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Preface

The papers in this volume, except for the concluding papers, were presented to an interdisciplinary colloquium arranged by the African Studies Center, University of California, Los Angeles, and held in the spring of 1966. They deal with the nature and social consequences of pluralism, and with problems of social cohesion and change in plural societies. The contributions have been arranged in four parts: Part I is introductory and consists of theoretical papers; Part II presents case studies in pre-colonial, white settler, colonial, and independent African societies; Part III is a discussion of general perspectives; and Part IV presents our conclusions in regard to theories of pluralism and conceptual approaches. While the case studies deal with pluralism in African societies, the theoretical interest extends beyond the boundaries of Africa to a general concern with the relations between groups under conditions of structural, social, and cultural pluralism.

The contributions made in discussions during the colloquium were most stimulating and have been of the greatest help in developing the main themes. We gratefully acknowledge the contributions of the participants: Marilyn Affleck, Corrine Armstrong, Beryl Bellman, Daniel Biebuyck, Wairimu Bowman, Alfred Brown, John Brown, Philip Burnham, Alifeyo Chilivumbo, Francis Carney, Henry Chipembere, Marge Clark, Peter Clark, Robert Collins, Paul Doody, Harvey M. Feinberg, Walter Goldschmidt, Thomas Gosebrink, Robert Griffeth, Jan Hajda, Sondra Hale, Michael Halliwell, Charles Harper, Richard Harns, Doyle Hatt, Steve Heyneman, Lloyd C. Honore, Martin Legassick, Angelo Loiria, Clifford Lutton, Sally Moore, John Meyer, Richard Moyer, Dickson C. Mwazoli, Anthony Oberschall, Hasu Patel, Merrick Posnansky, George Phillips, John Purcell, Charlotte Quinn, Kristin Ravetz, Theodore Ravetz, Catherine Read, Barry Schutz, John Spence, Charlotte Stolmaker, Nina Terebinski, Betty Thomas, and Robert Zwingora.
Preface

We wish to express our grateful thanks to the African Studies Center for its interest and enthusiasm, and its superb organization of the colloquium. We are especially grateful to Ailene Benson, John Brown, James Coleman, Thomas Gosebrink, Jo Mitchell, and Benjamin Thomas, all of the African Studies Center. We also thank Stephen Coddington, Edward Leddel, and Edna Bonacich for their help in preparing the papers for publication. We wish particularly to thank Grace Stimson for her editorial work on the manuscript.

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Chapter 13  Some Developments in the Analytic Framework of Pluralism

M. G. Smith

Social science is a mode of institutionalized cooperation. Its theoretical structures are the work of many hands and take form slowly. No sociological perspective of major importance can be elaborated in an appropriate analytical scheme without undergoing continuous development in the process. Even Marx and Weber, whose early work contains the essence of their developed theoretical systems, died after most productive careers, leaving their expositions unfinished or unsystematized.

This general pattern of slow and indirect growth is nicely illustrated by the theory of social pluralism which J. S. Furnivall advanced nearly thirty years ago. Furnivall died in 1960, having delineated the plural society as a specific type, but without having developed its theoretical basis adequately. After his major study of colonialism, his work remained uncultivated for several years. Neither during the period of waning imperialism nor the hurried decolonization that followed were Western scholars attracted to Furnivall's insights; since then, neither can the new rulers of these plural states, nor can sympathetic observers emphasize their plural features without implicitly questioning their viability, cohesion, and status. However, these are merely some of the factors that account for the limited interest in Furnivall's theory; they are not necessarily the decisive ones. Nevertheless, in the absence of the necessary positive response among sociologists, the rich possibilities of this perspective remain undeveloped. In consequence there does not now exist any agreed or systematic body of concepts and analytic propositions which could pass muster as a theory of pluralism or of the plural society. However, several scholars now share a sense of the problem and a consensus that it merits research and study. The variety of alternative approaches to the study of these phenomena is nicely il-
illustrated by various essays in this volume; and the growing literature on pluralism includes several others. Thus we are here concerned rather with problems of sociological perspective which enter into theory construction than with a single consistent scheme of concepts and propositions. To appreciate the open character of these recent advances, it is useful to review briefly the development of sociological interest in problems of pluralism and in their analytic formulation since Furnivall's day. Further, to illuminate the process and direction of this development, it is necessary to consider those features of the original model which tended to promote new orientations during their necessary revision. To this end it is convenient first to indicate the generality of these phenomena and some of the ways in which some sociologists have attempted to formulate them. After this, we may obliquely consider Furnivall's model by examining the most important criticisms leveled against it; and, finally, with due attention to these criticisms and to the many diverse perspectives in this and other publications, we may try to outline an analytic framework for further studies of pluralism which seems to summarize the present state of this inquiry.

I

As Leo Kuper points out, pluralism has several connotations, some of which are apparently opposed. Here we are concerned only with the denotation that corresponds to Furnivall's usage and its subsequent elaboration. Though Furnivall's notion is only one of several alternatives, it is also quite specific and distinctive; and for reasons a sociologist of knowledge may readily appreciate, it has aroused some quite hostile reactions. Whether the thesis would avoid such hostility under another label may be doubted. But clearly Furnivall was not alone in perceiving the structural distinctness of those social combinations he called "plural societies." In identifying the type, in specifying its properties, and in proposing this designation, Furnivall was merely revising and generalizing ideas formulated by the Dutch economist Boeke, who may himself have been influenced by Spencer and other social Darwinians. Using a variety of differing names, several modern writers have also identified the "plural society" as a distinct structural type, describing its major characteristics.

Preferring the term "composite societies," in 1940 Radcliffe-Brown cited South Africa as an example; and while stressing that "the study of composite societies, the description and analysis of the processes of change in them, is a complex and difficult task," he clearly recognized its importance for sociological theory and practical affairs alike. However, despite his reference to South Africa, Radcliffe-Brown, like Furnivall, identified these "composite societies" with a "colonial situation" such
as Balandier and others have described. This equation and typological
distinction have been challenged by Raymond Firth among others, and
on various grounds. Firth points out that colonial status as such does not
establish a distinct societal type, composite or other, which may then be
changed by simple decolonization, an observation which receives support
from various papers in this volume that describe the plural characteristics
of precolonial and postcolonial African societies, as well as colonial ones.
Illustrations could be multiplied from other continents and historical
periods; for example, after several decades of independence, various
countries in Latin America still impress observers with their plural char-
acteristics.

Gideon Sjoberg has used the work of Boeke and Furnivall to
segregate a special category of “feudal societies” characterized by cul-
tural “bifurcation,” though many did not experience colonialism. Names
for such institutionally divided societies multiply freely. Besides such
terms as “composite” and “feudal,” we may cite Manning Nash’s “multiple
society,” Van Lier’s “segmental society,” the “segmented societies” of
Hoetink and Speckman, or Kenneth Little’s “social dualism.” Such
terminology indicates the wide distribution of plural conditions in human
societies and their independent recognition by various social scientists.

Recently, stressing the need for systematic comparative study of ex-co-
lonial states, Shils indicates the plural character of their societal base
without specific typological designation. “In . . . the new states, the
pre-political matrix is in a most rudimentary condition. The constituent
societies on which the new states rest are, taken separately, not civil
societies, and, taken together, they certainly do not form a single civil
society.” Such units closely approximate the model of a “non-national
state composed of plural cultures” which Manning Nash, following Tax
and Wolfe, identifies in modern Guatemala.

As a political type, the non-national state is marked by the presence of two
societies within one political network. Although the entire population of the
territory is included in a single system of political bonds, only a part of the
population is fully aware of the national entity, participates significantly in its
politics, and has sentimental and personal bonds of attachment to the entity.
This group extends throughout the national territory; it is divided into social
classes, and is marked by rural and urban differences. This group is, in fact,
the nation and the state. Ranking below this national group in social power
and prestige are a series of local societies, the members of which have no, or
little, conception of the nation, and no significant participation in its political
apparatus. These local societies are of small scale and their customs and way
of life are different from the group which constitutes the nation and the
state.

Nash also points out that “the political life of a non-national state is
conducted in a social system with two levels of social and cultural
integration, resulting in different organizations and tasks at each level.”
To understand such social systems, he advises us to investigate “in some detailed and systematic analysis how the multiple society operates, the mechanisms of political control, and the social and cultural circumstances which are amenable to, or inimical to, the perpetuation and continuity of such a political structure.” On Guatemalan data, he concludes that “a non-national state can only become a nation by winning the adherence of the members of its component local societies.”

This conception is equally noteworthy for its analytic boldness and its clarity; yet, though it subsumes Sjoberg’s “feudal societies,” Little’s “dualism,” Van Lier’s “segmentarism,” and Radcliffe-Brown’s South African “composite” systems, so far as these are organized in states, it is not sufficiently comprehensive to accommodate the full range and variety of plural societies. Many of the “new states” lack a segregated national elite; and plural or multiple societies may exist without such institutions as the state.

Clearly then, it is neither correct nor instructive to dismiss pluralism as “a cliché of commonsense sociology” or as a general feature of “so-called ‘complex’ societies.” In the opinion of many scholars, it would seem to provide a more objective and incisive analysis of social and political relations in compartmentalized societies like Guatemala than such ill-defined concepts as “primordial attachments”—“the ‘givens’ or ‘assumed givens’ of social existence... congruities of blood, speech, custom and so on”—or than the yet vaguer postulate of the necessity for societal integration on the basis of common value systems. Indeed, if “primordial” sentiments are derivatives or correlates of “social existence,” then their analysis presupposes a thorough study of the specific societal context of this existence, which is precisely what the framework of pluralism seeks to provide. Likewise, to demonstrate that such divided societies as Guatemala owe their “integration” to the prevalence of a common value system within them, it is surely necessary to identify their main components and to determine how their respective valuations order their systems of social relations.

Other writers who have employed conceptions of social or cultural pluralism in analyzing “non-national states composed of plural cultures” include Freedman, Cann, Mitchell, Philip Mayer, Marriott, Sklar and Whitaker, Hoselitz, Benedict, W. A. Lewis, Fallers, and L. A. Despres, all thereby demonstrating the perceived relevance of this approach. Besides Manning Nash, Rex, Hoetink, Despres, Broome, van den Berghe, and Leo Kuper have sought to develop and clarify the theoretical model; and in their independent comparative surveys of legal conditions in the new states, Rheinstein, Schiller, and the Kupers have all found conceptions of pluralism indispensable. Evi-
dently, despite its differing use by different writers, Furnivall's model of
the plural society as a distinct type with specific characteristics has
considerable analytic relevance. The current wealth of perspectives and
hypotheses concerning pluralism, to which this volume bears witness,
simply illustrates the intellectual richness of these problems and the
recent increase of sociological interest in them.

Besides its standard theories of normative or functional integration in
human societies, sociology urgently needs a conceptual framework ap­
propriate for the systematic comparative study of those historical and
contemporary societies whose organization and composition positively
blocked their functional or normative integration and minimized their
internal cohesion. Only by continuous cooperative study of the many
dimensions and varieties of these conditions can we eventually construct
a single coherent system of analytic concepts and propositions applicable
to each specific case and to them all. Until then, our sociological theory
remains bound by its basic presuppositions and applicable only to those
societies that fulfill its exclusive criteria.47 It seems, however, that current
theories assume substantial uniformity in the institutional bases of the
societies with which they deal. Such institutional uniformities simultane­
ously determine the boundaries of social systems and the levels and
modes of normative or functional integration within them. Thus a theo­
retical framework appropriate for simultaneous comparative and indi­
vidual analyses of those "multiple," "composite," "segmental," or "bifurcated"
societies characterized by a plurality of institutional systems remains
to be constructed; and, as Shils suggests, this is surely one of the most
important and challenging tasks that confront social scientists to­
day.48

II

However exciting or important such exercises in theoretical construc­
tion may seem, there are various sociological reservations about the
utility of Furnivall's framework which should first be reviewed. These
criticisms and reservations may conveniently be grouped in three clus­
ters. Initial reactions to Furnivall's model came from British social
anthropologists familiar with colonial Africa and the Far East.49 A second
body of criticism has its roots in recent Caribbean sociology and is
addressed to formulations by Furnivall or myself, in equal measure.50
Finally, there are several criticisms and reservations in the various con­
tributions to the present volume.

I do not propose to discuss this latest body of comment in this essay.
Besides their critical elements, the contributions in this volume present
new models and perspectives for the analysis of social and cultural
pluralism which together illustrate the general awareness that such conditions cannot be adequately handled within a theoretical framework designed specifically for functionally integrated societies of tribal or industrial types. It seems best, then, to regard these differing formulations and perspectives as alternative exploratory strategies and orientations toward common problems of framing concepts and generalizations based on comparative studies of plural structures and their processes of change.

In contrast, the two earlier bodies of criticism both challenge the soundness and relevance of Furnivall's model for the analysis of institutionally mixed societies; and it is therefore necessary to examine these objections. Such a task is simplified by the repetitive character of these criticisms, where they are made explicit. Thus it is hardly profitable to discuss the charges that pluralism is a "sort of sociological reactionary scholasticism" or a "theory of incalculable danger for Caribbean progressivism," whatever that may mean. However, we can and should examine the writer's objection that this approach "overlooks the fundamental unity of the society." "It emphasizes the divisive elements of Caribbean society to the neglect of its emergent unifying elements; it takes racial and religious animosities as given permanent factors instead of seeing them as psycho-sociological accidents flowing from the character of colonial government; and it thereby mistakenly identifies those accidents as central essences of the . . . society." Clearly, such criticism seems more appropriate to analyses based on notions of "primordial attachments" than to the theory of pluralism, whether in Furnivall's or in its present form.

It is neither necessary nor useful to cite and review each of these various objections here. Much of the Caribbean discussion is of a polemic and ideological rather than an analytic, inquiring character. Moreover, almost all the criticisms of major substance were presented by H. S. Morris in two excellent essays published ten years ago. Except for the dogmatic insistence that all societies are normatively integrated, a position which Morris, following Furnivall, apparently rejects, and which I have treated elsewhere, this Caribbean discussion adds little to Morris' critique. I shall therefore restrict this review to Morris' discussion, citing relevant statements from Furnivall's work to indicate the salient features of his model. In this way we can elliptically summarize Furnivall's work to indicate the salient features of its inception.
The four most far-reaching and general objections to the perspective of social pluralism developed by Furnivall or others can be listed as follows:

1) This viewpoint “overlooks the fundamental unity” of the societies with which it deals. It minimizes the coherence and integration of their social systems, while emphasizing, perhaps for ulterior purposes, the depth, intensity, and permanence of their internal divisions. To this end, it denies the allegiance of the members to a common set of values and goals.65

2) Methodologically, pluralism is said to prescribe the analysis of social systems in a cultural frame of reference, a procedure that is both inappropriate and misleading.56

3) This approach misrepresents or distorts social realities by ignoring or minimizing the varied and numerous bonds that link people of different sections in “plural societies,” individually, or as categories or groups. Simultaneously, it exaggerates the unity and solidarity of these several sections and diverts attention from their many internal divisions. Pluralism accordingly misrepresents the interrelations of these social sections by overstressing their separateness, integration, internal unities, mutual differences, and conflicts of interest.50

4) Plural societies do not constitute a distinct societal class or type; they do not differ significantly, in kind or properties, from “other highly stratified societies” or from those with “minority problems.” 81 There is thus no need for any special sociological theory or approach on this score.62

It is obvious that these four sets of objections are intimately connected and mutually reinforcing. Each criticism represents an essential feature of the general thesis that societies—or other types of social systems—are functional unities, normatively integrated orders of functionally interdependent parts, and all alike amenable to the same mode and framework of sociological analysis. Though presented with varying explicitness and elaborations or corollaries in more recent critiques by Braithwaite,83 Rubin,64 Jayawardena,65 Benedict,66 and R. T. Smith,67 these central objections are all present in Morris’ discussion, especially in his second, shorter paper.

Morris based his critique of Furnivall’s model on his field studies of Indians in colonial Uganda, having generalized these observations to other Indian communities throughout the former British territories of East Africa.68 Apparently he chose to regard the populations of these
different territories—Zanzibar, Tanganyika, Uganda, and Kenya—as a single “plural society” because all were subject to British domination and contained people of the same “racial” stocks, namely, Britons, “Arabs,” Indians, and Africans. Morris did not attempt to analyze the societal structure of any or all of these colonial units, but sought instead to challenge Furnivall’s thesis by showing how the Indians of “East Africa” departed from expectations he attributes to Furnivall. In their studies of Indians in Guiana and Mauritius, Jayawardena and Benedict employed a similar procedure. 69

Briefly, although classified by the prevailing racial legislation and by the colonial administration as a single “Indian Community,” Morris found the Kampala Indians sharply segmented by religion, by sect, by caste, by language, and by regional provenience, and also stratified by economic, social, and political criteria. The Indian Muslims were divided by “sect” as Sunni and Shiah; Hindus, by caste, language, and regional origin. To illustrate the Indian organization in Kampala and elsewhere, Morris selects two collectivities, the Khoja Ismailis, a Shiah sect, organized as a corporate group under their absentee “divine ruler,” the Aga Khan, and the Patidars who hail from Gujarat, to which they still turn for appropriate brides under a system of intracaste “hypergamous” marriage. At Kampala, both Ismailis and Patidars were organized in 1954 as corporate groups, the former being directed by the Aga Khan to orient themselves to the East African milieu in which they lived, the latter, under their caste-endogamous marriage system, being at least equally oriented to their ancestral villages in India. Following the leads of these “pacemakers,” other segments of “Indian communities” at Kampala and elsewhere had also established their own exclusive organizations based on caste or sect, thereby undermining the unity and status of the Central Indian Association, with which the British colonial administrations preferred to deal as a common representative organization. Whereas initially wealthier Indians had pursued influence and power through leadership in the Central Indian Association, by 1954 they first sought office in their respective caste or sectarian body, and then acted as the unit’s spokesmen to the British administration. If sufficiently influential, a segmental leader could establish himself as a broker, a political middleman whose prominence within his group and among the local Indians reflected his appointments to official committees, and his relations with Europeans or African leaders. According to Morris, a successful broker would be ascribed an “upper-class status” 70 by other Indians; and at this stage his influence would clearly extend beyond the limits of his own caste or sect.

With these materials, Morris questions Furnivall’s model on various grounds, some of which Furnivall seems to have treated specifically. It is
convenient at this stage to juxtapose these writers’ statements with relevant comments.

Citing Furnivall, Morris first questions an economic interpretation of the foundation of plural societies. “It can perhaps be maintained,” he says, “that East Africa, in its present form, ‘evolved’ in accordance with the free play of economic forces; but examples of plural or ethnically composite societies formed by military conquest in both primitive and civilized conditions are not hard to find.” Undoubtedly Furnivall overstressed the strictly economic factor in his analysis of plural societies in the tropical colonies; but the political precondition of this economic order is perfectly evident in his account. “In a plural society . . . the union is not voluntary but is imposed by the colonial power and by the force of economic circumstance.” The plural society is in fact held together only by pressure exerted from outside by the colonial power.

As an economist, Furnivall devoted his attention to those colonial societies that came into existence as products of European commercial and industrial expansion and imperialism. It was in such colonial systems that he thought strictly economic interests were given free reign. To isolate these units for detailed study, he distinguished them from precolonial pluralities as a distinct type, thereby obscuring the theoretical status of either and of his analysis. “Despite certain plural features, tropical society was distinct from the plural society which has been created by modern economic forces.” It is clear from the preceding review of precolonial African societies in this volume that Furnivall’s distinction is neither self-evident nor sound.

In his eagerness to distinguish tropical colonial societies and those of industrial Europe in the twentieth century, Furnivall made two significant and mutually supporting errors: he strove to identify these colonial societies as a species sui generis, when indeed they are only a special subclass of a very widespread societal type, and even in Furnivall’s day by no means its only representatives. To validate his distinction, Furnivall treated the normal features of these tropical colonies as essentials of the plural society; prominent among these colonial conditions were multiracialism, dissensus, apathy, and subjugation of the colonized to the interests of the imperial power.

As an economist, Furnivall tended to minimize the significance of political motivations and relations within these colonial systems, except as regards their economic order and the accompanying social ma-laise. “Ordinarily, control has been established to the economic advantage of the colonial power, [and] the general result has been the domination of tropical society by economic forces.” “The plural society arises where economic forces are exempt from control by social will.”
eign rule in a tropical dependency liberates economic forces, which acting internally produce social disintegration, and acting externally produce economic disintegration, building up a plural society precariously balanced in unstable equilibrium and held in position only by pressure from outside." 77 "The dissolution of the [traditional] political structure is only the first stage in social dissolution, and it is completed by the second, or economic, stage, breaking up the village into individuals." 78 Thus Furnivall's model of colonial society, though insecurely set off as a distinct societal type, clearly presupposes political domination by the imperial power, whether through conquest, negotiation, metropolitan agreements, or by other means; and, while describing these units as the arenas and victims of economic laissez faire, Furnivall also notes that compulsion is often used in furthering the economic interests of the colonizing power. 79

Morris introduces his central argument by observing that although in East Africa, "the inhabitants . . . conceptualize the structure of their society in a slightly simpler version of the scheme used by Furnivall to describe mixed or composite societies of the Far East"—that is, as a set of occupationally and socially segregated racial sections—this "stereotyped view" merely enables them "to overlook the differentiation into groups and categories within each section, even though these latter divisions may in fact be structurally more significant in the composition of the total society than the broader 'racial' categories. . . . [It] also allows [them] to overlook the actual mingling of members of all sections which occurs, and which is comparable with that found within stratified societies which are not usually classified as plural." 80

If Morris was merely concerned to show that the stereotyped notions East Africans held about their societies corresponded imperfectly with observable patterns of conduct and interaction, this would be neither new nor relevant to the criticism of Furnivall's model. However, Morris intends to stress that in colonial East Africa the racial sections were neither totally segregated nor united as separate "corporate groups" for internal or external activities. Thus,

in the East African situation . . . members of the society are in their own minds divided into "racial" categories. In fact, the effective structural units are frequently quite other groups. Among the Indians, they are the organized Muslim sects and Hindu castes. Among Africans they are often tribal units or the factional followings of outstanding leaders; and among Europeans—a small minority of the population—it is unusual to find the "community" acting as a whole to defend or further its interests. Questions then arise, how far can Furnivall's conceptual scheme be usefully applied, and how far is East Africa a plural society different from other highly stratified societies? 81
These questions are surely critical for Furnivall’s thesis and its later elaboration. They may be answered at two levels: first, by seeing whether Furnivall did recognize these conditions in formulating his model; and then by comparing plural and “other highly stratified societies.”

Writing in 1945, Furnivall described the plural society most succinctly as one “in which two or more groups live side by side but separately, within the same political unit.” Continuing, he remarked that “one distinctive feature [of such a society] is the lack of organic unity within each group; each group tends to consist of an aggregate of individuals.”

By 1948 Furnivall had perceived the solecism in his description of such “aggregates” as groups, and he accordingly devised a more appropriate terminology. To describe his model, he then wrote as follows: “On looking at a plural society in its political aspect, one can distinguish three characteristics: the society as a whole comprises racial sections; each section is an aggregate of individuals rather than a separate or organic whole; and as individuals, their social life is incomplete.” Further, “each section in the plural society is a crowd and not a community.” “In each section the sectional common will is feeble, and in the society as a whole there is no common will. There may be apathy, even on such a vital point as defence against aggression.” “The plural society is broken up into groups of isolated individuals . . . [and] each section is merely an aggregate of individuals.” Thus instead of hypostatizing these social sections as internally unified, solidary “corporate groups,” Furnivall tended rather to overstress the “atomization of society”; and he may be more correctly criticized for doing so.

As in Morris’ report of colonial East Africa, so likewise in Furnivall’s model of the plural society, the constituent “racial” sections are constituted as corporate categories based on social and political distinctions of racial and cultural characteristics; and as corporate categories, such sections are, in some socially significant respects, mutually exclusive aggregates which lack the organizations appropriate to unify them as corporate groups. In an important passage, Morris comes very near to seizing this distinction between corporate categories and corporate groups. Failing to formulate it clearly, he contrasts “unorganized categories” with “corporate groups”; and, finding the racial sections in Kampala unorganized, he concludes that they lack corporate status and are primarily significant as popular stereotypes.

Furnivall frequently asserts that in plural societies “each group holds by its own religion, its own culture and language, its own ideas and ways. As individuals they meet, but only in the market place, in buying and
But he also points out that "sometimes a section of the native population is westernized," citing West African and Javanese examples. However, "in all tropical dependencies 'westernized' natives are more or less cut off from the people, and form a separate group or caste." Clearly such differential Westernization presupposes differential exposure of the colonial people to Western influences and models, directly, through interaction, or by other means. Furnivall recognized this explicitly. "In a plural society the sections are not segregated; members of the several units are intermingled and meet as individuals." Morris' observations confirm this for colonial East Africa. There, though Indian leaders may themselves enroll as Freemasons while their wives join an "interracial women's society," "the most active significant relations, then, between Africans, Europeans and Indians, take place at the top of the social system in the larger towns, a fact which might perhaps have been foreseen from the evidence of other plural societies. At the middle and lower levels relatively little interaction occurs." Thus, though Morris interprets them otherwise, his data on intersectional relations and intrasectional organizations illustrate Furnivall's model in detail.

The central question remains: "how far is East Africa . . . (or any other plural society), different from any other highly stratified society?" According to Furnivall, in the colonial plural societies of the Far East, "each group holds by its own religion, its own culture and language, its own ideas and ways . . . . In the economic sphere there is a division of labor along racial lines." Whereas the members of a modern stratified society share a common citizenship and common values and norms, "in a plural society there is a corresponding cleavage along racial lines . . . . There are no common standards of conduct beyond those prescribed by law . . . . All have their own ideas as to what is right and proper, but on this matter they have different ideas." "Even in a matter so vital to the whole community as defence against aggression, the people are reluctant to pay the necessary price." We need merely to compare the various resistance movements against German occupation in Europe after 1941 or the conduct of Britian after Dunkirk with the indifference to Japanese occupation displayed by subject peoples in Malaya, Burma, Indonesia, and New Guinea during the same period to appreciate this difference between plural societies whose "union is not voluntary but . . . imposed" and consensually integrated societies, stratified or other. Almost by definition the latter exclude major popular revolts, while the former provoke and must suppress them to preserve their current structures. From precolonial Africa, we may cite the revolts of Hausa against Fulani in Kano, Katsina, and other territories, and of various conquered people against their Lozi rulers; the Lozi revolt
against their Kololo chiefs; the more or less perpetual turmoil of Timbuktu; the Mahdist uprising in the Sudan; Chaka's revolt against the Ndwandwe; and many other instances of violent opposition to rulers of differing ethnic stock. More recent upheavals in Kenya, Cameroon, Algeria, Ruanda-Urundi, Niger, and Zanzibar likewise expressed their plural cleavages. So do the recent collisions in Uganda, Congo, Ghana, and Nigeria, though in these latter cases the conflicts engage ethnic collectivities ranked as coordinates and not hierarchically. Pluralism may prevail among sections of equivalent status and capacities, as for example in the Nigerian Federation, or between "tribes," as in the African category of colonial Uganda. Whether a plurality is stratified or segmental in its form, its normative basis is very insecure, its structure is radically divisive, its cohesion and continuity remain problematic. These are surely not the normal characteristics of modern stratified societies or of stable traditional ones such as China, India, and Rome, or Mongolian or Polynesian societies.

Briefly, the category of stratified societies presupposes communities of citizenship invested with common positive rights and duties, including access to a common law and a common system of political institutions. Plural societies are characterized by the exclusive incorporation of the collectivities that compose them, whether these collectivities are defined by practice or by law, and in racial, ethnic, religious, or other terms. Such a structure may have two quite distinct forms. In one form it ordains sectionally unequal distributions of legal, political, and other rights by the differential incorporation of collectivities within it. In the other, though coordinate and equally autonomous, its component sections constitute mutually exclusive collectivities of primary importance in law, politics, and citizenship alike. In its colonial phase Uganda society was legally established as a structure of differential incorporation. In the period immediately preceding and following its independence, old segmental divisions within the former subject category of Africans increased in depth and intensity without corresponding stratification of these opposing groups.

Evidently, like Furnivall, Morris equates plural with colonial societies which, being explicitly hierarchic, he assimilates to the general category of highly stratified societies. However, by his specific comparisons, Morris illustrates the ambiguity of this category. Though Britain presents an excellent example of a "highly stratified society," the examples he cites are quite extreme, namely, seventeenth-century France and modern South Africa, the latter being Radcliffe-Brown's prototype of the composite or plural society.

Two questions arise: (1) What criteria distinguish "highly stratified
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societies” from others that display stratification? (2) Assuming that analytically significant criteria can be found to distinguish “highly stratified societies,” is this category homogeneous? Do all “highly stratified societies” exhibit identical structural and cultural conditions? Or is it analytically useful and necessary to distinguish between them?

In treating these issues Morris is far from clear. Emphasizing that, however prevalent in colonial societies, social differentiation on the basis of race is always structurally contingent and may be misleading as an index of personal alignments, he asserts that a “society such as . . . South Africa, where the different categories of the population have status and occupation explicitly and legally defined, has more in common with the estate system found in 17th-century France than it has with contemporary East Africa. It is true that ‘racial’ categories which are not unlike estates exist in East Africa, but within these categories and across their boundaries, significant structural groups have a freedom and flexibility of movement more like that seen in present-day France than in South Africa or other estate systems.” Implicitly, then, Morris distinguishes two broad categories of “highly stratified societies” by the presence or absence within them of specific and explicit legal provisions that differentiate the population by conditions of status and occupation, a system that, where present, normally entails corresponding differentiation of civil and political rights among the population. Despite his favorable accounts of its regime, given “the legal recognition of ‘racial’ categories in East Africa,” the unequal racial franchise and virtual exclusion of Africans from the legislature at this date, the racial wage structure and distributions of occupation, education, income, public burdens, revenues, and facilities, administrative and legal provisions show that the significant comparisons between South and East Africa in 1954 were rather different from those Morris chose to stress.

Even so, the comparison still remains critical. Morris is clearly correct in stressing that racial or ethnic differences are socially significant only insofar as they are institutionalized to differentiate people within a society. Under their estate system in the seventeenth century, despite ethnic homogeneity, Frenchmen were differentiated by law, occupation, and civil and political status no less severely than are the racial sections of contemporary South Africa. Hence, if South Africa is a representative plural society, as everyone except Furnivall agrees, then, given its similarity to seventeenth-century France, racial or ethnic differences are not necessary conditions of a plural society. On Morris’ view of colonial Uganda, they are also not sufficient ones; and even if this liberal interpretation of the colonial order by a visiting Briton is rejected, other examples can be cited to substantiate the point.
Furnivall repeatedly identifies the sectional divisions of plural societies by racial differences, as the preceding quotations show; and Morris makes a real contribution in exposing the contingency of this association by showing that racial or ethnic differences are neither sufficient nor requisite features of social orders based on systematic sectional disjunctions and inequalities. Furnivall's emphasis on the racial basis of social divisions within plural societies almost reduces his model to a scheme for the study of colonial race relations. That the model survives these and other defects that flowed from Furnivall's preoccupation with colonial societies in the Far Eastern tropics is almost entirely owing to his remarkable grasp of the structural essentials that underlay these accidents of time and circumstance.

We can easily appreciate the considerations that led Furnivall to restrict his inquiries to colonial societies created by European industrial expansion. Nevertheless, in attempting to distinguish a societal type in the image of these units, he committed a major methodological error by treating the arbitrary products of historical combinations as necessary and sufficient elements of a distinct societal type. At best, by such procedures Furnivall could only isolate a particular variant of the generic type whose essential structural conditions remained partly hidden beneath the specific forms and substance of these multiracial colonial systems.

Pluralism is confined neither to the tropics, nor to the last four centuries of human history. Where it prevails in a colonial society, as Firth obliquely indicates, decolonization cannot always directly dissolve it. Furnivall himself was disturbed about this. Despite their independence, Latin America and South Africa provide excellent examples of the plural society as Furnivall described it. Evidently Morris perceived this point; and in classifying South Africa with seventeenth-century France as systems of similar structural type, he took a decisive step to free the concept of the plural society from the four arbitrary restrictions by which Furnivall had nearly destroyed it in his desire to segregate colonialism for special study. These four deficiencies of Furnivall's model are (1) its total restriction to and identification with the modern colonial situation; (2) its correlated restriction to tropical latitudes; (3) its restriction to the era of European industrial expansion and laissez-faire capitalism; and (4) its restriction to and identification with multiracial communities.

All these misleading features of Furnivall's model are implicitly repudiated by Morris in classifying contemporary South Africa with seventeenth-century France. It is thus unfortunate that he leaves the status of such societies obscure. The context of his discussion suggests that these are merely variant forms of the highly stratified society.
given above, this interpretation lacks substance. Rather we should recog-
nize that pluralism is restricted neither to colonial societies nor to mod-
ern multiracial or multiethnic ones. The plural society in its variant forms
is an old and familiar structure. It may even represent, as Spencer and
others thought, a particular phase in social evolution. The development
of elaborate estate systems among the conquering Franks and Germans
in medieval Europe shows clearly how ethnically homogeneous groups
may be organized into a series of ranked orders, estates, or closed social
sections. Long before the seventeenth-century, these French and German
estates were no less sharply distinguished by culture and internal organi-
zation than by differences of jural, political, or economic status. There-
after they were increasingly conceptualized as castes by their members;
and even the great French Revolution did not entirely eliminate this. 330

IV

To analyze the integration of societies characterized by structural
pluralism, we must surely examine their structural order in detail to
determine the bases of its social divisions, their specific conditions, prop-
certies, internal organizations, and interrelations, their conflicting or con-
vergent interests, and the scope, level, and style of individuation which
the social structure promotes, accommodates, or excludes within and
between these collective divisions. Structural pluralism consists in the
differential incorporation of social aggregates into a common political
society. This differential incorporation may be formal and explicit, under
the law and constitution, or it may prevail substantively despite them, as,
for example, among the American Negroes. The system of differential
incorporation may institute total disenfranchisement of a particular sec-
tion by withholding citizenship from its members, as for example in South
Africa or in seventeenth-century France. Alternatively, however variable
the system may be in its specific conditions and properties, the collective
character, and the scope of its substantive differentiations, must be
sufficiently rigorous and pervasive to establish an effective order of
corporate inequalities and subordination by the differential distribution
of civil and political rights and the economic, social, and other oppor-
tunities that these permit or enjoin. The "second-class citizenship" of a
social category identified by common disabilities and disqualifications,
whether on racial, religious, economic, or other grounds, is merely one
common mode of differential incorporation. Communal rolls, restrictive
property franchises, and similar arrangements also express and maintain
the differential incorporation of specific collectivities within a wider
society. Such mechanisms are generally developed to enhance the power
of the ruling section or the stability of the social order.
In East and Central Africa, as in many other British colonial territories, racial criteria were employed as bases for differential incorporation. In the French, Belgian, and Portuguese African territories, criteria of "civilization" were employed with like effect under the convenient fictions of assimilationist policy. With the differential access of these social or racial sections to the institutions of the common public domain went differential justice, administrative organization and service, differential allocation of public status, burdens, and benefits. Where, as in colonial East Africa, this differential incorporation consists explicitly in "the legal recognition of racial categories," such racial and structural divisions cannot be regarded as merely incidental or contingent elements of social order, since they constitute its very foundations. It is by reference to such systematic conditions of differential incorporation that plural societies are structurally distinguished from such "highly stratified societies" as modern Britain, France, and Holland, and from such traditional systems as China, India, Zulu, Uganda, Nootka, Yoruba, and Benin. Thus to identify the "underlying structural similarities" of "coherent social systems" based on differential incorporation, for example, in colonial East Africa, we must examine these structural conditions in detail. Failing this, we lack any objective basis for determining the relative "structural significance" of any features observed within them. If a racially diverse population is organized in a single society by differential incorporation on racial grounds, it is perverse to argue that "use of the criterion of race confuses the analysis and may involve the sociologist in irrelevant local political criteria." Likewise, in societies based on conquest or on religious, economic, or other differentiae, analyses that ignored these conditions could scarcely fail to mislead. Indeed, if sociologists exclude as "irrelevant" those structural units and criteria that are institutionalized in a society and perceived as basic by the people concerned, one wonders what underlies their criteria of relevance for sociological analysis.

In practice, Morris does not entirely discount these conditions of differential incorporation. Rather, he seems to take them for granted, much as Geertz regards his "primordial attachments" as "givens—or assumed givens—of social existence." Thus, in evaluating the relative significance of organizational features, Morris simply assumes the social context of differential incorporation in which the "Indian community" of Kampala was placed. "Although associations exist which claim to speak for all Hindus and all Muslims, these entities, like the larger 'Indian community,' are structurally of little importance. The division of the Indian population into Hindu castes and Muslim sects (both Shia and Sunni) of varying degrees of corporate organization is of greater significance in the structure of the Indian section of the society." In short,
the system of differential incorporation provides a frame of reference that measures the relative structural significance of alternative elements, among the Indians as well as throughout the whole society. For specific illustrations of such contextualization, we need only look at the essays by Lofchie, Gluckman, Davidson, and Hilda Kuper in this volume. In various ways their papers demonstrate the regulative primacy of the locally specific contexts and conditions of differential incorporation in organizing or restricting individual or collective activities and relations within and across sectional boundaries.

In postulating the "underlying structural uniformities" of Indians, Africans, "Arabs," and Europeans in colonial East Africa, Morris cites Radcliffe-Brown's dictum to the effect that in studying "composite societies" we should examine the "interactions of individuals and groups within an established social structure." Tactfully, he omits the next clause, which questions the quality and degree of the structural establishment by emphasizing that it is "itself in process of change." If the colonial social structure in East Africa had been really "established," the Mau Mau movement and ensuing demands for African independence, the boycott of Indians in Kampala, the revolution in Zanzibar, and other major local upheavals could neither occur nor be understood.

Though Morris omits Radcliffe-Brown's qualifying reference to change, his own ethnographic data illustrate it. However, by confining his discussion to the Indians, he diverts attention from the influence of their structural context, set between British and African social sections, on developments among them. To account for these changes, Morris relies heavily on such culture-historical conditions as Ismaili divine kingship and Patidar intracaste hypergamy, while paying little attention to their selective situational reinforcement by local factors. Describing such procedures as "simply a way of avoiding the reality," Radcliffe-Brown points out: "What is happening in a Transkeian tribe, for example, can only be described by recognizing that this tribe has been incorporated into a wider political and economic structural system." Thus to understand such developments we should specify the conditions of this incorporation and the salient characteristics of the wider structural system. Those "underlying structural similarities" or "uniformities" that express the "wide measure of agreement in many spheres of social life evident in all sections of the population" in colonial East Africa consist simply in the differential incorporation of these sections into "a wider political and economic structural system." No one would seriously argue that in this colonial regime, the racial sections were incorporated on uniform or similar terms; but it is precisely such systematic institutionalized collective disjunctions that constitute plural societies as distinctive systems of
differentially articulated sections subject to radically diverse sets of legal, political, economic, and other conditions. To postulate in such conditions any “underlying structural uniformities” or “wide measures of inter-sectional agreement” beyond those inherent in the common system of differential incorporation seems rather odd. That neither of these postulated conditions prevailed in British East or Central Africa during the final years of colonial rule may be seen from the preceding accounts by Davidson, Lofchie, and Hilda Kuper.

Clearly, plural societies are “structural systems” and can only be understood as such. However, by confining attention “mainly to the Indian section of East African society . . . to show how it is internally organized,” 221 Morris, and others who adopt this procedure, 222 exclude the data necessary “to understand the composition of the society as a whole and the relationship of Indians to it.” 223 This is so because the internal organization of any discrete section in a plural society reflects the context and conditions of its incorporation and presumes their continuity. Structural systems of such diverse constitution and complexity cannot be understood from any single sectionally exclusive standpoint.

Elaborating Radcliffe-Brown’s interest in such collective relations “within an established structure, . . . itself in process of change,” Shils calls for the “macro-sociological analysis” of their societal integration as follows: “Every constituent institution and stratum of the society or societies of a new state can be studied from the standpoint of the macro-sociological problem. . . . In every instance, the problem is as follows: How does this institution or practice or belief function in the articulation of the society, attaching or detaching or fixing each sector in its relationship to the central institutional and value systems of the society?” 224 Nonetheless, though, this problem of social integration remains the central analytic focus, its formulation and pursuit presuppose a structural model of the societal order and its internal articulation, that is, an adequate account of the sectional divisions, their bases, internal organization, and standardized interrelations. Lacking such an account, it is difficult to determine how any given “institution or practice or belief” operates to maintain current articulations within the system, or to change these in either direction.

V

Few would deny the “unity” or boundaries of plural or other societies; but as these differ in their composition, structure, and history, so do they differ in “unity,” institutional inclusiveness, consensus, cohesion, and functional coherence. In these regards, two sets of conditions are especially important: (1) the number, variety, and articulation of the institu-
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...tional systems current among the population in each society; and (2) the ways in which such institutionally differentiated collectivities are incorporated to constitute a common society. These two sets of conditions are closely though variably connected. Institutional differences between collectivities in a common society facilitate and may enjoin their segregation as corporate units, categorical or other. Such sectional disjunctions may take the form of differential incorporation, or they may take the consociational forms discussed below. Always, wherever differential incorporation prevails, one institutionally distinct section dominates the others, normally for its own advantage, and by various means which may include naked force where this seems necessary. Where this dominant section is a numerical minority of the population, as for example in the Far Eastern colonies studied by Fumivall, structural pluralism prevails in its most extreme form.

Alternatively, a number of institutionally diverse collectivities may be united in a single society as corporate units holding equivalent or complementary rights and status in the common public domain, as for instance in Lebanon, Switzerland, and Bwamba, or among the Ga and Terik-Tiriki. This type of structure, a consociation, represents the formal opposite of differential incorporation. It excludes differential distributions of privilege, right, or opportunity in the common public domain between its constituent collectivities, whether or not these share common institutions. Thus, although in such systems citizenship presumes identification with one or the other of these primary collectivities, formally at least no differences of civil status in the common public domain attach to membership in either, since each bears coordinate status. Where substantively effective, this condition of formal equivalence thus ensures that segmental identifications or institutional divergences are treated as optional equivalents in the private domain, with consequent increases in the scope for social mobility, assimilation, and wider allegiances throughout all component groups. The consociations just cited illustrate such tendencies toward increasing cohesion in various forms and degrees.

A third alternative mode of societal incorporation may be illustrated by contemporary Britain, France, Holland, or Denmark. This mode incorporates individuals as citizens directly into the public domain on formally identical conditions of civic and political status, thereby eliminating the requirement of individual membership in some intermediate corporation, segmental or sectional. Under this system, individuals hold their citizenship directly and not through segmental or sectional identifications, irrespective of similar or differing practices in other institutional spheres. Given these characteristics, we may describe this system as one
of "universalistic" or "uniform" incorporation. In such an order the institutional observances of individual citizens are equally indifferent except insofar as specific practices are directly or indirectly proscribed. The regime is inherently assimilative in orientation and effect. By assimilating all its members uniformly as citizens, it fosters their assimilation in other spheres also, notably language, connubium, economy, education, and recreation. Under such conditions, within the limits set by law, differences of familial or religious practice are private options of equivalent status and indifference in the determination of individual civic rights. Thus the persistence, modification, and dissolution of such ethnic and religious patterns are all equally consistent with this mode of corporate organization. They are also equally representative of it.

We should therefore distinguish three alternative bases of societal organization and unity, namely, the modes of differential, equivalent, or uniform incorporation. By the first the society is constituted as an order of structurally unequal and exclusive corporate sections, that is, as an explicitly plural regime. By the second, it is constituted as a consociation of complementary or equivalent, but mutually exclusive, corporate divisions, membership in one of which is prerequisite for citizenship in the wider unit. This consociational form is equally appropriate for the union of collectivities having common or differing institutional systems, ethnic origins, language, or religion. The accommodative capacity of this mode of incorporation is shown by the Aztec, Ashanti, Fanti, Egba, Iroquois, and early American confederations, the Delian and Achaean leagues, Malaya and Canada, besides examples already cited.

At best, however, consociations provide an imperfect and conditional basis for union, since they presuppose the structural primacy, internal autonomy, and mutual exclusiveness of the segments that constitute them. Yet, though it prescribes the equivalence of these segments in its inclusive public level, the consociation neither presupposes nor enjoins uniformities of their internal organization or composition, even where, as in Ashanti or the early United States, all shared a common cultural scheme. Within the leagues of ancient Greece formal equality of confederate states was also quite consistent with differences of structure among them; but, for "a more perfect union" than consociation, uniformity in the units and conditions of incorporation is essential, and these can be established only by a radical political individualism that eliminates intermediary collectivities as prerequisite membership units. Where this third mode of incorporation obtains, the sectional organization in which structural pluralism consists is firmly excluded, and citizenship is universalized among individuals. Conversely, where collective relations are
institutionalized as differential incorporation, structural pluralism prevails, whatever the ideology or constitutional provisions. This holds equally for the Belgian, French, and Portuguese African territories, for the Negro section of American society today, and for France and Britain from the eleventh to the nineteenth century.

It is evident that differential incorporation is often found in multiracial or multiethnic societies, and on racial bases. Thus in East and South Africa, the colonial Far East, or Latin America, collectivities differentially incorporated into a common society are usually defined in racial or ethnic terms, however misleading such designations may appear to the biological or social scientist. Nonetheless, neither is differential incorporation confined to multiracial or multiethnic aggregates, nor is it always present in them; nor, even where present, is it always prescribed on biological grounds. Even ethnically homogeneous populations constitute plural societies under regimes of pervasive differential incorporation, while ethnically or racially diverse populations may either be unified under structures of uniform incorporation or consociated by incorporation as equal or complementary units. Further, although differential incorporation typically presumes antecedent institutional differences between its collective divisions, it also creates their institutional differentiation within the common public domain; and in consequence of this, even where the differentially incorporated sections initially lacked them, they invariably develop differing institutional practices and organizations in their several collective domains, and in other sectors also. Moreover, since its status and dominion are bound up with the maintenance and scope of this intersectional structure, the dominant section in such societies normally seeks not only to preserve its current control, but to enhance this by promoting further institutional and structural differentiations in other spheres, notably in cult, communitium, economy, education, military organization, and residential segregation. Where, as in Sparta, Ruanda, Ankole, Kano, Ethiopia, Mauritius, medieval Europe, and modern Guatemala, or among the Tuareg, Ndebele, or Efik of Calabar, such sectional differentiations are pursued systematically, then whatever the initial situation, they promote the development of sectionally distinctive institutional systems among the incorporated collectivities by enjoining their structural segregation. To transform such plural orders into unitary social systems, it is therefore necessary to eliminate the bases and units of this sectional organization by incorporating the members of all sections directly and uniformly as citizens within the common public domain, and by making the provisions necessary to ensure that their civic assimilation will be substantively realized in other institutional spheres.
VI

At this point it is useful to specify clearly how institutional practice and social structure are related, and how we may identify culturally significant elements and levels of institutional variation. Both problems appear to puzzle certain writers, who sometimes discount such institutional analysis as “Malinowskian.” For clarification, then, we may cite Radcliffe-Brown, to whom “social institutions, in the sense of standardised modes of behaviour, constitute the machinery by which a social structure, a network of social relations, maintains its existence and its continuity.”

Institutions refer to a distinguishable type or class of social relationships and interactions. . . . The relation of institutions to social structure is therefore twofold. On the one side, there is the social structure, such as the family in this instance, for the constituent relationships of which the institutions provide the norms; on the other, there is the group, the local society in this instance, in which the norm is established by the general recognition of it as defining proper behaviour. Institutions, if that term is used to refer to the ordering by society of the interactions of persons in social relationships, have this double connection with structure, with a group or class of which it can be said to be an institution, and with those relationships within the structural system to which the norms apply.

In this sense, any mode of collective incorporation is always institutionalized; and being primary for the constitution of the unit and its members, serves to “order . . . the interactions of persons” according to its specific content and form and to their positions within it. Thus, at the comparative or “macro-sociological” level, we should distinguish societal types by basic differences of structure in their institutions of collective incorporation. This is routinely done by anthropologists, for example, when they distinguish societies based on bands from others based on lineages or age-set systems. Despite these typological distinctions, such simple societies all exhibit uniformity in their frameworks of corporate organization. On a wider scale, and by the same criteria, we may also distinguish other types of societies based on consociational or differential corporate structures.

Radcliffe-Brown did not discuss these typological problems formally, but he did try to show how we may determine the limits of structural systems defined as “arrangements of persons in institutionally controlled and defined relationships.” He points out that being established as “norms of conduct” and “institutionally controlled,” relations of identical type within a single structural system must also be uniform. Thus within a given institutional order, all types of status and role share a common
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specific form and content; and together, these elements establish the structural uniformity and particulars of the institutional order. Thus, when specific patterns of institutionalized action and social relationships differ in form and content, we should recognize corresponding differences in structural systems; and where such institutional differences are numerous and important in two or more structural systems, these are clearly incompatible in the sense that neither can incorporate essential elements of the other without modifications necessary to avoid the structural dislocations that inevitably follow when different systems of relations and roles are directly juxtaposed as reciprocals. Further, since roles generally cluster in sets, the ramifications of such maladjustments will normally spread beyond the institutional sectors immediately involved, such as the family or work group, to other areas of social action.

Thus, to determine the structural identity or difference of two institutional systems of the same kind, for example, alternative forms of family or cult, we may compare the specific elements that constitute their respective networks of social relations, and the specific connections that link these elements into coherent schemes of social action for collectivities and individuals alike. In this way we can identify and measure the correspondence of two or more institutional systems, or of any particular elements within them; and by the same method, we can specify the precise modifications necessary in either to effect their exact correspondence. To this end we need first to distinguish the elements of each institutionalized system of social relations, and then, by analysis, to determine their internal and external connections as sectors of a wider social system. Thus a uniform procedure enables us to specify and compare the differing levels and types of institutional variation or convergence within specific sectors of a given system, within or between different societies. Such analysis differs from the simple listing and matching of traits by requiring specific determination of the structural connections among the elements of each institutional system, such as kinship or cult, as well as those that hold between them and express their functional integration or discordance.

Now clearly even the highest degree of institutional integration and uniformity does not exclude conflict, as any student of segmentary lineage systems can show. But surely the conflicts that divide a people who share identical institutional organization and orientations differ radically from those that contrapose collectivities differentiated also at the institutional and organizational levels, whether they belong to separate societies or to the same society. Two different types of conflict correspond to these two situations: in one, the antagonists share similar means, norms, goals, procedures, and forms of organization; in the other, they do...
not. It is characteristic of this second situation that conflicts arising at one level and over specific issues are generalized rapidly and with little institutional restraints to other spheres and to other members of the outgroup.

VII

In the interdisciplinary discussions that form the background to this volume, and also in preparing two papers for these discussions, I had an excellent opportunity to reexamine the notion of pluralism and to try to develop its analytic framework as best I could. Such developments, although implicit in earlier work, seem, looking back, to have arisen here as byproducts of inquiries addressed to other issues. In consequence, they have thus far not been brought into systematic relations; and it seems appropriate to attempt this in closing.

In my first paper, taking up certain questions raised by Leo Kuper in his introductory essay, I tried to determine how the institutional and political aspects and conditions of pluralism were related. This inquiry emphasized the distinction between differential and universalistic modes of incorporation, although I doubt that either term occurs in that essay. Further, it showed that where there were systematic structural differences between constitutional forms of incorporation and the substantive realities of social life, as, for example, in the American incorporation of Negro citizens, then, as Weber said, "it is the actual state of affairs which is decisive for sociological purposes." In short, despite constitutional provisions, differential incorporation may be institutionalized within a universalistic order, and not merely sub rosa. If so, it is seriously misleading to analyze the system solely or primarily in terms of its formal ideology and its inoperative or ineffective laws. Where form and substance diverge structurally, the appropriate evidence for sociological analysis of pluralism or any other condition consists surely in the operational regularities and conditions of social life.

Following this paper, I had the task of reviewing ethnographic materials on precolonial African societies for evidence of pluralism and its correlates. This provided an excellent opportunity to test the hypothesis implicit in my first paper, that differential incorporation was invariably linked with pluralism. The unanticipated result of this test was the isolation of consociations as a specific type or mode of incorporation in which social segments were united as complementary or equivalent, irrespective of the presence or absence of ethnic and institutional differences between them. In concluding that essay, I wondered whether its findings were "illusory or tautological." Having since then considered these questions at length, I doubt that either is the case, for reasons
presented at various points in this essay. It remains necessary to consider how these alternative modes of corporate organization are related to differences in the level and scope of pluralism, and to the determination of societal types.

Briefly, we must first distinguish three levels or modes of pluralism: structural, social, and cultural. By itself the last consists solely in institutional differences to which no corporate social differences attach. Social pluralism is the condition in which such institutional differentiations coincide with the corporate division of a given society into a series of sharply demarcated and virtually closed social sections or segments. Structural pluralism consists further in the differential incorporation of specified collectivities within a given society and corresponds with this in its form, scope, and particulars. It institutes or presupposes social and cultural pluralism together, by prescribing sectional differences of access to the common public domain, and by establishing differing contexts and conditions of sectional coexistence, segregation, and subordination. Such conditions preserve or generate corresponding institutional pluralism by fostering diverse sectional adaptations to their distinctive situations and by promoting divergent and sectionally specific collective domains for their internal organization and intersectional relations. Such an order of structural pluralism may be instituted in one of two ways: by the total exclusion of subordinate sections from the inclusive public domain, which is then the formally unqualified monopoly of the dominant group; or alternatively by instituting substantial and sufficient inequalities of sectional participation in and access to this sector of the societal organization.

Insofar as they are substantively enforced, conditions of uniform incorporation exclude structural and social pluralism alike by individualizing citizenship and thereby eliminating sectional or segmental collectivities as representative structures from the common public domain. Thus an effective order of uniform incorporation proscribes social pluralism, though it is equally consistent with cultural uniformities or pluralism among the citizens.

The consociation of social aggregates as equivalent or complementary segments of a wider unit neither presupposes their institutional or ethnic uniformity nor precludes such differences. Consociational modes of incorporation are equally compatible with homogeneity or difference in these respects. On the other hand, wherever it is substantively enforced, such an order formally excludes structural pluralism by prescribing the equivalent status of its component segments instead of their differential incorporation. Thus consociational structures may be found among ethnically and institutionally homogeneous populations, or among peoples of
diverse ethnic and institutional background, and even in such extreme cases as Nigeria (1961-1965) or the Terik-Tiriki, in societies characterized by social as well as cultural pluralism and organized as combinations of structurally and culturally distinct coordinate segments.

Consortial systems may operate to preserve or to permit social and institutional differentiation between the segments that compose them. In this respect there are many variations, as may be seen by comparing differentiations among the Terik-Tiriki, Ga, Egba, and Amba. Normally, the social segments that form the consociation are territorially distinct and so form separate local communities, as for instance in Abeokuta or Switzerland. Where these segments also differ institutionally or ethnically, such spatial separation may reinforce or express their social pluralism. Alternatively, as in Lebanon or Buganda under British rule, the segmental constituents of the consociation may be socially and spatially interspersed, in both these cases the boundaries being defined by religion.

In strictly formal terms, given their initial equivalence or complementarity at the consociation level, institutional, social, or spatial differences between the component segments are structurally indifferent to their union. Where such differences prevail, the union should make corresponding provisions to accommodate them. Alternatively, as instanced above, all the segments within a given consociation may be institutionally and ethnically alike. In either case, the consociation as a union of corporate collectivities presupposes their mutual distinctness and complementary equivalence. Thus at the consociational level, individual identification with either of these segments is prerequisite for citizenship, but otherwise indifferent. For its existence and form, the consociation presupposes these segmental divisions.

Formally then, segmental continuities or differences of institutional or ethnic allegiance within consociations should have no wider structural significance, thereby restricting such diversity either to the cultural level or at most to that of the segmental communities. Individual practice and segmental affiliations are thus classified as optional equivalents of the private domain, thereby facilitating social mobility and assimilation unless segmental barriers obstruct this. However, in consociations as elsewhere, social forms and substance often diverge. Formal equivalence may prove impossible to harmonize with the substantive equivalence of the constituent sections; and indeed these features of the consociational order provide fertile fields of dispute wherever the segments whose complementarity or equivalence is presumed differ widely in number, wealth, institutions and social organization, technological and economic capacities, history, ethnicity, and ideological orientations, separately or
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together. Each of these conditions presents an implicit continuum along which differences may be scaled as greater or less. These continua and degrees of differentiation are often combined in various ways. To illustrate such combinations of segmental differentiations, we need merely cite Nigeria, the federations of British Central Africa and Malaya-Singapore, the defunct West Indies Federation, Uganda, Cameroon, Cyprus, Guiana, Lebanon, the unions of Egypt and Syria, of Senegal and Mali, or the various leagues of ancient Greece. Even when their segmental components share common institutional and ethnic backgrounds as, for example, in the early American confederations, the Ashanti Union, the League of Delos, the Nootka, Kwakiutl, or Iroquois confederacies, in ancient Israel, Switzerland, South Africa, or Canada, the conditions and scope of these unions remain uncertain. This is illustrated by the Swiss civil war of 1846, the American civil war, the war in Lebanon in 1958, the split between Judah and Israel, the military and civil strife of Boer and Briton in South Africa, the unfinished dispute between French- and English-speaking Canadians in Quebec, the numerous secessionist struggles between Kumasi and other Ashanti states, Iroquois division at the outbreak of the American War of Independence, and so on. Notably, as can be seen from the histories of Ashanti, South Africa, the United States, and ancient Israel or Athens, to counteract autarchic tendencies within the segments and to preserve or strengthen these consociations, some central unit endowed with superior authority and resources must emerge or be created, as Rome in Latium, or Kumasi, Athens, Judah, Tenochtitlan, and Washington in their several societies.

The sources and conditions of instability in consociational systems built upon institutionally different segments are reasonably clear. Segmental primacy and equivalence in such unions are recognized by their internal autonomy within the union. It is in such units that citizenship and representation are both explicitly vested. These political conditions facilitate tendencies toward segmental exclusiveness or assimilation equally. As regards probable courses of development, much depends on the number, distribution, and institutional or ethnic identity of the segments, as well as on their absolute and relative size, and common or differing external contexts. Formal equivalence and substantive equivalence are not always easily matched, nor always perceived as such by the interested parties. Segmental equivalence may be taken to mean strict or proportionate equality in representation, office, and in the disbursement of public revenues, or its particulars may be subject to continuous debate. Almost always, the components of a consociation are unequal in numbers, territory, and economic potential, and correspondingly preoccupied with the locally appropriate criteria of their equivalence to avoid
differential representation and influence at the center, especially insofar as these central organs are endowed with positive responsibilities and powers over the total society. Under such conditions, real or perceived segmental disparities may evoke segmental protests and policies designed to alter or to maintain current conditions of union and current distributions of power and influence. Autarchic segmental identities are correspondingly reinforced by such intersegmental conflicts; and unless these are effectively restrained or reduced, they may subvert and destroy the consociation by transforming its internal political order into a system of external relations between mutually hostile segments.

Consociations that unite collectivities of differing institutional organization, ethnic provenience, and sectional interest—as, for example, in Uganda, Guiana, Cyprus, or Nigeria—are especially prone to intersegmental strife, given their communal divisions. In such unions, institutionally differentiated segments are also normally unequal in numbers, need, and economic potentials, divided by interests and issues that provoke frequent collisions and segmental demands for secession or dominance. Structurally, although consociations prescribe equivalence or complementarity among their components, they can rarely avoid de facto disparities in distributions of power, influence, and public preference, though such disparities exacerbate segmental fears and tensions among the privileged and unprivileged alike.

Instability inheres in the combination of equally autonomous segments differentiated by structure, size, ethnic and institutional background, interest, need, and power. Lacking any continuous external threat to their joint security, each of these institutionally differentiated segments may seek to preserve or extend its internal autonomy against aggrandizements of others, while stressing its corporate unity and exclusive identity. Beyond a certain level, such intersegmental action reconstitutes the consociation as a system of external political relations between its segments, rather than a condition of social union. Recent events in Malaysia, Uganda, Guiana, Cyprus, the Congo, and Nigeria illustrate this.

Consociations that preserve their initial form and character over several decades without further increase of central regulatory powers simultaneously enhance segmental autonomies and equivalence by severely restricting the scope of central action and joint affairs to the minimum necessary for continuity and coordination of the union. In these cases the central autonomy is weak, and hence subject to that vested in the segments. Viable consociations of this character include the Terik-Tiriki, the union of Ga and Kpesi speakers, and Switzerland, all of which, while differing in organization and institutional content, were greatly strengthened by continuous external threats. Within their union, Terik
and Tiriki have maintained their social and cultural distinctness to this day, since "differences of opinion and belief concerning female initiation ... proved to be an effective deterrent to intermarriage." Among Kpesi and Ga, intermarriage promoted such assimilation in language, institutional practice, and social relations that, although the old consociational units and forms persist, their segments, originally different in language, organization, and culture, are now institutionally alike.

Societies constituted on the uniform incorporation of all members as citizens are universalistic and egalitarian in orientation and form. Such regimes may tolerate wide levels of cultural diversity among their members, but preclude the emergence of corresponding corporate social sections. Where such conditions of uniform incorporation are substantively enforced, being then by law confined to the secondary optional level of private individual conduct, divergent institutional practices cannot segregate sectional collectivities in the public domain. However, where objective social conditions diverge substantially from this framework of universalistic incorporation, as for example among Negroes in the United States, institutional or other differences may coincide with a structure of differential incorporation through which sectional exclusion, opposition, differences of institutional organization and culture are promoted or reinforced. Such differential incorporation may take either of two forms. One social section may be subordinated to the other, or it may be segregated beyond the pale as a dependent collateral like the Transkei or South African Bantustans. Either eventuality establishes structural pluralism with its concomitants, social and cultural pluralism, since even in this second segmentary form, the sections are differentially incorporated into a wider society despite formal disjunction. By contrast, although among the Terik and Tiriki, or among the Muslims and Christians of Lebanon, social and cultural differences persist, structural pluralism is excluded. This is also true of the Swiss and formally, of English- and French-speaking Canadians. Finally, among white Americans, differences of ethnicity and religion prevail without corresponding social exclusions or differential incorporation.

We must thus distinguish three levels of pluralism and three related modes of incorporation. Structural pluralism consists in the differential incorporation of collectivities segregated as social sections and characterized by institutional divergences. Cultural pluralism consists in variable institutional diversity without corresponding collective segregation. Social pluralism involves the organization of institutionally dissimilar collectivities as corporate sections or segments whose boundaries demarcate distinct communities and systems of social action. The differential incorporation that institutes structural pluralism is found only in societies
where institutionally diverse collectivities are set apart as corporate social sections of unequal status and resources. In these conditions, if the ruling sections forms a numerical minority of the aggregate, we find the plural society in the classic form described by Furnivall.

It is advisable to clarify the logical status and relations of these typologies before discussing their substantive bases. Despite their differing referents, these two typologies are not entirely independent of each other; nor does either distinguish a set of independent variables. As analytical categories, cultural, social, and structural pluralism refer to three levels of pluralism which differ in their properties, forms, intensity, and range. Though cultural pluralism may prevail without social or structural pluralism, these latter forms of pluralism cannot obtain without commensurate degrees of cultural pluralism. Moreover, while structural pluralism entails social and cultural pluralism, the converse is not necessary. As regards the alternative modes of incorporation, although analytically distinct, they are not necessarily exclusive, and may be combined in various ways to constitute differing types of complex regime. Thus, in South Africa, whites are incorporated differentially from nonwhites, universalistically as citizens of the Republic, and consociationally through the provincial organization. Consociational and universalistic modes of incorporation can be found in societies that lack cultural or social pluralism, but in the latter context they are differentially associated with these different levels of pluralism. While universalistic regimes can accommodate cultural pluralism without substantive change, social pluralism generates a substantively consociational order within them; but neither of these two regimes, if substantively valid, accommodates a state of structural pluralism, which always requires differential incorporation for its constitution and maintenance.

The disjunctions of mutually exclusive collectivities involve differences of social structure which reflect corresponding differences in their basic institutional systems. By contrast, where cultural differences prevail without correlative social divisions, they must be equally consistent with direct individual participation in a common collective life under uniform conditions of incorporation. Whether regionally concentrated or dispersed, such cultural differences will then be individually optional, functional alternatives, restricted to the private domain and to secondary institutional spheres. The resulting combination of cultural diversity and social assimilation is normal in heterogeneous societies.

Societies that contain two or more institutionally dissimilar and mutually exclusive collectivities manifest substantively consociational or differential regimes, even under universalistic constitutions. This arises wherever individual identification with one or other of the associated
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Collectivities is institutionally prescribed and prior, since this ordains individual dependence on representation in and through the collective organizations. Thus, whatever the constitutional form or the spatial distribution of social segments—given a society composed of institutionally distinct and exclusive collectivities—consociational or differential arrangements prevail, formally or informally, separately or together.

Though by no means restricted to contexts of social pluralism, consociation is formally appropriate for the union of institutionally diverse collectivities. However, multiethnic consociational regimes have certain structural weaknesses and face serious problems. In the absence of common external threats and widespread internal assimilations through intermarriage, they rarely endure. Persisting societies that contain institutionally distinct sections are commonly unified under conditions of differential incorporation as plural structures of radically unequal and disparate parts.

Structural pluralism intensifies and enhances the institutional disjunctions that social pluralism involves by prescribing collective differences of status and relation to the common public domain, and by transforming these differences into conditions of inequality and subordination. Whereas consociation assumes intersectional equivalence and encourages social assimilation, structural pluralism is constituted by the differential incorporation of such sections as superior and inferior, and to persist requires their continued disjunction. Where differences of collective organization and institutional practice antedate differential incorporation, pluralism increases and deepens these differences by establishing a new dimension of domination and subordination which imposes radically divergent societal contexts on the collectivities concerned. Moreover, in the absence of such antecedent differences of collective organization and institutional practice, differential incorporation generates them by prescribing distinct societal contexts to which collectivities must accommodate by appropriate socialization and institutional adaptation.

It is necessary, then, to distinguish social pluralism from cultural pluralism, though both assume systemic institutional differences among collectivities within a single society. Under formal or informal consociations, the institutionally distinct segments share identical status and relations with the common public domain, and thus share a common system of government and public law. This political and jural community modifies the institutional segregation of the sections accordingly, and defines their differences as equivalent alternatives. Under differential incorporation, one institutionally distinct collectivity regulates the others, having appropriated societal institutions of government, law, and force. Whereas the manifest equivalence of components—a condition that fos-
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Ten intersectional association, mobility, and assimilation—is necessary for a stable consociation, the habituation of subordinate social sections to inferior status is equally essential for a stable system of differential incorporation. In short, structural pluralism, the corollary of differential incorporation, involves a special set of arrangements which either generates or extends the collective disjunctions of social pluralism by proscribing intersectional equivalence, mobility, and individuation.

Homogeneous and heterogeneous societies may equally well be based on uniform or universalistic conditions of incorporation. Differential incorporation obtains always and only with structural pluralism. Consociations may provide the bases for homogeneous societies, as for example Ashanti, Iroquois, or Nootka. Consociation may also constitute a heterogeneous society as among the Aztec, in Switzerland, or in Lebanon. It may unite two or more structurally distinct homogeneous societies, as in the Terik-Tiriki and Ga-Kpesi cases; or, as in Nigeria, it may unite institutionally heterogeneous collectivities distinguished by culture and social systems as mutually exclusive corporate sections. In the latter case, the consociation exhibits social and cultural pluralism in its sectional basis, while formally excluding structural pluralism by prescribing segmental equivalence. The result, illustrated by Nigeria, Uganda, or Cameroon, is a plural society of differing structure and type from that based on differential incorporation. Whether we apply the same term to both these models, or describe the Nigerian or Ghanaian types as “composite” or as “segmental” societies, following earlier writers, is not of major importance. The internal inconsistencies that threaten consociations of this sort with radical transformations or dissolution have been mentioned above.

Since these alternative modes of incorporation are always institutionalized as formal or substantive conditions of societal structure, their relations with other institutional sectors of the collective life are clearly important, however variable or indirect these may seem. Moreover, given their status as structural alternatives to which different levels and ranges of pluralism correspond, diverse combinations of these types of incorporation are not difficult to find. Perhaps the most complex and obvious example of this is the United States, incorporated constitutionally in explicitly universal terms as a consociation of territorially discrete collectivities, but substantively characterized by the differential incorporation of its Negro citizens. Such a society exhibits heterogeneity and pluralism together, but in differing proportions. In its white sector, cultural pluralism prevails without corresponding social and structural pluralism; across the race line social and cultural pluralism are institutionalized in direct contravention of the constitution. By its consociational form, despite its unreserved universalism, this constitution provides the essential
resources for the defense of this system of differential incorporation by guarantees of states' rights.

VIII

However different our formulations may seem, we have not abandoned Furnivall's problem; instead, we have merely attempted to clarify and generalize it. Though he confined his discussion to colonial pluralities, Furnivall identified and formulated the basic issues of social cohesion and development which characterize pluralism in all its many forms and dimensions. Since Furnivall wrote, most of these tropical colonies have attained independence, with greater or less turmoil. As independent states, their vicissitudes and upheavals declare their generic fragility, the product of their plural character and base. To anticipate the smooth development of such societies into nations, or even any rapid, continuous process of modernization within them, is antihistorical and antiempirical in the extreme. We need merely remember Latin America, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, and Germany, all of which have known independence far longer and under far more favorable conditions. For these new "nonnational" states, with their "multiple" societies, internal order and survival are surely the first formidable task; the promotion of internal loyalties and cohesion by the dissolution of sectional divisions, identities, and fears is the second. Though very closely connected, this latter presupposes the first condition.

Furnivall was seriously in error when he wrote "there can be nationalism without a nation." 89 Does communalism exist without a "community," or tribalism without a "tribe"? Surely here Furnivall fell victim to the presuppositions, categories, and symbols of Western culture, which has long invested "nationalism" with a moral supremacy and prevalence it does not always possess. True, leaders of colonial independence movements appealed to sentiments, ideals, and principles of nationalism and self-determination; the public acclaim and support they received was proportionate to popular dissatisfactions and desires to be rid of European rule; but desires for self-determination or independence may prevail without nationalism, and do not presuppose it. It is easier and more common for people to mobilize and unite in opposition to alien rulers than to construct and consolidate new societies under the influence of strictly national sentiments and ideals. It is surely uncommon for people divided by history, language, institutions, habitat, and in many other ways to unite voluntarily and in peace, in the absence of any serious external threat to their common security. The unity of negation is no more satisfactory a basis for assuming the moral solidarity and present or future cohesion of an aggregate in motion than the unity created by their
differential incorporation. Even in the simplest situation, such as a lineage feud, this condition is evident. Thus in these new “nonnational” states, it remains necessary to pursue policies that eliminate sectional barriers, identities, and fears among the collectivities that compose them. Ultimately this can be done only through the complementary or equivalent incorporation of these collectivities within the wider unit or by their effective extrusion from the common public domain through the universalistic incorporation of all individuals as citizens.

NOTES


8 See papers in this volume by Michael Lofchie, Basil Davidson, Hilda Kuper, Max Gluckman, and myself.


12 Nash, “The Multiple Society,” and “Political Relations in Guatemala.”


17 Nash, “Political Relations in Guatemala,” p. 65.

18 Ibid., p. 65.

19 Ibid., p. 66.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid., p. 74.


32 Sklar and Whitaker, op. cit.


39 Hoetink, "Curazao como sociedad segmentada."


in Modern Africa (New York: Praeger, in press). See also his three contributions to the present volume.
50 Shils, op. cit.

63 Gordon K. Lewis, review of Eric Williams, The History of the People of Trinidad and Tobago, in Caribbean Studies, 3, no. 1 (April 1963), 104.


67 See Braithwaite, “Social Stratification and Cultural Pluralism”; Rubin, Social and Cultural Pluralism in the Caribbean; Raymond T. Smith, British Guiana,” and British Guiana; Cumper, “Notes on Social Structure in Jamaica”; Gordon K. Lewis, op. cit. For Morris’ views, see his discussion of “social will” in “The Plural Society,” p. 125: “It is not clear what Furnivall intended by the concept of ‘social will’ or his claim that plural societies do not display it. The presence or absence of this quality is critical in his scheme, and in the context of East Africa would appear to mean that Africans, Arabs, Europeans and Indians do not have a generally agreed set of ideas about right and wrong behaviour for the guidance of social action. The same thing can be said, however, of other societies that are not plural.”

68 M. G. Smith, The Plural Society in the British West Indies, pp. vii–xii and passim; M. C. Smith, Stratification in Grenada. See also van Lier, op. cit., pp. 16–19.


Braithwaite, “Present Status of the Social Sciences in the Caribbean,” and “Social Stratification and Cultural Pluralism.”

Rubin, Social and Cultural Pluralism in the Caribbean, and “Culture, Politics and Race Relations.”


Morris, “The Plural Society,” and “Indians in East Africa.”


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72 Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice, p. 307.
74 Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice, p. 306.
76 Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice, p. 306.
77 Ibid., p. 506.
78 Ibid., p. 297.
79 Ibid., pp. 286-290, 300-303.
81 Ibid.
83 Ibid., p. 168.
84 Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice, p. 306.
85 Ibid., p. 307.
86 Ibid., p. 308.
87 Ibid., p. 310.
88 Ibid., p. 307.
93 Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice, p. 305.
94 Ibid., p. 307.
97 Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice, p. 304.
98 Ibid., p. 311.
99 Ibid., p. 310.


Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice, p. 305. Compare with Radcliffe-Brown’s view (Structure and Function in Primitive Society, pp. 201–202); Mayer’s (op. cit.), Rex’s (op. cit.), and studies by Leo Kuper and Pierre van den Berghe in this volume.

M. G. Smith, Plural Society in the British West Indies, pp. 55, 60–63, 89 f., 111 f., and passim. See also data in “Pluralism in Precolonial African Societies,” in this volume; also Colby and van den Berghe, op. cit.


Since this paper was written, two recent restatements by Morris of his objections to pluralism as a framework for sociological analyses confirm this interpretation of his earlier position. See H. S. Morris, review of M. G. Smith, The Plural Society in the British West Indies, in Man, n.s., 1, no. 2 (June 1966), 270–271; and H. S. Morris, “Some Aspects of the Concept Plural Society,” Man, n.s., 2, no. 2 (June 1967), 169–184.


On China, see Maurice Freedman, Lineage Organization in Southeastern

114 Ibid.
115 Ibid., p. 124; my italics.
116 Ibid., p. 125.
118 Ibid.
119 Ibid.

Morris, "Indians in East Africa," p. 194.

Shils, op. cit., pp. 23–24.


Ibid., p. 10.

Rubin, Social and Cultural Pluralism in the Caribbean, claims to find utopianism in this approach. Speckman, op. cit., p. 6, claims that it leads to "trait-counting"; Despres, in his recent work, Cultural Pluralism and Nationalist Policies in British Guiana, rejects the distinction between basic and other institutions.


Philip Mayer, op. cit.

Furnivall, "Some Problems of Tropical Economy," p. 171; but see also Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice, p. 547.