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A HAUSA KINGDOM: MARADI UNDER DAN BASKORE, 1854-75

M. G. SMITH

I


When the Fulani under Umaru Dallaji finally overcame the Katsina Hausa and took the city after a bitter struggle and protracted siege in 1807, the defeated Hausa ruler, Magajin Halidu, fled with some of his close kin and servants north-eastwards to Tsirkau in Daura territory, where he is said to have thrown himself down a well in a fit of despair (Barth, 1890; Vol. 1, 261; Daniel, *passim*; Urvoy, 1936: 238; Palmer, 1928: Vol. 3, 8). On Magajin Halidu's death, those Katsinawa present immediately selected as their ruler Dan Kasawa, the son of Agawaragi (1752-69), and he made such appointments as were essential for formal continuity of the Katsina state to those positions that had become vacant in the defeat and confusion of flight. This done, the Katsinawa continued north-eastwards to Damagaram, where they met Abdu, the defeated Hausa ruler of Daura. After two years in Zinder, the capital of Damagaram, Dan Kasawa and his entourage moved west and settled at Gafai near the boundary between Damagaram and Maradi (see map). Maradi had formerly been a province of Hausa Katsina, but, following Fulani victory, came under Fulani rule. During the next eight or ten years, while Dan Kasawa remained at Gafai, the defeated Hausa of Gobir regrouped themselves under Salihu, Gumki, and finally Ali (1817-35), and continued the struggle against the Fulani. Meanwhile many Katsina Hausa withdrew to Gafai; but there is no evidence of counter-attacks by Dan Kasawa. He was evidently too weak to mount them.

The province of Maradi was then under the Fulani official, Mani, who lived at Maradi and administered the district directly on behalf of the Sarkin Suleibawa of Katsina. This territory stretched westward from the borders of Damagaram towards Tsibiri. On its south-eastern limits lay Daura, then under Fulani control,

directly south lay Fulani Katsina. Most of the indigenous people were pagans who worshipped spirits (*iskoki, bori*) by sacrificial rites, which included possession. These pagans (*arna*) were grouped in settlements under resident local headmen (*masugari, s. maigari*). Maradi itself, the largest settlement in the territory, was fenced with a stockade and had long been administered under the Hausa kings of Katsina by a Hausa lineage from Rano, in whom the title of Maradi was vested. The then holder of this office, Maradi Wagaza, had retained his post despite Fulani conquest and administration. Some time after Dan Kasawa's move to Gafai, Wagaza conspired with him to overthrow the local Fulani, and invited him to come to Maradi as its ruler. Dan Kasawa, fearing treachery, is said to have demanded Mani's head first. Although the Fulani had disarmed the conquered population and had prohibited the manufacture or use of weapons, Wagaza prepared a successful revolt in secret and took Mani and his men by surprise at night. According to tradition, Mani was beheaded at his prayers, and his head was duly dispatched to Dan Kasawa, who moved to Maradi with some Daura Hausa and a slave escort from Damagaram (Landeroin, 1911: Vol. 2, 461-2; Urvoy, 1936: 280-2).

The revolt organized by Wagaza spread rapidly throughout the district. The Fulani were caught off guard, their rule was overthrown, their property and persons placed at the pleasure of their erstwhile subjects. Umaru Dallaji, the Fulani Emir of Katsina, reported the disaster to Sultan Mamman Bello at Sokoto, who at once led his army to join Dallaji in an attack on Maradi town. With Gobir support, Dan Kasawa won a handsome victory and large booty in two battles near Maradi, following which he counter-attacked and captured Garabi, Maraka, Ruma, and Zandam, thus freeing Maradi and a large section of north-western Fulani Katsina, which had been formerly under the Fulani Sarkin Suleibawa. In these struggles Dan Kasawa enjoyed the sympathy and support of those Katsina Hausa who chafed under Fulani domination, and he also received help from Hausa Gobir, Daura, and the Tegamawa Tuareg under their chief, Tambari Gabda (Périé: 6; Landeroin, 1911: Vol. 2, 462).

When Dan Kasawa died in c. 1831 (Urvoy, 1936: 280-2), about ten years after the Maradi revolt, the Hausa dominion at Maradi was assured; and thus Maradi became the site of the successor-state of Hausa Katsina. In accordance with this, Dan Kasawa and



Sketch Map of Maradi

his successors are still entitled Chiefs of Katsina, not of Maradi, which is the town governed by the Rano lineage with that title. By 1830 the allies and the enemies of the successor-state were well defined. With active support from adjacent Gobir and Hausa Daura, and passive support from Zinder, the Katsinawa of Maradi were committed to expel Fulani from Katsina territory and to inflict as much harm as possible on adjacent Fulani dominions such as Daura, Zamfara, and Sokoto (formerly Gobir). The Fulani for their part understood this clearly. Dan Kasawa's successor, Rauda, was slain in 1835 with his ally, Sarkin Gobir Ali, at Gawakuke or Dakarawa by Sultan Mamman Bello in a battle which finally assured Fulani rule in Sokoto and Zamfara (Haj Said: 6; Mission Tilho: Vol. 2, 462). Rauda's successor Dan Mari (1835-43) was constrained to accommodate the defeated Gobirawa in Maradi town, so heavy were their losses (see p. 97). For the next year the Gobir and Katsina Hausa lived at Maradi together, each group subject only to its own ruler and officials. Disputes inevitably arose. The Gobir chief, Bakiri, was replaced by his younger brother Mayaki with Dan Mari's support, and the two rulers then agreed to establish the Gobir remnant in a town of their own near by. Dan Mari and Mayaki turned out their subjects in a joint *corvée* to build the new capital of Gobir at Tsibiri, five miles north-west of Maradi on the same water-course. This separation preserved the fraternal alliance which co-residence had threatened to destroy.

Dan Mari completed the new palace at Maradi which Rauda had begun, and he also pursued the war against Fulani Katsina and Sokoto. When the Sultan Atiku of Sokoto attacked the new town of Tsibiri to destroy it, Dan Mari assisted Mayaki to a victory at Katuru. Atiku died shortly after (Haj Said: 19-22). Dan Mari then led the most sustained effort to overthrow Fulani rule in Katsina. Moving in strength to the Ruma district between Katsina city and Zamfara, he organized a general revolt against Fulani in the environs (Gowers, 1921: 19; Mission Tilho: Vol. 2, 463). In suppressing this revolt, the Katsina Fulani under their Emir, Sidiku, received support from the Fulani states of Kano, Daura, Sokoto, and Zamfara. Sidiku's revenge was to convert the Ruma district into a wilderness, the *dajin Rubu*, which it has remained until recently, many towns being destroyed and their residents killed rather than enslaved.




Fig. 4. The rulers of Maradi

Shortly afterwards Sidiku was deposed by the Sultan for contumacy and harshness. He fled to Maradi, where Binoni (1844-1849) had succeeded Dan Mari, and sought help from the Katsina Hausa to recover his Fulani throne. Binoni provided Sidiku with hospitality but little support. Sidiku then moved to Tassawa to seek aid from Damagaram, but was finally persuaded by the Sultan to return to Sokoto, leaving his brother Mamman Bello in charge of Katsina (Haj Said: 31; Daniel: 18-19; Mission Tilho: op. cit.). From Dan Mari's defeat in Ruma until the accession of Rauda's son, Dan Baskore, in 1854, the Sultan of Sokoto, Aliyu Babba (1842-59) bore the brunt of the war with Hausa Gobir and Katsina himself. Aliyu won important victories over the Katsina and Gobir Hausa at Kotor Kwoshi, south of Ruma, and brought that district (Katsina Laka) under temporary Fulani control, but his various efforts to take Tsibiri and Maradi were unsuccessful. The Hausa continued their raids, and so did Fulani, but by 1854 a condition of military stalemate had been reached. While neither side could reduce the other, each was vulnerable to the other's attacks; and these were no longer directed only at vital points, such as the capitals where the contest could be decisive, but also at smaller towns or villages which could be quickly surprised and overrun, and which yielded convenient booty of cattle and slaves. Dan Baskore (1854-75) is credited with eighty-three raids against Fulani Katsina, Zamfara, and Sokoto, including two unsuccessful sieges of Katsina City (Mission Tilho: Vol. 2, 463-4). Thereafter the rulers of Maradi raided farther afield in Kano and Zaria, while the recovery of Katsina remained their aim. For his part, Dan Baskore suffered setbacks, such as the burning of Tassawa by Sultan Ahmadu Rufa'i; but with Gobir assistance he defeated Rufa'i shortly after at Gidan Sarkin Arna in Sokoto (Mission Tilho: Vol. 2, 464).

Dan Baskore's long successful reign marks a watershed in the history of Maradi. At this time the successor-state was most prosperous and fully developed. Its stability, internal and external, seemed assured. Though incapable of much further expansion at Fulani expense, it was apparently too strong for them to overthrow. Its internal organization may also have seemed to assure an orderly future. Dan Baskore had built a large wall around his capital at Maradi. He seems to have ruled his dominions firmly, and maintained effective alliances. Perhaps few then alive could have fore-

seen the internal dissensions and conflicts by which the Katsinawa of Maradi were repeatedly split in the years between Dan Baskore's death and the French occupation. Since it is not possible to discuss these developments here, I shall describe Maradi under Dan Baskore, three generations after the *jihad*, when its institutions and policies seemed secure.¹ In this account I employ information pertaining to later or earlier periods, where it probably holds true for this period also; but my reconstruction remains preliminary and hypothetical.²

II

Unlike its sister successor-states of Abuja and Daura, Katsina-Maradi was able to pursue a vigorous counter-attack on the Fulani rule in its homeland; and, far more than their Gobir allies, the Katsinawa initially expected and met with success. Their conquered home had been weakened by partition among the Fulani. They had at Maradi and Ruma already recovered large sectors of Katsina. Being adjacent to Fulani Katsina, they had excellent information about their enemies' movements and plans. They enjoyed wide support from the Katsina Hausa; and, despite periodic defeats, they undoubtedly had the better of the exchange. For *raison-d'être* their state had one primary objective—the re-establishment of Hausa rule in Katsina, but as a pre-condition Maradi had to maintain its independence and internal order. This internal organization was influenced by its historical antecedents and context; as far as local conditions allowed, it was modelled on the former Hausa kingdom at Katsina.

In eighteenth-century Katsina the four senior titles after the Sarki were the Kaura, Galadima, Yan Daka, and Durbi. Three of these offices were vested in noble patrilineages. The Kaura, a nominal slave, commanded the state's military force and had direct control of its cavalry. He alone resided outside the capital. The Galadima, a eunuch, was the senior civil administrator and supervised the territories south of the Karaduwa River, including the vassal states of Maska, Kogo, and Birnin Gwari. The Yan Daka's territory lay due south-west of Katsina City. The Durbi traced descent from Kumayau and the earliest kings of Katsina. Together these four nobles, the *rukuni*, formed the senior council of state and exercised important checks on the power of the

Sarki (chief). The *rukuni* selected and appointed the new *Sarki*. It is possible that they could also depose him for constitutional breaches, such as refusal to heed their advice, or for certain other faults. Together they may have controlled more military force than the ruler independently. The *Sarki* and *rukuni* were the mutually indispensable elements of the Hausa Katsina state. Without the *Sarki*, *rukuni* could not rule; but without *rukuni* neither could the *Sarki*. For this reason, after his appointment as *Sarkin Katsina* by the well at Tsirkau, Dan Kasawa is said to have filled these essential offices as best he could. The eunuch Ginga was made Galadima, and the slave Mainasara Dubau, Kaura. Dan Kasawa's Durbi, Kuraye, is said to have been of Kumayau's lineage; his descendant, the present Durbi, has the distinctive facial marks borne only by the Durbawa and the royal lineage. Dan Kasawa's Yan Daka, Muhamman, was a nominal slave of the traditional lineage. Under Dan Kasawa's successors Kaura remained a royal slave office, and the Galadimaship a eunuch office until the time of Dan Baskore.

Territorial Organization

The Katsina Hausa settled at Maradi as liberators resuming their rightful inheritance, with support from the local chiefs. Their initial successes attracted immigrants from Fulani Katsina, and Sidiku's harshness drove many natives of Ruma to Maradi. From farther afield the family and supporters of Alwali, the defeated Hausa king of Kano, came for protection and help. From these immigrants the Katsinawa of Maradi selected persons for the traditional Katsina titles and replicated the official structure of their former state as best they could under the new conditions. Among the principal differences between the original and successor states are territorial arrangements and distributions of titles by status category and descent group.

Even before the Fulani *jihad*, the indigenous pagan population of Maradi was administered by resident chiefs (*hakimai* or *sarakunan kauye*), each of whom controlled several contiguous villages under local headmen referred to as *masugari* ('owners' of the village). The Hausa reoccupation of Maradi owed much to the initiative and loyalty of these *hakimai* and their subjects. Dan Kasawa and his successors retained them in office as reward, and preserved their former privileges. Most *masugari* and *hakimai*

were pagans; all held their office by hereditary right and lived in their administrative areas, rarely visiting the capital unless summoned. All *hakimai*, of whom there were twelve, excluding the *Tasar* at Tassawa, were placed under the supervision of one or other of the senior Hausa officials. Among the latter were the Kaura, who alone as was customary lived away from the capital, and the Galadima. The ruler's senior slave, Magajin Bakebbi—a title created by Dan Kasawa on his arrival in Maradi—was the channel of communication for the *Barazaki* in charge of Agai and the *Tasar* in charge of Tassawa. The history and position of *Tasar* farther to the east gave him considerable independence. He belongs with the vassals of Maradi rather than with the *hakimai*. In 1851 Barth (1890: Vol. 1, 250) described him as:

'in certain respects an independent prince, though . . . a powerful vassal of the king or chief of Maradi. Every head of a family in his territory pays him three thousand kurdi (cowries) as *kurdin-kay*, head money or poll tax; besides there is an ample list of penalties (*kurdin-lacfi*), some of them very heavy, for . . . illicit paternity, 100,000 kurdi . . . (for) wilful murder, the whole property of the murderer is forfeited . . . Every village has its own mayor who decides petty matters and is responsible for the tax payable within his jurisdiction. The king or paramount chief has the power of life and death, and there is no appeal from his sentence to the ruler of Maradi. However, he cannot venture to carry into effect any measure of consequence without asking the opinion of his privy council.'

Tassawa (estimated population 15,000 in c. 1851) subsequently broke away from Maradi following on dynastic splits at Maradi. Other *hakimai* did not have anything like this degree of freedom. South of Tassawa lay Kworgum, originally claimed by Daura and Katsina, but at this time tributary to Zinder and Maradi (J. F. Schön, 1885: 23–29). Kworgum was supervised by Durbi, and Kwauna by the *Sarki* through a slave. Maradi town was under the titleholder Maradi (the most senior of the *hakimai*), who had three titled assistants, each in charge of a couple of villages near Maradi town and directly responsible to him. Of these settlements, only Maradi, as capital, was walled (*birni*); much of the country was uninhabited waste through which armies could move freely, water supplies permitting.

The former vassal states of Katsina at Chafe, Kotor Kwoshi, Kwoton Koro, Bena, and Birnin Gwari maintained their allegiance

as far as conditions allowed, sending irregular tribute of horses, slaves, and *kyenkyendi* (bales of robes), as well as troops when needed. Most of these distant tributaries communicated through Kaura, and some also paid tribute to another state to avoid molestation. Though dependent and in theory subordinate to Maradi, they remained internally autonomous under hereditary dynasties. The Sarkin Katsina at Maradi levied no tax therein, nor did he exercise any superior or appellate jurisdiction for these areas. The rulers were all appointed locally by their own electoral councils, and were free to fight the Fulani independently. They were only subject to the threat of dismissal or attack from Maradi for disloyalty or treachery, overdue tribute being interpreted in this way. On these occasions the punishment was often severe, as the sack of Chafe *c.* 1897 shows. In return, vassals could call on Maradi for aid against any Fulani attacks, as Birnin Gwari did when raided by Sarkin Kontagora Ibrahim Nagwamatse.

The Sarki and his *rukuni* selected the *hakimai* of Maradi territory from the official lineages, and appointed them formally in Maradi with turban and gown. These *hakimai* lacked jurisdiction in matters punishable by mutilation or imprisonment—that is, crime or serious torts. Each was free to select or dismiss the *masugari* of the various villages they controlled, but only when raided by Fulani could they independently take up arms. Their people were subject to direct taxation and levies from the Sarki, and, when summoned, turned out as bowmen or cavalry to swell his force. These *hakimai* were freely dismissible by the Emir in theory, but in practice he dismissed them only on political grounds of disloyalty or disaffection, choosing a collateral kinsman to replace them. Each *hakimi* appointed his own titled staff (*lawanai*) and held a small court for local cases of divorce, debt, and the like. Each could levy fines for certain offences on his subjects, giving the Sarkin Katsina half. As required, they also supplied the Sarki with *corvée* labour or levies and assisted his tax collectors in gathering various tithes and special taxes. Of these, the *zakka* or grain tithe collected annually in the ruler's name was perhaps the most important. One bundle of guinea-corn or millet in every ten was due the ruler; it was the duty of the *hakimi* assisted by the ruler's officials to collect this. The bundled grain was then stored in special granaries and recorded by the ruler and the *hakimi* separately. From these stores, the ruler made annual

distributions to his officials, in amounts which varied with rank. As secretary, the Magajin Bakebbi recorded the ruler's donations and reserves, the latter being kept as security against famine or loss through war.

Maradi territory also contained bands of nomad pastoral Fulani and immigrant Muslim Hausa. The Fulani were administered through Fulani officials holding the titles of Sarkin Fulani, Yerima, and Hasau, these being drawn from a particular lineage. An older Katsina title, Dan Yusufa, was formerly reserved for Fulani scouts, but this was rarely filled at Maradi. As part of his duties, the Sarkin Fulani mediated between pastoralists and the settled farming population, supervising grazing rights with the local *hakimai* and investigating disputes over damage to crops or beasts. The Sarkin Fulani and his staff also collected the annual cattle tithe (*jangali*) of one beast in ten for the ruler. These officials had powers to settle civil issues of divorce, inheritance, or debt among the Fulani, giving the chief a set portion of the receipts. They were especially required to report all Fulani movements into or out of the territory, and to patrol the cattle routes when required.

A special set of arrangements known as *tarayya* or *tarewa* applied to Hausa Muslims, who were mainly immigrants from Katsina or Daura. On arrival, they either reported to the capital or to the *hakimi* in whose area they had settled. In either event the *rukuni* were notified, and the immigrants were brought to one or other of them. Having identified themselves, the newcomers made allegiance (*chapka*) to the *rukuni* and appealed for protection. He then informed the Council, which discussed suitable placement for the immigrants. From state reserves, the ruler provided such grain, labour, and assistance as was necessary to sustain their families until the following harvest, and the *rukuni* patron then arranged with the relevant *hakimi* for fallow farms and a compound for the strangers.

These provisions were well adapted to accommodate the sporadic movements into Maradi, but they attached Hausa immigrants directly to individual *rukuni* despite their dispersal throughout the country. In consequence, *hakimai* normally administered areas which contained a number of Muslim Hausa subjects of different *rukuni* over whom they exercised no jurisdiction. Such Hausa were directly responsible to their

Muslim patrons at the capital. To these they paid their tax and took their complaints or requests; from them they received instructions and orders. The relations thus instituted were not personal: the immigrant's issue remained and still remain under the jurisdiction of the *rukuni* title. These dispersed Hausa provided their patrons with valuable information about local conditions under the local *hakimai*. Though perfectly free to change residence as they pleased, they could not change their *rukuni* overlord and were obliged to attend his summons and orders directly. In their disputes with local pagans both parties repaired to the *rukuni* at the capital to settle the case. Thus, Muslim Hausa were exempt from local *corvée* and fines, though free to join the local war levy, unless summoned by their lord. Their grain tithe was due to their patron, who could also fine them judicially, retaining the proceeds. As skilled craftsmen and traders, these Muslim immigrants were liable to occupational taxes.

Finally, certain rural towns with predominantly Muslim populations were placed directly under senior Muslim officials. The Galadima administered Galadimci, where there was an official slave estate; the Kaura administered Gezawa, whose population Barth estimated at 10,000 (Barth, 1890: Vol. I, 260). Magajiya, the chief's 'younger sister' administered the village of Liyadi, and the Dan Zambedi, a senior prince, Madarumfa. Thus the territorial organization as a whole combined various methods by which the Katsinawa accommodated to their situation at Maradi.

III

State Offices

Excluding twenty-two titled princes, nine princesses, and nine titled wives and concubines of the ruler, the state of Maradi contained over 130 titled offices (*sarautu*, sing. *sarauta*) distributed as follows: 4 *rukuni* and their official staffs of 45; the chief's free courtiers, 27; his eunuchs and slaves, 34; his territorial chiefs, 12; titled clerics, 9. Of the princes and princesses, two each had administrative roles.

Together these officials represented the main status groups in the kingdom, Muslim and pagan, immigrant and native, free and slave; but the distribution of offices stressed status distinctions mainly significant to the Muslim Hausa, as was the case in Katsina.

Offices were reserved for the dynasty, for the ruler's wives and kinswomen, for his principal councillors and their kin, clients, and slaves, for his eunuchs and civilian or military slave staff, for free clients and Muslim clerics. Even the semi-pagan *hakimai* had their place as a separate rank-order. The *rukuni* were the pillars of the state (*shikashikai*): in local idiom, they supported the ruler as posts a roof. While the chiefship was clearly hereditary, all other offices were divided into two groups, as hereditary (*gado*, *karda*) or open (*shigege*). The offices of Kaura and Galadima were reserved for royal slaves and eunuchs respectively, and were regarded as *karda*, though in the latter no succession by descent was entailed. Until Dan Baskore's reign, the Galadima at Maradi was always a eunuch; Dan Baskore gave this office to a free man. Some time later the office reverted to eunuchs; and although the last six holders have all been free men, the Galadima is still regarded as a eunuch office.

As the senior eunuch officer, the Galadima was often recruited by promotion from other royal eunuchs, such as Marai, Horoce, and Yari, the last being the probable successor. And perhaps the senior palace slave, Magajin Bakebbi, who was literate in Ajemic and served as the ruler's secretary, was a likely future Kaura. The Durbi title remained hereditary, and so did the Yan Daka's office throughout this period.

Of the *rukuni*, Galadima and Kaura had precedence and most power. Yan Daka was described as 'the Galadima's younger brother'—that is, his deputy, and Durbi's relation to Kaura was the same. Civil and military duties were sharply distinguished and distributed between Galadima and Kaura. As senior civil administrator, Galadima administered the kingdom and capital during the ruler's absence; he was responsible for regulating dynastic affairs, the marriages of princes, their appointments and conduct. The installation of all officials appointed by the ruler took place in the compound of the Galadima and was presided over by the latter's master of ceremonies, Bagalan. Official compounds, with their attached slaves, horses, farms, and other equipment, were provided only for the ruler, the Kaura, and Galadima. The two free *rukuni*, Yan Daka and Durbi, remained in their own family compounds (*gidan talauci*) after appointment, and were installed with turban and gown only, not with an *alkyabba* or mantle such as the ruler, Kaura, and Galadima received. On installation, each *rukuni* made

fixed payments to the ruler and his colleagues—one million cowries for Kaura and Galadima, half a million for Yan Daka and Durbi. Shortly afterwards each received a fully caparisoned horse and sword of tempered steel. Together, the *rukuni* and ruler selected individuals to fill vacant *rukuni* posts; the ruler had no authority to fill these independently, nor was he in theory entitled to decide important affairs without the council. Various successors of Dan Baskore were dismissed by *rukuni* with more or less violence for such conduct. No promotion was possible from one *rukuni* office to another. Though the ruler's office was clearly senior, and traditionally dominant, the legitimacy of its power was conditional on support from the council of state. As in eighteenth-century Katsina, the political relations of *rukuni* and ruler formed an important aspect of the political history of Maradi.

The commander of the Maradi forces, Kaura, resided outside the capital at Keffin Kaura, Gezawa, or Madarumfa according to his choice. He was therefore absent from the routine council meetings held on weekdays, and took little part in political decisions about minor civil affairs. However, on the Sabbath, when he greeted the ruler, by tradition Kaura enjoyed the prerogative of a purely private audience from which the other *rukuni* were all excluded. Thus the ruler's position *vis-à-vis* the Galadima, Yan Daka, and Durbi might be strengthened by his private consultations with Kaura, whose deputy, Durbi, had the duty of keeping him informed about council discussions while he was away. With Kaura's support, the ruler could override the council's advice, and if this support was assured he might well be dominant. Conversely, with the council's backing, he could override the Kaura, even in military affairs, the Kaura's province. But, through the good offices of Durbi and his right to attend any councils he wished, the Kaura could also support *rukuni* to overawe the ruler.

In certain spheres the ruler's independence was acknowledged. Though he did not select the Iya or Magajiya independently, he could at his pleasure fill such offices as Maskome, Jesa, Maraya, etc., from the dynasty, the Galadima conducting the appointment; and he also distributed the eight titles reserved for his wives and concubines as he pleased. The ruler selected retainers for appointment to the *shigege* titles reserved for his staff. Hereditary (*karda*) offices at his disposal were filled after canvassing senior men of

the lineage in which the title was vested. Again, the Galadima made the formal appointments.

In like fashion, each *rukuni* selected from his own kin, free clients, or slaves, suitable persons for appointment to the titles traditionally reserved for the staff of his office. As a council, the ruler and *rukuni* together selected successors to the three hereditary priestly offices of Maradi—the Limam Juma'a, Magaji Dan Doro, and the Alkali, whose family was settled at Tabarawa. They also chose suitable mallams for *shigege* clerical offices such as Dan Masani. However, the office of Limamin na Kyankyale, who read the Koran to the Palace women during Ramadan, was filled by the ruler's choice.

Independently of the ruler, the *rukuni* distributed princely titles. With few exceptions, these were purely honorific, and entailed neither office nor defined authority. Perhaps as a function of this, they merely conferred an ill-defined and undifferentiated *iko*, recalling the early *imperium* at Rome, but here expressed in *kwace* (appropriation of goods). The main benefits that princes derived from their titles were twofold—public identification as possible chiefs and protection against evil magic (*samau*) through which their Koranic names could be used to injure them. Palpable benefits were otherwise slight.

Of twenty-two princely titles, only two merit notice. When vacant, the Dan Galadima title, whose occupant had formal precedence as the official heir, was always given to a son or brother of the reigning Sarki. Normally, since princes were not dismissible, having no administrative office, this position was often held by a collateral of the chief. Despite its honorific character, the Dan Galadima paid a *kurdin sarauta* of 10,000 cowries and received a turban and robe on installation. But so did the Dan Zambedi, whose office gave him control of Madarumfa, one of the largest towns in the state. Although officially listed as the Crown Prince, the Dan Galadima had no administrative role, and most rulers of Maradi were appointed from other royal titles. Dan Zambedi alone of all princes held administrative office, and thus had the resources with which to canvass his candidacy with the electoral council. Other senior princely titles include Dan Baskore, Binoni, Magaji Halidu, and Mayana. On their accessions, rulers retained these honorifics as shields against magical misfortune.

Of the female titles, only two merit attention, the Iya and the

Magajiya. Iya (Mother), regarded as the Queen Mother, was usually a senior royal kinswoman selected by *rukuni* for her disposition, marital status, and good sense. She presided over all marriages and kinship ceremonials involving girls and women of the royal lineage. She was usually single, though previously married, and was the official head and patron of local prostitutes and devotees of the pre-Islamic cult of spirit worship (*bori*), whom she led in to greet the chief on the Muslim sabbath. She was consulted in all *bori* initiations and public ceremonies, such as market renewal rites. Through her slaves, Iya levied grain from market vendors, and annual taxes from prostitutes and cult specialists. Her compound was an official sanctuary. She had her own clients, horsemen, and attendants attached to the office, whom she equipped with war gear and from whose booty she received a portion. These male clients were not her jural subjects, though privileged by her patronage; and although frequently invoked by *rukuni* to mediate between them and the ruler, she did not directly take part in the council of state.

Magajiya was usually a junior kinswoman of the ruler. She administered the village of Liyadi through her staff and kept the taxes and fines levied there. After Ramadan she led the women's celebrations at the palace. Presumably some Magajiya's might be promoted to the senior title of Iya on the latter's death.

At Maradi most royal title-holders were systematically divorced from administrative responsibility, jural and military power, and economic resources. They were thus dependent on the largesse of senior officials, on gifts (*gaisuwa*), or on appropriations (*kwace*) from commoners. Dan Zambedi, Iya, and Magajiya excepted, none had any subjects; and all princes were under the eunuch Galadima's jurisdiction, their behaviour being reviewed by the *rukuni* critically to select the most suitable successor. *Rukuni* stress the qualities of patience, forbearance, humility, self-reliance, energy, dignity, distance from *talakawa* (commoners), lack of adulterous or other 'un-royal' habits, and respect for the *rukuni* and custom as desiderata in a ruler; but, as the chart on p. 97 shows, from Dan Kasawa to Dan Dadi, the succession passed to a collateral until the senior generation died out. The upheavals at Maradi and Tassawa, which followed the appointment of Mijinyawa as the fourteenth ruler, are linked with the change in the principles regulating succession which his appoint-

ment introduced. Under the rule of collateral succession, immediate candidacy had been limited to senior royals. Mijinyawa's appointment seemed to define all titled princes as equally eligible. Thus, *rukuni*, perhaps inadvertently, weakened the chieftaincy.

Together, *rukuni* could and did freely dismiss most of the rulers at Maradi who succeeded Dan Baskore. They also selected their successors. Separately, they formed the electoral council and, with the ruler, the Council of State. The internal politics of Maradi is a history of struggle among *rukuni*, on the one hand, and between *rukuni* and ruler, on the other. In asserting the royal power against local *hakimai*, the ruler could normally rely on support from his *rukuni*, whose interests, though not identical with his, tended to coincide in such cases. The *rukuni* were in no sense popular representatives; rather, in their own and the public eyes, they represented the continuity of Katsina tradition. Together with the dynasty and the ruler's staff, they were the true Katsinawa, the custodians of the greatness and future of the former state, and perhaps its most central institution. Maradi they regarded as a minor province of their legitimate ancestral domains. With their staffs, their *tarayya* subjects, their supervisory roles over vassal chiefs and *hakimai*, their control of the succession, of the princes, and indirectly of appointments to territorial office, they were, if united, undoubtedly more powerful than the Chief; and, given the Katsina tradition, their dissent deprived his acts of legitimacy. In theory and in practice the ruler could dismiss one of the *rukuni* only with the others' consent; and, until the emergence of Kaura Hasau, all *rukuni* died in office. Since in theory they could veto the ruler's plans when they all agreed, the ruler's best chance was to solicit support from Kaura and Galadima, or set them at odds. However, Dan Baskore's dominance was unchallenged.

Each *rukuni* had one or more titled princes who sought his support for the next succession, but, being economically dependent, these princes could only offer promises of future benefit, rather than material gifts, and the position of *rukuni* was already such that their customary prerogatives were not easily enhanced.

It seems that *rukuni* often differed on the candidates they supported for the throne, each having equal powers of nomination. If their discussions revealed agreement the appointment was certain, although the council might pretend dissension in order

to strengthen further its hold on the chosen candidate. In the event of disagreement, or even without it, as just shown, they called in the Limamin Juma'a to divine the appropriate choice. The Limam 'measured' (*aura*—weighed) the various candidates by divinatory means in order of their sponsors' seniority without knowing the candidates' names. He would first measure the Kaura's choice, this being unspoken, then the Galadima's, then Durbi's, then Yan Daka's. For this purpose the Limam used either of two divinatory techniques, one with a Muslim rosary, the other with a wooden cube marked with numbers (Mission Tilho: Vol. 2, 467-8). In either case he determined whether the unnamed candidate sponsored by a given councillor was suitable. If the results were positive the selection process stopped; if negative the candidate of the *rukuni* next in seniority was 'weighed'. By withholding the names of their candidates, *rukuni* confined the Limam to a purely technical role, and so prevented him from manipulating the oracle to influence the succession. The Limam's participation lent a certain Muslim sanctity to the proceedings, and his techniques were plainly Islamic.

The selected prince was then installed in an elaborate ceremonial supervised by the Galadima and the *rukuni*. After a ritual bath of henna in the Galadima's compound he was secluded outside the palace in a thatched shed for a week, during which he was instructed by eunuchs in protocol, palace affairs, and chiefly modes of behaviour. News of the accession was meanwhile sent to nearby rulers, who would reply with handsome gifts. Throughout this week of the new ruler's seclusion, he received the allegiance (*cafka*) of his *hakimai* and subordinate officials, and guidance from the *rukuni*. The townsfolk meanwhile celebrated the event with drumming, dancing, and various games. On the seventh day, together with the Sarkin Gobir, the *rukuni* led the new ruler on horseback alone outside the city to a special tree called Kwaru, perhaps a substitute for the old tamarind in Katsina City (Daniel: 2 and fn. 5). This they circled three times, riding in silence, then returned to Maradi, where the ruler received galloping charges of allegiance from all officials of state, as is usual at the two annual Muslim festivals. Next came the *samari* (young men), then drumming, after which the new ruler made a brief speech of thanks and prayer for good fortune before withdrawing to the palace with the *rukuni* to receive the greetings of his officials.

On entering the palace, the new ruler took over many familial roles from his predecessor. Anything the previous ruler had given to his children remained theirs, but all else pertained to the throne under care of the palace eunuchs—Yari, Sarkin Gida, etc. Shortly after entering the palace the new ruler dispatched a properly caparisoned horse to each of his *rukuni* and lesser gifts to other senior officials. Within a fortnight of his installation the new ruler was expected to take the field, irrespective of the season, to *wanka takobi* (blood the sword). Until this was done, the accession was not confirmed. This fortnight was therefore given over to planning the expedition.

On their appointments, turbanned officials received a horse from the person who appointed them, the ruler's kinsmen and senior staff from him, the Kaura's staff from Kaura, and so on. When these officials died their horses and equipment were returned to the superior who had appointed them, as silent evidence. The dead man's successor normally remained in his own compound; but besides Kaura and Galadima, it seems that *hakimai* in the rural areas also had official compounds, one-half the contents of which passed with their office, the remainder going to the ruler.

The ruler's court was the main centre of ceremonial activities, save that installations and princely marriages were held at the Galadima's. The *rukuni* came to greet him daily, except Kaura, who came on Friday or as events required. The *rukuni* would follow the ruler into a special chamber where they met in council. After their departure other courtiers and princes were free to enter and greet the ruler. He might then move to the *zaure* or entrance-hut to hear any law cases awaiting his attention, being screened by his servants with extended robes so that none saw him sitting down; or he might retire to his private rooms within the palace. On the Sabbath and at Muslim festivals there was a more elaborate gathering of officials, with *rukuni*, *rawuna* (free turbanned officials), slaves, eunuchs, and princes all present, distributed in set positions behind the Galadima and Kaura respectively, on the right and left hand of the ruler. The clerics, titled and untitled, sat directly opposite him, at a distance.

At Maradi the distribution of officials between the right and left hand (*hannun dama da hannun hagu*) seems best to correspond with distinctions between warriors and civil administrators, the

princes being grouped with hereditary officials and eunuchs, in contraposition with slaves and *shigege* officials ranged below the Kaura. But various placements were exceptional, and it seems likely that this division, which does not exactly coincide with the *karda-shigege* classification of Maradi, reproduces an older Katsina arrangement rather imperfectly. Behind Galadima and his staff sat Yan Daka, his entourage, the princes, the Maradi and his staff, the Sarkin Fulani, the lesser eunuchs under Dan Karshe, and the *hakimai* and their attendants when present. On the ruler's left, behind the Kaura and his staff, sat Durbi with his, followed by the Magajin Bakebbi and throne slaves, the ruler's craft officials, clients, and titled warriors. No female official, even Iya, took part in this assembly.

Economic Basis of the State

For revenues the state depended on booty, fines, and legal taxes, such as the *zakka* (grain tithe) or the inheritance tithe (*ushira*), tribute from vassals, customary fees paid by office holders on appointment, *corvée* labour, cattle tax paid by Fulani, and on a variety of occupational taxes known oddly as *hur mushi* (the ruler's share of the booty). The ruler also had rights to the skins of any lion or leopard slain in the territory, to one large civet cat per year from the local civet dealers, and to the larger tusk of local elephant. A charge averaging about 1,200 cowries per year was levied on all occupational specialists such as drummers, praise-singers, fishermen, itinerant traders, leather-workers, tailors, dyers, blacksmiths, barber-doctors, potash traders, haberdashers, weavers, straw-workers, tanners, woodworkers, hut-builders, potters, civet dealers, each item being collected by a separate official. Iya levied her tax on all prostitutes and *bori* dancers. Merchants bringing loads into or through the country paid 500 cowries per camel and 200 per ass. Growers of sweet potatoes, cassava and bambara groundnuts also paid 1,200 cowries per annum.

Each year the ruler's craft officials went on tour with their colleagues who served the *rukuni*, stopping at each *hakimi*'s headquarters, where the local craft heads turned over the tax due from local craftsmen. Presumably the *rukuni*'s representatives collected tax from their lord's Muslim Hausa subjects. On returning to the city, the ruler and *rukuni* appropriated their portion,

the collectors keeping the rest. This onerous task was carried out by menial officials, free and slave. Though its direct rewards were probably small, the number of officials involved widened the administrative base, while the method of collection increased the central executive's knowledge of the territory and its population. Indirectly these royal collectors thus helped to supervise the *hakimai*.

In addition, there were numerous customary levies. The gatekeepers of Maradi town, throne slaves, were reimbursed with threshed grain taken from the townswomen, who were required to thresh their grain outside the city walls. Most customary levies were directed at the market, and involved the collection of foodstuffs, antimony, aphrodisiacs, cotton, etc.

Slave officials authorized to collect these levies reported to Masai, the official market head, who then escorted them to the vendors each dealt with. As remuneration, Masai was authorized to levy salt from the Bugaje and Tuareg. He was also empowered to settle any disputes arising in the market. He could select certain vendors in each trade to supervise their colleagues. Through them, market prices were efficiently controlled on instructions from the ruler and *rukuni*.

Some title-holders who lacked subjects or regular means of subsistence exploited the market irregularly according to their needs and opportunities; but such nobles did not confine themselves only to markets. Being mainly of royal descent and without independent means, they exercised this privilege of *kwace* or appropriation with the connivance of the ruling council if not the public; but *rukuni*, despite their independent jurisdictions and means, also periodically practised appropriation. The commoners were the main losers.

Apart from *hur mushi* and *zakka*, commoners were required to perform *corvée* annually after harvest. They were summoned to repair the walls of Maradi or the stockade of their *hakimi*'s town, the mosque and official compounds of the ruler, Kaura and Galadima. During the rainy season they also cultivated the farms of these officials as well as those of Yan Daka and Durbi. The *hakimai* could also levy local *corvée* for farm work and repairs.

Booty taken in war was apportioned roughly according to Maliki Law: one-fifth of the warrior's loot was officially due to the state, and this was collected in the war camp (*sansani*) en route

to Maradi. At best the rule was interpreted rather stringently; it is said that, if sometimes a warrior captured two cows, the state took one. Special officers of the army commander, usually the ruler or Kaura, attended by staff of other *rukuni*, supervised this collection. Its distribution was limited mainly to *rukuni* and ruler, the Kaura when in command appropriating a portion for himself and his *rukuni* colleagues, and sending the ruler the rest. Much of the ruler's share was distributed to clerics whose charms and imprecations were regarded as indispensable for military success, and who thus received their reward. Those who fought without securing booty received nothing. The *rukuni* and ruler might give some booty to princes, who were prohibited from fighting, but they sold most of it, especially slaves, in nearby markets. Superior captives were sometimes held for ransom.

My informants, the Sarkin Katsina Buzu, the Galadima Kwan-yau, Yan Daka Muhamman, and Durbi Ibrahim, all stressed the importance of booty and war in the economy of the Maradi state. It was to these sources and to the irregular tribute from distant vassals or dependent allies that the ruler and nobles looked for the windfalls which validated the militarism of Maradi, and provided occasions for overawing dissident allies or vassals, while mobilizing wide support. None the less, booty alone could not be said to support the state. Its main use was to provide equipment for military forces. Captured horses were distributed to valorous men, who undertook, on receiving them, to turn out whenever summoned. Other booty was used to purchase flintlocks, ammunition, swords, and other gear from nearby Damagaram, where cannons were being made (Mission Tilho: Vol. 2, 444, and Note 2). Arrows, spears, daggers, and inferior iron swords were made at Maradi under the ruler's senior blacksmith by the *corvée* of blacksmiths, the ruler providing large blocks of locally smelted iron.

Court fees and fines provided other sources of income. The ruler's slave, Sarkin Diya, collected a marriage fee of 1,000 cowries from her father on every girl's first marriage. On the death of prosperous Muslims the ruler received as *ushira* one-tenth the value of the movable goods, the inheritance usually being administered by some cleric specially commissioned for the purpose. The ruler received a larger share, between one-third and one-half, of the estates of the deceased and dismissed *hakimai*.

Fines levied by local chiefs were shared equally with the ruler, but besides levying a collective fine of 1,200 cowries per householder in the district in cases of homicide, the Sarkin Katsina imposed a fine of a million cowries on the offender, all of which he retained himself. Substitutes, such as horses, goats, cattle, or slaves, might be accepted. This fine included no compensation to the dead man's kin. Its value was roughly equivalent to the price of twenty camels (Barth, 1890: Vol. 1, 295). The offender's kin were expected to contribute to the payment, under pressure from their *hakimai*. Undue delays were met by confiscation of their property and possible enslavement.

Finally, the ruler received customary fees on the appointment of new men to office. This was the *kurdin sarauta* (money of office), which Shehu dan Fodio also condemned (Hiskett, 1960: 568). On his own accession, the ruler also made similar prestations to the *rukuni* electors.

These official revenues may have touched only a small segment of the Maradi economy, which was primarily committed to subsistence production, with the local market providing necessary services and commodities, such as salt or farm tools. Undoubtedly the most substantial portion of official revenues was the grain tithe (which also applied to locust bean) and *corvée*, and from these the senior officials drew their subsistence. Moreover, given official acceptance of goods in place of cash, the elaborate machinery for collecting cash tax probably served also to increase their incomes in kind. Most Maradi pagans made limited and irregular use of cash; their standard of living is even now typical of a closed household economy.

Judicial Institutions

As formal Muslims, the Katsina Hausa made special provisions for Islam in their government by various observances and appointments; but in many spheres, such as law, Muslim rules were only partially observed. There was an alkali at Maradi, and he was authorized to hear cases between Muslims, but his powers were limited and not unique. Though his jurisdiction covered the Great and Lesser Law (*Shari'a Manya da Karami*), the alkali could only impose fines and whippings. Such fines as he levied were shared with the ruler. In the main, the alkali heard civil issues of divorce, debt, contract, and minor torts. Such cases in rural areas were also

tried by *hakimai*, whose jurisdictions included land issues, but as Muslim residents of rural areas were beyond the *hakimi*'s jurisdiction, issues involving them were referred to their respective *rukuni* lords at the capital. I cannot say how the Magajiya and Dan Zambedi, who administered certain villages, handled legal matters, but their position was probably like that of the *hakimai*.

The *rukuni* heard all issues concerning their scattered subjects. They could levy fines and order individual whippings; and thus they could destroy an individual's prosperity. Of the *rukuni*, Galadima acted as jural supervisor of junior officials, especially princes, but not of *hakimai*. In this capacity as a throne eunuch, the Galadima presumably represented the ruler and other *rukuni*. For such matters he employed a special slave official, Dan Negaba, whose police functions at the Galadima's orders were confined entirely to offending officials. Princes who committed adultery, excessive *kwace*, and the like, were summoned by Dan Negaba to Galadima for an admonitory lecture. They were not directly subject to protests by the subjects injured, nor were they liable to fines, whipping, or imprisonment, provided they were politically loyal; but presumably the *rukuni* and ruler might ask Galadima to confine a recidivist prince in his compound as a warning. By such misbehaviour princes forfeited chances of royal favour and further promotion.

The ruler's court could be resorted to for difficult issues between Muslims and pagans. Appeals from lesser courts were rather rare. To the ruler were reserved all offences which merited severe punishments such as 'imprisonment', execution, mutilation, or confiscation—that is, all political offences and any assaults which drew blood or inflicted wounds, as well as theft. Though rare, banishment sometimes occurred in disguised forms as individual flight or sale abroad into slavery. The main issues with which the ruler's court was concerned were *renon ikon sarauta*—literally, rejection of the power (authority) of the office, i.e. treason, subversion. This covered treacherous plotting, breach of customary duties, such as payment of tribute, any tampering with official prerogatives, such as the dead wood which belonged to the Galadima's office, or refusal to execute orders. The ruler also administered estates of dead or dismissed officials. The ruler's court exercised discretionary powers consistent with the Muslim doctrine of *siyasa*, especially as regards the political behaviour of

officials. Thus, *hakimai* were liable to dismissal or fine for failure to pass on instructions, to produce the required *corvée* or supplies, to turn out or attend the war levy, to report the movements of immigrants, or to observe the limits of their own *iko* (authority). In extreme cases dissident *hakimai* were lured to Maradi and summarily dispatched along with any free witnesses. When a subject, ordered to carry out some task such as *corvée*, failed to do so he could expect punishment and/or confiscation of his property.

The ruler's palace contained a prison. This was a large pit set deep in the floor of a stoutly walled room well beyond sunlight in a separate courtyard. The royal warders were slave officials: Makama, in charge of arrest, Doka (Law), the executioner, and Dan Tura, who pushed the victims from behind over the edge and into the pit. The last was also in charge of the gates of the city. The prisoner's fall into the pit usually resulted in some injury, but aid, water, or food was withheld, sometimes for a week at a time, unless ordered from above. He shared the pit with others not dead, unless his kinsmen could compound his offence with an acceptable fine. Normally those imprisoned were not expected to survive. No case of female imprisonment is known to me.

Executions were carried out at a special *marke* tree called the Marken Doka by the market-place in Maradi, the head being impaled near by as a public warning. Legislation was also announced in the market and throughout the town by public criers and drummers—the ruler's *maroka* (praise-singers). Such regulations took the following form: 'No one is allowed to cut wood in the marsh. This is an offence. It is forbidden.' Punishments were left unspecified. Orders to assemble for work or war were communicated in similar fashion. The praise-singers were thus town heralds.

Judicial sanctuary was an archaic institution of Maradi, clearly inconsistent with Islam. Whatever their offences, providing it was not political, once offenders touched the walls of the ruler's compound, the Iya's, or any of the *rukuni*'s, they were thereafter immune from trial and punishment. Though I failed to inquire into the subsequent condition of these persons, it seems probable that by such acts they enslaved themselves to the offices which provided reprieve.

Another archaic practice inconsistent with Islam was *kwace*, mentioned above. *Kwace* differs from theft in that it is the open

appropriation of an individual's property or labour by a titleholder exercising an ill-defined *iko*. Differences in status are basic to it. The officials most prone to practise *kwace* were *rukuni* and princes, the latter being without regular means of support. *Talakawa* (commoners) were the main losers. On occasion, such a high official as the Durbi simply marched into a pagan's compound and commanded him to deliver so many bundles of grain. If the farmer hesitated he was bound up with ropes and forced to watch its removal. If he demurred he might be whipped. The officials who acted thus held that they were entitled to do so because they lacked subsistence and represented the state. Indeed, there seems to have been a shortage of *rumada* (slave-farming) in Maradi; but late in the last century a dominant Fulani Kaura, Hasau, who controlled an overwhelming force, virtually stopped this practice, to the bitter chagrin of his colleagues, by enforcing restitution of the appropriated goods to the victims. These practices, condemned by Shehu dan Fodio as *kame*, were clearly inconsistent with Islam.

Under Maradi law, owners were liable for offences done by their slaves to the slaves of others. If the offending slaves were alienable—that is, if they were first-generation slaves, captives or purchased—they might be transferred or sold as compensation. If not alienable, failing compensation, offending slaves were delivered to the ruler. If a slave injured a free person further damages or fines were due as though the offender was free. A free man killing another's slave simply furnished an acceptable replacement.

Military Organization

For *rukuni*, war was the purpose of the Maradi state, indiscriminately against Fulani, but especially against Fulani in Katsina. As they phrased it, Maradi was merely their *sansani*, a war camp, in which preparation of new expeditions was the central activity. Though this emphasis may be misleading, their primary interest in war cannot be doubted. To this they looked for changes of fortune, including extra income; and this preoccupation with booty was partly responsible for the redirection of Maradi attacks from Katsina to Kano and Zaria, which offered more loot at less risk.

The main forces of Maradi were cavalry and infantry, the latter

including bowmen (*masu-baka*). Nobles, their slave staff, free clients, and a few self-equipped warriors provided the cavalry. *Talakawa* (commoners), especially pagans, supplied the bowmen, and Muslim Hausa youths the infantry (*dakaru*, 'yan karma). Official scouts, Dan Yusufu and Baita, preceded the army to spy out the route in advance. The ruler maintained storehouses of weapons, with which he equipped his own troops, courtiers, and servants. Others joining an expedition came equipped for the role they wished to play, bringing some food also. Only officials and their immediate staffs were obliged to attend all campaigns.

The ruler and his *rukuni* councillors planned the expedition in secret. Of these, the Galadima always remained at Maradi in charge of the capital and environs during the army's absence. As a eunuch, this was his appropriate role. The remaining *rukuni* were all *tirikai*, that is, officials who could be placed in charge of an expeditionary force. Having selected the target and route, the council calculated the number and types of force necessary, keeping this information to themselves. Officialdom would be mobilized as cavalry; but infantry and bowmen were recruited as needed through the *hakimai*. If necessary, the Gobirawa, Maradi's chief allies, might be invited. The council announced the expedition publicly through their heralds, themselves preparing to join the army at an appointed time and place. On the departure of the expedition, all movements outside or between the various towns of Maradi became subject to official control by the Galadima.

The headquarters of each *hakimi* contained an informal age-grade of young men, *samari*, under a head appointed by the *hakimi*. This head, the Sarkin Samari, was instructed to mobilize a contingent to move to Maradi by a set day. No penalties attached to those youths who did not attend, except ridicule and mockery; but rural chiefs who failed to turn out themselves as well as their forces were culpable.

These contingents of *samari* reported through the supervisor of the *hakimi* to the ruler's Sarkin Karma, who was the Sarkin Samari of the whole territory and captained its infantry. Bowmen were then dispatched to the ruler's Sarkin Baka, in charge of archers. Those lacking equipment who sought this from the ruler's captains were enrolled in the latter's force. Kaura was the permanent captain of the Maradi cavalry. The titleholder Maradi, perhaps as a reward for Wagaza's bravery, but also because

Maradi was the capital, commanded the bowmen under Kaura, the ruler's Sarkin Baka commanding archers in the rear force around the ruler.

The war equipment of Maradi included spears, swords, chain mail, quilted cotton armour, throwing axes, ordinary axes, poisoned arrows, flaming arrows, ankle chains for slaves, cavalry, and muskets purchased from Zinder.

In attacking a town, Maradawa usually adopted one of two plans. Either they relied on darkness and surprise, being excellent night fighters, or they shot burning arrows over the walls to set the thatched huts on fire, thus generating panic, during which they cut foot-rests in the wall for infantry to climb, the archers firing volleys to keep the wall clear. When their own towns were attacked the Maradawa preferred pitched battles to sieges. For this they generally relied on surprise attacks in the enemy's rear or camp. When Maradi or Madarumfa was threatened the forces of Sarkin Gobir or of Kaura at Gezawa had this relieving task.

IV

Despite many omissions, this account adequately represents the kingdom of Maradi during the relatively stable reign of Dan Baskore. To focus attention on its principal features I have simplified the structural details. Its historical background vividly explains the central motifs of Dan Baskore's state, but, as our account shows, the government of Maradi was more elaborate and complex than that of a warrior band. In its overt identification with Islam and its historical derivation from Katsina, we find many institutional features which could not otherwise be accounted for: for example, the positions of *rukuni* and princes and the role of Iya. The organs of state, its councils, offices, procedures, military, judicial, and religious organization are all evident legacies of old Katsina adapted to new conditions. We have seen how this old constitution was accommodated to the circumstances in which Dan Kasawa and his successors found themselves. In turn, these necessary modifications were institutionalized, and so also were later deviations. Though the Kaura and Galadima of old Katsina were free, and are so now, they are still classified as slave and eunuch offices. Thus, some offices classified as hereditary (*karda*) are distributed freely within a given status category. The model

to which this classification refers may be that of Katsina before the *jihad*, or Maradi under Dan Kasawa, rather than Dan Baskore and his successors.

In no sense does Maradi or its antecedent Katsina correspond to Weber's patrimonial chiefdom, nor is either government feudal (Weber, 1947: 317 ff.; Goody, 1963). In both states authority and power were vested in the ruling council, and were generally fused in the undifferentiated concept of *iko*, without which various deviations from Islam as well as from Katsina traditions and pagan customs cannot be understood. Dominance oscillated between the ruler and his *rukuni*, and also among the latter. As Muslims ruling a pagan population, the Katsinawa of Maradi administered a plural society held together by external threats and internal symbiosis. Except for *iko*, the norms of this unit, were uncertain and not inclusive. A strong ruler such as Dan Baskore, by his simple dominance, was tempted to weaken the throne's position, as when he appointed a free official already in charge of the bowmen to the Galadima's office, and gave the office of Maradi to the new Galadima's son, thus concentrating two important and hitherto distinct functions in one family. When Kaura Hasau and Maradi Idi conspired to appoint and depose rulers at will subsequent rulers regretted this innovation.

NOTES

1. No population figures for the state of Maradi in the nineteenth century are available, but in 1938 the Canton of Maradi (in the Niger Colony, now the Republic of Niger) had a population of 48,282 distributed in 144 'villages'.

2. Fieldwork was carried out by the author in Maradi in March 1959, as one phase in a series of Hausa historical studies made during 1958/9.

Since this paper was written, Philippe David's monograph, *Maradi, l'ancien état et l'ancienne ville: site, population histoire* (Documents des études nigériennes, No. 18, IFAN-CNRS, Niger, 1964) has been published.

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