Title: “Race and stratification in the Caribbean”
Author(s): M.G. Smith
CORPORATIONS AND SOCIETY
The Social Anthropology of Collective Action

M.G. Smith

Professor of Anthropology,
University College London

Aldine Publishing Company
Contents

Preface 7
1. On Segmentary Lineage Systems 13
2. Anthropological Studies of Politics 71
3. A Structural Approach to Comparative Politics 91
4. The Sociological Framework of Law 107
5. Pre-Industrial Stratification Systems 133
6. A Structural Approach to the Study of Political Change 165
7. Institutional and Political Conditions of Pluralism 205
8. The Comparative Study of Complex Societies 241
9. Race and Stratification in the Caribbean 271

Bibliography 347
Index 367
symbolic, open or closed, homeostatic or other, nor to what degree or under what conditions. Such metaphysics are only essential in functionalist analyses of social situations and processes; but instead of furthering our understanding of concrete social phenomena, those conceptions merely obscure them.

9.

Race and Stratification
in the Caribbean

It is said that the Caribbean includes over fifty societies;¹ and perhaps there are almost as many ways in which we might discuss their interracial patterns. Since David Lowenthal's recent account of these patterns² cannot be faulted, I shall try to carry forward the analysis by seeking to isolate those conditions or factors which have regulated the allocation of differential status among racially distinct stocks within Caribbean societies. Although the data and discussion concentrate on Creole societies, I shall cite sufficient materials from Hispanic units in this region to indicate that the analysis applies to them also. To pursue these goals I shall first indicate the nature of stratification and race, and, then outline the variation and development of Caribbean societies with special attention to their population compositions and histories. In conclusion I shall briefly relate these data and findings to the general theory of social and cultural pluralism.

1.

To investigate the relationship between differences of status and differences of race in Caribbean societies, we need equally objective conceptions of stratification and race. Stratification is often identified as an evaluative ranking of social units; and some writers assert that, being an institutionally necessary response to a requisite of any social organization, it is a universal feature of all social systems. However, such assertions appear to be unfounded and at variance with ethnographic fact.³ In any event, since the evaluations that constitute a stratification are neither random nor contingent, their criteria must be institutionalized within the social structure, and for this reason evaluative rankings will express principles that underlie and regulate social organization.⁴ We may therefore defer this ideological conception of stratification in favour of one that is more concrete and empirically demonstrable.

Concretely, stratification is manifest by and in the differential

1. Lowenthal (1960b).
2. Lowenthal (1967).
3. See above, Chapter 5.
4. See above, Chapter 5.
distribution of resources, opportunities, rewards and sanctions among the members of a society. Where institutionalized, for structural reasons, these differential distributions of resource, opportunity, reward and sanction normally correspond and thus reinforce one another, thereby distinguishing ranked strata within the population, each characterized by internal and external similarities of social situation, advantage and disadvantage. Inevitably, in systems of this sort, the most privileged stratum enjoys the highest prestige and rank, the most disadvantaged stratum the least. Inequalities in the distribution of social assets, opportunities and values are thus central to stratification; but the concrete empirical distribution of these inequalities presupposes some principle or principles to regulate, integrate and order the differentiation. Analytically, then, the stratification can be reduced to a set of specific principles that generate and organize the prevailing distribution of resources and opportunities. In racially heterogeneous societies such as those of the Caribbean, racial identity and racial difference are generally prominent among these bases of stratification; but, as we shall see, this is neither necessarily nor always the case. Moreover, since we are concerned to determine the precise conditions under which racial difference is institutionalized as a principle of stratification, we shall initially exclude race as a criterion or determinant of status in order to investigate these relationships objectively in different Caribbean milieus.

To isolate the relationships between race and stratification in Caribbean societies, we must therefore seek to determine the objective distributions of social assets and disabilities in quantitative terms among racially distinct sections of their populations. Moreover, to this end, we should review the historical development of these units as well as their current racial structures. It is clearly impracticable to attempt an adequate or exhaustive review of such materials in this essay; and indeed the data we seek are distributed unevenly by topic and period for any single unit, much less for the entire range of Caribbean societies. To proceed methodically under these conditions, we therefore need a typology of Caribbean units which will facilitate comparative generalizations for societies of each category while forestalling unsound extrapolations between them; but we can only attempt to elaborate this societal typology after reviewing the variations of scale and racial composition these units display.

In these agrarian societies with their long colonial histories, the social assets and values of most immediate relevance for study of the social stratification include differential distributions of civil and political rights, land ownership and access, distributions of educational opportunities and facilities, of income, occupation, employment and social status. The distributions of these resources and opportunities among racially distinct categories can be objectively illustrated where data are available by distributions of land, income, professional and managerial roles, educational experience and qualifications, political representation, office and disbursements, employment and social status. They could also be instanced at greater length by data on the differential rates of fertility, infant mortality, marriage, illegitimacy, literacy, tenancy, house values, crime, wages, salaries, overcrowding, disease, sanitation, and other indices of living standards and life chances among racially distinct sections of the populations; but since these two sets of indices are clearly associated as conditions and effects we may employ distributions of either type to describe historic and prevailing patterns of racial stratification within these units.

However, stratification is not the inevitable and only possible mode of interracial accommodation. Interracial accommodations are institutionalized relationships between racially distinct components of heterogeneous societies that regulate the adaptation of each component to its social environment. In a racially heterogeneous society, the stratification of racial stocks is a very general mode of interracial accommodation; but this enjoins the active and continuous participation of the ranked strata in a common system of interaction. Without such functional and jurid interdependence, racial sections of a wider society would approximate discrete collectivities aligned solely by ties of political alliance or subordination. In such a case, the racially distinct collectivities may also be spatially separate, endogamous, and bionomically self-sufficient; and under such conditions, these racially distinct populations will normally differ in culture, perhaps in language, and in their systems of social organization and value, since each segment will constitute an exclusive context of reproduction and socialization. It is appropriate then to distinguish the societal alignment of racial segments ranked externally by criteria of numbers and dominance from systems of racial stratification which presuppose the incorporation of racially different stocks within a common system of action, even where both structures overlap. As we shall see, the Caribbean contains several societies of either type.

Granted their membership in a single society, whether segmental or stratified in its structure, the accommodation of racially distinct populations has a limited number of primary alternatives. If the racial segments are bionomically and spatially discrete, their accommodation may either be stabilized as a hierarchy; or it may be non-hierarchic and symbiotic, and take the form of a consociation in which the various segments collaborate externally with one another as units of equivalent status. Alternatively, racial stocks may either be incorporated into a single system of action by subjugation to a dominant group, or on an egalitarian basis which permits individuals to associate and cooperate freely, irrespective of their racial or ethnic identities. Each of these four alternatives represents a
particular mode of collective accommodation; and each of these modes assumes certain specific conditions for its stability. Any event or condition that invalidates the requisites of a prevailing interracial accommodation will destabilize it, in proportion to its salience. Thus either a stabilized segmental symbiosis or a stabilized racial stratification may be converted into contexts of collective uncertainty and conflict by unsettling events. Alternatively, racial identities and exclusions may lose their earlier significance under the influence of changing conditions. Recent developments in Caribbean societies illustrate these alternatives nicely.

Besides residual Amerindians in the Guianas, Dominica, St. Vincent, Aruba, and British Honduras, Caribbean populations include whites of varied nationality, Negroes, Chinese, East Indians and Indonesians (Javanese). I shall treat these six stocks as racially distinct since they 'are distinguished from each other...by the relative commonness within them of certain inherited characters'. The hereditary characters that distinguish these six stocks are such prominent physical traits as skin colour, hair type, facial features and stature, which receive general notice in Caribbean societies. As traits these characters are gross and variable though none the less modally distinctive; but being transmitted biologically from parents to children within each racial stock, they are highly stable collective differentiae that possess objective validity. Accordingly they serve to distinguish children begotten by parents of the same racial stock from others begotten by parents of differing races through miscegenation; and these objective physical differences between hybrids and genetically unmixed stocks validate that biological conception of race which hybridization itself presupposes.

Since race is a biological term that may be used to distinguish populations by objective and biologically transmitted features, its relations with nationality are indifferent and variable. In classifying Amerindians, Chinese, Negroes, whites, East Indians or Javanese as racially distinct, it is irrelevant whether they belong to the same nation or many. However, in many Caribbean societies, for political and social reasons that reflect the interests of dominant groups, nationality and race have been long and variably confused. Thus, in the British West Indian census of 1943-6, resident whites were divided into the following 'races': locally born (Creole) whites, English, Scotch, Irish, Italians, Germans, Jews, Portuguese and others. Such classifications clearly invoke criteria of national origins, language and culture rather than race to group whites in political categories of interest to the colonial power. Even so, these categories are not always consistent. Thus, even locally born Jews and Portuguese are segregated from 'locally born whites'.

In Trinidad the West Indian census of 1960 distinguished the following racial categories: Negro, white, East Indian, Chinese, mixed and Lebanese-Syrian. The Jamaican census of that year supplemented these categories with one for 'other races, unspecified', and broke down the mixed class into four divisions as follows: coloured (Afro-European), East Indian coloured (Afro-East Indian), Chinese coloured (Afro-Chinese), and Syrian coloured (Afro-Syrian). Thus, if we employ these successive censuses to identify local races, we shall have to conclude that Trinidad and Jamaica had experienced profound racial transformations between 1943 and 1960. In practice the differing racial classifications of these successive censuses merely reflect differences in the political statuses of the territories concerned, and in the political identifications and interests of those who designed these censuses, that of 1943 being directed by Britons under Crown Colony rule, while those of 1960 were directed by native Trinidadians and Jamaicans on the eve of decolonization. By illustrating how variably people of different national identity and social status may classify themselves and others in racial terms, these census classifications indicate the inadequacy of those analyses of race relations which are based on folk schemes of racial classification. If we seek objectivity, we cannot rest a comparative study of these phenomena on the current sociological view that a race is any 'group of people who are regarded and treated in actual life as a race', since this casually assimilates racial, ethnic and national blocs, and destroys in advance the necessary conditions for isolating the objective relations of race and society by enjoining acceptance of all societal classifications of race as equally valid even where these directly contradict one another. For example, according to some, in Cuba 'a man with some white ancestry is not Negro', whereas in the USA anyone with Negro ancestry is a Negro. Moreover, as our West Indian census categories illustrate, folk systems of racial classification are often inconsistent, unstable, and differ for different reference groups. Thus though relevant as descriptive data, they cannot furnish a reliable base for the comparative analysis of objective relations between differences of race and social stratification. To investigate such relations we need equally objective and verifiable empirical conceptions of race and stratification, which should facilitate our identification of the variables under study despite their obfuscation by local stereotypes and ideologies. Such conceptions should also permit objective diachronic analyses of changing interracial accom-

7. Eastern Caribbean Population Census, 7 April 1950, Series A, Bulletin no. 1; Francis (no date), ch. 4, pp. 4-6.
modations, even though current ideologies obscure the boundaries and relations of racial units.

As the 1960 Jamaican census indicates, besides primary stocks, Caribbean societies contain a variety of hybrid types derived from the crossings of whites, Chinese, Negros, East Indian, Amerindian and Javanese, within or without wedlock. Setting aside these patterns of miscegenation for later discussion, the 1960 census classification of hybrids in Jamaica also shows that most of these hybrid varieties and populations are coloured or part-Negro.

Historically, most Caribbean societies were constituted by European colonists who dispossessed local Amerindians and imported African slaves in variable quantities and rates for the mines or plantations. Given the unbalanced sex ratios among these immigrant stocks, and the prevailing social organization, miscegenation proceeded between free white men and black women whose status as slaves excluded marriage. The hybrid offspring of such unions constituted a fast growing mulatto or coloured bloc, some being free and others slaves. Various factors differentiated these coloured hybrids from the white and Negro stocks to which their parents belonged; but differences of personal status further divided the coloured into two exclusive categories, the free and the slave. As Negro slave majorities increased with colonial development, white dominance increasingly relied on the support of free and slave coloured people. For generations the colonial populations were enumerated as whites, free coloured, free blacks (that is, manumitted or self-redeemed ex-slaves), and slaves. In some territories resident Jews, who lacked civil rights until 1832, were also distinguished from nationals of the colonial power. Thus when slavery terminated, most of these mixed societies recognized three racially distinct categories — white, black and coloured; the latter internally differentiated by decreasing Negro components in their genetic mixtures as sambo, mustafino, mulatto, quadroon and octoroon. Although emancipation eliminated the distinction between slave and free, these racial classifications persisted together with this quasi-genetic differentiation of Negro-white hybrids. The socially and physically heterogeneous category of coloured hybrids accordingly stressed its difference from Negros while seeking to assimilate to the dominant white minority; and thereafter this heterogeneous category of coloured hybrids has remained structurally distinct from whites and Negros in most Caribbean societies. However, since coloured people vary rather widely in physical type, the phenotypical limits of this category remain indeterminate, so that at both extremes blacks and whites whose associates and qualities are predominantly coloured are easily assimilated to this social category:

The line between 'coloured' and 'black' fluctuates with the bias of the census.

3. MacGaffey and Barnett (1965), p. 34.

Despite the uncertainties that attach to the boundaries and relative size of this hybrid category by virtue of its interstitial social and biological position, its objective existence and significance in Caribbean societies remain undeniable. None the less, this hybrid population has undergone various changes in social status, recruitment patterns, and composition over the generations, with consequent increases in its physical and social heterogeneity. It is also identified very differently in Hispanic and non-Hispanic societies. In the Dominican Republic (Santo Domingo) whites were estimated at 13 percent and Negros at 19 percent of the population in 1942, the remainder, classified as mulattoes, being mainly of 'lower class'.

In Cuba while officials estimate that 72 percent of the people are white and 12 percent black, one unofficial estimate gives 30 percent white, 20 percent mestizo (coloured), 49 percent Negroid, and 1 percent Oriental. In Puerto Rico there has been a steady transfer of mestizo and coloured folk to the white category in successive censuses since 1860. Thus, whereas in British territories the difference between coloured and black fluctuates situationally, in Hispanic areas this is true of the difference between coloured and white. In Cuba 'racial antagonism between Negros and mulattoes is often sharp, for according to the proverb, one Negro may harm another but a mulatto will do worse! Similar tensions characterize relations between the middle-class coloured and lower-class black throughout the West Indies; and, as in Cuba, these social categories are often contraposed in racial terms.

Another distinction to persist from slavery which requires notice is that between locally born folk and others from abroad. Natives of Caribbean societies, whether white, black or racially mixed, are called Creoles or Criollos. The Creole category should therefore include Amerindians, East Indians, Jews, Javanese, Chinese, Lebanese and Portuguese who have been born in this region. However in practice these latter populations are designated by specific names, though their hybrid issue by black or coloured mates are normally classified as Creole. Thus, in Guyana, Surinam and Trinidad where Asiatics are numerous, the older Negroid sections reserve the
Corporations and Society

designation of Creoles for themselves, thereby indicating the sociocultural nature of this category. Particularly in Guyana and Trinidad, Creoles describe East Indians by the pejorative term ‘coolie’, while East Indians describe their Creole hybrids as doglas (bastards, outcasts). ‘To the Trinidadian [free Creole], the Hindu East Indian has always been a “coolie” regardless of status, never a Creole.’ In short, generically, Creoles are native West Indians of black, white or mixed racial stock. To distinguish Negro-white mixtures from hybrids begotten by unions of Amerindians and Spaniards, it is therefore convenient to use the local terms, coloured and mestizo.

In Table 1 I set out the reported population and approximate racial compositions of those Caribbean units for which reasonably recent data are available. Unfortunately the table excludes the French and Netherlands Antilles, together with Aruba, Bonaire and Curaçao, British Honduras, Cuba, Haiti, Puerto Rico and Santo Domingo since I failed to find recent data on their racial compositions. As indicated above, the reported ratios of coloured may err in differing degrees and directions in different territories. We should therefore regard these ratios as indicative rather than exact.

3.

Besides the West Indian archipelago, at the minimum the Caribbean region includes Surinam, French Guiana, and Guyana (British Guiana) on the Atlantic shoulder of South America, together with British Honduras in Central America. These four mainland territories with a joint area of 172,000 square miles and a population of 1.1 million belong to this ethnographic zone by virtue of their histories, colonial experience, cultures, racial composition and social organization. In 1963, the islands contained about 22 million people in a total area of 91,200 square miles. Of these 23 million West Indians, 7.2 million live in Cuba, 4.5 million in Haiti and 3.3 million in Santo Domingo, which together occupy 73,363 square miles or four-fifths of the archipelago. The remaining 7 million West Indians are dispersed among forty-eight island societies, which range in size from Redondo with one square mile, or Saba with 5.4 square miles, to Jamaica with 4,400 square miles; in population from Mairo in the Grenadines with 250 to Puerto Rico with 2.35 million; and in density from Dominica with less than 200 per square mile to Barbados with over 1400.

These gross physical variations have parallels in social and cultural spheres. Caribbean societies divide into two major classes which may be labelled Creole and Hispanic or mestizo, according to their derivation from Spain or other West European countries.

Cuba, Santo Domingo, and Puerto Rico all other Caribbean societies can be classified as Creole, whether derived from France, Holland, Britain or Denmark. The great majority of these societies are racially heterogeneous; however, we should distinguish three categories in racial terms: the racially homogeneous, the basically bi-racial and those multi-racial units that contain three or more distinct stocks. Provisionally also we should distinguish societies of moderate size, that is, with more than 15,000 people, from those miniscule units with less, most of these being political dependencies of their larger neighbours. From the data on racial compositions set out above, we can classify the Caymans, Turks and Caicos Islands, Montserrat and the British Virgins as miniscule units, of which only the first is clearly bi-racial. We can also identify Guyana, Trinidad-Tobago and Surinam as multi-racial societies, all other units being bi-racial in base and of moderate size.

To generalize about societies exhibiting such diversity of composition and scale, we have first to distinguish their major varieties and then to proceed comparatively. As indicated above, all racially homogeneous Caribbean societies are economically marginal units of miniscule size, while all Caribbean societies of moderate size are bi-racial or multi-racial. The overwhelming majority of these bi-racial units are highly stratified, while Caribbean multi-racial units all exhibit a segmental alignment of segregated racial stocks. In addition, all Caribbean societies are poor, weakly industrialized, heavily dependent on agriculture, forestry or mining; and in most the effective density of population on arable land is high. All were established as European colonies, and all have histories of slavery. In the general decolonization that followed the Second World War, most of the larger units have acquired internal autonomy, and some are now formally independent.

4.

Since ‘the explanation of race relations must be sought in social conditions and historic experiences’, I shall now sketch the historical development and organization of Caribbean societies, paying special attention to their racial composition.

On discovery and settlement by Spaniards, Cuba, Hispaniola, Puerto Rico, and Jamaica were occupied by Arawak and Ciboney Amerindians. Despite initial intermarriage of Spanish men and Amerindian women, these native populations were rapidly eliminated by disease, overwork, and oppression. African slaves were imported from 1510 to replace them but, with the conquest of Mexico in 1521 and Peru in 1554, Spanish interests focused on the wealthy mainland colonies and these four Antillean territories became way-stations that serviced the shipping between America and Seville.
coloured, and the remainder were slaves. In Jamaica and St. Vincent by 1820, there were equal numbers of free coloured and whites, while about 10 percent of the slave population were also coloured.24 In 1838 slavery was terminated in British possessions by an act of Parliament; in 1848 France did likewise; in 1863 the Dutch followed suit.

Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when these West Indian territories ranked among the richest and most profitable European colonies, France, Britain, Spain and Holland contested their possession in a continuous series of naval wars. Such territories as St. Lucia changed hands several times during these struggles. Others such as Saint Dominique, Barbados and Cuba escaped that fate. Meanwhile throughout the eighteenth century Cuba, Puerto Rico and Santo Domingo (the eastern half of Hispaniola) remained undeveloped by comparison with the colonies of Britain, Holland and France. In 1776, of 70,260 inhabitants in Puerto Rico, only 6,487 were listed as slaves.25 Cuba, which may have contained 2,000 slaves in 1790, probably had a similar composition. However, by 1817, when the first Cuban census was taken, of 630,000 inhabitants, 291,000 were whites, 115,000 free coloured and 224,000 were slaves.26 The remarkable changes in the composition and size of Cuba's population during these twenty-seven years followed the island's conversion from ranching and small-scale tobacco farming by free white residents to sugar production by imported slave labour. This conversion was stimulated by the collapse of sugar production in Saint Dominique, formerly the largest and richest plantation colony in the region, and by the rapid growth of a major sugar market in the newly independent USA.

Saint Dominique was ruined as a plantation colony by the revolution of Negro slaves and free coloured that began in 1791 and terminated in 1804. This revolution, which freed the country from France, was perhaps the most important episode in the history of Caribbean slavery. Set off by the Great Revolution in France, the successful Haitian revolt had rather special antecedents which merit notice.

Miscegenation of white males and black slave women characterized the slave regime everywhere. These unions proceeded outside wedlock, since their male participants were free, while the women were normally slaves. However, throughout the French colonies until 1674, since 'children received at birth the status of their father',27 all issue of these interracial unions were free by birth; and, since Louis XIV had conferred full legal and political rights of citizenship on this increasing population of free coloured affranchis in 1658, another law

was passed in 1674 to restrict the growth of the free coloured populations which ruled that hybrids should take the status of their mothers.

Even so, the free coloured continued to increase in numbers and wealth, until white planters came to regard them as potential rivals. Beginning in 1758, the white planters who dominated the colonial legislature in Haiti passed discriminatory laws against the free coloured citizen. 'One by one his rights in the Code were abrogated... Law and religion were barred to him because of their honorific nature. Coloured women were forbidden in 1768 to marry white men. In 1779 began a series of laws designed to humiliate the coloured person in public.'28 None the less, 'some say that in 1791 they [the coloured] owned a third of all the land in the colony and a fourth of all the slaves; others, more conservative, put the figure at one-fifth of each'.29

When the Third Estate convened at Paris in 1789, the white planters of Saint Dominique sent a delegation to seek colonial autonomy. They were met by radical demands for the forthright abolition of slavery as a direct implication of the Rights of Man. The resulting compromise formally re-enfranchised the free coloured of Saint Dominique, but left implementation of this measure to the colonial legislature, itself the instrument of white oligarchy. As the free coloured perceived that they would have to fight to secure their rights, they prepared to do so; and when the slaves independently revolted against their masters in August 1791, the free coloured aligned themselves with this revolt and sought to direct it to their own ends. Against this unprecedented combination the local whites were unable to offer effective resistance. Intervention by the navies of Britain and Spain merely consolidated the alliance of free coloured and slaves, who proclaimed their allegiance to revolutionary France with fervour. But when, in 1793, the Republic voted to abolish slavery in Saint Dominique and other French territories, 'the action [was] as distasteful to the free coloured people as it was to the whites; both groups wanted to own slaves'.30 In 1797, after the surviving whites had been expelled from the colony, the free coloured under Rigaud fought the ex-slaves under Toussaint L'Ouverture, and were defeated. In 1801-3, when Napoleon, having removed Toussaint, attempted to reinstitute slavery in Saint Dominique, Christophe and Dessalines resumed the struggle until 1804, all whites had been eliminated from the territory, and its independence from France was finally assured.

This sequence reveals clearly the central role of political relations in the racial order and social stratification of a Caribbean slave society. The revolt of Haitian slaves owed its success to the

antecedent persecution of coloured affranchis by white planters who feared the growing wealth and numbers of this hybrid category. This persecution forged a revolutionary alliance between the free coloured and the black slaves which had few parallels, even in the revolts led by the mulatto Fedon against the British in Grenada and by the Jacobin commissioner, Victor Hugues, in St. Lucia and Guadeloupe in 1794-5. For, on deciding to abolish slavery, the French Republican Government sent Hugues to implement its decree in the southern colonies, St. Lucia, Guadeloupe and Martinique. In response local French planters welcomed the British navies to protect them against the proclaimed emancipation. Hugues temporarily relieved St. Lucia but failed to take Martinique. However he did seize Guadeloupe and stimulated its slaves to assert their new freedom by revolt against their masters. In 1801, when Napoleon decreed the restoration of slavery, it proved necessary to re-establish the old regime in Guadeloupe by force and mulatto control was overthrown. The successful defence of slavery by French planters in Martinique, St. Lucia and ultimately in Guadeloupe contrasts sharply with its destruction in Saint Dominique (Haiti).

Spain’s response to the revolutionary struggles that ruined the sugar industry of Saint Dominique was to promote plantation slavery initially in Cuba, and, as Cuba prospered, in Puerto Rico, the only other West Indian island that remained under Spanish control, since the Haitians overran Santo Domingo from 1806 to 1844. Despite an Anglo-Spanish agreement of 1817 to suppress the African slave trade, Cuban slave imports increased steadily, until by 1837 they exceeded 12,000 per annum. By 1870 when the trade finally terminated another 200,000 Africans may have entered the island.31 Only in 1815 did Spain begin to convert Puerto Rico to sugar production; but by then it was too late to secure the necessary numbers of African slaves since the Anglo-Spanish agreement of 1817 restricted these imports, while the Cuban slave market nearby offered better terms. In consequence Negro slaves never exceeded 15 percent of the Puerto Rican population; and in the absence of these and other supplies of foreign labour, the Puerto Rican government forced ‘free but landless peasants to work on the plantations. A whole series of laws were passed during the period 1815-50 to exact more labour from landless freemen. Puerto Rico in this period presented the curious picture of a Caribbean colony where slaves were treated little worse than freemen.32 Thus, while their brief but vigorous careers as sugar colonies fuelled by black slave labour have given the racial compositions of Puerto Rico and Cuba a Creole complexion, this did not disturb their Spanish cultural foundations. In both territories Negroes have remained the minority. Only in Santo Domingo, following its domination by Haiti between 1806 and 1844, were Negroes numerically preponderant in these Hispanic societies.

Although closely linked to the sugar plantation, West Indian slavery was not entirely restricted to it. In British Honduras slaves were employed in logging and 'worked side by side with their masters on similar terms to those of hired labourers'.33 In Saba, where slaves remained a numerical minority, they worked alongside their masters in the field and at sea.34 Curacao and St. Eustatius, where Negroes predominated numerically, prospered through commerce instead of plantations. In French St. Barthélemy, slaves were marginal. On Grand Cayman, where sugar was not cultivated, they remained a minority. On the Turks and Caicos Islands, devoted to fishing, sailing and the production of salt, there were very few resident owners. There were also many small islands such as Barbuda, St. Maarten, and Carriacou in which Negro slaves employed in sugar plantations predominated heavily.

Caribbean societies with differing ecologies and economic resources responded differently to the abolition of slavery. Where all arable lands had been pre-empted by sugar plantations, as in Barbados, Antigua, and St. Kitts, emigration was the only feasible alternative that emancipation presented ex-slaves to tenancy and wage work on estates at rates dictated by the planters. Perceiving this, Antiguan planters eliminated the statutory period of apprenticeship and emancipated their slaves directly in 1834, without losing their labour. In Barbados, colonial legislation of 1840 effectively tied all labourers within the island to the plantations on which they lived.35 But as the sugar market slumped with the repeal of imperial protection between 1846 and 1854, the Barbadian government encouraged emigration; and by 1920 over 100,000 people had left the island.36

In Haiti, despite Christophe, plantations were abandoned and broken up shortly after independence. The ex-slaves occupied themselves with subsistence cultivation. In Jamaica, British Guiana and Trinidad, where unused lands were available, emancipation permitted a heavy exodus of workers from the plantations to establish new communities based on subsistence farming. In Grenada some ex-slaves quit the estates to acquire their own small holdings, while others remained as resident labourers.37 Emancipation created a labour crisis in those plantation colonies that contained unused lands available for settlement by ex-slaves. This economic crisis was complicated and intensified by the withdrawal of protective tariffs in metropolitan states, and by the increasing supplies of cheaper sugar from Brazil and Germany. In this context, marginal sugar-producing areas, such as the Grenadines, the

Virgin Islands, St. Maarten, Montserrat and Nevis, were abandoned to Negro peasantry as planters withdrew. Where territories had been entirely parcelled out in plantations as in St. Kitts, Antigua and Barbados, sugar production continued without serious decline in labour supplies since the ex-slaves had no practical alternative to plantation labour except emigration; but in St. Lucia, plantations were gradually abandoned over several decades, in St. Vincent they were converted to arrowroot, in Grenada to cocoa and nutmegs, in Jamaica to bananas; and in each case there was a sufficient turnover of management to facilitate the emergence of a coloured planter class, who were often the lineal issue of the last generation of white sugar planters. Alternatively, where planters decided to pursue sugar production despite the labour shortage that followed emancipation, foreign workers were imported at public expense under indenture contracts that ensured plantation control of their labour for several years. This response was adopted for different reasons in different measures and at different rates by planters in Guadeloupe, Martinique, Surinam, Trinidad, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Vincent and Cuba; and in general the largest numbers of indentured workers were imported by those units with the most expansive plantation systems.

Indentured workers recruited for these different territories came in different ratios from Africa, from Germany, Portugal, Madeira, Malta, the Azores and the Cape Verde Islands, from China, from India and from Indonesia, to Surinam, Martinique, Trinidad, Guyana and Jamaica. Cuba continued to import African slaves until 1870, following which it recruited indentured workers from China, and later from Yucatan. While these immigrations complicated and diversified the racial and socio-cultural composition of these Caribbean countries, they did not transform their social structures immediately, but facilitated their persistence.

In 1841, three years after emancipation had taken effect, Jamaican planters imported 10,000 free Africans, 1,000 Germans, 2,700 Britons and some Portuguese.38 Between 1860 and 1893 the island also received 5,000 Chinese workers.39 By 1871, Guyana had imported 14,000 Africans and 6,900 Chinese. Between 1835 and 1851, another 4,000 Spanish-speaking mestizos and whites settled in the territory. While these immigrations complicated and diversified the racial and socio-cultural composition of these Caribbean countries, they did not transform their social structures immediately, but facilitated their persistence.

The demographic history of British Honduras differs from other territories as an effect of its ecological situation. Following their revolt in St. Vincent and Dominica at the instigation of Victor Hugues in 1795, the black Caribs were deported en masse to the Honduran coast, and by 1802 had entered the colony. Between 1848 and 1851, another 4,000 Spanish-speaking mestizos and whites settled in the north to escape the Maya revolt in Yucatan. By 1861 these immigrants from Yucatan, totalling over 9,000, outnumbered the English-speaking Creoles who were then concentrated around Belize on the coast. At various periods during the past century Kekchi and other Maya tribes have also moved into British Honduras from Guatemala to settle empty lands in the interior; and in 1958 they were followed by 1,000 German-speaking Mennonites from
Mexico seeking freedom from governmental regulations. Unfortunately the British Honduras census of 1960 does not indicate its racial composition. However, in 1946, 38 percent of the colonial population were black, 31 percent were 'mixed', 17 percent were Amerindians, 7 percent black Caribs, 4 percent whites and 3 percent Asiatic, mainly East Indian. It should be noted that the 'mixed' category in this census return is a composite of English-speaking Creoles, descended from Britons and Negroes, and of Spanish-speaking mestizos, descended from Spaniards and Amerindians. Classified by language, some 60 percent of this mixed category, and thus 18 percent of the colonial population, were Negro-white hybrids, the remainder being Spanish-speaking mestizos. At that date resident whites were almost equally divided between Spaniards and Britons.43

Emigration has also affected the racial composition of Caribbean societies differently, and at differing rates and times. For example, whereas Jamaica contained 35,000 whites in 1820, by 1946 there were less than 14,000. In Grenada, St. Lucia, Dominica, Nevis and elsewhere, where white planters withdrew during the latter half of the nineteenth century, they were succeeded by a hybrid class of coloured landowners who never formed more than 5 percent of the population, and who have since themselves withdrawn from such marginal areas as Carriacou, Union and Mairo, Barbuda, and some British Virgin Islands, thereby simplifying the social structure and racial composition of these abandoned communities. On the Cayman Islands, despite 'almost continuous emigration'44 and very little immigration, population doubled between 1881 and 1943 with remarkable changes of racial composition. During these sixty years local Negroes increased by 10 percent from 972 to 1,051, while whites increased by 140 percent from 864 to 2,086, and hybrids by 185 percent from 1,230 to 3,518.45 These figures suggest substantial rates of miscegenation and some emigration by blacks. Comparable patterns can be traced through census tabulations for South St. Elizabeth, Jamaica, where there are settlements of white peasants around Bull Savanna, and on Petit Martinique, near Carriacou, where the coloured descendants of former French colonists retain their ancestral culture, language, names and cult. On Saba, one of the Dutch Windward Islands, the white majority has been reduced by emigration, until now the population is evenly divided between whites and non-whites, very few of whom are hybrids. While 'poor whites' maintain exclusive peasant settlements in Barbados, Grenada, St. Vincent, Jamaica and elsewhere, on Saba by 1964 there was 'an almost completely random distribution of population'. All four villages contain white and black families.46

Since the various immigrant stocks that entered the Caribbean were differentially affected by shortages of women, miscegenation, adult and infant mortality rates, migration and ecological context, they have declined or increased in numbers at differing rates in different countries and periods; but of all racial stocks within the region, East Indians everywhere exhibit the highest rate of natural increase and among the lowest rates of miscegenation and emigration. Thus, since indenture ceased fifty years ago, these Indian populations have increased disproportionally until they are now the second largest blocs in Surinam and Trinidad and the majority in Guyana. As indicated below, this rapid rate of natural increase among local East Indians has acquired political significance in Guyana, Trinidad and Surinam with the introduction of popular government, party politics and universal suffrage, following the Second World War.

5.

Miscegenation is an old and widespread feature of Caribbean societies which has generated two important categories, the mestizos and the coloured, while affecting all racial stocks differentially. Patterns of miscegenation illustrate prevailing modes of collective accommodation, and, for this reason, among others, they attract the attention of natives and observers alike. Miscegenation is not of course restricted to interracial mating. It may be identified wherever individuals belonging to mutually exclusive social categories establish sexual unions. Some examples of matings which controvert local norms and are therefore regarded as miscegenation, despite their avoidance of racial mixture, are cited below.

In polyglot societies characterized by the stable symbiotic accommodations of their racial or ethnic components, these will generally remain bionomically distinct, physically separate and mutually endogamous. In consequence the society will articulate discrete segments of parallel status but distinctive locations, memberships, organizations and cultures. The multi-racial society of British Honduras illustrates this type nicely. There, until recently, four racially distinct segments, speaking different languages and practising different cultures, coexisted under British rule in physical isolation from one another. Of these segments, the English-speaking Creoles were most numerous, followed by the Spanish-mestizo bloc, the Maya Amerindians, and the black Caribs. With the recent immigration of German Mennonites, the country now contains five segregated segments. Decolonization has placed British Honduras under the administration of coloured and Negro Creoles, since the Maya, Carib and Spanish-speaking mestizo segments are separately too small, isolated and remote from one another to challenge Creole leadership. However, repeated Guatemalan claims to the territory...
threaten its precarious post-colonial accommodation and may reverse the current relations and roles of mestizos and Creoles.

Other Caribbean multi-racial societies, such as Surinam, Guyana and Trinidad, exhibit similar segmental patterns. In Surinam the primary segments are Creole, Indian and Javanese, the native Bush Negroes (Djuka) and Amerindians being without political representation. In Trinidad and Guyana until 1946, Creole and East Indian peoples remained segmentally distinct, as do the Amerindians of Guyana today. However, under the political economies of colonialism, although these Creole and East Indian segments were bionomically sufficient and discrete, they were articulated symbiotically by their common subordination to the British, a condition expressed by their differential disenfranchisement, differential civic rights, differential opportunities for education, public employment and access to land, as well as by their racial segregation. As Britain proceeded to decolonize, these colonial symbioses were destabilized, until the Creole and East Indian segments were duly mobilized as blocs under political parties competing for political dominance in both territories. This enhanced competition has reinforced and extended their traditional segmental exclusiveness. The indirectly symbiotic accommodation that prevailed under the colonial regime has thus been changed by decolonization into relations of collective competition and conflict in Guyana and Trinidad. In Surinam, however, where colonialism had stabilized a more effective symbiosis by introducing the Javanese as a third bloc, decolonization has fostered a consociational regime in which Creoles, Indians and Javanese, organized by racially exclusive political parties, collaborate in the territorial administration proportionately with their respective numbers. Yet, even in Surinam, ‘parties have become even more racially oriented, and attempts to forge an interracial movement have been up to now quite unsuccessful’.

Differences in the racial compositions and proportions of the populations of Surinam, Trinidad and Guyana have played a critical part in promoting these diverse developments. In Surinam no single racial segment can command a majority. In Trinidad-Tobago, where the Creole (Negro and coloured) segment accounts for three-fifths of the people, its present dominance seems secure. In Guyana, where, although numerically the largest, the East Indian segment recently formed less than half of the population, until 1964 the struggle for dominance between Creoles and East Indians was violent and keen.

White and Negro populations of Saba in the Dutch Windwards illustrate another type of segmental accommodation and its dissolution. Until recently Saba has always had a white majority. In 1863, when Holland abolished slavery, Saba contained 704 slaves and a few free Negroes. Following emancipation the two racial segments lived apart in several villages, each securing its own subsistence by fishing,

sailing, peasant cultivation and wage-work abroad. During the past century, population has fluctuated under the influence of successive emigrations. Whereas formerly black and white residents lived apart, in 1964-5 they occupied common communities. A report on Saba published in 1960 relates that:

Whites still stand firmly for complete segregation. In Saba whites are adamant and unanimous about this. .. On Saba the tradition against intermarriage and even against extra-marital relations between members of the two races remains deeply entrenched; attitudes of whites towards race mixture are full of abhorrence and repugnance.

These observations are invalidated by a later study which reports the situation on Saba in 1964-5:

Black and white children frequently play together, parents of both races frequently choose godparents of the other racial group for their children, people frequently use a phrase ‘my good neighbour’ in reference to a person of the other race, and there has been a slight increase, during the past thirty years, in interracial unions. The majority of these unions, whether within marriage or outside it, are of the type opposite to those which formerly took place ... most modern unions are between black men and white women. Where there is no marriage and the child of a bi-racial union is brought up in the home of the mother, he usually shares in her social-racial assignation.

These successive reports on Saba indicate that the formerly exclusive relations of blacks and whites have changed there quite significantly since 1955 from segmental symbiosis to an increasingly inclusive egalitarian accommodation. Although we lack relevant data, it seems probable that some black and white communities of the Cayman Islands may have experienced somewhat similar developments during the decades between 1881 and 1943.

Thus recent developments in Guyana, British Honduras, Surinam, Trinidad and Saba illustrate alternative transformations of stabilized segmental symbioses towards domination, strife, and consociational articulations, and to the dissolution of segmental boundaries in an inclusive social order. Comparably divergent accommodations of two identical racial segments may be illustrated by the fusions of runaway Negro slaves and Carib Indians on St. Vincent and Dominica between 1635 and 1763.

Under continuous attacks and harassment by French, British and Spanish, the St. Vincent Caribs first gave refuge to two boat-loads of Negro slaves in 1635; and by 1676 they had admitted about 3,000 Negroes, most of whom were males. These Negroes settled on the windward coast of St. Vincent, while the Caribs lived as before on the leeward coast. At that date the St. Vincent Caribs probably

47. Mathews (1966), in Mathews et al. (1966), pp. 96-103.
49. ibid., p. 200.
exceeded 4,000. By 1700 when the Negroes approached 4,000 in numbers the ‘red’ Caribs had been reduced to 2,000 through continual warfare with the Europeans. As the population of Carib males decreased through slaughter, Negroes abducted Carib women to their settlements. By 1763 when Britain annexed St. Vincent, the ‘black’ (Carib) outnumbered the ‘red’ Caribs by almost ten to one. 51 In adjacent Dominica, Caribs had also united with Negroes for common defence; but there they intermarried freely under ‘the influence of French priests’. 52 Thus, whereas Negroes effected a forcible fusion of the two stocks in St. Vincent by seizing Carib women, in Dominica the union of these two peoples appears to have proceeded peacefully, under similar external threats, as fugitive slaves replaced Carib males slain in war.

With these data we can attempt to distinguish alternative patterns of interracial miscegenation as indices of collective accommodations among racially distinct stocks within Caribbean societies; but while miscegenation patterns are sensitive indicators of interracial adjustments, they are neither uniform nor transparent in their implications. Mutually exclusive racial segments are inevitably endogamous as, for example, the Negroes and whites on St. Maarten, St. Eustatius or contemporary Barbados. Where miscegenation is formally unrestricted, it must be symmetrical in the sense that partners of either sex and racial stock may mate by marriage or otherwise. In such a case, racial stocks participate as equals in a society defined by common connubium. Though rare, this pattern seems to be the direction of current developments on Saba, as earlier among the Caribs and Negroes of Dominica and St. Vincent. More commonly, miscegenation is either forbidden, in which case the racial blocs remain genetically discrete, or it is restricted in range and form. Wherever restricted, miscegenation is always asymmetrical and unilateral, in the sense that men of one stock or ethnic segment have access to the women of one or more others, without reciprocity. Such asymmetrical miscegenation generally expresses and presupposes relations of dominance and subordination among the stocks concerned, as for example prevailed between free whites and Negroes on West Indian slave plantations.

However, an asymmetrical and unilateral pattern of miscegenation may also prevail without the hierarchical alignment of inter-breeding stocks as a simple effect of complementary disbalances in the sex ratios of racially distinct populations. For example, the indentured Chinese and Portuguese workers who completed their contracts and quit the plantations for towns in Trinidad, Guyana, Jamaica and Cuba during the nineteenth century, acquired Negro and coloured concubines from the urban lower and middle classes, and the offspring of these unions were assimilated to the Creole population as hybrids of distinctive type. Chinese communities in contemporary Cuba illustrate these processes very nicely. 53 In their turn these Chinese and Portuguese hybrids mated with persons of differing social level by marriage or outside it, thereby completing the assimilation process. Partly as an effect of these processes in 1946 only 8,500 Portuguese remained out of more than 30,000 who were brought into British Guiana between 1835 and 1882. In Trinidad, Grenada, and Jamaica also, most persons descended from indentured Portuguese are to be found within the coloured category. In Jamaica only 130 Portuguese residents were listed in 1943. 54 Likewise in Martinique ‘several families have Chinese surnames and may have members who have distinguishable features, but do not otherwise differ from the bulk of the Martiniquians’. 55

None the less, that mere imbalance in the sex ratios of an immigrant stock is not always sufficient to produce miscegenation is shown by the history of Indian populations in Surinam, Guyana, Trinidad, Martinique, Grenada, and, until 1943, in Jamaica also. Under institutions of caste, Indians practice endogamy to avoid ritual pollution. They accordingly ostracize their hybrids as ‘doglas’ and anathematize the Indian parents, unless such unions can be assimilated to Indian notions of hypergamy, by which women of lower caste may in some areas mate with men of higher caste. 56 Their ritually enjoined endogamy ‘has accordingly preserved the racial distinctiveness, culture, language and traditional social organization of Indian enclaves against rapid dissolution by Creole contacts and influences throughout the West Indies, while obstructing their assimilation to the Creole society’. 57 In Surinam, the Javanese have been even more successful in resisting their ambience, and maintain their segmental isolation in the midst of diverse peoples. 58

Until recently, unions between members of those ethnic stocks which were locally distinguished in racial terms despite their common objective racial identity were also described and treated as instances of miscegenation. As indicated above, Creole societies distinguished Creole (native born) whites of colonial descent from expatriate residents and nationals of other European countries in racial terms. Jews, Lebanese and Portuguese were also distinguished racially. On religious grounds Jews, who are one of the earliest immigrant groups to settle in this region, marry endogamously, though mating asymetrically with Creoles outside marriage. As recent immigrants from Asia Minor, Lebanese are also highly endogamous; and so, until recently have been those Chinese who came to the area at their own expense after 1910 as traders and

52. ibid., p. 26, n.46.
craftsmen. However, unions of Lebanese, Portuguese, Jews, Spaniards or Italians with whites of British stock were locally classified as miscegenation until quite recently. Nor is such exclusiveness entirely restricted to groups of different ethnic or national stock. In Martinique:

Metropolitan whites [expatriate Frenchmen] are in the civil service and commerce. Almost all of them live in the capital city... Economically and socially the metropolitan are on a par with the coloured native class. They are not accorded the status of békés [Creole white planters] whose exclusive-ness is reinforced by endogamy... Metropolitan whites arrive expecting to be accorded the deference they believe is due to their colour. They quickly learn, though, that their social position is determined by their occupation and by their birthplace. Marriage between coloured Martiniquans of either sex and metropolitan is common, especially among those who are educated in France... Middle class noirs also marry metropolitan, but less frequently than do the mulâtres. 59

Except that Creole whites are more heavily dependent on the metropole and thus less estranged from visiting expatriates in Guadeloupe, the pattern there is similar. 60 In Trinidad, the remaining French békés avoid intermarriage with local Britons; and in Jamaica, the members of Creole white planter families are no more willing to marry British expatriates engaged in commerce, industry or the civil service than are the békés of Martinique to wed their compatriots from France. Thus besides the norms of race and ethnicity, those of caste and class enjoin endogamy among Creole white planters as among immigrant Hindus. However, for white males, these taboos on intermarriage do not exclude miscegenation with women of other ethnic or racial stocks, notably Negro and coloured.

Some observers ascribe the absence of a 'mulatto social class in the Dutch Windwards' where white and black peasants have long been settled close together to the absence of a 'deeply entrenched, numerous or long enduring plantocracy'. 61 But similar patterns are also found at Mt. Moritz, Grenada, at Windward, Carriacou, at New Scotland, Barbados, and elsewhere in areas with long plantation histories. Moreover as data from Saba, Petit Martinique, and the Cayman Islands indicate, it is not always the case that contiguous black and white peasantries maintain sexual exclusions. Evidently, where Negroes and whites occupy similar socio-economic positions, the only alternative to symmetrical miscegenation is none at all. This principle explains why all enduring contexts of asymmetrical miscegenation between these stocks in Caribbean history have been characterized by the subordination of one to the other; moreover throughout West Indian history, with the sole exceptions of Haiti,

60. Leiris (1955), pp. 188-87.
of white and Negro peasants such as Crane reports from Saba. It also overlooks the refusal of Creole white plantocracies to intermarry with members of their own national or ethnic stock; and it overlooks the endogamy practised by white ethnic stocks, by Hindu labourers, and by coloured elites who imitate their white predecessors. It also ignores historical patterns of intermarriage between coloured folk and metropolitan whites locally as well as in Europe. In short this thesis misinterprets endogamous patterns which subserve and express the political inequalities of differentiated social sections or classes by treating them as pure effects of directing racial archetypes. It is argued by Hoetink that these idealized racial phenotypes (somatic norm images) differ among Iberians and north-western Europeans in degrees that permit the former to marry coloured women while prohibiting the latter. However, Hoetink himself admits difficulty in distinguishing observable phenotypes of north-western Europeans and Portuguese; and no one has ever yet observed, nor ever will, a ‘somatic norm image’. Surely, as historical data indicate, indentured Portuguese, like the Chinese, being powerless, poor and in need of mates, were constrained by their circumstances to accept coloured or Negro women as intimates, whereas whites engaged in plantation management were equally constrained by their social circumstances to maintain social distance throughout these liaisons. If the ‘somatic norm image’ and its derivative, the ‘somatic distance’, regulates the matings of Negroes and whites, it should surely prescribe unions characterized by equality between Chinese and Negroes while facilitating close relations between East Indians and Negroes.

The data on Caribbean miscegenation presented above indicate that asymmetrical miscegenation is common among immigrant groups that have unequal sex ratios, as an adaptive response to their social situations. However, such unbalanced sex ratios are only found among the first generation of immigrants whose hybrid offspring must either assimilate to the host stock or be segregated socially by mechanisms of collective control. Ritual prohibitions may exclude both miscegenation and the problem of socially placing its hybrids; but wherever such asymmetrical mating is institutionalized among successive generations, it expresses and presupposes the political inequality of the racial stocks as a condition of their union. In contexts of collective parity, the alternative to symmetrical conubium between racial stocks is strict endogamy that excludes miscegenation between them. Thus, in seeking to isolate the critical factors that have regulated interracial status relations throughout Caribbean history, we should concentrate on the distribution of political resources and power among racial sections. The liberation of Haitian mulattoes and blacks by the elimination of resident whites illustrates the relevance of political relations for the racial com-


To examine the hypothesis that collective alignments of power have determined the racial stratification of Caribbean societies, we should compare racial stratifications during periods of slavery, colonialism and since decolonization. We should also compare the racial distributions of social assets and disabilities in societies of different type and scale, for example, in segmentally organized multi-racial societies, and in bi-racial societies of moderate and miniscule size, distinguishing those with plantation foundations from others without. By a racial stratification we simply mean the differential distribution of social advantages and disadvantages among the racially distinct stocks of a given society. By comparing such distributions for selected societies of different base and type at successive intervals of time, we can test the thesis that the relationships between peoples of differing race in the Caribbean have always reflected distributions of collective power, without claiming to demonstrate it conclusively. However, if representative data from societies of differing base, type and periods support this hypothesis, the onus will rest on those who hold that interracial accommodations are governed by non-political interests and factors such as the maintenance of racial purity or the pursuit of economic gain to prove their case.

To locate reliable and comprehensive quantitative data on the differential distributions of social resources, advantages, and values among racial stocks in Caribbean societies is no simple matter. Of recent censuses, by far the most informative in this respect is the British West Indian census of 1946, and especially the Jamaican census of 1943, which provides a unique and invaluable account of the differing social situations of racially classified stocks. Some data from a study of social stratification in Grenada are also illuminating, although less comprehensive. Successive censuses rarely permit detailed comparisons of these distributions since they differ so widely in their categories and tabulations; and even within the same census, as illustrated above, we should not expect uniformity in criteria or tabulations. Comparative problems, compounded by the variable political statuses and affiliations of these Caribbean societies, are thus extended by our desire to compare the racial distributions of
social assets within representative units at differing intervals of time.

Fortunately we need little quantitative documentation of the racial stratification of Caribbean societies for the centuries of slavery. During this period, whites exercised an unqualified authority over coloured and African slaves whose status at law was that of chattel property. In plantation colonies, if the owners were absentee, the slaves were subject entirely to the direction and control of the owner’s agents. In colonies that lacked plantations, such as Saba, British Honduras, or the Turks and Caicos Islands, the lot of slaves was generally lighter, as shown by the relative absence of slave revolts or attempts at collective escape in these areas. In plantation colonies slave revolts and their suppression alike indicate the political basis of the social order. To police these plantation colonies, imperial states dispatched adequate military and naval forces, while local legislatures required all able-bodied white males to enrol in colonial militias and turn out as summoned to suppress slave revolts. These colonial legislatures provided representation for wealthy colonists from the imperial countries, while excluding other nationals, Jews, and the free coloured or free black population. Slaves were forbidden access to arms; slave evidence was inadmissible against white persons in colonial courts. Slave societies that lacked plantations lacked these or equivalent arrangements, but probably enjoyed greater internal security. For example, when the Spaniards invaded British Honduras in 1798, the local Britons armed their slaves who ‘fought with considerable spirit’ against the invaders.\(^{65}\)

The freedom of proprietors or their agents to make innovations in the administration of their own slaves varied with the proprietors’ influence, in plantation areas. In Carriacou, Sir George Maclean converted the labour system from daily tasks to weekly job work without protest in 1830.\(^{66}\) In Jamaica in 1816–17, Monk Lewis, a British MP, was arraigned on charges of sedition and subversion by neighbouring planters for innovations that ameliorated the lot of his slaves while increasing their productivity.\(^{67}\)

While plantations yielded high rates of profit on new lands, their profitability declined as the soil was exhausted under cultivation techniques then in use. By 1820 most of Jamaica’s slave plantations were uneconomic. None the less, local planters resisted all proposals to modify the slave regime.\(^{68}\) Like the planters, economists find it difficult to calculate the profitability of production under conditions of plantation slavery.\(^{69}\) Thus in such conditions, the planters’ insistence on the subordination of other strata could hardly be based on clear economic considerations. In Saint Dominique, pursuing non-economic objectives, the white oligarchy had hastened its own elimination by driving the free coloured strata into a desperate revolutionary alliance with the slaves and the metropole. In Martinique and Guadeloupe, slavery was finally abolished by France in 1848 on the grounds that it cost her more to maintain the regime than to replace it.\(^{70}\) In territories such as Saba or British Honduras, which lacked plantations and any significant external trade, it is doubtful whether slavery ever yielded any financial profits. Thus economic interpretations of Caribbean slavery vary in their validity for different areas and different periods.

In no Caribbean Creole society were rights of political representation conferred on slaves by their emancipation. Indeed except for the limited instruction by missionaries which planters warmly opposed, the ex-slaves had very little formal education; on liberation, they formed a landless, illiterate labour force with consequences mentioned above. Whites restricted their rights to participate at elections to the colonial legislatures as voters or candidates by property requirements that effectively disenfranchised all but a few of the black and coloured population. Colonial legislatures, dominated by planters who resented emancipation, predictably adopted policies to control the ex-slaves by imposing onerous tenancy laws that compelled them to labour under stringent conditions for low wages as the alternative to eviction. In Barbados, the Located Labourers Act of 1840 re-established planters’ control most effectively. Planters also used their political power to import indentured workers from abroad with colonial revenues obtained by increasing excise and custom duties which transferred these costs to the Negro and coloured population. By admitting coloured men of property into the ranks, the colonial militia was expanded in anticipation of Negro revolts. Exiguous educational provisions were made for Negro and coloured people to meet the formal demands of imperial governments. While direct taxes on landed property remained negligible, and in many areas personal incomes went untaxed until 1938, revenues from excise and customs duties accounted for 80 percent of all indirect revenues in British territories, where indirect revenues often formed a similar ratio of government incomes.\(^{71}\)

The general policy of these post-emancipation colonial regimes can be formulated simply: the propertied classes which monopolized the franchise employed their legislative power to levy revenues on the unenfranchised for the pursuit of policies designed to further their own collective interests and ends. Under onerous laws that regulated the relations of landlords and tenants, plantation management retained extensive control over resident ex-slaves. When disputes arose concerning wage payments, task measurements, task performance, tenancy conditions, evictions and the like, Negro complainants

---

67. M.G. Lewis (1845), p. 113; see also M.G. Smith (1965c), pp. 96, 110–14.
71. West India Royal Commission (1945), pp. 71 and Appendix D.
had to bring their suits before magisterial benches manned by white plantation personnel. This 'sectional definition and administration of justice which had been developed and employed by their former masters as a prime instrument of social control during the years after the abolition of slavery' finally generated a violent protest by the ex-slaves at Morant Bay, Jamaica, in 1865.72 John Eyre, then Governor of Jamaica, authorized action in which 1,000 Negro homes were burnt and 600 individuals killed under martial law. Following this the colonial legislature, elected by a total of 1,905 voters, acting in 'the full conviction that nothing but the existence of a strong government would prevent this island from lapsing into the condition of a second Haiti',73 decreed its own abolition, and transferred the government of the country entirely into the hands of the Crown. Revolts in Martinique and Dominica at this period encountered similar repression.

To justify their oligarchy, white planters had an armory of racist arguments inherited from earlier apologists of slavery such as Edward Long; and at this period in Europe, Thomas Carlyle, Anthony Froude, Arthur de Gobineau, James Hunt, and many others amplified this ideology with other arguments of diverse type that served merely to reinforce the sectional demands of West Indian whites. Understandably, despite periodic criticism by visitors, this colonial regime persisted with little change until 1937-8 when the politically inarticulate masses erupted in riots and strikes from Trinidad, Guyana, and Barbados to Jamaica. At that period, registered voters formed 6.6 percent of the estimated population of Trinidad and 5.3 percent in Barbados. Even in 1944, when Grenada held its last election under the Property Franchise, only 14.8 percent of the people had a vote.74 In 1915 — when 51.8 percent of the adult males in Guyana were Indian, 42.3 percent (Creole) Africans, 2.9 percent Portuguese, 1.7 percent Britons, and 0.9 percent Chinese — 46 percent of the Britons, 17.7 percent of the Portuguese, 12.3 percent of Chinese, 6.8 percent of the Creoles, and 0.6 percent of the East Indians qualified to vote. Even so, of the 4,512 voters in Guyana that year, 17 percent were Britons, 11.4 percent Portuguese, 62.7 percent Creole 'Africans', 2.4 percent Chinese, and 6.4 percent East Indians, Amerindians being without representation.75 In 1936, when the Dutch finally initiated a common legislature for their six Antillean colonies, 'only 140 persons qualified as voters in all of the three Windward Islands... Only one member of the Staten was allocated from the three Windwards.'76 Throughout the region this pattern prevailed until the Second World War when universal adult suffrage was introduced in British territories on the recommendation of the Royal Commission that followed the riots of 1937-8. In 1944 Jamaica witnessed the first election by popular suffrage to be held in the British Caribbean. In 1946 the French Republic decreed a new status for the French West Indian colonies of Guadeloupe, Martinique and French Guiana that reconstituted them as overseas departments of France, and simultaneously introduced universal suffrage. In 1948, the first elections by universal suffrage were held in Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles under a new constitution. Thus post-emancipation colonialism concluded, as it began, by political changes that significantly altered the antecedent distribution of power among racial stocks. But while emancipation had merely freed the Negro and coloured slaves from direct subordination to individual whites who finally replaced them with indentured Indians, given their overwhelming numerical predominance, universal suffrage made it formally possible for Creoles and Indians to strive for political control as a strategic condition of racial re-stratification in all territories except those under France.

To assess the significance of these recent political changes on the racial stratification of Caribbean society is not easy, given the numerous gaps in available data and the varied courses of 'decolonization' adopted by different metropolitan powers. Thus France technically decolonized Guadeloupe, Martinique and French Guiana by redefining them as overseas departments. However, despite the regionally exceptional allowances for social assistance that such integration has brought, until the race riots at Fort de France, Martinique, in December, 1959, the substance of colonialism persisted with its characteristic racial stratification at least as vividly in these areas as in the British or Dutch territories.77 Perhaps our best guides to the significance of recent political changes are comparisons of the distributions of social assets under and since colonialism. In reviewing these distributions it is necessary to segregate the data on inclusively stratified bi-racial societies from those that pertain to multi-racial units with a segmental organization. It is also convenient to compare territorial data on the distributions of land, education, literacy, occupation, and incomes, for periods immediately preceding and succeeding decolonization before examining parallel data on politics, as far as our information allows. I shall, therefore, summarize the distributions of these indices within selected bi-racial societies, before presenting similar data on multi-racial units, following which we shall review briefly some data that indicate contemporary distributions of political attitudes and power.

74. West India Royal Commission (1945), p. 579.
In 1935-6, 73 percent of the arable land in Martinique was held in units of more than 100 hectares (247 acres or more), 40 percent of the registered proprietors holding units of 40 hectares (100 acres or more). In 1960, of 222 plantations totalling 42,275 hectares, all of which exceeded 50 hectares in size, 151 with a total area of 28,066 hectares were owned and administered by Creole whites who formed 0.70 percent of the Martinique population and controlled 66.41 percent of its capital. In Guadeloupe, according to the agricultural census of 1957, 51 farms of 100 hectares or more occupied 31.6 percent of the total area and represented 0.2 percent of all holdings. At that date, 13,813 holdings of less than one hectare occupied 14.8 percent of the total area and represented 58 percent of all holdings. There also, the larger holdings are owned and operated by whites, the lesser by blacks, coloured and Indians. On both islands, agriculture engages one-half of the labour force and furnishes one-third of the Gross Domestic Product.

On St. Vincent in 1946, 45 holdings of more than 100 acres each occupied 28,434 acres or 57 percent of all privately owned land. Even in 1965 practically all of the 24 large estates are exclusively held by the whites. All contribute through white ownership to white supremacy. In 1960, there were about 1500 agricultural workers on the island and about one-half of these were employed on the 24 estates.

We can compare the distributions of large land holdings among members of different racial categories within British Caribbean societies in 1946 by summarizing data from the census taken that year (Table 2).

Table 2
Landholdings of more than 100 acres in British Caribbean territories (excluding Jamaica), by race of owner, 1946

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Coloured</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Windward Islands:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominica</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Lucia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Vincent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All with over 100 acres:</td>
<td>10,682</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>348</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total landholders:</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>110</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Honduras</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All with over 100 acres:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total landholders:</td>
<td>3,525</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>738</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4,881</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Leeward Islands:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbuda</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antigua</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Kitts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nevis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anguilla</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montserrat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virgin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All with over 100 Acres:</td>
<td>840</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>618</td>
<td>1,941</td>
<td>3,452</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All landholders:</td>
<td>3,452</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4,881</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3
Landholdings in Jamaica, 1943, classified by size and landholders' racial status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Holdings by Size</th>
<th>Whites</th>
<th>Blacks</th>
<th>Coloured</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total Holdings</th>
<th>Total Acreage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100-199 acres</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>497</td>
<td>67,149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200-499 acres</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>120,074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500-999 acres</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>146,294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000 acres +</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>921,203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total large holdings</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>605</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>1,318</td>
<td>1,254,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total landholders</td>
<td>969</td>
<td>51,163</td>
<td>12,398</td>
<td>1,062</td>
<td>66,173</td>
<td>1,793,688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large holdings as percent of total</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>70.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At that date, of 1,237,000 residents in Jamaica, 1 percent were white, 1 percent Chinese, 2 percent East Indian, 17.5 percent coloured, and 78 percent Negro.

In 1943, when the total farms and buildings in Jamaica were

79. West Indian Census, 1946, part B, p. 44.
81. West Indian Census, 1946, part B, pp. 17, 35, 56; ibid., part E, p. 35.
82. Eighth Census of Jamaica, 1943, Table 200, p. 306, and Table 211, pp. 325-7.
valued at £17,930,000, the farms and buildings on units of 100 acres or more were valued at £9,218,000, or 51.5 percent of the total, although these were the most heavily capitalized units and 70 percent of the area. Such differential valuations of large holdings for taxation prevailed throughout the British Caribbean at that date.\(^8\)

By 1954, Jamaican farmland had reduced to 1,788,660 acres, of which only 920,199, or 51.5 percent, remained in 1,213 units that exceeded 100 acres; but by 1960 this sharp fall in the area under large holdings had been partly redressed. Although the island then contained 1,706,560 acres in farms, a reduction of over 80,000 acres in six years, 1,130 units of 100 acres or more, representing 0.7 percent of all farm holdings, accounted for 955,165 acres or 56 percent of the total area in farms.\(^4\)

In 1946 Barbados contained 88,580 acres in farmlands, distributed in 4,881 plots. Of this area, only 59,000 acres were cultivated, 41,000 acres with sugarcane in 4,078 plots.\(^5\) By 1960, when the arable area had reduced to 83,000 acres, 85 percent was held by 260 estates of more than 100 acres each, almost all of them owned by whites, many of whom lived abroad. Of the 46,000 acres under canes in 1960, 36,000 were cultivated by these estates, the remainder being parcelled out among more than 30,000 peasants who held lots that averaged one-third of an acre each.\(^6\) The racial composition and history of Barbados together ensure that the overwhelming majority of these cane-farming peasants were Negroes descended from slaves through generations of 'located labourers'.

Of 65,000 acres owned by private individuals on Grenada in 1946, 40,000 (61 percent) lay in 113 units of more than 100 acres held by 1.7 percent of 6,528 landholders. According to an agricultural survey of 1952-3, 10,000 plots of less than 25 acres each accounted for 18,600 acres together, while the remaining 100 estates of 100 acres or more totalled 34,400 acres.

In attempting to study the stratification of Grenadian elite in 1952-3, I investigated the relationship between social status and various conditions such as phenotypical colour, genotype, income, acreage owned, occupation, birth-status, and the like, and for this purpose employed a sample population of 405 prominent residents listed in the directory that was published in the Grenada Handbook of 1946. A panel of 19 residents ranked the personnel listed in this directory according to their relative status within the local society. By collation these rankings generated a single status scale with uniform intervals which ranged from 0.18 for the highest possible status to 1.00 for the lowest. As part of this inquiry four Grenadians also classified the directory personnel by phenotype as white, fair, medium or mulatto, dark, and black. These qualitative ratings were converted into a decimal scale by assigning values of 0.2 to whites and 1.00 to blacks, with the fair, medium, and dark spaced equally between. Phenotypical ratings of these sample individuals were then collated on this scale for correlation with their status scores.

An exhaustive scrutiny of the land rolls in all Grenadian parishes that year identified 76 landowners within this classified sample, for all of whom phenotypical values were available. Table 4 indicates the distribution of acreages among these 76 individuals, ranked by phenotypical scores that range from 0.2 for whites to 1.00 for blacks. The mean social status and acreages held by each phenotypical category are also tabulated to illustrate the distribution of status and land within this elite.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phenotype</th>
<th>No. of Owners</th>
<th>Mean Status Scores</th>
<th>Total Acreage</th>
<th>Mean Acreage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>1,822</td>
<td>607.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>1,241</td>
<td>206.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>1,779</td>
<td>222.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>4,770</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>3,159</td>
<td>351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>1,189</td>
<td>148.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>1,484</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>3,834</td>
<td>348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>0.417</td>
<td>19,359</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indians</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>2,425</td>
<td>606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>0.425</td>
<td>21,784</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of 72,000 Grenadian residents in 1946, 0.9 percent were white, the majority being peasants settled at Mt. Moritz and at Windward, Carriacou; 4.8 percent were Indian; 20.4 percent were coloured; and 73.6 percent were black. Of the 76 resident landowners in our sample, 14.4 percent were white, 5.2 percent were black, and the remainder, 76.4 percent, were coloured folk of varying hue. The steady decline in the social status of individuals as pigment deepens is nicely illustrated in this table.

These data on the distribution of land among the racial categories in Martinique, Guadeloupe, St. Vincent, Barbados, Jamaica and Grenada illustrate patterns that still prevail in bi-racial Caribbean societies. Parallel data on land distribution in multi-racial units will

---

83. West India Royal Commission (1945), pp. 81-3.
85. West Indian Census, 1946, part B, pp. 2-4.
be cited below when describing the racial organization of those segmented societies.

8.

Since the distribution of minimal educational experience and opportunities is best revealed by the differential literacy rates of the various racial stocks, these rates are appropriate to introduce our review of the educational, occupational and economic dimensions of racial stratification in Caribbean societies under and after colonialism.

Of young men called up annually between 1946 and 1951 for military training, 21 percent were illiterate in Martinique and 42 percent in Guadeloupe, 37.5 percent in French St. Maarten, and 50 percent in Marie-Galante. Given the historic composition of these populations, Negroes and coloured folk predominate heavily among illiterates; but if their elders had been included the illiteracy rates would surely be higher.

Of school-age children on Martinique in 1951-2, between 16 and 20 percent did not attend school; of those in Guadeloupe, at least 23 percent. In primary schools maintained by government, classes ranged in size from 80 pupils per teacher in the infant ranks to 20 in the more advanced. In Martinique, government public schools averaged 41 pupils per class as against 52 in Guadeloupe. In both islands, the Church operated fee-paying secondary schools with smaller classes for the children of Creole whites and wealthier coloured bourgeois. In both islands, the secondary school enrolment was then about 5 percent of the enrolment in primary schools.²⁸ Excluding Jamaica, Table 5 describes the distribution of illiteracy among racial stocks in British Caribbean societies in 1946:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Territories</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Mixed</th>
<th>Carib</th>
<th>Other Amer-Indian</th>
<th>East Indian</th>
<th>Other Asiatic</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Guiana</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Honduras</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leeward Islands</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windward Islands</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>29.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Weighted total 3.3 | 12.1 | 14.0 | 24.1 | 46.1 | 47.4 | 11.6

These data speak so clearly for themselves that no comment is necessary.

In December 1942, of the 12 to 18 year age group, the ratios enrolled in secondary schools throughout the British Caribbean varied as follows: less than 0.2 percent – Dominica, British Guiana, and St. Lucia; 0.2 to 0.3 percent – Jamaica, Montserrat, and St. Kitts; 0.3 to 0.4 percent – Antigua, St. Vincent, and Grenada; 0.4 to
0.5 percent – Trinidad-Tobago; 0.6 to 0.7 percent – British Honduras; over 0.7 percent – Barbados. At that time, fees for secondary education averaged £12 per annum per pupil throughout the area. In addition, governments gave an estimated £25 per pupil per annum to secondary schools, the overwhelming majority of whose pupils were drawn from the propertied white and coloured classes. Of children under 12 years old in British Caribbean territories in 1942, 90 percent were thought to attend primary schools. For these, almost all of whom were drawn from the then voteless black and Indian population, government expenditure averaged £4.50 per annum per child. Of children between 12 and 15 years old, it was estimated that only one half attended schools of any kind; and for those in government schools, the state contributed an average of £6 per annum per child. At this date there were very few scholarships to secondary schools for children whose parents could not afford the normal fees. Thus government expenditures on education systematically favoured those children whose parents could pay the fees that currently averaged £12 per year per child. The parents of these privileged children had voting rights, and used their political influence to secure high government grants for pupils at the secondary schools while keeping expenditure on elementary education very low. Thus the differential allocation of political rights which was based on educational and economic differences was used by its beneficiaries to maximize the sectional differences in education which underlay these economic and political inequalities. The educational system and the sectional order were integrated, and the one tended to perpetuate the other.

In Haiti the situation was similar though more extreme. There the coloured elite are aristocrats, partly (largely one might even say) because they are educated... Any programme which proposed universal education would cut the ground from under the present social structure by giving the masses equal opportunities to the elite... An ordinary degree of self-interest is quite sufficient to explain the lack of enthusiasm of the ruling class when the subject of general education is broached.

The dramatic collapse of rural education in Haiti during the American occupation of 1915-31 illustrates elite policies on this subject nicely.

In British territories at this period almost all upper-class Creoles or whites sent their children to school overseas, preferably to Britain as their parents had done before them. In 1953, no member of the white upper stratum in Grenada had been schooled locally; one-
fourth of all persons in the three highest strata of the local society had been educated in Britain; and half as many again in Barbados. 97

Comparative data for 1957 are tabulated above to illustrate the measure of change and continuity in British territories since 1943-6, and the extraordinary variation in educational provisions characteristic of the region (Table 7).

As decolonization proceeded, some British Caribbean governments initiated plans for educational expansion in 1956-7, and by 1960, though uneven and often ambiguous, there were evident signs of change. In 1960 the proportion of all school children who were enrolled in secondary schools ranged from 5.5 percent in the Windwards (Grenada, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Dominica) to 21.4 percent in Barbados. 98 However, at that date less than 1 percent of the people over 25 years of age in any British Caribbean territory had attended universities.

In 1957 the Jamaican government initiated a programme of scholarships to secondary schools and undertook to meet half or all the educational and subsistence costs of children whose performances in an annual Common Entrance examination exceeded certain minima. Despite advice the government refused to restrict its awards to the children of poorer parents, ostensibly to avoid discrimination in reverse. The examinations were thus open to all children aged between 9-10 and between 12-14; in consequence those children who failed to secure scholarships or bursaries in their first attempt had a second chance to do so, while youngsters who received bursaries on their first attempt could seek scholarships by retaking the examination.

Between 1957 and 1961 the numbers that took these examinations increased from 15,000 to 18,000 per annum while the proportion who qualified for scholarships and bursaries declined from 15 percent in 1957 to 10 percent in 1961. Entrants were drawn from high (secondary) schools, from fee-paying private schools, and from government primary schools, in differing proportions and with differing results. These three types of school differed widely in the amount of government support they received, and thus in the quality of their educational arrangements and instruction. They differed also, not surprisingly, in the socio-economic classes for which they catered.

The distribution of entrants and awards among pupils drawn from schools of differing type in the Common Entrance examination of 1959 is tabulated below to show how this scholarship programme actually worked (Table 8).

Table 8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of School</th>
<th>Entries</th>
<th>Awards</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government primary schools</td>
<td>81.1</td>
<td>54.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private fee-paying schools</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary (high) schools</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

have skilled or semi-skilled parents, while an equal number are children of cultivators. Slightly over one-half of these scholarships and bursaries went to children whose parents paid income tax and ranked in or above the Jamaican middle-income range.

As we descend this parental scale of occupational status, the ratio of girls among scholarship winners increases steadily, being highest amongst entrants from primary schools. Thus under the scholarship scheme 'social mobility through the primary school system is largely a female affair'. 100 However, since males predominate heavily in Jamaican extra-domestic employment, and especially in its higher occupational levels, in commerce, management, the professions and government service, such sex-selective scholarship recruitment from the predominantly black 'lower class' will have little effect on the current distributions of executive occupational roles among Jamaicans of different racial stock in the immediate future.

In Trinidad the government's plan to build modern secondary schools and to fill them with successful candidates in the Open Annual examinations may actually increase prevailing educational inequalities of Creoles and Indians, given the historic educational disabilities of this Indian population. 101 It is by no means a simple matter to transform historically stable structures of economic and educational inequality that have served to differentiate racial stocks into substantively egalitarian distributions of opportunities. Colonialism systematically employed the unequal distribution of these facilities to sustain and extend the stratification in which whites enjoyed maximal advantages, propertied Creoles of hybrid stocks moderate benefits, and blacks, or East Indians and Amerindians where present, the minimum. Inevitably such regimes presupposed grossly unequal distributions of political power and rights among the differentiated racial categories. Inevitably they also generated correspondingly unequal distributions of occupational opportunities and incomes. The colonial distribution of occupations among racial and ethnic stocks is nicely illustrated by data from the Jamaican census of 1943 (Table 9).

100. ibid., p. 71.
Table 9
Male wage-earners and unpaid workers by occupation and race, Jamaica, January 1943

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Coloured</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Jews</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>East Indian</th>
<th>Syrian</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Managers, farm</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers, factory</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers, construction</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers, transport</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total managers</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade, wholesale</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade, retail</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total, commercial executive</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance, managers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>626</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountants</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other professionals</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>496</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1,198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All professionals</td>
<td>1,034</td>
<td>1,037</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2,584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Service officers</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military officers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Public Services</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled manual workers</td>
<td>38,426</td>
<td>4,151</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>794</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>43,458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total workers</td>
<td>162,332</td>
<td>31,225</td>
<td>2,310</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>1,512</td>
<td>5,404</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>203,358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total executives</td>
<td>1,190</td>
<td>1,408</td>
<td>883</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3,691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of all executives</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executives as % of all workers in racial category</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>4.52</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>6.52</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>1.82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

102. Eighth Census of Jamaica, 1943, Table 92, pp. 179 ff.

Table 10
Percent distribution of wages earned in Jamaica
week ending 12 December 1942, by race of worker and amount

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wages in Shillings</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Coloured</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Jews</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>East Indian</th>
<th>Syrian</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-10/-</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>52.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-20/-</td>
<td>26.35</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-40/-</td>
<td>16.65</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-60/-</td>
<td>2.94</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-80/-</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80-100/-</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100-150/-</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150-200/-</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200-300/-</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300-400/-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400/- +</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total workers</td>
<td>151,101</td>
<td>33,650</td>
<td>2,990</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>1,526</td>
<td>4,770</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>194,458</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

103. ibid., Table 125, pp. 220-1.
The West Indian census of 1946, though less detailed and informative, indicates that similar occupational distributions prevailed throughout all stratified bi-racial societies of moderate size in the British Caribbean at that time. Moreover, since distributions of employment opportunities and incomes correspond closely with the allocations of occupations, the highest ratios of unemployed and underpaid workers fell among East Indians and blacks, the lowest ratios among the whites and coloured folk. The distribution of wages among Jamaican workers classified by race and ethnicity at the end of 1942 illustrates this pattern in detail (Table 10).

To indicate recent changes, the wage distribution of employed males in Jamaica during April 1960 may be compared with that of December 1942 (Table 11).

TABLE 11
Male wage-earners in Jamaica, 1960, classified by weekly income in shillings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weekly Income /-</th>
<th>Number of Workers</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-20/-</td>
<td>50,384</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-40/-</td>
<td>53,162</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-80/-</td>
<td>50,898</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80-200/-</td>
<td>40,480</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200-400/-</td>
<td>11,508</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400-800/-</td>
<td>4,006</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>800/+</td>
<td>1,045</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income not stated</td>
<td>7,668</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>219,171</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although the Jamaican census of 1960 does not indicate the distribution of wage incomes among workers of differing racial categories, clearly the bulk of the most poorly paid workers and unemployed were black, while the majority of those receiving high incomes were white. In 1960, Jamaican officials estimated that some 15 percent of the labour force were unemployed.  

To compare these Jamaican wage distributions of 1942 and 1960, we must take note of the currency devaluation in 1951 and the subsequent steady decline in the purchasing power of money. In cash terms the average per capita annual income of Jamaica had risen from less than £50 in 1943 to over £110 in 1960; but this rise is largely offset by the fall in the value of the pound from $5 (US) to $2.80 (US) during this period. Money values accordingly overstate the growth rate of the Jamaican economy during this period; and perhaps we may compare the wage distribution of 1942 and 1960 more realistically by doubling earlier money values to adjust the real values exchanged as expressed in purchasing power. While 80 percent of the Jamaican wage-earners of both sexes received less than 40 shillings a week in 1943, in 1960 70 percent of employed males received less than 80 shillings ($11.20 US) per week, and another 18.5 percent between 80 shillings and 200 shillings weekly. By comparison with the data of 1942 which include all workers of both sexes, those of 1960 are also relatively inflated by the exclusion of female workers whose wage rates are on average lower than those of men. However, this comparison indicates that changes in the distribution of real incomes among the Jamaican workers of differing racial stock during this period were limited indeed.

In April, 1960, the character and stability of income distributions in Jamaica became the focus of a widespread controversy, following the calculation of E. P. G. Seaga, who later became Minister of Finance and Development, that together with their household dependents, all who receive incomes above £300 per annum, or 120 shillings per week ($16.80), and paid income tax, represented only 7 percent of the population and 15 percent of the electorate. In the ensuing debate alternative calculations were presented to show that wage incomes had increased significantly in Jamaica since 1954, but this issue remained to influence the referendum and elections of 1961 and 1962 which overthrew the government that had taken office in 1954.  

Since 1960, data from a random sample of households, budgeted for incomes and expenditures in 1958, have shown that 20 percent of Jamaica's households then received less that £50 per annum (20 shillings per week) while another 20 percent received between £50 and £99 per annum, and an equal ratio received incomes exceeding £300 per annum or 120 shillings a week, many of whom apparently escaped income tax. Of the island's households in 1958, 10 percent received 43.5 percent of the total income, while the lowest 70 percent received 27.3 percent. By comparison with other countries for which data on income distributions were then available, this Jamaican pattern appeared exceptionally unequal. Income accruing to the lowest 60 percent of recipient units [in Jamaica] is among the lowest recorded — 19 per cent... The percentage of incomes received by the 15 percent of units next to the top is higher than in all the countries listed.  

In 1954, a survey of income distribution in Trinidad revealed that while 73.6 percent of the population, who received incomes of less than £250 per annum (100 shillings per week) shared 38.4 percent of the total income, the wealthiest 8.2 percent received 36.7 percent of all incomes between them. In 1956 a second survey reported that 71 percent of Trinidad wage workers received less than £250 per

104. Francis [no date], ch. 9, p. 19, Table 9.6.
annum, thereby indicating limited change.\textsuperscript{108} When the Jamaican and Trinidadian data for 1958 were compared, the poorest 60 percent of the Trinidad population received 27.1 percent of the aggregate income while the top 10 percent received one-third.\textsuperscript{109} Evidently there was little change in Trinidad income distribution between 1954 and 1958. By contrast, in Puerto Rico only 21 percent of the workers received less than 72 shillings ($10.90) a week or £186 per annum in 1967. Another 27 percent then received between 72 shillings and 144 shillings per week; while over half the labour force received above 144 shillings ($20) weekly or £400 per annum. While it appears that in Puerto Rico, 'distribution of taxable income has become more equal during the period' (1955-67),\textsuperscript{110} data from Jamaica and Trinidad indicate little change. This implies that despite increases in absolute value, the patterns of income distribution described for Jamaica in the 1943 census persist substantially to the present as part of the persisting social order and racial stratification inherited from the colonial period. Other indices of such structural persistence which are reported above include distributions of land and educational opportunities even under the scholarship scheme of 1957.

On Martinique in 1938, whites controlled 85 percent of the export trade. There, while over 1000 families, all of whom were white, enjoyed annual incomes in excess of 200,000 francs, between 150,000 and 170,000 agricultural and industrial workers received less than 10,000 francs a year. 'Selon une estimation remontant à 1949 aux neuf dixièmes de la population des Antilles françaises reviendrait la possession d’un quart seulement des étendues globales, et, à la Martinique moins de 5 pour cent des exploitations occuperaient les deux tiers des terres.'\textsuperscript{111} In 1955, after a period of inflation, an economic survey estimated that 56 percent of the population on Martinique and 59 percent in Guadeloupe had disposable incomes of less than AF 350,000 ($700 US) per annum, though the total disposable income of each island at that date exceeded AF 25 billion ($50 million US) per annum. In 1952, shop-girls, washer-women and domestic servants in Martinique received AF 5,000 to 6,000 per month ($10-12 US).\textsuperscript{112} Recent quantitative data on the racial composition of these two societies are hard to find, and data on the differential distributions of social assets among the racial stocks even more so. In 1961, Martinique contained 292,000 persons and Guadeloupe 283,000. In both islands the bulk of the poor are of Negroid and Indian stock, while the wealthy consist of Creole békés, metropolitan Frenchmen, and the coloured elite.

\textsuperscript{108} The Economist Intelligence Unit (1959), pp. 43-9.
\textsuperscript{109} Abiram (1966), p. 106.
\textsuperscript{110} F.M. Andic (1963), p. 75.
\textsuperscript{111} Leiris (1955), p. 38.
\textsuperscript{112} ibid., p. 45; F.M. and S. Andic (1966), in Mathews et al. (1966), p. 105.

To illustrate some aspects of the racial stratification in a bi-racial Caribbean society of moderate complexity and size, I cite data gathered in 1952-3 on a sample of 403 prominent members of the colonial elite in Grenada. The status scores of those 403 individuals were determined from their individual rankings by nineteen local judges, as related above. Of the 403, I secured phenotypical classifications for 364, and genotypical values for 171 men from genealogical data on their family lines. These phenotypes and genotypes were reduced to colour scales that ranged from 0.2 for pure whites to 1.00 for pure blacks on either scale. Of these 376 prominent Grenadians whose phenotypes were known 57 (15 percent) were black, 94 (25 percent) were dark, 101 (26 percent) were mulatto, 85 (22.2 percent) were light-coloured, and 39 (11.1 percent) were white. On the status scale, these 39 whites had a mean score of 0.277, while the 85 light-coloured elite averaged 0.43, the mulattoes 0.52, the dark brown 0.7, and the blacks 0.752. On this scale, 'peasants' or non-elite ranked below 0.835.\textsuperscript{113} Differences of personal status correlated closely with differences of phenotype -- \( r \) being 0.682 with a probability 0.001. For those 171 males whose genotypes were known, correlations of individual status and genotype were even closer -- \( r \) being 0.734 with the probability of 0.001.\textsuperscript{114} Structural analysis identified four social strata within this elite, the three superior strata consisting of phenotypically similar families that intermarried more or less exclusively.\textsuperscript{115} Except for immigrants of similar phenotype, culture, economic and social attributes and interests, these kin-bound social strata were virtually closed to penetration by mobile individuals from below.\textsuperscript{116} All members of the higher strata, who were locally described as 'the planter class', although less than half were planters, had been educated abroad, as their fathers had been before and their children after them.\textsuperscript{117} Those data described a series of highly impervious elite strata distinguished by mutual endogamy and differences of race, colour and social status.

Of 376 phenotypically classified sample members, I collected details of taxable incomes in 1952 from the Grenadian Income Tax Department for 230, and also for 9 Indians and 1 Chinese whose status scores were known. In Table 12, these data are presented for taxpayers classified by phenotypical score, so as to exhibit the numbers, mean status, and taxable incomes of these different colour categories.

\textsuperscript{113} M.G. Smith (1965b), pp. 158-63.
\textsuperscript{114} ibid., pp. 164-8.
\textsuperscript{115} ibid., pp. 168-204.
\textsuperscript{116} ibid., pp. 209-12.
\textsuperscript{117} ibid., pp. 217-27.
As indicated above, we cannot validly extrapolate from distributions of social advantage within the Creole populations of bi-racial societies to distributions current among the non-Creole segments of multi-racial Caribbean units. However, we shall not find quantitative data of comparable specificity on the distribution of these assets within the non-Creole population segments. Such statistical gaps are themselves illuminating; but however imperfect or casual, such information as we presently have illustrates the division between Creole and non-Creole segments of multi-racial societies.
In Surinam, the concentration ratio of 0.62 for the distribution of incomes indicates extensive inequalities, despite considerable tax evasion. In 1956, of those who paid income tax, 2.3 percent received 13 percent of all incomes taxed, while 34.2 percent received 16.3 percent of the total. We have no indication of the distribution of these incomes among peoples of different racial stock.

In 1959, the distribution of Surinam farmland was equally concentrated. Of all holdings, 20 percent occupied 1.7 percent of the total area, while units exceeding 50 acres in size, although only 0.85 percent of all holdings, occupied 50 percent of the area in farms. Thirty enterprises alone accounted for 33,654 hectares or 32 percent of the acreage. Indian, who then formed 35 percent of the population, owned 50 percent of the farms and 45 percent of the land, while Indonesians, totalling 16 percent of the population, owned 38 percent of the farms but only 10 percent of the land. Creoles do not seem to play an important part in agriculture, though they do possess some of the larger plantations, which, however, are not being operated. The remaining ethnic groups possess 1 percent of the farms but 31 percent of the land. Presumably resident or absentee Dutchmen were prominent among these ‘remaining ethnic groups’.

In British Guiana, the Bookers Company, a British corporation, owned 13 of 21 sugar estates that occupied some 155,000 acres of irrigated land. A second British syndicate had four estates, while another of less than 1,000 acres was independently owned. Sugar accounts for half of the country’s exports, and 45 percent of the government’s revenue; bauxite for one-fifth of its exports and 10 percent of government revenues. Both industries are owned and directed by overseas whites in Britain or America. Rice, which between 1957 and 1960 provided 10 percent of the colony’s exports, was cultivated by East Indians on 27,000 holdings that occupied 137,000 acres. Only 1 percent of these rice farms exceeded 32 acres in size. Like rice, sugar cultivation, the major colonial industry, depended on Indian labour. Indians were 89 percent and 99 percent of all households and field workers on two sugar estates studied in 1956-7; and 73 percent and 92 percent of all workers on another two estates studies in 1960-1.

The distribution of voting rights in 1915 among Guayanese of different racial stocks has been cited above. In 1940, of 34 government departments, 27 (79.4 percent) had British heads, 5 (14.7 percent) had Creole heads, and 2 (5.9 percent) Portuguese. East Indians, already more than 40 percent of the colonial population, were 3.1 percent of 1940’s government heads.

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phenotype</th>
<th>East Indians</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Creole sub-total</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Corporations and Society

In 1946, 92.4 percent of East Indians in Trinidad lived in rural areas; but by 1960 one-fourth of the people in San Fernando, the second largest city on the island, were East Indians. Scholars have debated the scope and intensity of Indian 'Creolization' in Guyana and Trinidad in terms of Indian assimilation or exclusiveness. Cultural transfers between Creoles and Indians have failed to erode segmental boundaries. East Indians restrict miscegenation with Negroes and coloured folk. The two populations mate endogamously under strikingly different arrangements. According to one observer, 'probably the greatest source of friction between the two groups stems from economic competition.' However, criteria of individual and collective stratification rank high in the segmental disassociation and contraposition of Creoles and Indians. Creole conceptions of contemporary and desirable forms of stratification in Trinidad, as presented by Braithwaite, a Trinidadian Creole, differ radically from those that Indians espouse. While Creole society elaborates differences of skin colour as indices and conditions of social status, 'skin colour plays almost no part in the East Indian group as internal stratification. The primary determinant of status among rural Indians is caste membership.

The differences and incompatibilities of these East Indian and Creole status systems are summarized neatly by the Niehoffs:

The [Creole] status system can be reviewed as primarily based on colour with whites at the top and the Negroes at the bottom as is done by Braithwaite. This is logical from a Negro point of view, but it does de-emphasize the importance of other ethnic groups, particularly the Indians. From the Indian point of view, social differences are more often categorized in terms of whites, Chinese, Indians, and Negroes. The difference between coloured and Negroes, which figures importantly in Braithwaite's study, is comparatively unimportant to Indians. Pure Negroes, Negro-whites, and Negro-Chinese admixtures are all still Negroes to Indians. The middle class of 'coloured' (Negro-white) admixtures (Braithwaite: 1953, 92-120) has no clear-cut counterpart among Indians. Indians who become wealthy and educated do not tend to merge into this 'coloured' middle class, nor do they tend to establish such a class on their own. There are status differences among Indians, based primarily on economic position and leadership roles, but these differences can be viewed as a continuum more logically than as a system of classes. From the Indian point of view the most

---

125. Ibid., p. 130.
126. Ibid., p. 129.
131. Crowley (1957), pp. 817-24: (1960); Klass (1960); Braithwaite (1960); Skinner (1960); all in Rubin (1960).
133. Roberts and Braithwaite (1963).
136. Braithwaite (1953), pp. 92-120.
clear-cut line of demarcation is that between whites and non-whites, and Indians and Negroes.)

A survey of racial attitudes among students at secondary schools in Trinidad also reports that "in connection with their definition of the change in colour-class structure... the white student tends to regard all Creoles as Negroes, and does not make refined colour distinctions." Thus the central significance of colour differences rather than race is restricted to those elite hybrids who on these grounds claim 'ascendancy... concomitant with the withdrawal of the British."

However, since these hybrids represent only 17 percent of the population, their sectional view of the social order and its stratification is hardly representative and merely serves as an ideological model to legitimize their minority rule. The divergence of this coloured status model from the views of whites and Indians indicates a source of profound disagreement between racial blocs in Trinidad about the nature of the society that their combination constitutes and their respective places within it. Several scholars have recently remarked this source of dissension in contemporary Trinidad, particularly as regards the contraposition of East Indians and Creoles. The situation in Guyana is essentially similar but more advanced.

Critical emphases on colour as a basic condition of status are general among the hybrid elites of Creole societies. In bi-racial Grenada,

the hierarchy of status tends to correspond with the hierarchies of colour, power and wealth; but while the positions of whites and blacks in these overlapping hierarchies were well defined, that of the browns was far from clear. These conditions may explain why browns avoid those categorical concepts of race that whites and blacks employ, insisting instead on the relative scale of colour... The more problematic the significance of these colour differences, the greater the stress laid upon them.

As far as they go, these data on the distributions of social resources and values among racially distinct stocks of Caribbean societies identify two historic patterns of social organization that distinguish bi-racial and multi-racial populations. In bi-racial units there is a stratification that subordinates Negroes and coloured folk to a white minority whose forbears initially owned their ancestors as slaves and monopolized rights to land and political organization. In some of these bi-racial units coloured elites have now succeeded...

11.

these white minorities as dominant strata, sometimes by inheritance from the old plantocracy, in other cases by appropriating bureaucratic and political positions. In Haiti, 160 years of independence have witnessed a continuous struggle for domination between the small but powerful hybrid elite and a succession of personalistic black leaders of the disorganized majority. In yet other bi-racial units such as Carriacou, St. Maarten, Saba, or the Cayman Islands, where the means and rewards of racial domination have no place, Negroes and whites live separately or interspersed, and mate endogamously or symmetrically without any evident stratification of racial stocks or differential distributions of social advantage.

In such multi-racial societies as Surinam, British Honduras, Trinidad, and Guyana, besides the Creole segment of Negro and coloured people socialized by historic domination to Europeans, there are also segments of Amerindians, Black Caribs, Bush Negroes, Indonesians, East Indians, and in British Honduras, the Spanish-mestizos, all of whom remained throughout colonialism aloof from the Creole politico-economic arena under various conditions. The processes of decolonization have affected these multi-racial units in differing ways; but nowhere have they promoted the dissolution of segmental boundaries or the assimilation of racial stocks. In Surinam, Javanese, Creoles, and Indians currently collaborate to govern the country by sharing political power on the basis of their numbers; but this political equivalence has reinforced segmental boundaries while inhibiting their stratification. As the Indian population of Surinam increases relative to that of other groups, this accommodation will become increasingly unstable. Already some Indian leaders in Surinam are seeking its amalgamation with Guyana where Indians are now the numerical majority, while Creole leaders seek to remove those constitutional restraints on local government that derive from the country's participation in the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Likewise in British Honduras, Guatemalan territorial claims threaten the current Creole dominance, and may be expected to elicit the support of the large Spanish-mestizo bloc. Thus far, however, crises and confrontations between these segments have been avoided. In Trinidad and British Guiana, by contrast, decolonization has converted the traditional disassociation of Creoles and Indians into explicit contrapositions and struggles for segmental dominance. Both segments are acutely aware of the material and ideological issues at stake in their current struggles.

When universal suffrage was introduced to British Guiana in April, 1953, East Indians and Creoles combined to form a nationalist movement that sought to remove British control. Six months later the British government repealed the Colonial Constitution and placed Guiana under the direct administration of the Crown for nearly four years. During this interval, the popular movement split into two
racial blocs of Creole-Africans and East Indians, each organized in a political party under leaders of appropriate race.\textsuperscript{144} Since elective government resumed in August, 1957, racial alignments have dominated the Guyanese votes. In the election of 1961, the party led by Dr. Jagan, an Indian, polled 46.7 percent of all votes cast, while that led by Mr. Burnham, an Afro-Guyanese (Creole), polled 44.7 percent of the votes. These percentages are almost identical with the ratios of Indians and Africans in the population when the coloured are counted with the Africans. It would seem that very few voters crossed racial lines in the 1961 election.\textsuperscript{145} In 1962, the Creoles and Portuguese of Georgetown, Guyana's capital, directed racial violence against East Indian administration and residents and burnt down much of the city. In 1963, there were prolonged strikes against Dr. Jagan's government. In 1964, 'East Indian-Negro violence swept through the country. Before the proclamation of a state of emergency in July, 1964, over 170 persons had been killed in the racial conflict.\textsuperscript{146}

Despite these upheavals, the British government proceeded to decolonize, and conceded Afro-Guyanese demands for proportional representation in place of the previous single-member districts and simple majority rule. This change encouraged the Portuguese leader, Mr. P. D'Aguiar, to establish a third party based on the Portuguese and their affiliates in Georgetown. In the pre-independence election of 1964, Dr. Jagan's party, backed by Indians, received 45.8 percent of the total vote and 24 seats in the legislature; Mr. Burnham's party, backed by Creoles, received 40.5 percent of the votes and 22 legislative seats; the party led by D'Aguiar received 12.4 percent of the votes and 7 seats. The Creoles and the Portuguese then formed a coalition under Burnham's leadership to exclude Jagan's party from the government which led Guyana to independence in May, 1966. Late in 1967 it was officially announced that East Indians outnumbered Creoles by 54,000, and had achieved a clear majority of the country's population. The Premier, Mr. Burnham, duly appealed to West Indian Creoles resident in Britain to immigrate to Guyana at his government's expense;\textsuperscript{147} thus far, his invitation has had few takers.

These Guyanese developments illustrate how decolonization has generated segmental struggles for domination between East Indians and Creoles and has encouraged resident whites to organize themselves separately for the protection and pursuit of their own interests. As in Surinam, so in Guyana, Amerindians remain outside the political arena.

\textsuperscript{145} Despres (1967), p. 8; see also Table 20 and 21, pp. 172-3.
\textsuperscript{146} Moskos (1967), p. 21.
\textsuperscript{147} Caribbean Monthly Bulletin, 4, no. 11, p. 3; 5, no. 1, p. 2.

In Trinidad, where East Indians still number less than 40 percent of the population, although unable to frustrate Creole support for the West Indian Federation, which began in 1957 and dissolved in 1962, they were able to secure effective restrictions on further Creole immigration to Trinidad. In Guyana, then under the government of Dr. Jagan, the Indian majority opposed its entry into the West Indian Federation, since this would reduce their local dominance.

By 1960, Trinidad had a bicameral legislature, ministerial government under a Premier and cabinet, and two mass parties based on its Creole and East Indian segments respectively, each led by men of appropriate race, Dr. Eric Williams, the Creole Premier, and Dr. Rudranath Capildeo, an East Indian. Following their defeat in the 1961 elections, the East Indians were represented by four members in the Island senate, although the East Indians then formed 36.5 percent of the population. Of 23 senators nominated by the party leaders and the Governor, a Trinidadian Chinese, 7 were white or coloured, although together these categories accounted for only 18.2 percent of the population. 'Significantly under-represented, although by no means absent, are the two largest groups of the general population – Negro and East Indian.'\textsuperscript{148} The Creole Premier, Dr. Eric Williams, none the less justified the unrepresentative racial composition of this nominated upper chamber as evidence 'that Trinidad is an open society with equality of opportunity'.\textsuperscript{149}

Although 'the so-called racial politics [of Trinidad] may ... actually be seen as socio-cultural politics',\textsuperscript{150} these cultural oppositions have deep foundations in antecedent social and biological exclusions. For these reasons

East Indian national consciousness and East Indian population increase seem latent threats to the Creole elites; on the other hand the ascendency of Creole elites, concomitant with the withdrawal of the British, poses a latent status threat to the East Indian upper-class and mobile elite. From their class vantage point, Creole elites view East Indian traits in terms of socially undesirable and politically threatening exclusiveness.\textsuperscript{151} ... The East Indian tends to think in terms of the community because he conceives it as a Negro nation.\textsuperscript{152}

Thus recent development in the segmented multi-racial societies of Surinam, Guyana, and Trinidad substantiate the thesis that the alignments of racial stocks are regulated by political relations that express the conditions and distributions of collective power.

The history of slavery, indenture, and colonialism in these
countries illustrates white supremacy, which itself presumed and expressed the political predominance of different colonizing nations in different territories. That this social supremacy was restricted by political factors and reserved for nationals of the colonizing power is evident from the low status accorded immigrant Portuguese, Jews, and Syrians in these colonies, in this century as well as the last. In Guyana, on completing their indentures the Portuguese 'tended to move away as soon as possible and go into shopkeeping. So long as they remained small shopkeepers, they did not enjoy high prestige ... Despite their colour ... they tended to be despised, even by the Negroes ... The identification of "Portugee" tended to become a fixed derogatory description.153 Their anomalous position as racial whites of relatively low status which parallels that of 'poor white' peasants in Barbados, the Dutch Windwards, Caymans, Jamaica, Grenada, St. Vincent, and elsewhere, demonstrates that whiteness in itself is insufficient to ensure high status in racially mixed Caribbean societies. While powerless whites have low status, dominant whites, hybrids, Negroes, or Indians enjoy the status that corresponds with their resources and power. In Trinidad the recently immigrant Jews and Syrians compete as peddlers, moneylenders and petty tradesmen. The coloured population does not care to distinguish between them. Both categories are disesteemed; and local Portuguese fare little better.154 By contrast, in Jamaica, Jews and Syrians are sharply distinguished and rank high by virtue of the resources and power at their disposal.155

For bi-racial Caribbean societies, whether of Hispanic or north-west European derivation, the historical evidence demonstrates this political determination of racial stratification in unambiguous detail. Where prevailing stratification was reversed by revolt, as in Haiti, Guadeloupe, or Grenada in 1795, the conditions and processes of these reverses were unmistakably political; but so too were those collective withdrawals of African slaves, who evaded the racial stratification of colonial societies, and constituted autonomous communities of their own, in Dominica, St. Vincent, Jamaica, and Surinam, sometimes in alliance with Amerindians, sometimes separately. Reimpositions of slavery in Guadeloupe, Grenada, and St. Lucia, during or after the revolutionary decade, also illustrate the critical role of political power in ordering and maintaining these racial stratifications. So do the suppressions of numerous unsuccessful slave revolts that darken the history of these Caribbean plantation colonies from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century. As we have seen, after emancipation white planters maintained the preceding racial stratification by employing their political power to control the ex-slaves, to finance imports of foreign labour, to restrict education and political rights, and to suppress protests against their racial oligarchy. Where these adaptations seemed insufficiently secure, imperial governments assumed direct control along with responsibilities for maintaining the racial stratification of these colonies. This era in Caribbean history was terminated by upheavals at the end of the Great Depression; and, following the Second World War, imperial governments introduced numerous modifications as necessary conditions of decolonization.

Having reviewed some consequences of decolonization in segmented multi-racial societies, we may indicate their parallels in stratified bi-racial units by citing data on recent distributions of political roles and attitudes in these units. As always, Jamaican data are the most precise and illuminating for illustrative purposes. Like Trinidad, Jamaica has a bicameral legislature in which the lower house is elected by adult suffrage while the members of the upper house are nominated by the governor and by the leaders of the two major political parties. In 1951, after two elections based on universal suffrage, the elected lower house contained 31 members of whom 28 were phenotypically classified as: white or near-white 3; light and medium brown 10; dark brown 12; black 3. Of 15 nominated and official members of the upper house at that date, 13 were white and one each light and dark brown.156 In 1958, after further elections, under a government led by the opposing political party, the elected house contained 3 whites, 22 coloured, and 7 black members; while the nominated upper house contained 8 whites, 1 black, and 8 coloured members, of whom 5 were light and 3 dark brown. Indians and Chinese were conspicuously absent.157 Evidently the coloured elite employed its leadership of both Jamaican political parties to restrict the access of blacks, Indians, and Chinese to the local legislature by election and nomination alike, while providing the white and coloured sections with disproportionate representation. It is equally characteristic of Jamaica during this decolonization phase that a sample of 72 'top leaders' in the country included 37 whites (52 percent) — of whom 8 were born abroad and 29 were Creole — 20 mulattoes (28 percent) and 15 others (21 percent) listed as 'dark brown and black'.158 Such data demonstrate the persistence of colonial racial alignments in modern Jamaica, and indicate the widespread concern of its white and coloured elites to preserve their differential advantages and position in this overwhelmingly Negro country, despite universal suffrage, by managing the political parties, trade unions and government equally. Understandably, throughout 1959 to 1961, the black proletariat in Kingston protested against the persistence of the colonial order of racial stratification despite local self-government. Their protests generated considerable unrest and alarm and helped to discredit the current

158. ibid., Table 10, p. 84.
Corporations and Society

Race and Stratification in the Caribbean

In 1961, a sample of 2,197 students, drawn from the fifth and sixth forms of 21 secondary schools throughout the island, together with 51 percent of the Jamaican students in the local university campus, was surveyed to determine their attitudes towards equality. Of this sample 2,091 students classified themselves by colour as follows: black 146 (7 percent); white 113 (5.4 percent); coloured 1,647 (78.8 percent). The remaining 185 students (8.8 percent) were self-identified as Chinese and Indians. Of the total sample, only 52.2 percent espoused egalitarian attitudes even at that critical phase of Jamaica’s development. These egalitarian attitudes were expectably predominant among the black students (61.6 percent), marginally so among the coloured students (53.1 percent), and least common among whites (42.5 percent).¹⁶⁰ Neither the composition of this sample nor the distribution of political attitudes within it suggest that any major revision of the colonial system of racial stratification will occur by peaceful means in Jamaica for several decades.

Unfortunately these Jamaican correlations of phenotype and political attitude are representative of other British Caribbean societies. In 1961-2 a sample of 111 ‘top leaders’ in Jamaica, Trinidad, British Guiana, Barbados, Grenada, and Dominica were interviewed to elicit their political attitudes. On the basis of interview data, these leaders were classified as ‘democrats, authoritarian idealists, cynical parliamentarians, and authoritarians’. Of all the territorial contingents surveyed, the Jamaican leaders had the highest ratio of ‘democrats’ (39 percent) and the fewest ‘authoritarians’ (26 percent). If anything, these data suggest that the Jamaican political spectrum was rather more liberal than those of other British Caribbean territories.

Of equal relevance is the phenotypical composition of this leadership sample and the distribution of political orientations by phenotype within it. Of the 111 leaders, 38 were white, 20 light brown, 41 dark brown and black, and 12 ‘orientals’ (Chinese and Indian). Of the 38 whites, 10 percent were identified as ‘democrats’ and 58 percent as ‘authoritarians’. Of the 20 light brown leaders, 25 percent were ‘democrats’ and 60 percent ‘authoritarians’. Of the 41 leaders classified as ‘dark brown and black’, 34 percent were ‘democrats’, 24 percent ‘authoritarians’, 10 percent ‘authoritarian idealists’, and 32 percent ‘cynical parliamentarians’. Of the 12 ‘oriental’ leaders, 8 percent were ‘democrats’ and ‘authoritarian idealists’ equally, while 42 percent were ‘authoritarians’ and ‘cynical parliamentarians’ equally.¹⁶¹

Clearly the historic structures of social inequality by which these racially mixed populations were bound have generated deep and widespread commitments to inequality and authoritarianism within them, while discrediting parliamentary institutions among those racial stocks whose subordination was effected by these means. ‘Il y a, écrit Tocqueville, un préjugé naturel qui porte l’homme à mépriser celui qui a été son inférieur, longtemps encore après qu’il est devenu son égal; à l’inégalité réelle que produit la fortune ou la loi succède toujours une inégalité imaginaire qui a ses racines dans les moeurs.’¹¹⁶²

It may seem rather trite to conclude from our review of racial stratification in Caribbean societies that race relations and alignments are normally mediated by political action and express differential distributions of collective power. However, others have interpreted these data very differently. According to Dr. Tannenbaum, cultural systems of religion and law may and normally do mediate race relations in stratified societies.¹⁶³ However illuminating, in order to apply, this hypothesis presupposes the subordination of one or more racial stocks to some other, and such subordinations assume and express collective dominance by political means.

According to Dr. Eric Williams, the Creole historian and Premier of Trinidad and Tobago, Caribbean race relations have always been determined by the economic interests and goals of dominant ‘racial groups’, that is, until his party came to power.¹⁶⁴ Data already cited invalidate such simplistic economic determinism and suggest rather that “Gaining the power to rule over the other” is the key to the ethno-political conflicts underlying race antagonisms”,¹⁶⁵ and also to racial stratification. Retaining this power of rule and the privileges of rule, restraining the autonomy of others, or at least evading their power to rule – these are complementary concerns of equal relevance that mobilize racial collectivities, demarcate their boundaries and memberships, and impose internal solidarity and external contraposition, thus fixating individual identities in closed segments which, irrespective of physical likeness or difference, assume exclusive ethnic characters and racial status. These Caribbean data illustrate the proposition that ‘race prejudice exists basically in a sense of group position’.¹⁶⁶ They also specify the political conditions that determine the relative positions and alignments of racial groups in stratified, segmented, and unstratified societies equally.

H. Hoetink has recently argued that specifically ‘racial’ factors, such as perceived differences between the ‘somatic norm images’ or idealized phenotypes of the dominant segment and other racial

¹⁶¹. Moskos and Bell (1964), pp. 326, 328; see also Moskos (1967).
¹⁶₄. Williams (1946, no date, 1957).
To expose the systematic order that underlies the diverse and dynamic interracial accommodations reviewed above, we must show that these are neither accidental nor arbitrary products of historical process, but logically necessary consequences of a finite set of structural alternatives that together prescribe the frameworks for all possible types of society, whether racially and ethnically heterogeneous or not. This exposition requires a brief excursus on the forms and alternative bases of societal incorporation and their implications for the continuities and disjunctions of culture and organization in human societies, following which we can show how the entire series of interracial accommodations reviewed above illustrate the necessary effects of these relations.

There are only three alternative sets of conditions by which societies may incorporate individuals or collectivities as members. All societies must either incorporate their members under one of these alternatives exclusively, or by some coherent combination of them. The three alternative modes of societal incorporation may be characterized as uniform or universalistic, equivalent or segmental, and differential.173

Under the first alternative, individuals are incorporated uniformly as citizens of a society by direct enrolment on uniform conditions with formally identical status in its public domain, where the unit's regulative institutions and governmental processes are centred. Thus individuals incorporated under this mode will hold identical legal and political rights, restraints and obligations in the society by virtue of their direct, identical and unmediated incorporation into its public domain. In consequence, they must accordingly share those social, educational and economic institutions which are directly relevant or subject to the public domain; and they will normally also share common institutions of kinship, religion and language. None the less, despite its inclusive design and assimilative effects, societies based on the universalistic or uniform incorporation of their members do not proscribe differences of language, kinship and cult among them. This order merely relegates such institutional forms to the private domain of individually optional and legally equivalent practices which entail no formal civic, legal or political inequalities among the citizens.

173. For the essential specifications of these alternative modes of incorporation and their relations to alternative modes of pluralism, see L. Kuper and M.G. Smith (1969), pp. 433, 436, 440-8, and Chapter 6 above, pp. 187-9.

Another recent recognition of the salience of incorporation for the comparative analysis of societies, quite distinct from that presented here, is to be found in Cohen and Middleton (1970), especially pp. 1-24. For my conceptions of corporations, their bases, requisites and implications, see especially the essay on political change and other papers reprinted above.
Thus a regime of universalistic incorporation is equally consistent with cultural homogeneity, heterogeneity or pluralism in those institutions that pertain to the private domain of social action. However, it excludes pluralism at the public or corporate level of social organization.

To determine whether a society that formally proclaims the uniform incorporation of all its members on conditions of civic and political equality fulfills these ideals in practice, we need only examine the historic and contemporary distributions of political and civic rights and burdens within the various categories of its population. If such data reveal systematic legal and political inequalities among the population, then whatever the formal ideology proclaims, actual practice demonstrates institutionalized deviations from these norms. Confronted with such differences of substance and form, analysis must seek to isolate the conditions associated with such structural inconsistency as effects of alternative forms of incorporation that substantially obstruct the uniform enrollment of all citizens in the public domain. In such circumstances we can expect to find that the unequally incorporated collectivities of the society may also be differentiated by culture and social organization, and perhaps by language and race also.

Under the second alternative mode, individuals are incorporated as members of a society by virtue of their prior incorporation in one or other of a series of mutually exclusive segments of formally equivalent status that together constitute the society. As these segments are formally co-ordinate, the status, rights and obligations of their members in the public domain of the wider society will be formally equivalent, though mediated by the prerequisite incorporation of these individuals in the collectivities that constitute the unit. Thus this mode of incorporation constitutes autonomous societies as consociations of mutually exclusive segments which may or may not share common culture and forms of social organization. In consequence, individuals incorporated indirectly in such consociations may differ in their immediate rights, privileges and obligations as an expression of institutional differences in the segments to which they belong; but these segments are jurally and politically equivalent divisions of the inclusive society.

The third alternative mode incorporates individuals differentially into a society by prescribing their prior identifications with one or other of a series of closed collectivities which are ordered unequally as superior and inferior by their differential access to the public domain of the inclusive unit. Normally one of these collectivities dominates the others and thus the society, by denying them access to the public domain and thus prescribing their political and legal subordination. If the subjugated population is also divided into two or more exclusive segments, these may be incorporated as equivalents under common conditions of differential incorporation in the wider society. In that event all the incorporated collectivities will exhibit distinctive cultures and social organizations as conditions and consequences of their differing structural positions. Such systematic institutional differences among the corporate collectivities in a society indicate its pervasive pluralism. In the case under discussion, such pluralism has three modes: differential incorporation of collectivities institutes and sustains their structural pluralism by investing one segment with exclusive control of the legal and political institutions of the society; but the mutually exclusive segments incorporated as equivalents by their common disabilities and exclusion from the public domain display social pluralism in those divergences of social organization and situations that generate and sustain their mutual exclusiveness. Moreover, such differences of internal organization and societal situation will also distinguish the dominant collectivity from the two subjugated ones. Thus structural pluralism subsumes social pluralism, although the latter does not entail it. Finally, both these modes of pluralism assume and express institutional divergences of collective culture within the frameworks prescribed by the alternative modes of incorporation under which these collectivities are associated. Thus structural and social pluralism both assume and express cultural pluralism, but in differing forms and with differing intensities.

If two collectivities, B and C, are incorporated as equivalents in a single society by common subjugation to a third, A, and if all members of the latter are incorporated uniformly in the public domain which it monopolizes, then all three modes of incorporation will be found within the society regulating the articulation of these collectivities. Evidently, each of these modes of incorporation may be transformed into either of its alternatives by altering the articulations of these collectivities, or by dissolving or crystallizing their boundaries; but such conversions of collective alignment can only proceed by political action, since this is the basis and character of all relations between incorporated collectivities. However, the conversion of differential incorporation into a universalistic regime by political means cannot immediately eliminate those differences of culture and social organization that formerly characterized these collectivities. The dissolution of such institutional differences within and between collectivities presupposes extensive opportunities for processes of social and cultural assimilation over a period of at least two or three generations.

Collectivities incorporated under either of the three modes outlined above have the distinctive characteristics of corporations. Moreover, all corporations aggregate in all societies are necessarily incorporated under one or more of these alternatives. As a corporation, each collectivity is presumed to be perpetual and has a unique identity, fixed conditions or modes of recruitment, and thus a determinate membership. Any social unit with these four formal
features has the institutional form, closure and perduring qualities of a corporation; but collectivities may be incorporated as categories or as groups. If a collectivity is incorporated solely with the attributes listed above, it is thereby constituted as a corporate category by its lack of the organization necessary to convert it into a group.

Besides the four requisites of corporate status listed above, a corporate group must also have a coextensive organization, appropriate procedures for corporate action, its own exclusive common affairs, and the autonomy it needs to regulate them. These properties endow the corporate group with capacities for positive action as a collectivity which corporate categories do not possess; and as corporate action is always political in basis and character, and since corporate groups have positive political capacities while corporate categories do not, under regimes of differential incorporation, while the dominant collectivity is organized as a corporate group, subjugated collectivities are normally denied the opportunities to organize, and thus constituted as corporate categories. Thus the mode of differential incorporation distinguishes the collectivities it articulates in form as well as legal and political status, the dominant unit reserving to itself the opportunities and advantages of collective organization in order to immobilize the dominated. Thus the way in which these collectivities are incorporated and articulated is explicitly political in basis and corporate in form. As a consequence, collectivities incorporated as equals by common subjugation under structures of differential incorporation must normally be constituted as corporate categories, and they are thus rendered incapable of collective action to redress their grievances.

When their differential incorporation is abolished, these equivalent segments must either dissolve by relaxing the criteria of their mutual exclusions, in which case they will forfeit their corporate closure through processes of social and cultural assimilation by which their members are uniformly incorporated in the public domain of a wider unit; or they must reconstitute themselves as corporate groups by developing the necessary organizational arrangements, in which case they will articulate politically by contraposition or by associational agreements. Only by virtue of their common differential incorporation can equivalent segments remain as corporate categories. Released from differential incorporation, they must either dissolve and amalgamate, or reconstitute themselves as corporate groups. But in either case substantive differences of culture and social organization which formerly characterized these closed equivalent collectivities will persist within and between them for several generations, until their social and cultural assimilation is complete, even though their members may be uniformly incorporated in the public domain of the autonomous society.

These structural alternatives and their transformations are sufficient to explicate all forms of interracial accommodation in human societies, since racial differences can only be institutionalized within societies by constituting racial stocks as corporate collectivities. Thus in racially heterogeneous populations, the only alternative to the incorporation of racial stocks as groups or categories is the incorporation of individuals of differing race directly in the public domain of the wider society on identical conditions that prescribe or effectively discountenance their collective segregation on racial lines. Such an order will generate conditions which are simultaneously favourable to racial amalgamation and to social and cultural assimilation by suppressing racial identifications among the citizens in favour of common identifications with and loyalties to the wider society. Conversely, as such situations indicate, the structural preconditions of all interracial accommodations is the incorporation of racial stocks as exclusive corporate units whose articulations or standardized relations express prevailing conditions of corporate organization and distributions of corporate power. The alternative modes of such collective articulation and the essential conditions of their development and change have already been outlined. These alternatives and transformations apply equally to racially homogeneous and to racially mixed societies, being direct logical entailments of the corporate character of societies themselves. Thus in the absence of such gross physical differentiae as racial features, societies must and do select and institutionalize other principles as bases for the differentiation, segmental or universalistic incorporation of their members. These principles include ethnicity, language, cult, locality, occupation, wealth, descent or ancestral status. In so far as these or other differentiae are employed to incorporate collectivities within society, they have direct political implications and corporate expression.

An individual can only be assigned racial status by the observable correspondence of his phenotype with that of some biologically distinct collectivity. Thus differences of race presuppose and refer to biological differences among reproductively closed stocks which are presumptively perpetual, perceptually distinct, and thus conceived as corporate categories. None the less, as a basis for social organization, the only features exclusive and intrinsic to race are those inherent in biology, namely the transmission of collectively distinct phenotypical features by heredity. That such biological characteristics are intrinsically neutral and non-determinative phenomena in relation to social organization is shown by the fact that the conditions and consequences of the three alternative modes of incorporation outlined above govern all possible forms of societal organization in racially homogeneous or heterogeneous societies alike. Thus if racial variables are institutionalized as bases of collective incorporation and
artificial in some societies, we must seek the foundations of these social orders in the conditions and consequences of their incorporations. Of these conditions, the simultaneous constitution of racial stocks as collectivities with the corporate characteristics listed above is directly prerequisite and decisive for the forms of interracial accommodations and societal structure alike.

Racial incorporations can only develop in racially heterogeneous societies, and since Caribbean data show that no intrinsically biological facts prevent racial stocks in such societies from amalgamating by miscegenation to produce a homogeneous hybrid group, we must recognize the social and cultural determination of racial incorporations and accommodations. Racial stocks may amalgamate freely or otherwise, as Caribs and Negroes amalgamated in St. Vincent and Dominica, or as Negroes and whites have amalgamated in Petit Martinique and more recently in Saba, or as Chinese indentured workers and Negroes have done in Jamaica. The hybrid offspring of these interracial unions will normally be incorporated in a hybrid collectivity on uniform conditions by virtue of their common racial derivation, status and external distinctness. In consequence they will all share identical rights and obligations that distinguish them as members of their collectivity from others around. If these hybrids are also isolated from other stocks, their collectivity will form a distinct society. The situation and development of black Carib society illustrates this process nicely, as do developments in Saba and Petit Martinique.

If the racially distinct stocks in a society are not incorporated on uniform conditions in its public domain, they must either be incorporated as collectivities of equivalent status, or as superior and inferior, or by some combination of these alternatives. Thus, throughout Caribbean colonialism, whites occupied positions of privilege and dominance. They differentially incorporated Negroes, Indians, Javanese and other stocks successively in the societies they created, ruled and exploited for their own benefit. Such regimes initially institutionalized inequalities of racial stocks on political and legal bases such as conquest, enslavement or indenture, and by specifically political means. To justify and perpetuate these differences, the dominant whites tried to allocate political and legal status on the basis of ascriptive racial criteria; but this attempt was less successful due to inconsistent practices. Though all non-whites were ascriptively subject to differential incorporation, substantial differences were allowed to develop among them, as for example in Saint Dominique and Jamaica during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and between the Creoles and East Indians of Guyana and Trinidad throughout colonialism.

None the less, in Guyana, Surinam and Trinidad, Negroes and East Indians were incorporated as mutually exclusive segments of equivalent status by their common but mutually distinct subordination to the ruling whites. In British Honduras, so were the Negroid Creoles of Belize and the Spanish-mestizo peoples of the interior. At colonial levels, since jural differences between these subject stocks were of little significance, they were differentially incorporated as equivalent. However, being segregated physically, culturally and by differences of social organization, these segments remained bionomically closed and virtually exclusive.

Historically, the successive immigrations by which these racial stocks were introduced to Caribbean societies manifested white political predominance and white institutions of differential incorporation. Evidently white colonists sought also to institutionalize equations of race and political status in these societies, to simplify, consolidate and perpetuate their exclusive political control. However, in this process contrary classifications of the coloured hybrids begotten by white colonists were adopted in Hispansic and non-Hispanic societies. In the former, the coloured were distinguished from Negroes as free, and thus legally assimilated to whites. In non-Hispanic territories, hybrids were initially classified with Negroes in contradistinction to whites, and were then allowed various privileges as a superior Negro stratum, despite their differential incorporation.

The white section of these non-Hispanic societies exhibited another structural inconsistency within its own ranks, since the dominant white elites were sharply distinguished by culture, organization, power and social situation from those 'poor whites' who were descended from indentured workers imported after emancipation as a labour force and reserve militia. Thus, while non-whites were differentially incorporated as non-citizens in these societies, 'poor whites', who lacked political rights, enjoyed the forms but not the substance of legal citizenship. Their communities were thus incorporated on conditions sufficiently similar to those of the emancipated Negroes to demonstrate once more how political alignments and sectional interests have determined the ways in which racial criteria have been institutionalized as bases of collective organization within these societies.

It is equally clear that the institutions by which white colonists incorporated white indentured labourers and other racial stocks differentially through indenture or slavery in the Caribbean societies were merely adaptations and elaborations of the structures of servitude and helotage familiar in medieval Europe. There, in the absence of obvious racial differentiae, societies had been constituted and perpetuated by political means as ascriptive systems of inequality through the differential incorporation of subject majorities under institutions of servitude and villeinage. In the racially mixed Caribbean societies created de novo, slavery and indenture were employed to subjugate non-whites more rigorously.

Always the dominant whites in these colonial societies organized
themselves as a corporate group, to which local 'poor white' enclaves were subordinated. Simultaneously the colonists constituted other racial stocks as subordinate corporate categories under various institutions of differential incorporation — slavery, indenture, and exclusive property franchises — which effectively denied non-whites the opportunities to organize themselves separately. Thus, even when contraposed as segments of parallel status, subordinate racial blocs such as the Negroid Creoles and East Indians lacked the inclusive organization requisite to constitute them as groups capable of collective action to redress their lot. In short, to institute, sustain and extend their political domination, white colonists reserved to themselves opportunities for collective organization in order to incorporate all other stocks differentially. This basic condition governed the form and content of all secondary collective structures by prescribing the basic framework for their operations.

Initially the diverse stocks brought together in these Caribbean societies differed fundamentally in language, religion, values, technology and social organization as well as race. In consequence, the predominant stock had an unchallengeable cultural monopoly of the institutional systems it employed to incorporate and subordinate other stocks, who were also normally subdivided by differences of social and cultural organization among themselves, as, for example, were the African slaves by their tribal cultures and languages, the Hindu and Muslim immigrants from India by religion, and the Portuguese, Chinese, Germans, Jews and others by various criteria. So likewise to a significant degree were the dominant whites divided from 'poor whites' whose ancestors were imported under indenture after Negro emancipation from the metropole, as labourers, settlers and reserve militias. Cultural differences simultaneously segregated local communities of 'poor whites' from the white colonial elites, from the ambiguously situated browns, and from surrounding blacks; but when dispersed and removed from their community matrix, poor whites commonly assimilated to those Creoles whose cultural and social organization most closely resembled their own. Contemporary processes of assimilation in Saba and Carriacou illustrate the conditions that facilitate dissolution of these racial barriers by symmetrical connubium.

Wherever racial stocks are bound together by structures of differential incorporation, their amalgamation is directly excluded. At best, such structures will only permit asymmetrical forms of miscegenation that express the differential status of the incorporated stocks. Thus if, by exigencies of structural adaptation to local conditions some members of differentially incorporated racial stocks none the less share substantially similar life chances and situations, as do poor whites and Negro peasants around them in various Caribbean societies, symmetrical and asymmetrical miscegenation are both ruled out by the incongruities of their de facto equivalence and de jure inequivalence.

Conversely, in the absence of such differential incorporation, peoples of diverse race must either amalgamate or maintain their racial boundaries. They will normally do the latter only if they are either physically remote from one another, or separated by severe differences of language and culture, or if they are contraposed as corporate groups in political struggles for dominance or parity. Relations under and since colonialism between Creoles and Asiatics in Surinam, Guyana and Trinidad, and between Creoles and others in British Honduras, illustrate both sets of alternatives. In all other conditions the probability of progressive amalgamation and assimilation by symmetrical miscegenation increases with the cultural and social continuities among the stocks concerned, with their perception of this common culture, and with their indifference to the political inducements of racial exclusions and contrapositions. This particular combination of conditions presently prevails in minuscule Caribbean societies such as Saba and Carriacou. Historically, it also prevailed among racial segments of equally low status in larger societies, which accordingly displayed high rates of amalgamation.

We have seen how differential incorporation perpetuated fundamental cultural and social differences among the racial stocks of Caribbean societies by systematically restricting the opportunities of subordinate stocks for education, intermarriage, political participation, occupational mobility and educational advance, while concentrating these opportunities in the dominant white group. Thus despite the pervasive Creole culture, differentially situated racial stocks continued to exhibit disjunctions of culture, social organization, situation and activities that reinforced their mutual exclusions, even when such segments shared equivalent status by virtue of their common exclusion from the colonial domain monopolized by dominant whites. In this way the structure of differential incorporation preserved the basic social and cultural discontinuities of these societies despite the prevalence and influence of Creole culture among them. The resulting pluralism, intensified by the acutely divergent demographic and political statuses of the dominant whites in non-Hispanic societies, characterized the Creole culture itself as a hotchpotch of distinctive and often contradictory institutions and values, rather than a coherent integrated synthesis of originally diverse traditions. In this context, racial segments that occupied differing physical or economic situations normally exhibited distinctive and formally incompatible systems of culture and social organization, irrespective of their political status. In consequence, following the formal abolition of differential incorporation by decolonization, exclusive racial blocs of equivalent status such as Negroid Creoles, East Indians and Javanese, were readily organized as political units to compete for dominance, power or parity. In effect, then, decolonization converted the structural pluralism institution-
alized by differential incorporation into the social pluralism characterized by institutionally distinct racial blocs contraposed as corporate groups under political parties. Thus multi-racial Caribbean societies experienced these developments as direct effects of their decolonization.

In basically bi-racial Creole societies of moderate size, formal decolonization has not entirely removed the antecedent structures of differential incorporation. Excluding the peculiar situations of Martinique, Guadeloupe and Cayenne as overseas departments of France, universal suffrage and internal autonomy incorporated all stocks equally in the public domain of other territories, and thus implicitly transferred political initiatives to the majority race. Whites accordingly lost their historically exclusive monopoly of political administration to the mass of the colonized peoples. None the less there persists today a substantial measure of differential incorporation between the Creole elites, who are mainly coloured, and the black majority, which operates to the material advantage of local and foreign whites, without whose support these coloured elites would soon lose control.

To justify and obscure their present dominance, these hybrid elites proclaim ideologies of racial equality, national unity, equal opportunities and rewards in the pursuit of economic development. Some indications of the substantial gaps between these proclamations and the current social realities have been cited above; but while such distributions demonstrate that the Negro majority are still substantially subject to differential incorporation in these states, their differential incorporation is substantive rather than formal, and coloured elites may argue that it is neither deliberate, official, nor as extensive as formerly. They argue also that inequality has already been reduced by recent measures and will continue to be reduced; but these developments and ideologies alike illustrate the political bases and character of interracial accommodations and change.

As effects of their recent liberalization, bi-racial Caribbean societies of moderate size have experienced significantly increased opportunities for cultural and biological assimilation and social mobility. Their basically coloured Creole elites have appropriated positions formerly reserved for whites and, while accepting white allies, have also recruited appropriately qualified blacks into their ranks. Thus the ruling personnel in these bi-racial societies of moderate size now appear to validate the official ideologies of racial equality and mobility proclaimed by their coloured elites. Data cited above indicate once more the substantial divergence between reality and ideology on these questions. The measure of these differences expresses exactly the degree to which other racial stocks in these societies remain differentially incorporated in substance, despite their formal equality.

Correlatively, these differences of social and cultural organization that distinguished the hybrid elites from the Negro majorities of these societies under colonialism, persist in proportion to the prevailing degree of their substantively differential incorporation. In effect, then, decolonization has modified these social structures by formally disestablishing the legal and political conditions under which populations with differing social and cultural systems were incorporated within them, while leaving unchanged other conditions that differentiated these stocks institutionally and culturally. Accordingly, ascriptive influences and inequalities prevail, informally but substantially, in contemporary bi-racial Creole societies to the advantage of their former and the present rulers, and serve to perpetuate the subordination of their black majorities. Even so, the coloured stratum that currently dominates these bi-racial units has materialized its strength by alliance with whites and by the recruitment of qualified blacks. Thus, although predominantly hybrid in the racial status of its core, these coloured elites are more accurately defined by cultural and social criteria than in racial terms. None the less, despite its political predominance, the coloured elite ranks in social status and prestige below elite whites and above the Negro mass, as well as the residual ‘poor white’ enclaves. The latter condition further strengthens the elite ideology that ex-colonial Caribbean societies are now indifferent to race.

Historically, the coloured population have always occupied an intermediate cultural and social position in Creole societies, to their material benefit, and to the advantage of the dominant white minorities, who thereby secured a suitable stratum of subordinates as allies and buffers between themselves and the blacks. Under colonialism, while promoting coloured interests, to restrain the pressures of coloured folk for social assimilation, whites employed two congruent but quite distinct classifications of the Creole colonials. Primarily they distinguished between themselves and non-whites; but among the latter they also distinguished a stratum of coloured hybrids who were culturally interstitial, from the weakly-acculturated Negro majority. Though privileged, this coloured stratum formed part of the Negro majority.

During and after slavery, colonial institutions expressed the differential emphases of ruling whites on these congruent but divergent classifications of the Negroid section. Thus whites incorporated non-whites differentially by law, government, and other means; but they also extended educational, economic and symbolic political privileges to bi-cultural hybrids under various arrangements that simultaneously distinguished them from the black majority and intensified their dependence on white patronage. Accordingly the ascriptive racial bases of differential status and advantage in these societies was qualified and situationally obscured by prevailing emphases on cultural criteria in the differentiation of coloured folk. These tendencies and structural inconsistencies first developed under
slavery when the free coloured were sharply distinguished by status and culture from coloured slaves.

In biological terms, the coloured category consists of all varieties of Negro-white hybrids; but this biological definition has been obscured and overruled by cultural criteria which distinguish the better-educated and better-endowed hybrids who enjoy distinctive life-chances and life-situations as a social stratum from other members of the biological category, who are thereby classified with Negro folk, despite their hybrid status. Successive census tabulations neatly illustrate these features of the coloured category in Carribean societies and they also reveal how uncertain are the boundaries and membership of the coloured stratum, since indices of cultural and phenotypical qualities vary situationally, and since continuing miscegenation within and beyond the boundaries of this category has prevented its crystallization as a stratum with uniform culture, homogeneous social position, and constant, identifiable phenotype. In short, under and since slavery and colonialism, the coloured stratum has been constituted as an anomalous corporate category of intermediate status with a central core of members who share several distinctive social and cultural institutions, and with situationally fluctuating margins of uncertain membership and size. It is thus equally inevitable and appropriate that coloured Creoles should now exploit these properties of their category to sustain their dominance by assimilating whites and talented blacks to their ranks; and that they should cite such associations as proofs of racial equality and harmony in the societies they now control.

The ambiguous status boundaries of the category of coloured Creoles, coupled with the socio-cultural divisions between elite and poor whites, and between metropolitan whites and other nationals under colonialism, illustrate the ultimate predominance of social and cultural factors in the genesis and institutionalization of racial criteria, boundaries and relations in Caribbean societies. Such social and cultural determinations of racial categories should not surprise us, since the notion of race as a cultural construct is only socially relevant when employed to subdivide and align collectivities within societies. However, besides the generically cultural character of all collective conceptions of race, Carribean data also show how the specifically social and cultural continuities and disjunctions that characterize these plural societies have distorted racial categories and alignments within them. Coloured Creoles and poor whites provide two obvious examples of such socio-cultural determinations of racial criteria and boundaries; but these are by no means the only cases.

Generated in slavery as a strictly biological category of Negro-white hybrids, the coloured Creoles were simultaneously identified by social and cultural criteria as a social stratum, intermediate between the white and black populations. By these criteria, those hybrids who lacked the appropriate social and cultural attributes were socially reclassified as black, despite their biological status, while those blacks who possessed these attributes were socially reclassified as coloured. In like fashion, those whites who lacked the social and cultural attributes of the dominant elite were sharply distinguished from them as poor whites, and socially equated with Negro peasants, though socially and racially distinct. Differences of culture, institutional practice, status and power thus served to redefine racial categories and their relations, simultaneously dividing the whites into two strata and several national stocks, and the differentially incorporated Negroes into three or four situationally variable categories: those who were biologically and socio-culturally black; those who were biologically black but socio-culturally coloured; those who were biologically coloured but socio-culturally black; and those who were biologically and socio-culturally coloured. Poor whites were those whose status and culture were closest to those of the black. Poor whites accordingly ranked below the socially and culturally coloured elite in status, despite the ascriptive racial scale. Given such concurrent and situationally variable emphases on the biological, social and cultural criteria of racial identification and alignments, complementary, competing and often divergent categorizations of individuals, collectivities and social strata prevailed, so that no simple set of purely biological criteria can accurately describe the racial organization of Caribbean society. Since social, political and cultural factors are always decisive in these relations, they are equally relevant in defining the racial status of individuals. The collective relations and political processes that generated West Indian folk conceptions of racial characteristics and differences and institutionalized them variably in the diverse strata and segments of these societies, ineluctably combined and confused biological traits with differences of culture, status and social situation in formulating racial models of Caribbean social structure. In this way these folk conceptions express the indissoluble though dynamic associations of racial, cultural and structural factors which were forged in frameworks set by the alternative modes and conditions through which diverse racial stocks were successively incorporated in these societies.

To summarize: the diverse and changing forms of interracial accommodation to be found in historic and contemporary Caribbean societies express alternative modes of corporate organization and indicate the political conditions that generate or transform them. For interracial accommodations to develop within a society, its various racial stocks must be categorized and incorporated as mutually exclusive and corporate collectivities, in which case they must either have co-ordinate or differential status. In the former event, and in the absence of external domination, racial segments must either
confront one another as contraposed corporate groups that compete for power and parity, or they may collaborate symbiotically in some consociation, while maintaining their closures, or they may relax their connubial exclusion and amalgamate by symmetrical miscegenation, if their cultures and social organizations are sufficiently similar to permit this. Under the various structures of differential incorporation that institutionalize and perpetuate inequality on racial or other bases, only the dominant stock will be organized as a corporate group, while all others will be constituted as categories by that proscription of representative organization on which their subjugation depends. If the dominant and the dominated are racially distinct, this structure prescribes categorical racial inequalities. In such conditions, miscegenation is only possible in asymmetrical forms. Under either equivalent or differential modes of incorporation, mutually exclusive racial stocks will exhibit such divergent forms of institutional practice, culture and social organization that their societies will represent respectively the alternatives of social and structural pluralism. Formally in the multi-racial Caribbean societies, and substantively in bi-racial ones of moderate size, such conditions and structures currently prevail. Only minuscule Caribbean societies, whether racially homogeneous or not, exhibit or experience universalistic incorporation and cultural homogeneity. It is likely, furthermore, that these minuscule units owe their structural and cultural integration to their poverty, uneconomic size, and political insignificance.

Bibliography

Aberle, S.F. et al. 1950
Adams, R.N. et al. 1961
Ahiram, E. 1964
Almond, G. 1961
Almond, G. and J.S. Coleman (eds.) 1961
Andic, F.M. 1963
Andic, F.M. and S. Andic 1966a
1966b
Apthorpe, R. (ed.) 1959
Argyle, J.W. 1966
Arnett, E.J. 1922
Ayeart, M. 1960
Bacon, E. 1958
Bailey, F.G. 1960
Balandier, G. 1965

'The functional prerequisites of a society', Ethics 60.
'Economic background of the French Antilles', in Mathews et al. (1966).
'Economic background of Surinam', in Mathews et al. (1966).
From Tribal Rule to Modern Government, Lusaka.
The Fon of Dahomey, Oxford.
The Rise of the Sokoto Fulani, Being a Paraphrase and in Some Parts a Translation of the Infaqu'l Maisuri of Sultan Mohammed Bello, Lagos.
Obok: A Study of Social Structure in Eurasia, Viking Fund Publications in Anthropology no. 25.
Tribe, Caste and Nation, Manchester.
'The colonial situation', in van den Bergh (1965).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Publication Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Introduction to Gierke (1960).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barth, F.</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Political Leadership Among Swat Pathans, Monographs on Social Anthropology, London School of Economics, no. 19.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basham, A.L.</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>The Wonder that was India, New York.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beals, R.</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>'Social stratification in Latin America', American Journal of Sociology 58.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bell, W.</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Jamaican Leaders: Political Attitudes in a New Nation, Berkeley and Los Angeles.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>'Stratification in plural societies', American Anthropologist 64, no. 6.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernardi, B.</td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>'The age-set system of the Nilo-Hamites', Africa 22.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>'Industrialization and race relations', in R. Hunter (1965).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boas, F.</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>Race, Language and Culture, New York.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bohannan, L.</td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>'A genealogical charter', Africa 22.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broom, L.</td>
<td>1954</td>
<td>The social differentiation of Jamaica, American Sociological Review 19, no. 2.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>'Discussion', in Rubin (1960).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>'Urbanization and the plural society', in Rubin (1960).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean Monthly Bulletin</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>4, no. 11 (September) and 5, no. 1 (November), Puerto Rico Institute of Caribbean Studies, Rio Piedras.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cobbs, J.</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>'Caste and class in Haiti', American Journal of Sociology 46.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cole, C.W.</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Land Tenure in Zaria Province, Kaduna.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colson, E.</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, Berkeley and Los Angeles.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crowley, D.J.</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>'Plural and differential acculturation in...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Corporations and Society

Trinidad', *American Anthropologist* 59.

1960

'Cultural assimilation in a multi-racial society', in Rubin (1960).

Cumper, G.

1954


Cumper, G. (ed.)

1961


Davis, A. and M.R. Gardner

1941


Davis, J.P.

1961

*Corporations*, New York.

Davis, K.

1949

*Human Society*, New York.

1953


Davis, K. and W.F. Moore.

1956


Delavignette, R.

1950

*Freedom and Authority in French West Africa*, London.

Despres, L.A.

1963

*New World*, Georgetown, British Guiana.

1964

'The implications of nationalist, policies in British Guiana for the development of cultural theory', *American Anthropologist* 66.

D'Hertefelt, M.

1955

*The Old Regime and the French Revolution*, translated by Stuart Gilbert, Garden City.

1953

*Russia After Stalin: With a Postscript on the Beria Affair*, London.

De Tocqueville, A.

1951

*The Institutions of Primitive Society*, Oxford.

Deutscher, I.

1953

*Russia After Stalin: With a Postscript on the Beria Affair*, London.

D'Hertefelt, M.

1960a

'Stratification sociale et structure politique au Rwanda', *La Revue nouvelle* 31 (Brussels).

1960b

'Les Élections communales et le consensus politique au Rwanda', *Zaire* 14, nos. 5-6.

1962a

'Le Rwanda', in D'Hertefelt, Troubworst and Scherer (1962).

1962b

'Développements récents', in D'Hertefelt, Troubworst and Scherer (1962).

1964

'Mythes et idéologies dans le Rwanda ancien et contemporain', in Vansa, Mauny and Thomas (1964).

1955

'The Rwanda of Rwanda', in Gibbs (1965).

1952


1957

*Caste and Class in a Southern Town*, New York.

Doland, J.

1967

'Égalitarianism and future leaders in Jamaica', in Bell (1967).

Dukc, J.T.

1958


Durkheim, E.

1938


1947

*The Division of Labour in Society*, translated by G. Simpson, Glencoe, Ill.

1957


1959

*Socialism and Saint Simon*, translated by C. Sattler, London.

Dyson-Hudson, N.

1963

'The Karimojong age system', *Ethnology* 2.

Eastern Caribbean Population Census,

1961

7 April, 1960

Easton, D.

1957


Edmonson, M.S.

1956

*From Generation to Generation: Age Groups and Social Structure*, Glencoe, Ill.

Ehrenberg, V.

1966


Ehrenberg, V.

1956


Elkins, S.M.

1957

'事业单位 and supply in the Jamaican sugar industry 1830-1950', *Social and Economic Studies* 2, no. 4.

Etsioni, A. and E. Etzioni (eds.)

1964

*The Institutions of Primitive Society*, Oxford.

1940a

*The Nuer: A Description of the Modes of Livelihood and Political Institutions of a Nilotic People*, Oxford.

1940b

'The political structure of the Nandi-speaking peoples of Kenya', *Africa* 13.

1948

*The Divine Kingship of the Shilluk of the Nilotic Sudan*, London.

1951

*Kinship and Marriage among the Nuer*, Oxford.

Evans-Pritchard, E.E.

1954

*The Institutions of Primitive Society*, Oxford.

Fallers, L.

1956

*The Karimojong age system*, *Ethnology* 2.

Farley, R.

1954

*Habitat, Economy and Society*, London.

Forde, D.

1934


1939a


1939b

'事业单位 and supply in the Jamaican sugar industry 1830-1950', *Social and Economic Studies* 2, no. 4.

1939b

'事业单位 and supply in the Jamaican sugar industry 1830-1950', *Social and Economic Studies* 2, no. 4.

1950a

'事业单位 and supply in the Jamaican sugar industry 1830-1950', *Social and Economic Studies* 2, no. 4.

1950b

'事业单位 and supply in the Jamaican sugar industry 1830-1950', *Social and Economic Studies* 2, no. 4.

1951

*The Yoruba-speaking Peoples of Southwestern Nigeria*, Ethnographic Survey of

Bibliography

1957


1959

*Socialism and Saint Simon*, translated by C. Sattler, London.

1963


1961

7 April, 1960

Easton, D.

1957


Edmonson, M.S.

1958


Eggn, F.

1950


Ehrenberg, V.

1956


Elkins, S.M.

1963


Etsioni, A. and E. Etzioni (eds.)

1964


Evans-Pritchard, E.E.

1940a

*The Nuer: A Description of the Modes of Livelihood and Political Institutions of a Nilotic People*, Oxford.

1940b

'The political structure of the Nandi-speaking peoples of Kenya', *Africa* 13.

1948

*The Divine Kingship of the Shilluk of the Nilotic Sudan*, London.

1951

*Kinship and Marriage among the Nuer*, Oxford.

The Nuer: *A Description of the Modes of Livelihood and Political Institutions of a Nilotic People*, Oxford.

1934


1939a


1939b

'事业单位 and supply in the Jamaican sugar industry 1830-1950', *Social and Economic Studies* 2, no. 4.

1950a

'事业单位 and supply in the Jamaican sugar industry 1830-1950', *Social and Economic Studies* 2, no. 4.

1950b

'事业单位 and supply in the Jamaican sugar industry 1830-1950', *Social and Economic Studies* 2, no. 4.

1951

*The Yoruba-speaking Peoples of Southwestern Nigeria*, Ethnographic Survey of
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corporations and Society</th>
<th>Bibliography</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yako Studies, London.</td>
<td>Gierke, O.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forde, D. (ed.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forde, D. and G.I. Jones</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956 Efik Traders of Old Calabar, London.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fortes, M.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940 'The political system of the Tallensi of the northern territories of the Gold Coast', in Fortes and Evans-Pritchard (1940b).</td>
<td>Gluckman, M. (ed.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950 'Kinship and marriage among the Ashanti', in Radcliffe-Brown and Forde (1950).</td>
<td>Goody, J.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction to Fortes and Evans-Pritchard (1940b).</td>
<td>Goody, J. (ed.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948 'An administrative survey of the Masai social system', Tanganyika Notes and Records 26.</td>
<td>Grousset, R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964 Tribe and Class in Monrovia, London.</td>
<td>Guerra y Sanchez, R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945 Readings in Anthropology, New York.</td>
<td>Grousset, R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959 Sugar and Society in the Caribbean, New Haven.</td>
<td>Guerra y Sanchez, R.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Corporations and Society

Hobbes, T. 1651 Leviathan.
Hocart, A.M. 1941 Kingship, London.

Bibliography

Hutton, J.H. 1946 Caste in India, London.
International Institute of Differing Civilizations
Jamaica, Agricultural Census of, 1961-2
Jamaica, Eighth Census of, 1945.
Jamaica, Government of
Jamaica, Handbook of
Johnson, C.S. 1934 'The political organization of old Calabar', in Forde (1956).
Kagame, A. 1957 'Le Pluralisme ethnique et cultural dans le Ruanda', in International Institute of Differing Civilizations (1957).
Pluralism in Africa, Berkeley and Los Angeles.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Title and Edition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Pirenne, H.</td>
<td>Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe, New York.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No date</td>
<td></td>
<td>Medieval Cities: Their Origins and the Revival of Trade, New York.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Powdermaker, H.</td>
<td>Jurisprudence, St. Paul, Minn.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-1</td>
<td>Radcliffe-Brown, A.R.</td>
<td>The social organization of Australian tribes', Oceania 1, parts 1-4.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td></td>
<td>Preface to Fortes and Evans-Pritchard (1940b).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952a</td>
<td></td>
<td>'Social sanctions', in Radcliffe-Brown (1952d).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952b</td>
<td></td>
<td>'Patrilineal and matrilineal succession', in Radcliffe-Brown (1952d).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952c</td>
<td></td>
<td>'Primitive law', in Radcliffe-Brown (1952d).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td></td>
<td>A Natural Science of Society, Glencoe, Ill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>Redfield, R.</td>
<td>'The folk society', American Journal of Sociology 52.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>Richards, A.I.</td>
<td>'Some types of family structure amongst the Central Bantu', in Radcliffe-Brown and Forde (1950).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Bibliography**

- Sahlin, M. 1958
- Salmond, J. 1947
- Sansom, G.B. 1962
- Schacht, J. 1950
- Schapera, I. 1950
- Schapera, I. (ed.) 1937
- Schneider, D.M. 1961
- Schumpeter, L. 1955a
- Schwab, W.B. 1955b
- Schwartz, B.M. (ed.) 1967
- Service, E.R. 1962
- Sharp, L. 1958
- Sheldon, R.C. 1951
- Shils, E. 1962
- Siegel, B.J. (ed.) 1970
- 'Some observations on the educational position of the British Caribbean', Social and Economic Studies 14, no. 1.
- 'Mating among East Indian and non-Indian women in Trinidad', Social and Economic Studies 11, no. 3.
- Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia, Cambridge.
- 'Culture, politics and race relations', Social and Economic Studies 11, no. 4.
- Caribbean Studies: A Symposium, Kingston Institute of Social and Economic Research, UWI.
- The Crowd in History, New York.
- Byzantine Civilization, New York.
- "The struggle for Afro-Indian solidarity in Trinidad", Trinidad and Tobago Index 4.

Social Stratification in Polynesia, Seattle.
Japan: A Short Cultural History, New York.
The Origins of Muhammadan jurisprudence, Oxford.
'Kinship and marriage among the Tswana', in Radcliffe Brown and Forde (1950).
The Tswana, International African Institute, London.
'Kinship and politics in Tswana history', Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 93.
The Bantu-speaking Tribes of South Africa, London.
'Comments', Current Anthropology 2, no. 3.
'Social classes in an ethnically homogeneous environment', in Schumpeter (1955b).
Imperialism and Social Classes, New York.
Caste in Overseas Indian Communities, San Francisco.
'People without politics', in Ray (1958).
'Some observations on theory in the social sciences', in Parsons and Shils (1951b).
Political Development in the New States, Gravenhage.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Pirenne, H.</td>
<td><em>Life and Labour in the Old South</em>, Boston.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930-1</td>
<td>Radcliffe-Brown, A.R.</td>
<td><em>The social organization of Australian tribes</em>, <em>Oceania</em> 1, parts 1-4.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td></td>
<td>Preface to Fortes and Evans-Pritchard (1940b).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952a</td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Social sanctions</em>, in Radcliffe-Brown (1952d).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952b</td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Patrilineal and matrilineal succession</em>, in Radcliffe-Brown (1952d).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952c</td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Primitive law</em>, in Radcliffe-Brown (1952d).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>Richards, A.I.</td>
<td><em>Some types of family structure amongst the Central Bantu</em>, in Radcliffe-Brown and Forde (1950).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td></td>
<td><em>The struggle for Afro-Indian solidarity in Trinidad</em>, <em>Trinidad and Tobago Index</em> 4.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Kinship and marriage among the Tswana</em>, in Radcliffe Brown and Forde (1950).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Schwartz, B.M. (ed.)</td>
<td><em>Caste in Overseas Indian Communities</em>, San Francisco.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>Shekleton, R.C.</td>
<td><em>Some observations on theory in the social sciences</em>, in Parsons and Shils (1951b).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For further reading, consult the bibliography in the section linked.
Corporations and Society Bibliography

van der Sprenkel, S. 1962
van Lier, R.A.J. 1950
Vansina, J., R. Mauny 1964
and L.V. Thomas (eds.)
van Warmelo, N.J. 1931
Vasiliev, A.A. 1958
Vaughan, C.E. 1915
Vinogradoff, P. 1959
von Grunebaum, G.E. 1953
Waddell, D.A.G. 1963
Warde Fowler, H. 1952
Weber, M. no date
Wendell-Holmes, O. 1897
West Indian Census, 1946
West Indian Economist 1961
West India Royal Commission 1945
Williams, E. no date

364

Draft Second Five Year Plan 1964-8, Port of Spain.
Caste in a Peasant Society, Princeton.
The Forest People, New York.
The Ethiopians: An Introduction to Country and People, London.
Africa: Social Problems of Change and Conflict, San Francisco.
South Africa: A Study in Conflict, San Francisco.
Legal Institutions in Manchu China, London.
The Development and Nature of Society in the West Indies, Royal Institute for the Indies, Amsterdam.
Kinship Terminology of the South African Bantu, Pretoria Department of Native Affairs, Union of South Africa.
History of the Byzantine Empire, revised ed., Madison, Wis.
The Political Writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, London.
Medieval Islam, 2nd ed., Chicago.
General Economic History, translated by Frank Knight, New York.
'Jamaica's income and its distribution', vol. 3, no. 11.
Report, London.
The Negro in the Caribbean, Manchester.

365

Capitalism and Slavery, Chapel Hill, N.C.
Race relations in Caribbean society', in Rubin (1957).
'Of colour of skin and St. Vincent', Flambeau 3, January 1966.
'Urbanism as a way of life', American Journal of Sociology 44.
The Trumpet Shall Sound: A Study of 'Cargo' Cults in Melanesia, London.
The Third World, London.

Worsley, P. 1957
Wittfogel, K.A. and Feng Chia-Sheng 1949
Zinkin, T. 1960

Wirth, L. 1938

Of colour of skin and St. Vincent', Flambeau 3, January 1966.
'Urbanism as a way of life', American Journal of Sociology 44.
The Trumpet Shall Sound: A Study of 'Cargo' Cults in Melanesia, London.
The Third World, London.

Worsley, P. 1957
Wittfogel, K.A. and Feng Chia-Sheng 1949
Zinkin, T. 1960

Wirth, L. 1938

Of colour of skin and St. Vincent', Flambeau 3, January 1966.
'Urbanism as a way of life', American Journal of Sociology 44.
The Trumpet Shall Sound: A Study of 'Cargo' Cults in Melanesia, London.
The Third World, London.

Worsley, P. 1957
Wittfogel, K.A. and Feng Chia-Sheng 1949
Zinkin, T. 1960

Wirth, L. 1938

Of colour of skin and St. Vincent', Flambeau 3, January 1966.
'Urbanism as a way of life', American Journal of Sociology 44.
The Trumpet Shall Sound: A Study of 'Cargo' Cults in Melanesia, London.
The Third World, London.

Worsley, P. 1957
Wittfogel, K.A. and Feng Chia-Sheng 1949
Zinkin, T. 1960

Wirth, L. 1938

Of colour of skin and St. Vincent', Flambeau 3, January 1966.
'Urbanism as a way of life', American Journal of Sociology 44.
The Trumpet Shall Sound: A Study of 'Cargo' Cults in Melanesia, London.
The Third World, London.

Worsley, P. 1957
Wittfogel, K.A. and Feng Chia-Sheng 1949
Zinkin, T. 1960

Wirth, L. 1938

Of colour of skin and St. Vincent', Flambeau 3, January 1966.
'Urbanism as a way of life', American Journal of Sociology 44.
The Trumpet Shall Sound: A Study of 'Cargo' Cults in Melanesia, London.
The Third World, London.

Worsley, P. 1957
Wittfogel, K.A. and Feng Chia-Sheng 1949
Zinkin, T. 1960

Wirth, L. 1938

Of colour of skin and St. Vincent', Flambeau 3, January 1966.
'Urbanism as a way of life', American Journal of Sociology 44.
The Trumpet Shall Sound: A Study of 'Cargo' Cults in Melanesia, London.
The Third World, London.

Worsley, P. 1957
Wittfogel, K.A. and Feng Chia-Sheng 1949
Zinkin, T. 1960

Wirth, L. 1938

Of colour of skin and St. Vincent', Flambeau 3, January 1966.
'Urbanism as a way of life', American Journal of Sociology 44.
Abbasid caliphate, 246  
Abecie, S.F. et al., 135n, 145n, 152n  
absolutism, 71, 118, 162  
Abu Hanifa, legal school of, 112  
accommodation: interracial, 265-8, 272-4, 331-3, 337-47; and miscegenation, 289-97, 323-4  
accretion, in lineages, 17, 18, 38, 59, 49, 50  
acephalous societies: based on lineages, 18, 35, 82-4; boundaries of, 97-8; compared with centralized societies, 45, 71-2, with stateless societies (q.v.), 80; linked publics in, 208-9; pluralism and, 208-9, 220, 231; political organization and, 81; shared institutions in, 208-9; social conflict in, 97-9, 154  
achievement and ascription, in status, 137, 138, 149-51, 154  
action: authorized, 27; co-ordinate (common), 44, 99-100, 208; governmental, 26-31, 46-56; in institutions, 206, 208; ultra vires, 29 (see also administrative, collective, corporate, political action)  
activities, and political authority, 25  
Ada, 113  
Adams, R.N. et al., 159n  
ad hoc agencies, 52-3, 101-2  
accommodation, in political systems, 92  
administration: and segmentary lineages, 19-56; as mode of action in political systems, 28, 92; bureaucracy and, 21, 28, 29; centralization, 18, 30, 52-5, 117-8, 121-4; law in, 117-8, 121-4; offices in, 52-5; segmentary systems and, 28-30, 47-8; hierarchic form of, 31-5, 54, 71-2, in plural societies, 230-4; super- and sub-ordinate relations in, 27-8, 32; territorial, 19, 47 (see also corporations, government, societies)  
administrative action: 26, 27-32, 139; as regulatory action, 85-6; political action and, 28-57, 46-62, 57-8, 67-9  
'administrative organs', as offices, 44  
advantage, in matrilineages, 74  
advantage, see differential distributions 'affairs', in government, 24-5, 27  
Africa: colonial societies in, 234-8; emergent nations in, 207, 258; law in, 107-9, 110, 126-31  
African in Caribbean, 276, 280-1, 284, 298, 300, 328, 340  
age-organization, 141, 145, 201  
age-sets: as corporate categories, 100, 201; as segments, 55-7, 54, 59, 74, 78; hierarchies of, 141-2, 145; in complex societies, 222-5, 266-1; in multinational societies, 260-1  
agmatic descent groups, 41, 61, 68, 110  
Aham, E., 316n  
Ahmad b. Hanbal, legal school of, 112  
Akamba, law among, 122  
Akan: chiefdoms among, 55; descent groups among, 57  
Allah, and law, 110  
allocation, in complex societies, 252  
Allport, E.A., 250n  
Almond, G., and J.S. Coleman (eds.) 255n  
Althusius, on federalism, 118  
amalgamation: in lineage descent, 32, 49 (see also fusion); of racial segments, 300-1, 338-43  
American Negroes, as corporate categories, 101  
Amerindians, 274, 280-1, 300, 325; miscegenation among, 276, 288, 290  
Amish, 225  
analogy, in Muslim law, 111  
'analytic structures', 244  
Andamanese bands, 30, 52  
Andic, F.M., 316n; and S. Andic, 303n, 316n, 321n  
Anglo-Saxon law, 122  
Anguilla, landholdings in, 302  
antecedent corporations, 125  
antropological field study, 75, 75-6, 78, 81  
Antigua, 283, 302, 307, 309  
aprenticeship, 285  
Aphrorke, R., 75n  
Aquinas, on law, 116  
Arabs, 110, 264  
arawak, settlers in, 280  
archaic societies, 73, 246, 249  
Arye, J.W., 260n  
Aristotle: on citizenship, 210n; on collective domination, 234n; on law, 115  
arms laws, in Caribbean, 298  
Arnett, E.J., 233n  
arification: of segments, 239-40; of systems, 184-7, 191-204, 246  
associations: dyadic and triadic, 100; hierarchies in, 83-4, 86-7; in lineages, 33, 37, 51, 54; regulatory, 85-7
384 | Corporations and Society

indexed