by 1971, while the Javanese and Bush Negroes represented 15.2 and 9.4 percent respectively of the country's population, East Indians outnumbered Creoles by 37.6 to 31.3 percent (Europa 1983: 1519). The political implications of these ethnic ratios proved too much for Pengel's policy of government by ethnic and party coalition. Thereafter the tendencies of ethnic parties to form mutually exclusive blocs steadily increased, as did the domination by mulatta elite of the Creole parties, which relied on large nengre votes for power.

From 1969 to 1973 East Indians dominated the government, but in 1973 a coalition of Creole parties in favor of independence from Holland won control of the Staten (parliament). The Creole prime minister, Henck Arron, duly negotiated a new constitution and Suriname's independence with Holland, despite opposition from the East Indian parties and community.

Independence was achieved on November 5th 1975, following the renewed flight of many thousands of Surinamers at a monthly rate of six to seven thousand (Hira 1983: 177). Most of the emigrants were East Indians and all fled to Holland. However, since many others left behind also wished to emigrate rather than live in independent Suriname, in negotiation the Dutch government agreed to permit Surinamers to settle freely in Holland during the first five years of independence, i.e., until November 5th, 1980. Holland also undertook to capitalize the Suriname economy by a development loan of over U.S. $1.6 billion during the next ten to fifteen years. On their side, the Creole government of Suriname agreed to guarantee its Hindustani population certain rights in the independence constitution, and to ensure that the new Suriname army drew its recruits from all ethnic groups. To replace the Dutch Crown as head of state, a ceremonial presidency was created, but executive power remained with the prime minister and cabinet, who were constitutionally responsible to parliament.

In October 1977, following further heavy Hindustani emigration, Arron's party increased its share of the popular vote without improving its parliamentary majority. The Creole coalition thus continued to control the legislature by the slenderest of margins, holding 20 out of 39 seats, and excluded their Hindustani rivals from government, until the coalition lost its majority in 1979 on the death of a member. To prevent his replacement and terminate the unsatisfactory situation, the East Indian representatives ceased to attend the Staten, thereby frustrating the necessary quorum and precipitating a constitutional crisis. In reply, for several months Arron and his cabinet administered the country without parliament, but in response to public pressure, they finally agreed to hold elections in March 1980. Given its orientation and policies, even before that parliamentary crisis, the government had lost support among nengre as well as Hindustani (Hira 1983: 178-180).

By the end of 1979 the Suriname army, which had been created at independence to replace Dutch forces, numbered one thousand, of whom 50 to 60 were officers and 200 were non-commissioned officers (NCOs). Following a prolonged dispute over wages, discipline, the command structure, and other conditions of service, the association of non-commissioned officers, BOMIKA, called on the government to dismiss their commanding officers. The government's refusal precipitated the coup that terminated the regime on February 25th 1980 (Hira 1983: 183-185). On taking charge of the country, Sergeant-Major Bouterse and his associates dismissed the civil administration, dismissed their former officers, and settled their wage claims and other disputes to their own satisfaction.

In August 1980 the president installed by Arron's government was
Cuban advisers, who also assisted in training the new People’s Militia, or neutralizing its Hindustani elements. To train those recruits, he relied on a coup in March. Martial law was imposed and a state of siege declared. 

President Chin A Sen and the Council of Ministers were dismissed and replaced by Bouterse and the NMC, who survived yet another attempted coup in 1981. In response Bouterse arrested the leader of the largest trade union, thus precipitating demonstrations and strikes. On December 15th 1982, almost certainly at Bouterse’s instigation, several buildings were destroyed, including the headquarters of the largest union, and fifteen leaders of important civilian organizations were summarily executed. The country’s borders were closed, and the university and schools shut down. The Dutch government then suspended their flow of aid. In January 1983 the regime survived its sixth attempted coup, following which two-thirds of the military officers were dismissed and Major Horb, a close associate of Bouterse in 1980, was executed. In the following months the NMC appointed a new civilian government drawn from two rival left wing parties under Dr. Alibux (Europa 1983: 1517).

Following the executions of December 1982, in January 1983 the American CIA considered the possibility of invading Suriname (Dew 1983: 29). Probably associated with that, early in 1983 the Brazilian military visited Paramaribo to make clear their opposition to the increasing number of Cubans in Suriname and to the country’s growing ties to Cuba and the U.S.S.R. When one of Bouterse’s leftist ministers, Sergeant-Major B. Sital, opposed friendly relations with Brazil, he was promptly dismissed, along with his radical associates. In July plans were announced to increase the army and police to 10,000 each and to mobilize youth brigades numbering up to 50,000 on the Cuban model. However, within a few days of the U.S. invasion of Grenada, the ambassador and a hundred other Cubans were expelled from Suriname. By then over one-third of the Suriname people, 200,000 out of 550,000, lived in Holland (Dew 1983: 29-30).

Despite his ties with Maurice Bishop, Guyana, Cuba and the U.S.S.R., Bouterse’s erratic political behavior shows that he has never had any firm intention of creating a new social and economic order in Suriname, nor any clear idea of how to do so. Instead, like Eric Gairy in Grenada after...
1967, he has had no firm and definite objective beyond the survival of his personal rule and regime. Accordingly the coup that Bouterse organized, like the various regimes he has directed, are best understood as demonstrations of his desire for power and determination to retain it, and of his sectional hostilities to Hindustani and mulatto Creoles. The support his coup and regime have had to date among the Surinamese Nengre indicates that such sectional sentiments were initially widespread; but it is doubtful whether there is now (1984) sufficient public support for Bouterse and the NMC government to sustain the regime.

GUYANA, 1966-1984†

In nearby Guyana, following independence in 1966, the People's National Congress (PNC) under Forbes Burnham retained power the next year in an election marred by extensive fraud and intimidation (Jagan 1966, 1974, R.T. Smith 1971, 1976). To offset the faster growth rate of the country's East Indian population, which already in 1953 outnumbered the Creoles, at Burnham's request the constitution was twice amended to facilitate increased PNC majorities in the elections of 1970, 1973 and 1980 (Thomas 1983: 40-41). The constitution of 1970 also declared Guyana to be a Co-operative Republic and replaced the post of Governor-General as head of state by an elected president with little executive power. Since then there have been no local government elections.

In 1973 laws were passed allowing the government to restrict freedom of movement and detain people without trial on preventive grounds. In 1974 the PNC identified itself as a socialist party, and undertook to nationalize all foreign enterprises and redistribute land. In 1971 and 1975 the country's bauxite mines and operations were nationalized. In 1976 the sugar plantations and other assets of Booker McConnell Ltd. were taken over in return for annual transfers of foreign currency. In 1976 Guyana provoked U.S. hostility by allowing Cuban aircraft to refuel there en route to Angola. In 1977 and 1979 the PNC government suppressed severe industrial strikes (Thomas 1983: 39). Following a constitutional referendum whose results were condemned as fraudulent, the general elections due in 1978 were deferred (Thomas 1983: 40-41). Early in 1979 the former Black Power spokesman Walter Rodney established the Working People's Association (WPA) in an effort to mobilize and develop unified national protest against Burnham's administration and policies. In July Rodney was accused of arson when the PNC headquarters went up in flames; and when he died in mysterious circumstances on June 14th 1980, his death was immediately and widely attributed to Burnham by anti-imperialist leaders, parties, and ordinary citizens throughout the Caribbean.

In 1980 Guyana became a Co-operative Socialist Republic under a new constitution that created an executive presidency authorized to veto all legislation and to appoint and dismiss the vice president and prime minister, who as head of government leads the majority party in the National Assembly (Singh 1983, Lutchman 1982, Thomas 1983: 41-42). The general elections of 1980, which the PNC claimed to win with a 77 percent majority, were denounced by a team of international observers as 'the most flagrant fraud' (Thomas 1983: 41).

By these and other means, including the free use of police harassment and such strong-arm gangs as the 'House of Israel' to intimidate and eliminate opposition, Burnham transformed and impoverished Guyana (Latin America Bureau 1984, Dunkerley 1984, Thomas 1983: 43-45, Tennessee 1982), while incorporating over 80 per cent of the country's major economic assets and activities in the public sector. To manage these operations and resources, Burnham created several parastatal bodies and staffed them liberally with Afro-Guyanese bureaucrats and technicians. Though they are citizens, members of the large East Indian majority have played a diminishing part in the state since 1964. While still supporting Cheddi Jagan and the PPP, they have been rendered powerless by Burnham's electoral rules and procedures and are marginalized from the political and economic arenas under PNC control. Though the 1980 constitution provides for an ombudsman and includes a Bill of Rights that guarantees freedom of property, religion, expression, association, assembly, movement, and freedom from discrimination, it has notably failed to fulfil its promise, due primarily to political control of legal processes. Those disaffected persons and opponents of the regime's policies and methods who remain in Guyana are harshly dealt with by the PNC, the police, strong-arm gangs, and if necessary by the army, which increased steadily under Burnham to over five thousand by 1980, almost all being Afro-Guyanese.

As the world recession deepened and local productivity fell, Guyana's economic decline accelerated, aggravated by the inefficient and

† As indicated in the introductory note, this was written in 1984 before the death of Forbes Burnham and has not been updated.
corrupt parastatal organization and management of its major sectors (Tennessee 1982, Thomas 1983, Latin America Bureau 1984). Nonetheless, the WPA founded by Rodney in 1979 has made little headway in mobilizing and uniting Guyanese workers of East Indian and black race. Even today, under the intellectual leadership of C.Y. Thomas, an economist at the University of Guyana, its support comes mainly from those Afro-Guyanese intellectuals who are dissatisfied with the regime that Burnham established. As in 1955-56, when Burnham and his associates quit the PPP, so today; segmental contraposition of East Indians and Afro-Guyanese frustrates the efforts of dedicated and able leaders to unify workers of differing culture and racial stock. In consequence the leader and party that represent the large black Creole segment now control the resources and organs of state, and use them as they deem fit.

In its systematic and extensive discrimination against East Indians, Burnham fashioned Guyana after his concept of a model Black Power state even more fully than François Duvalier did in Haiti, since Burnham's socialist state, which operates in favor of Afro-Guyanese, subsumes most of the Guyanese economy. Notwithstanding the differences of form, content and context in their regimes, the parallels between Burnham and Gairy, and between both and Duvalier, in their personal styles, methods and aims, are many and deeply revealing. Notably, as typical Creole hierarchic pluralities, Grenada and Haiti lack the multiracial composition and modally segmental structure of Guyana and Suriname. Yet, despite formal differences in their regimes, the similar orientations, methods and styles of Gairy, Burnham and Duvalier identify the sectional composition and hierarchic order of Creole communities, whether separate and autonomous or enclosed within some larger society, as the generative sources of personalized Black Power as well as the ideology.

Though Trinidad has so far been more fortunate, in structural essentials its political development parallels Guyana's. In Trinidad, the People's National Movement (PNM) has ruled since 1957, having then preempted the votes of the Creole population, and has always enjoyed their support to defeat East Indian parties and exclude them from power. As in Guyana, so in Trinidad in 1970, those Black Power leaders who opposed the PNM failed to mobilize workers of both races, since the island's East Indians distrusted Creole politicians and their promises, while its black workers refused to challenge the elite government for fear of disrupting the Creole political hegemony and facilitating East Indian access to power. Given Guyana's cultural divisions and racial antagonisms, there was little chance that the usual processes of civilian politics would remove or replace Burnham's regime during his lifetime. Whether and how that might happen under his successors remains to be seen.

JAMAICA, 1972-1984

A rather different set of developments occurred in Jamaica following the general election of 1972, when the People's National Party (PNP) under Michael Manley, its founder's son, won a landslide victory over the ruling JLP after a campaign that stressed the country's need for social change. Manley's book, *The Politics of Change*, published in 1973, expresses his goals and perceptions of the country's problems at that time, and the methods by which he then hoped to fulfill the people's mandate. However, by 1972, and increasingly thereafter, having attracted several prominent members of the Black Power movement whose criticisms and protests had borne no fruit in the late sixties, the PNP had assimilated various Black Power orientations and ideas (Ambursley 1983b: 81). Such orientations accorded closely with the mood and aims of the new PNP government, and with the general demand for social change and racial redress.

In 1973 the PNP government unilaterally increased its revenues from bauxite and alumina by a levy, and announced its decision to acquire majority shares in that industry. In 1974, after Manley's overtures to the affluent white and colored elites had borne little fruit and had failed to halt the flight of capital, the PNP declared its commitment to democratic socialism, and set out the goals and policies that that implied (PNP 1974).

Having established friendly relations with Cuba and learnt of South Africa's operations in Angola, in 1975 the PNP government supported Castro's decision to assist Augustino Neto's government in that country. While visiting Jamaica shortly after, Henry Kissinger indicated his government's dissatisfaction with Manley's stance on that issue. Five months later, in January 1976, the guerilla war between armed groups of JLP and PNP supporters in Kingston, the capital, escalated abruptly. For months the violence continued, despite attempts by police, by churchmen, by other civic leaders, and by the government to halt or reduce it. Other approaches having failed, on June 19th 1976 the PNP government declared a state of emergency, and shortly afterwards announced its intention of holding a general election later that year.

In December 1976 the PNP was re-elected on a platform of demo-
By January 1977 the PNP government had to decide how best to deal with the escalating economic crisis that faced the country as a consequence of its increasing import bills, declining exports, and the inflationary effects of government policies and excessive expenditure. The government’s early efforts to increase revenues from the bauxite-alumina industry, followed by its initiative in establishing the International Bauxite Association of exporting countries, had provoked reactions in Washington, but did not materially fulfill their hopes, due primarily to sharp increases in the oil price initiated in 1973 by OPEC, and to the world economic recession. Lacking feasible alternatives, after months of agonized debate, the government decided to seek a loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), against the advice of the new cadre of Leftist advisers and technicians who had been recruited from the university and elsewhere by its Black Power members.

Thereafter the influence of these racialized leftists on party counsels, organization and policies increased rapidly until it provoked a bitter and protracted intra-party struggle between the new militants drawn from the lower level of the Creole middle section and the old leadership identified mainly with its upper strata. Essentially, the emergent new political elite wanted to adopt and integrate Black Power ideology with Marxist theory and measures as a guide for political action by the PNP government. In October 1977 the government failed its first quarterly IMF test, and failed again the following year, thereby forfeiting claims to further loan disbursements. These developments reactivated and intensified the intra-party struggle of Leftists and Centrists concerning the most appropriate bursements. These developments reactivated and intensified the intra-party struggle of Leftists and Centrists concerning the most appropriate

was lifted. The JLP and its allies then stepped up their critique and campaigns against the PNP’s economic and social programs and administration. In response to such pressures, under the influence of its leftists, the PNP turned increasingly to Cuba for assistance, encouragement and advice, at government and party levels. The Cuban government sent teams to strengthen the island’s medical service and to construct a new secondary school, and Fidel Castro paid an official visit to Jamaica. Squads of PNP youth went to Cuba at intervals for training in construction and other skills as brigadistas.

The U.S. government was understandably disturbed at Jamaica’s increasing dependence on Cuba. Locally the JLP launched a strident anti-communist and anti-Cuban crusade, to which ruling PNP leftists responded by emphasizing their attachments to Cuba and its Marxist institutions. The U.S. government supported the JLP campaign against Manley’s government and steadily increased the number of CIA personnel in Jamaica, while discouraging tourism, the stockpiling of bauxite imports, new American investments, and proposals that U.S. banks should reschedule their Jamaican loans or interest payments. As political violence continued to rise in Kingston, the police established a plain-clothes squad to eliminate known and suspected killers, thereby augmenting the slaughter.

Given continued violence and the country’s economic collapse, on March 22nd 1980 Michael Manley announced his government’s decision to hold a general election later that year. Police reports of the numbers killed in the capital each month that year tell the dark tale of the ensuing campaign. In January, 33 were killed; in February, 27; in March, when the election was announced, 24; in April, 48; in May, 52; in June, 80; in July, 133; in August, 54; in September, 64; and in October, the election month, over 94. These figures refer only to those killed by civilians in the capital. They exclude those destroyed by fire or killed by the police and army. By comparison with the calendar year 1979, when 267 were killed by civilians in the capital, for the first ten months of 1980 the police listed 629, two and a half times the total of the preceding twelve months (Jamaica 1980). To this we should perhaps add the number of that number to include police and soldiers killed by gunmen, and civilians killed in this period by the security forces. In 1980, 32 police were killed by civilians, twice the number shot in 1979. From October 1st 1980 to February 28th 1981 another 253 were killed by civilians and 149 by police or soldiers (Daily Gleaner 1981). Thus the number killed in the capital between January 1st and October 30th 1980 certainly exceeded 700. Clearly the Jamaican general election of 1980 included both military and political campaigns (Manley 1982). Whether the island’s young demo-
ocratic institutions and traditions will survive that struggle remains obscure more than six years later, even though in 1980 the Jamaica Labour Party under Edward Seaga had returned to office with the largest electoral majority and number of parliamentary seats in the history of Jamaican general elections.

The PNP leadership of 1980, old and new, moderate or Black Power leftist, were greatly surprised by their defeat and shocked by its magnitude, having been led by the party secretariat, the national executive committee and the constituency groups, all of which were then controlled by the racialized left, to expect another resounding victory. However, in many areas, fearing for their personal safety, PNP constituency workers did less and less house-to-house canvassing as the campaign drew to its close, and misled the party headquarters by returning optimistic 'guessedimates' of local PNP majorities. The Black Power ideology and leftist policies with which the PNP had become increasingly identified since 1977 had alienated that large portion of the Jamaican electorate committed to parliamentary institutions and the two-party system. The people feared Communism, distrusted Cuba, admired and supported the U.S.A. in its struggle with the U.S.S.R., and resented the leftist racial-political rhetoric and conduct of some PNP ministers and political leaders, together with the country's increasing involvement with Cuba and the U.S.S.R. (Stone 1982). The JLP's landslide victory was virtually guaranteed by the culturally inappropriate rhetoric, policies and symbolic gestures of the PNP leadership under the influence of Black Power and racialized Marxism. Notably, rather than join the PNP before or after 1972 as the shortest route to power, Jamaican Marxists who refused to confuse race and class remained aloof and organized their own party, the Workers' Party of Jamaica (WPJ) (Munroe 1982, 1983, Ambursley 1983b: 89-91).

Choosing to forget the resounding defeat in 1962 of Millard Johnson's "black man's party" or to deny its relevance for them, the PNP's racialized leftists mistook their own social identities when presenting themselves as natural leaders of the large black lower section of Jamaican society on grounds of race and color, despite their widely different social, educational and economic positions. No amount of symbolic gesturing could bridge that gap. Indeed the rhetoric and postures of PNP leaders who sought the majority black vote by such means alienated sufficient numbers of that social section to ensure the JLP victory, despite their general attachment to democratic socialism and to Michael Manley personally.

For their part, Seaga, the JLP and their American allies and backers correctly sensed and fostered these public reactions. On returning to power, Seaga immediately reopened negotiations with the IMF, restored warm relations with Washington, and expelled the Cuban ambassador. Nonetheless, despite the long promised support of President Reagan's Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), in July 1984, when this essay was first drafted, the Jamaican economy was in very poor shape, and remains so today. Prospects of early public protests and official repression loom large, and the island's future is at best ambiguous. When the 'black masses' voted overwhelmingly against the party whose spokesmen had identified themselves with the racist themes and leftist objectives of Black Power ideology, the commercial sector of the two upper sections reasserted its political predominance; and, despite protests, they have exploited that position with little restraint from Seaga's government.

Despite official claims to the contrary, the Jamaican economy has failed to demonstrate the 'deliverance' promised by the JLP in 1980. Unemployment has increased together with the costs of basic commodities, while wages lag far behind. There has been much less foreign investment in the island than the JLP led voters to expect, and as long as U.S. interest rates are high, there is little reason to expect much more. Despite approval of President Reagan's CBI proposal by the U.S. Congress in 1983, economic conditions had so severely reduced public support for the JLP early that year that a PNP victory at the next general election seemed likely (Stone 1983). However, following the U.S. invasion of Grenada, which the Jamaican government solicited and which the country supported in visceral reactions against Marxism and the execution of Bishop by his Marxist opponents, Seaga stirred the people's deep anti-Communist sentiment, and called a snap election on December 15th 1983. That election was held on an obsolete electoral roll despite an agreement made by the parties in 1979, at Seaga's insistence, that the voters' roll would be updated by a non-party electoral commission before any future elections, and despite the PNP's refusal to contest the election on those grounds. In consequence, though not a one-party state, since December 1983 Jamaica has had a one-party parliament. Seaga may thus be halfway towards eliminating the multi-party democratic system which has no place in the East Asian model of economic development he is believed to admire (Berger 1984). The probabilities of early protests and official repression are obvious; and following PNP victory in the local government elections of July 1986, extensive use of gun warfare and terror in the capital and countryside when the next general election is held in 1988-89 cannot be ruled out.
3. REVIEW AND ANALYSIS

COMPARISON AND THE FUTURE

The cases reviewed demonstrate that the internal forces that generated, opposed and guided these differing attempts at social change were rooted in conditions and components of the plural structure specific to each of these societies. The main external conditions and forces that influenced, obstructed and sometimes reversed these processes of social change have recently reflected American political interests and power. In such segmental pluralities as Trinidad, Guyana and Suriname, the political competition of large racial and cultural blocs has tended to produce a virtual monopoly of power and state resources by representatives of one social segment to the exclusion of others. In such situations when, as in Trinidad, the Creole segment has a sufficient demographic majority to ensure its political dominance, civilian politics of a democratic kind based on multiple parties will normally prevail, the ruling group being drawn mainly from the middle section of the Creole hierarchy. However, when the Creole segment is a demographic minority, as in Guyana, under civilian rule regimes like Burnham's are likely as long as they are viable. In such conditions, though its leaders are drawn from the middle section, the regime will be based on the predominantly black majority of the Creole segment, who will be over-represented in the police and army. Alternately, if the military seize power in such situations, as happened in Suriname, they will normally entrench their domination of the society by recruiting further troops from that section of the Creole segment to which their leaders belong. Thus our data indicate the decisive significance of their demographic and social compositions for the political organization and development of multiracial segmental Caribbean pluralities.

In all three multiracial societies the sectional differences and antagonisms of the black majority and ranking elite in the Creole segment are transparent and decisive. In Trinidad, the Black Power protests of 1970, like the WPA movement in Guyana, sought without success to mobilize and unify East Indian and black workers against the governing Creole elite. Both protest movements derived their leadership, inspiration and ideology from the lower stratum of the middle ranking Creole section, to which the black intelligentsia belong. However, while the WPA in Guyana is anti-racist, leaders of the anti-government movement in Trinidad invoked Black Power to mobilize black workers against the Creole elite leaders of the PNM, and thereby alienated the East Indians. As we have seen, despite these differences, both appeals were frustrated by the similar structures of their plural contexts, which obliged the black lower sections of the Creole segments to stand by their leaders in government in order to prevent the East Indians, who remained aloof and loyal to their ethnic leaders in both contexts, from taking power. Unless these states fall under foreign control, it seems unlikely that the social structures and forces that have so far shaped their political developments will cease to do so in the near future.

Of the other regimes reviewed, Haiti offers little security threat to the U.S.A. and little interest to the Soviet bloc, being powerless and impoverished as the result of nearly two centuries of sectional strife. Under the Duvalier dynasty, black leaders have stabilized their sectional domination by new policies and structures, including the tontons macoutes and vodun cult groups. Whereas forty years ago James Leyburn (1941) saw little likelihood of future black rulers in Haiti (Nicholls 1979: 190), it seems now that the dominant blacks have little to fear from the mulatto elite, their old antagonists; but how long the regime will persist, we cannot say. Since Haiti enjoys American political protection and is so proximate, it is unlikely to be troubled by its neighbors, Cuba and the Dominican Republic. Thus in the near future its political development should reflect interaction between American interests and the balance of local forces. It is therefore likely that when no longer viable, the Duvaliers and their regime could be replaced by other black leaders, presumably with backing from the armed forces and some mulattoes.

The Jamaican and Grenadian experiences also illustrate the decisive effects of their plural composition and structures in shaping their political development, as well as the overriding power of the U.S.A. in the Caribbean. In both countries the de jure differential incorporation of their colonized people was finally revoked following mass protests by the black folk section, under leaders drawn from the active lower margin of the Creole middle section (M.G. Smith 1965a: 69), such as Bustamante in Jamaica in 1937-39, or from the active upper margin of the folk section, such as Eric Gairy in Grenada in 1951. In both cases these popular leaders were later successfully challenged by others from the middle section whose education, occupation, cultural background and social experience differed sharply. In Jamaica initially the political balance and leadership excluded party violence. Bustamante and his rival, Norman Manley, were first cousins and held power in turns until both retired from politics. But in Grenada, after
alternating in office with his former lieutenant, Herbert Blaize, who founded the Grenada National Party, Gairy was attacked more severely by the NJM and replied with repression, until they seized power by coup.

In Jamaica the two multi-class mass parties created by Manley and Bustamante sought social change by means of economic development, and for a time within the West Indian Federation of 1957-62. However satisfactory to those above, neither program materially improved the social and economic condition of the large lower section, or reduced its cultural and material disadvantages. Accordingly, beginning with the Rastafari protests of 1960, the two-party regime was increasingly challenged and criticized by spokesmen of the disadvantaged 'masses', including Millard Johnson in 1962 and the Black Power intelligentsia of 1968-69, who hailed mainly from the lower stratum of the Creole middle section. Defeated on the streets by the police and the JLP in 1968, many of these Black Power advocates later chose to enter the PNP and campaigned effectively against the JLP in the election of 1972. Its victory then committed the PNP to improve the social and economic conditions of the poor, ill-educated Jamaicans who are overwhelmingly black. During the next few years, Black Power leftists won control of the PNP from its traditional leaders, whose attitudes and policies they found inadequate. Increasingly, the government's policies illustrated its changed orientation; and increasingly the electorate was alienated by the racism, rhetoric and Marxist/Cuban orientations of the PNP left, which seemed to confirm JLP allegations and criticisms. Torn by violence and economically crushed, in October 1980 Jamaica voted massively for Seaga and the JLP to put an end to its political nightmare; but the country's hopes for recovery have yet to be fulfilled.

In Grenada, having seized power, the NJM proclaimed the People's Revolutionary Government (PRG) and established friendly relations with Cuba and the U.S.S.R., while the U.S.A. and nearby Caribbean states lined up against it. For three years the PRG withstood a diplomatic and political siege by the U.S. government and made impressive economic and social advances, with Cuban assistance, despite its straitened situation. To do so, the NJM generated widespread support and enthusiasm among the people by rallies and meetings that mobilized popular participation. It also won the co-operation of businessmen and landowners, despite their differing commitments and goals, by protecting their interests (Searle 1983, Hart 1984). However, with its predominantly neocolonial economy and non-parliamentary regime, this ambiguous polity did not satisfy those NJM leaders who were keenly committed to the Marxist-Leninist theory of society and revolution. In October 1983 that group removed Maurice Bishop and his closest associates from the PRG and the NJM, and thus precipitated the crisis that alienated the widespread public support which Bishop's leadership had won for the regime, while encouraging the country's hostile neighbors to invite the U.S. to invade the island in order to eradicate the rogue PRG and 'restore democracy'.

The conflict between Bishop and the Marxist-Leninist section of the NJM reflected their differing awareness of the people's wishes and their concerns for popular interests and support. Though heavily influenced by personal factors, including rivalry and ambition, those involved formulated the conflict as a clash over policy and organization between principled Marxist-Leninists led by Coard, and petit bourgeois pragmatists led by Bishop. While the Marxist-Leninists, committed to inappropriate theories and models (Caribbean Review 1983: 14-15, 48-58), were indifferent to the people's needs, Bishop and his supporters also erred in abandoning the democratic institutions and rule of law on which the country had relied for protection against such violence as Gairy had used in the seventies, and the Marxists used on October 19th 1983 (Feuer 1983). In these respects, both Bishop and his Leninist opponents demonstrated the different views of the Grenadian 'black masses' that reflected their differing sectional identities and culture, as well as their personalities and ideologies. Thus the tragic developments of October 1983 in Grenada reveal the political implications of its plural society and culture with compelling clarity and force. They also illustrate the U.S. government's concern with Caribbean developments, and its readiness to intervene against local leftist regimes whenever opportunity allows. It is most unlikely that these U.S. policy orientations will evaporate tomorrow; but it is also unlikely that the differing structures of the plural societies in Jamaica, Grenada, Guyana, Suriname, Trinidad and Haiti will cease to generate powerful forces for and against social changes of the differing kinds reviewed above, as long as current conditions persist.

So long as the Cold War continues, and perhaps for some time thereafter, since neither Cuba nor the U.S.S.R. are likely to abandon either socialism or one another, and since the U.S.S.R. needs no more Cuba's in the Caribbean, given the power of the U.S. government, as well as its fears and hostility to Cuba and Russia, any future attempt to promote social, economic or political change in the Caribbean basin of which the U.S. government does not approve, will invite the application of U.S. power to arrest or reverse it.
Pluralism, Structure and Ideology

This review of recent political developments in Haiti, Jamaica, Trinidad, Suriname, Grenada and Guyana was undertaken to test the relevance of plural theory to Caribbean societies by asking whether and how similarities and differences of their plural structures and contents can account for similarities and differences in their recent political developments. Hence, having first distinguished the modally segmental pluralities of multiracial composition as Guyana, Suriname and Trinidad from such simpler biracial Creole hierarchic pluralities as Haiti, Grenada and Jamaica, I sketched their common geopolitical situation and summarized their recent political experiences, paying special attention to endogenous pressures and movements for social, economic and political change, on the assumption that the diverse nature, objectives and outcomes of those movements and programs should provide excellent material with which to test the relevance and validity of plural and other theories of Caribbean society. Though five of these six societies became politically independent during the period under review, they did so at different times and by different routes, and all six were swept by endogenous cultural forces to seek radical changes in the economic condition and/or social status of their large black populations. However, while explicit racial ideologies stimulated those political developments in Haiti, Grenada and Jamaica under Duvalier, Bishop and Michael Manley, they fell flat in Trinidad, Guyana and Suriname, despite Creole predominance in all those countries. Though the illegitimate regimes of Burnham and Bouterse demonstrate and pursue black political dominance, they have done so without ideologies of Black Power, Rastafari or noirisme, since in both countries the blacks are numerical minorities. By contrast, in Trinidad, where black and colored Creoles together constitute the majority, Eric Williams' PNM government withstood the direct challenge of Black Power leaders who vainly sought to mobilize the black population against their rule.

Like the PNP and JLP governments of Jamaica from 1955 to 1972, the PNM under Eric Williams sought social change through economic development. All three parties and their governments accordingly let the basic inequalities and divisions of their societies persist with little change, and disappointed the hopes and expectations of their chief supporters, the large disfranchised black population who had looked to them for substantial improvements in their situation. Under these conditions, racist ideologies emerged as bases for political critiques and alternative programs, and flourished, whether imported, like Black Power doctrines, or locally gener-erated like Garveyism and the Rastafari religion. Those ideologies intensified and focussed popular demands for change, and helped to bring the PNP to power in Jamaica in 1972. However, in Trinidad, where a large East Indian population confronted the dominant Creoles, the black lower section of that segment could not mobilize against the governing Creole elite without the risk of bringing the East Indian segment to power. Being more opposed to the Indian community than to the elite PNM leaders at whom the Black Power protests were directed, in 1969-70, as before and since, most black Trinidadians remained loyal to Eric Williams and the PNM and, like the East Indians, ignored Black Power appeals.

Since Creoles are demographic minorities in Guyana and Suriname, their structural contexts excluded public adoption of Black Power ideologies by Burnham or Bouterse. Both leaders were thus free to pursue whatever goals they wished, without either threatening or mobilizing East Indians and other ethnic blocs to oppose them, or inviting charges of racialism and inconsistency. Nonetheless, in differing ways, Burnham and Bouterse have both pursued and established Black Power, Burnham the more ambitiously and successfully.

Though actively canvassed by Black Power advocates, the segmental structures and multiracial compositions of Trinidad, Guyana and Suriname precluded adoption of that ideology by their black governments and national leaders, without preventing the latter from pursuing similar goals by methods of their own. In contrast, the hierarchic structure of such biracial pluralities as Haiti, Grenada and Jamaica, all of which combine large subordinate black sections with small colored and/or white elites, virtually ensured the overt adoption and pursuit of such ideologies and policies by their political leaders and governments. Of those movements, only Manley's government in Jamaica continued to uphold the rule of law and electoral conditions of political democracy; and, as related above that government was removed by those means. In Haiti, François Duvalier and in Grenada the NJM replaced the preceding 'democracy' and 'rule of law' by arbitrary and unconstitutional regimes in order to retain power without open challenge, much as Bouterse and Burnham have done in Suriname and Guyana. Although internal conflicts over their organization, leadership, methods and objectives finally led to the fall of the PRG and NJM in Grenada, François Duvalier survived several assaults from the margins on his regime, which became dynastic on his son's succession and which only fell formally when abandoned by the tontons macoutes, the army and the U.S.A. in the face of great public protest.
Thus, while the segmental structures of multiracial Caribbean societies preclude open adoption of Black Power goals and methods by their Creole governments and political leaders in times of peace, the hierarchic structures of biracial Creole pluralities generate these ideologies and seem to require them at this phase of their development. However, in hierarchic pluralities that maintain parliamentary democracy and the rule of law, as the failure of Millard Johnson's PPP in Jamaica demonstrated in 1962, racist political programs will not succeed unless experience has convinced the people that no other policies will address their needs. In such conditions, to win support, racist doctrine must either be fused with other appropriate ideologies such as socialism or Marxism, or it must adopt a religious form such as Rastafari, since it depends on popular desperation for success. Perhaps these conditions explain why in Caribbean societies Black Power advocates have adopted and racialized Marxist theory by equating race with economic class and racial protest with class revolution. To avoid such confusions, other Marxists have refused to accept these false equations, knowing that the different classes in these societies are racially mixed, and that people of the same race are members of different classes.

In Haiti during and after the American occupation the rigid caste-like divisions between the mulatto elite and the black majority deepened with the emergence of an urban black middle class, whom the traditional mulatto elite refused to treat as equals. Such mulatto exclusiveness merely renewed black antagonism, and intensified the sectional struggle for political dominance that had begun with Toussaint and Rigaud. In Haiti the subordinate black majority possessed a vigorous folk culture, rich in such African themes and elements as the vodun cult and secret societies, the Creole language, folklore, cuisine, community organization, land tenure, mating and family and so on, all of which the mulatto elite openly denigrated, having identified themselves and the country with French culture, language and institutions. Under these conditions, the primary emphasis of François Duvalier's noirisme on the value and unique richness of Haiti's black cultural heritage is easy to understand, together with his proclaimed intention to promote and protect the institutions of that culture in the state.

Though Duvalier belonged to the new black middle class of Port-au-Prince, in developing the ideology of noirisme, he avoided the complex problems of Haitian economy, including the great economic differences between his class and the black majority, their economic prospects, and his programs for their improvement. It is possible that while aware of the vast economic differences between Haitian classes, Duvalier downplayed these issues because as a leading member of the relatively prosperous black urban elite, he needed support from them as well as the black proletariat and peasantry. It seems, however, that, as he conceived and formulated it, noirisme was an essentially cultural doctrine, and not an economic one. Duvalier identified the noirisme common to all Haitian blacks by the Creole language and the institutions of vodun, kinship, mating and family organization, by their shared history and folklore, by their common concepts of gender, division of labor by sex, peasant economy, and subsistence activities. Thus for him the essence of blackness, noirisme, was primarily cultural rather than physical; and in his ideology, differences of economic status or condition had far less significance than shared black racial and cultural identities.

In the Jamaica of his youth, with its long history as a British colony, its large black population and minute black middle class, Marcus Garvey greatly resented the prevailing structure of racial inequality and subordination of blacks to whites and their colored supporters. However, lacking a folk culture as rich in African traits as that of Haiti, Garvey took the facts of racial difference, exploitation and pride on which to base his teaching. Given the then unchallengeable political, economic and cultural dominance of whites in Jamaica and the U.S.A., to preserve and strengthen black racial pride, Garvey urged his people to organize and work together resolutely for that cause, by segregating themselves socially and physically from the dominant whites, and by preparing to return to Africa as soon as possible.

Garvey's teaching was perhaps racist in the sense that he called on blacks to maintain pride of race by their individual and collective efforts, and to withdraw from all contexts of servitude to people of other racial stocks. But Garvey did not proclaim the superiority of blacks to other races, and thus avoided those themes that are most widely associated with racist doctrine and racist practice.

In Jamaica, Garvey's message gave birth to the religion of Rastafari even before he left the island for the last time (Smith, Augier and Nettleford 1960). In essence, that religion prescribed the spiritual and social withdrawal of its believers from the society of 'Babylon' around them, and prophesied their 'repatriation' to Africa/Ethiopia by the power of its Emperor Haile Selassie, the returned Messiah. However, unlike Garvey's teaching, Rastafari doctrine affirmed the innate superiority of blacks and claimed that that is most manifest in those it had redeemed by conversion from the snares and delusions of Babylon.

From these Garveyite beginnings different varieties of black ideology
and remained without serious challenge until May. Colonial administration, and without adopting any ideology except Rosicrucianism, Gairy retained the loyalty of most Grenadian black folk. Qualities that enabled him to personalize and translate it into status and sectional perceptions gave Gairy's leadership the charismatic status and administration, and to himself (M.G. Smith 1965a: 262-303). These congruent sectional perceptions gave Gairy's leadership the charismatic status and qualities that enabled him to personalize and translate it into status and wealth by questionable means. In doing so, despite periodic setbacks by the colonial administration, and without adopting any ideology except Rosicrucianism, Gairy retained the loyalty of most Grenadian black folk and remained without serious challenge until May 1970, when the Black Power demonstration against his rule that Bishop led in St. George's initiated the policy of systematic repression he pursued until the end.

Although Black Power asserts the right of blacks to control the communities or societies to which they belong in order to exclude their exploitation by others, like Duvalier's noirisme, it says very little about the differential distribution of wealth and power among blacks, or about the exploitation of blacks by blacks under present or future conditions. On these subjects, despite their religious orientations, the Rastafari Brethren are more perceptive, having distinguished and condemned 'black and white oppressors'. Thus, insofar as the Black Power movement in Jamaica strove to improve the material and political conditions of its disprivileged black population without explicitly recognizing the role of 'black oppressors' in promoting and upholding black exploitation, it was either devious or naive. In Trinidad the Black Power 'revolt' against the PNM government explicitly charged the latter with such roles and responsibilities; and in Grenada, similar Black Power critiques of Gairy and his regime generated the NJM and legitimized its coup. In Guyana, by contrast, Walter Rodney, though originally a leading Black Power spokesman, for structural reasons could not base his opposition to Burnham's regime on race, and founded the WPA instead, seeking thereby to mobilize both the East Indian and the Afro-Guyanese segments of the country's working class. Clearly, if Black Power legitimizes the exploitation of blacks by blacks, it has less ground for condemning the exploitation of blacks by others. Yet if Black Power explicitly or otherwise seeks to equalize the life situations and opportunities of blacks, whether within exclusive communities or in mixed milieux, its orientations are implicitly egalitarian and socialist, and its advocates must then give equally close attention to socialist literature and to the social and economic conditions of their communities.

By contrast, noirisme implicitly accorded legitimacy to black oppressors as well as black sufferers, provided only that all were equally committed to promote and sustain black culture and uphold its central institutions. In these respects, François Duvalier perhaps displayed a better understanding of local conditions than did Millard Johnson, the Rastafari, or the Black Power ideologues of Jamaica and Trinidad, who perhaps sought by that ideology to establish and legitimate themselves as new ruling elites, as Bishop and the NJM did in Grenada.

In their commonalities the diverse versions and applications of black racist ideology that have structured political developments in differing Caribbean countries over the last four decades reflect those sociocultural
conditions that are common to these plural societies, while their differences reflect the specific differences of their plural structures and historical contexts. The comparative analysis of political developments in these countries since World War II convincingly demonstrates the appropriateness of plural theory to Caribbean societies.

4. ALTERNATIVE THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS

Besides the plural approach to Caribbean societies a number of theories or models may be invoked, separately or together, to account for some or all of the developments and sequences outlined above. Of these, besides structural-functionalism, and modernization and development theory, the most influential are economic in emphasis and either conceive Caribbean countries as required by Marxist theory, as the plantation systems that historically provided their economic base, or as shaped by their dependency on metropolitan centers of the capitalist world system. Unfortunately I do not know of any systematic attempt to see whether recent developments in Caribbean Creole societies confirm any of these theories. Thus to evaluate the relative capacities of other theories of Caribbean society besides pluralism to account consistently, coherently and cogently for these societally distinctive experiences of political protest, I shall have to construct and consider the interpretations they provide for the case histories related above.

As dependency and world system perspectives overlap closely, their contributions to understanding the case histories related above are best taken together, with due attention to their differences. For present purposes these latter can be stated briefly. While dependency relations need not presuppose a world capitalist system, the latter does entail hierarchies of that kind. Moreover, while contemporary dependency relations can be studied with little attention to history, for plausibility and relevance the idea of a world capitalist system depends on detailed historical documentation of its emergence.

To begin with we may ask how do the divergent developments of these countries derive either from the dependency relations that differentiate them, or from their diverse places in the contemporary world capitalist system? To rephrase the question, how may world system or dependency theory 'explain' or account for these divergent developments, their geneses, forms and contents?

Throughout the period reviewed all the societies we have considered were heavily dependent politically, economically and culturally on their imperial masters and on other centers of capitalism. Even Haiti was bound to France by heavy indemnities for French losses in the revolution, and by bonds of French Catholicism, language, law and cultural history. Differences in the kind and degree of dependency between the other colonial countries were more clearly political than economic, and found expression in their differing political histories, levels of autonomy and progress to independence, since as colonies all depended economically on their imperial masters for capital, credit, markets, technology and organization. However, during their colonial phase the governments of Grenada and Suriname needed annual subsidies from Britain and Holland respectively in order to balance their budgets and finance their administrations. To that extent their political and economic dependency clearly exceeded that of Jamaica, Guyana or Trinidad.

Given their greater economic and political dependency, it could be argued by dependency and world system theorists that Grenada and Suriname were more heavily subject to imperial control than Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad, and were therefore more liable to violent or revolutionary upheavals, since their constant need for budget subsidies reduced their ability to undertake the kind of programs that protected the other countries from their 'revolutions'. Yet what did the 'revolutions' in Suriname and Grenada involve? Abrupt and forceful seizures of power by small closed groups occurred in both cases, military in one, civilian in the other. Thereafter the new rulers exercised power without free public participation; but whereas in Grenada the NJM and its PRG were ideologically committed and explicitly tried to transform the local society, nothing similar can be said of Bouterse or the NMC in Suriname. In any event, to attribute the coups in Grenada and Suriname to their greater degree of political and economic dependency on imperial finance ignores the fact that both countries had achieved their political independence prior to those coups, each of which arose at short notice in response to political and administrative developments that were wholly local in their genesis and significance.

World system and dependency theory cannot explain why Black Power policies have been pursued, effectively though covertly, in Suriname by the military regime, and in Guyana by the civilian regime of Burnham's PNC, to the disadvantage of East Indians and other groups in both coun-
independence, and its institutionalization linked, derived from the pioneer studies of the Haitian ethnologist, Mars (1928). The political triumph of political factors. Even political relations. The genesis of political developments in Haiti from 1935 to July 1984 and beyond, given Haiti's marginal relations with metropolitan centers of the world system. Though its society as it has been for nearly two centuries, the least dependent economically or increasing poverty?

As we have seen, both the NJM in Grenada and the PNP in Jamaica adopted some basic Black Power policies and goals, and tried to promote social change by implementing them. However, while the PNP took power in Jamaica in 1972 and lost it in 1980 by general elections which, though violent, involved extensive public participation, in Grenada the NJM won and lost power by violent and unconstitutional means with minimal public participation. Clearly those differences are neither due to the dependency relations of these countries nor to their places in the world capitalist system, but to their differences of political leadership and organization.

Can world system or dependency theory account for political developments in Haiti from 1935 to July 1984 and beyond, given Haiti's marginal relations with metropolitan capitalism and its long experience of increasing poverty? Of all the countries we have discussed, Haiti remains, as it has been for nearly two centuries, the least dependent economically or politically on metropolitan centers of the world system. Though its society and culture bear witness to Haiti's history as a former sugar colony of Bourbon France, neither its social structure nor its recent ideological and political development can be derived from contemporary dependency relations. The genesis of noirisme owes nothing to exogenous economic or political factors. Even Aimé Césaire's concept of négritude, with which it is linked, derived from the pioneer studies of the Haitian ethnologist, Price-Mars (1928). The political triumph of noirisme under François Duvalier increased the country's cultural independence, and its institutionalization via the tontons macoutes enhanced the state's autonomy at the expense of human rights. However, precisely in that situation, Haiti attracted the American political support and investments on which Jean-Claude Duvalier's government relied increasingly until, in response to public protest, the United States acted to displace the dictator while preserving elements of his regime, despite popular demand for their removal. Clearly, the public protests that repudiated the Duvaliers had their roots in local reactions to the regime and its repression long before the U.S. became its patron and financial support. These Haitian developments seem almost the opposite of expectations based on dependency and world system theory.

As these cases show, despite their significance, neither world system nor dependency theory consistently and convincingly accounts for recent ideological and political developments in the Creole Caribbean. As bases for detailed explanations of such specific developments, world system and dependency theories are severely restricted by their generality, by their exclusive focus on center/periphery relations, and by their inadequate attention to those local structures and conditions that normally determine the nature and course of social and cultural developments in any country.

The same kind of criticism holds for analyses based on the idea that the organization and development of contemporary Caribbean societies are determined by their origins as plantation systems. Though all these countries were historically organized as plantation societies, they have differed then and since in kind and degree as examples of the type. Of the set, during the eighteenth-century heyday of Caribbean sugar and slavery, St. Domingue and Jamaica were the most fully developed plantation societies, while Trinidad and Grenada were least so, and Suriname and Guyana, with their similar ecological conditions and large forested interiors fell between. However, while slave revolts in Jamaica, Grenada, Guyana and Suriname were rapidly suppressed, the plantation society of St. Domingue was destroyed by the Haitian revolution of 1792-1804. As in Haiti after that revolution, so in Jamaica, Guyana, Suriname, Grenada and Trinidad, following emancipation, black plantations emerged, but the plantation systems of Guyana, Trinidad and Suriname were maintained and extended by massive imports of indentured labor from India and other Far Eastern countries. By then although the plantation sectors of Jamaica and Grenada had contracted sharply, planter interests still dominated their politics. However, while Haiti in 1900 was a peasant society without plantations, and while cocoa and nutmeg estates replaced sugar plantations in Grenada, Jamaica then combined plantation and peasant economies almost equally, although favoring the former. Thus at that date Trinidad, Suriname and Guyana most closely represented the plantation model,
By 1935 there was only one sugar plantation and factory in Grenada, all others having been converted to cocoa and nutmeg estates on which large numbers of peasant-workers lived in diffuse relations with the owners-managers. Thanks largely to those quasi-familial reciprocities, Grenada escaped the labor disturbances of 1937-38 that shook Guyana, Trinidad, Jamaica and Barbados; but having subsequently dismantled those relations, by 1950-51 Grenada’s planters saw their estate workers unite under Gairy to strike for better wages and working conditions (M.G. Smith 1963, 1965a: 267-271, 280-287). By then, although plantations accounted for most of the agricultural wage labor in Trinidad, Guyana, Suriname and Jamaica, some economic diversification had occurred in all four countries, whether through tourism, mineral extraction, forestry, manufacturing, or peasant production of such export crops as bananas, coffee, cocoa, pimento and rice. Viewed abstractly, of these societies, by 1940 Suriname and Guyana best illustrated the model plantation society in structure and substance, followed by Trinidad and then Jamaica. After the changes that accompanied the conversion of its estates from cane to cocoa and nutmeg, only metaphorically could Grenada be called a plantation society, though that has often been done. Haiti, of course, had abandoned the plantation model after the fall of Henri Christophe. Accordingly, if the relative size and dominance of their plantation sectors determine the political, cultural and other developments of these societies, those developments should be most similar in Suriname and Guyana, followed by Trinidad and Jamaica. If Grenada in this period is regarded as a plantation society, then its development should most closely resemble Jamaica’s. However, we can make no inferences from plantation theory about Haiti’s developments during these decades.

As we have seen, political movements animated by Garvey’s teaching or by Rastafarian and Black Power doctrines tried to reorient society in Jamaica. In Grenada also Black Power ideology generated the NJM. In Jamaica, despite much violence, under Manley the search for change proceeded constitutionally, in Grenada by coup and Marxist party dictatorship. When in power both the PNP and the NJM governments justified their policies by populist and socialist appeals; but while the PNP, proceeding constitutionally, nationalized Jamaica’s bauxite resources, sugar estates, a leading bank, and set up a State Trading Corporation to control basic imports of food, drugs and building materials, in Grenada the NJM, despite their rejection of legal and constitutional restraints, having confiscated Gairy’s land holdings, left the island’s neocolonial economy almost unchanged and concentrated on developing the army and people’s militia.

In its military and economic policies as well as its constitutional status and legal practices, the NJM regime in Grenada resembled that of Bouterse in Suriname more closely than the PNP government in Jamaica. However, while the NJM leaders initially advocated Black Power and later upheld socialism, in a very different social context Bouterse set up and practised his own version of Black Power and relied on Marxist ministers and Cuban support without overtly advocating either Black Power or socialism. There is also an important difference between the NJM party dictatorship which destroyed itself by destroying its leader, and the military regime in Suriname, dependent wholly on the arbitrary will of the ruthless sergeant-major who set it up. Despite these differences, it is clear that Grenada’s development resembles Suriname’s more closely than Jamaica’s, though according to the logic of plantation theory, that should not be the case, the difference between Grenada and Suriname as plantation societies being much greater than that between Grenada and Jamaica.

Given their similarity as plantation societies, if such conditions regulated their development, we should expect developments in Guyana and Suriname to correspond most closely, followed by those of either country and Trinidad. In certain respects these expectations are fulfilled. Both Suriname after its coup in 1980 and Guyana after the constitutional frauds of 1968, 1970 and 1980 have had illegitimate regimes, and in both countries the regime and government have depended on the arbitrary will of a single despotic leader. Like Suriname, Guyana has also expanded its army and created a people’s militia, both forces, like the state police, being overfilled by black recruits. Likewise, in both countries while the governments of Burnham and Bouterse clearly pursue Black Power goals, neither proclaims that ideology, and the PNC in Guyana justifies its policies by socialist principles. However, unlike Suriname, Guyana still has an independent and vigorous trade union movement and maintains the facade of plural democracy. The civilian government of Guyana also differs from Suriname’s military regime in having nationalized almost all major assets that were formerly in foreign hands, such as bauxite, public utilities, sugar plantations and factories, and Bookers’ commercial interests, and administers these through statutory corporations predominantly led and staffed by Afro-Guyanese.

In these respects Guyana’s practice more closely resembles that of Trinidad than that of Suriname; but unlike Guyana, the regime and government of Trinidad are de facto as well as de jure legitimate and constitutional, and its political democracy and law are valid and free. Both countries
societies than dependency theory and the world system, the theory of composition of the plural societies created by European colonization and aged, and in Haiti precluded, the importation of large numbers of indentured workers from India or Java, thereby preserving the modally biracial composition of the plural societies created by European colonization and African slavery. Though more useful for comparative study of Caribbean societies than dependency theory and the world system, the theory of plantation society does not provide an adequate explanation of their diverse recent developments.

As a dynamic general theory of human society at all levels of development and in situations of all kinds, Marxism is often invoked to 'explain' recent developments in Caribbean societies and to predict their future. Marxism claims to explain the emergence, spread and decline of popular cults and ideologies such as Rastafari, noirisme or Black Power by reference to the economic positions and interests within the class structure of their advocates and creators. According to Marxist theory, the class structure of a society derives from the diverse relations of its people to the means and mode of production, which are held to determine its form and content. According to Marx, society develops as its mode or modes of production evolve to resolve or reduce various obstacles and contradictions that beset economic production. At any moment an economy contains two or more modes of production, one of which is normally dominant while the others are emergent or in decline. Together these modes of production determine the social formation or structure, of which the class structure is the most important aspect. Thus to account for recent ideological and political developments in these Caribbean societies, Marxism asks firstly, what are their current and recent modes of production? Secondly, are the relations of these modes of production similar or different in these societies? Thirdly, what classes and class relations constitute their social formations? Fourthly, how similar or different are the class structures and relations in these societies?

To some extent, in reviewing their recent developments and discussing the degrees to which these societies approximated the plantation model over the past fifty years, we have allusively indicated various features of their class structures. For example, since 1935 Haitian society has included, besides the old merchant class of mulattoes and Lebanese, an urban petite bourgeoisie engaged in the professions, civil and military bureaucracies of career personnel, peasants, fishermen and petty commodity producers, an urban proletariat, and increasing numbers of landless and unemployed people, many of whom have emigrated, illicitly or otherwise, while others, drifting daily to the capital and other cities, become in due course lumpenproletariat. Besides landlordism expressed in exploitive tenancies, metayage, peasant and small scale commodity production for nearby markets, the Haitian economy included commission agencies, mercantile capitalism, a professional service sector centered in towns, and the civil, military and police services. Though preferred by Marxists, such a list gives no basis for anticipating or understanding the meaning and relevance of
As we have seen, Rastafarian doctrine asserts the value of blackness without giving special emphasis to economic relations or change; and so do some versions of Black Power. Yet the rejection of Black Power and similar ideologies by the PNM and Trinidad people, like the public reticence of Forbes Burnham and Bouterse on this matter, can with no more validity be attributed to the class structure of their societies than can Gairy’s conduct and regime, or the public adoption of various Black Power goals and policies by the PNP in Jamaica and the NJM in Grenada, and their rejections by the Jamaican people in October 1980 and by the NJM’s Marxists in 1983.

As regards their class structure, modes of production, political history and culture, in 1970 Trinidad and Guyana were most alike. In both countries the government’s official aloofness from Black Power doctrine was paralleled by similar programs to recover their major economic assets from foreign owners for the state and the people. Within a few years both countries became republics. However, while the Guyanese regime, though de jure constitutional, was in fact illegitimate and brooked little local opposition, that of Trinidad was both legitimate and constitutional in fact as well as law. Neither can their modes of production account for the formal similarities of these regimes nor for their radically different substance and operations. Nor can various similar and differing developments in Grenada and Jamaica during the last forty years be convincingly attributed to similarities and differences in their class structures and modes of production, both of which were considerably more developed and complex in Jamaica. We are therefore obliged to conclude that, whatever its merit and relevance elsewhere, Marxist theory provides little basis for a detailed understanding of recent developments in Caribbean societies, being too general in its scope and too economic in its emphasis to give adequate weight and detailed attention to those non-economic attributes, relations and conditions that are so important to Caribbean people.

According to structural-functional theory Caribbean societies are consensual normative systems based on generally shared common beliefs, norms and values (Braithwaite 1960, R.T. Smith 1967, 1971). Their norms include such institutions as the rule of law, constitutionality and parliamentary government, political parties, free and peaceful elections, independent judiciaries, freedom of the media to discuss public issues and freedom of citizens to take peaceful political action. It is often asserted by exponents of this theory that developments such as those reviewed above are functional responses of social structures to the changing conditions and contexts in which they arise, and that they normally serve, whatever their content, to enhance the solidarity, consensus and integration of their society. Structural-functional theories of ‘modernization’ and economic development are particularly prone to reach such conclusions.

Such doctrines seem strangely inappropriate when applied to Desi Bouterse’s regime and policies in Suriname, to Burnham’s acquisition and use of power in Guyana, to the rise and fall of Maurice Bishop and the NJM
in Grenada, or to the long violence that savaged Jamaica in the seventies and escalated into urban guerilla warfare at general elections. Neither, given the abuses attributed to Duvalier's security forces and tontons macoutes or to Gairy's police and Mongoose Gang, is it easy to believe that their operations demonstrated or enhanced the normative consensus, functional integration and social solidarity of Haiti and Grenada.

Such indices as the per caput GDP and its distribution, foreign exchange account, labor force employment, migration and investment figures, literacy, crime rates and poverty scarcely demonstrate that the PNP administration of Jamaica from 1974 to 1980 was 'positively functional' for the society or enhanced its consensus, solidarity and integration; and the same can be said of the governments of Burnham in Guyana and Jean-Claude Duvalier in Haiti from 1976 on. Such statements should not be taken to mean that preceding or succeeding regimes performed much better. To interpret both the seizure and retention of power in Suriname by the army and the failure of the mutiny in Trinidad's army in February 1970 as positively 'functional' simply indicates that structural-functionalism retrospectively accords positive values to developments of opposite kinds, irrespective of their nature, source, purpose and context. More discriminating analyses presuppose the use of procedures and criteria that can identify all effects of any social process or event and measure their diverse implications for the society and its development. Unless such analyses are objective and comprehensive, the theory that informs them can shed little light on the genesis, dynamics, nature and outcomes of those ideological and political developments that have reoriented and transformed these Caribbean societies during the period under review. By such criteria, of all the theoretical frameworks that claim to illuminate Caribbean society, structural-functionalism perhaps provides least insight into the dynamics that underlie and generate their social development.

'Modernization' theory is a specialized application of structural-functionalism to changes associated with 'economic development' which it generally assesses for their role in building a 'modern society'. In the model 'modern society' that informs this theory, social relations are functionally specific, rational in their choice of means and ends, impersonal, universalistic or egalitarian and performance-oriented. By contrast, in 'traditional' societies interpersonal relations are said to be functionally diffuse, particularistic and ascriptive, heavily personal, laden with affect, and rather less rational in their selection of means and ends. For some writers, as a process and condition modernization assumes and accompanies economic development. Others hold that development and modernization may occur independently; but few sociologists would agree that 'modernization' permeated the Renaissance and has since always been to some degree present in Europe and its colonies. Some scholars claim, on structural-functional grounds, that development and modernization generally produce social tensions which give rise to public protests and sometimes violence, increased crime rates and other manifestations of social and cultural progress. However, most agree that such expressions of social malaise will disappear as society adapts appropriately to the processes of economic change and develops new functional arrangements and social equilibria.

Such a theory faces obvious difficulties in accounting for recent developments in Haiti, Suriname and Guyana. Noirisme, like the situation of Haiti in the late nineteen-fifties, bears a negative relation to modernization or 'development' of any kind; and the same is true of the military coup and regime in Suriname and of Burnham's personalized Black Power regime in Guyana, despite its socialism. In all three countries those developments arose neither as effects of processes of modernization and economic development, nor as efforts to promote them. The superficial 'modernization' and economic development of Trinidad under Eric Williams and the PNM from 1957 onwards may perhaps plausibly be called to account for the Black Power protests of February 1970, much as the limited 'modernization' and development of Jamaica in the sixties may be held to account for the Rodney Riots of 1968. However, the rise and fall of Michael Manley's PNP government which implemented various Black Power programs and materially improved the situation of the island's poor for some years can be no more plausibly attributed to modernization and development than the rise and fall of Gairy or Maurice Bishop and the NJM in Grenada.

Lacking reliable institutional indicators of modernization, if we use such familiar indices as the number of motor cars, telephones, radios, television sets, daily newspapers and the like per thousand population, then of these six countries, Trinidad displays the highest degree of modernization, followed by Jamaica, Suriname, Guyana, Grenada and Haiti in that order. It is also often assumed that differences in degrees of modernization correspond broadly with differences in degrees to which societies rationalize their goals and their efforts to achieve them in their differing political contexts. Political stability and economic development generally rank first in any 'rational' set of societal goals; and if the differing degrees of modernization indicated by the material measures cited above correspond with differing levels of economic development and political stability, then by comparison with the other countries, the experiences of Trinidad and Haiti during these decades confirm their positions at the top and bottom of
the list. However, the other four countries show no clear differences in their levels of economic development, political stability, adaptation to environment or rationality of aims and policies that might correspond with their differing degrees of modernization. In other words, as a set, these countries provide no such correspondences between their differing levels of political stability, environmental adaptation and rational choice of national goals and policies as are needed to demonstrate correlations between their diverse political and ideological developments and their respective degrees of modernization. This effectively means that differing degrees of modernization reflected in the material indicators and rates listed above do not provide a sound basis for analysis of a country’s development.

5. CONCLUSION

From this review it may seem that the ways in which these countries differ, and particularly the histories that have shaped their differences, account for the diversity and parallels of their recent ideological and political developments better than their plural features. However, being mere attributes of societies without any inherent dynamic potential, by themselves such differentiae could not generate recent developments in these countries, much less their similarities and differences.

That possibility obliges us to reconsider what this essay has tried to do and what it has done. Briefly, I have tried simultaneously to account for the most important recent ideological and political developments in these societies, and for their variant patterns. The analysis has demonstrated that the recent ideological and political developments in these countries have their primary source in their plural conditions. Similarities in the plural structures of certain countries underlay their parallel recent developments, while the differing plural structures of others underlay their differing developments. Moreover, divergent patterns of development in countries that have the same kind of plural structure reflected differences in those aspects of social composition that directly affect their plural relations. These are some of our findings.

Analysis has also identified certain commonalities and differences in the structures and recent histories of these six countries. For example, Jamaica, Grenada and Haiti display great similarity of structure and development as a group; and so do Suriname, Guyana and Trinidad. Differences of structure and recent development are greatest between countries of differing groups. Similarities and differences in the nature, source and conditions of recent ideological developments in these countries correspond broadly with similarities and differences of their plural structure and social composition. Though their political developments often differed widely in form, such developments in each set of countries had much the same conditions, nature and source, while differing from those of the other set. In the three hierarchic pluralities, while Duvalier was elected president for life and bequeathed that office to his son, Bishop won and lost power by coups that changed the regime of state, and Manley rose and fell by elections without change of regime. Despite such differences of form, all three leaders based their power on the black sections of their societies and gave that section’s interests priority in national policy. In the three modally segmental pluralities, though blacks are minorities in Guyana and Suriname, Burnham and Bouterse relied on black support, radically changed their state regimes, and ruled dictatorially while pursuing Creole interests. However, having a safe Creole majority in Trinidad for nearly three decades, Eric Williams and the PNM relied on a Westminster constitutional model for re-election to office, despite diminishing electoral turnouts. The formal differences of these political regimes and histories cannot obscure the essential dissimilarities of their nature, social bases and goals. Burnham, Williams and Bouterse all drew support from the large black sections of the Creole segment whose interests they promoted, constitutionally where Creoles were the demographic majority, as in Trinidad, but otherwise by other means.

A plural analysis cannot say why François Duvalier, Forbes Burnham, Michael Manley, Eric Gairy, Eric Williams, Maurice Bishop, Cheddi Jagan or Desi Bouterse presented themselves when and as they did and were accepted as champions of popular interests; but it does show that they were all strategically located in their respective societies, that each had a highly appropriate combination of structural attributes and personal qualities for the roles they sought; and also that the contexts and manner in which they became leaders were most opportune. Since plural theory deals in structural models of social systems, plural analyses of social processes concentrate on their structures and structurally relevant conditions. Since social structures generate structural problems, issues, and conditions for their pursuit, differing plural structures will present differing structural problems and issues that generate different conditions and alignments of forces that direct political action on differing lines. Conversely, similarities of plural structure will generate similar problems, issues, alignments of forces and conditions that subject political action to similar constraints.
Though plural theory cannot lay down the details of history, in plural societies, as elsewhere, history does not make itself. It is generally shaped by social forces that struggle in combination or opposition to realize particular interests and goals. In the Caribbean, from their foundations the histories of individual societies have been profoundly influenced by their plural structures and orientations. To illustrate, though theorists say the plantation system determined Caribbean social and cultural patterns, plantation slavery presupposed the differential incorporation of whites and blacks as free and unfree, masters and slaves, and thus the structural pluralism of their society. So did the numerous slave revolts the plantation system generated. Likewise, the flight of black slaves from plantations on emancipation was a direct response to their experience of those conditions. Similarly, given their political predominance at this period, throughout the Caribbean planters demanded new supplies of labor to replace those lost by emancipation. Accordingly, where sugar plantations still yielded high returns, colonial governments imported large numbers of workers from India, Java and elsewhere over many years; but even where plantations were no longer profitable, as in Grenada and Jamaica, planters obliged their governments for several years to import tied labor. Like the slavery it replaced, the new regime of indentured labor displayed in detail the differential incorporation of whites and non-whites, planters and workers, that it presupposed. In Haiti, where there were no white planters or plantations, no indentured labor was imported.

Thus current differences between such modally biracial hierarchic pluralities as Jamaica, Grenada and Haiti and the modally segmental pluralities of Guyana, Trinidad and Suriname show clearly how the dominant alignments and interests produced by their plural structures in the last century generated those similarities and differences of social composition that underlie their contemporary formations. In effect, similarities and differences of structure among contemporary Creole societies demonstrate the historical operation of appropriate conditions and interests in much the same way that similarities and differences of their recent ideological and political developments presuppose the similarities and differences of plural structure that generated them.

Others might reject this account of recent developments in these countries because of the elastic and apparently indiscriminate conception of Black Power it uses. Besides such explicit local champions of that ideology as Millard Johnson, Walter Rodney, Maurice Bishop, the Black Power rebels in Trinidad and Black Power PNP activists of Jamaica in the seventies, I have named Eric Gairy, Duvalier, Bouterse and Forbes Burnham as leaders who practised and frequently personified Black Power in their regimes, though they never openly proclaimed that ideology, and sometimes upheld others such as noirisme, Rosicrucianism or cooperative socialism. On these grounds some readers may feel that this account merely confuses Black Power with political control by black leaders, whatever their ideology.

While recognizing the salience of such comments, I do not agree that my presentation of Gairy, Burnham, Bouterse and Duvalier as Black Power leaders and representatives either distorts or falsifies their own perceptions or those of their followers. The criteria and concepts of Black Power are so ambiguous and elastic, the ideology so diffuse, and its programmatic implications so variable, that the exclusion of these Caribbean leaders as Black Power representatives could be criticized as cogently as their treatment here. Following in the wake of Marcus Garvey, Stokely Carmichael, Frantz Fanon, Eldridge Cleaver, Malcolm X and others, Black Power spokesmen sometimes advocated violent action to achieve Black Power, sometimes non-violence; sometimes advocated black withdrawal into 'independent' communities, sometimes the contrary; sometimes advocated socialism, sometimes not; and so forth.

In the Creole Caribbean context, Walter Rodney and his associates had to consider direct control of their societies, since, with their overwhelming black populations, anything less repudiated Black Power. However, given the many complex issues involved, the future organization, direction and nature of those Creole societies under Black Power inevitably remained obscure. In those circumstances Black Power spokesmen could freely invoke the teachings of Marcus Garvey, Rastafari, noirisme, négritude, Fanonism, Marxism, cooperative socialism, and other ideologies as consistent with their own, much as Walter Rodney, following Carmichael, classified Castro as black on the basis of his revolutionary goals and achievements. By such criteria, and by others of greater local specificity, it is undeniable that Duvalier, Gairy, Burnham and Bouterse in their societies and periods represented and personified Black Power to the common man, much as Cheddi Jagan and Bhadase Maraj in their day represented and personified (East) Indian power in Guyana and Trinidad. In short my usage of Black Power in this essay directs attention to its intrinsic ambiguity and to its multiple meanings not only for its advocates and representatives, but also for those they addressed. Notably, Walter Rodney, though once its leading Caribbean advocate, implicitly abandoned the concept when he founded the non-racial WPA in Guyana in 1979.
Finally, many might reject this analysis on the ground that it provides no fair test of the relative value and capacity of any theoretical alternative to pluralism to account for recent ideological and political developments in the countries reviewed. Critics may feel that the case histories of those countries are so unequal, biased and inadequate that they can neither provide acceptable accounts of the developments they discuss, nor appropriate data for the evaluation of alternative theories.

It may also be claimed that the inferences I have drawn from the social compositions and plural structures of these societies concerning their recent ideological and political development are in various respects untenable; and that besides various blunders in the presentation and interpretation of competing theoretical frameworks, my plural 'explanations' of those developments require extensive correction.

We may therefore hope that this essay will stimulate others to reanalyze the recent histories of these countries in order to demonstrate the superiority of alternative 'explanations' and inadequacy of the plural analysis. In that way, my critics might help to bring Caribbean social analysis to the stage in which it routinely combines comparative and historical data from several societies to test the validity of competing social theories.

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