Title: “Pluralism and social stratification.”
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As this conference to honour my former colleague Professor Lloyd Braithwaite will focus on changes in the social stratification of Caribbean countries, and as various questions about the nature and relationships of pluralism and social stratification remain open, though central to Caribbean sociology over the past thirty-odd years, I shall review certain issues in that controversy and try to clarify or resolve them in the light of recent developments in the theory of pluralism. To that end and to honour Lloyd Braithwaite who advocated the superiority of stratification as a frame of reference for the study of Caribbean and other societies instead of pluralism,¹ as conceived by J. S. Furnivall or myself, I shall discuss the differences and relations of pluralism and social stratification.²

As regards pluralism, Leo Kuper showed long ago that the term has two competing and opposite meanings, each with its own distinct agenda for study and action.³ Derived from Alexis de Tocqueville the older and better known usage identifies pluralism with situations in which competing views and programs are canvassed freely on issues and subjects of public interest, be they religious, political, educational, economic or other: that is, with those social processes and conditions that are the goal and measure of liberal democratic societies.⁴ The other concept of pluralism which derives from J. S. Furnivall concentrates rather on those situations and social conditions in which people, often the numerical majority in their society, are denied the chance to participate in such liberal democratic processes and contexts. In terminology I shall clarify below, pluralism in the liberal, Tocquevillean sense presupposes the
universalistic incorporation of all citizens, whereas for Furnivall pluralism involves the differential incorporation of those who participate freely as citizens in the juridical, civic and political institutions of their society, and others who do not. The continuing struggles of non-whites in the USA, South Africa, and elsewhere for equal political and legal rights illustrate the significance and implications of this difference. To the dispossessed and their masters alike, the contrasts between pluralism based on differential incorporation and regimes based on universalistic incorporation are sufficiently deep and stark to sustain intense and violent conflict for generations, since ruling groups rarely surrender privilege except under pressure. In this essay I shall therefore try to identify the necessary conditions for pluralism of the kind noted by Furnivall, and show how it relates to class and social stratification.

To that end, I shall review the controversy about their nature and relationships to clarify its central issues, and correct certain features of my early account of pluralism; but wish first to acknowledge my debt to Lloyd Braithwaite, Vera Rubin, Raymond Smith and others whose critical data and arguments have forced me to rethink many points in my understanding of pluralism and plural societies.

I

Though it is convenient to begin this review with the seminar on pluralism in the Caribbean that Vera Rubin organised, the debate really began some years before with publications by Lloyd Braithwaite and myself then both at the ISER in Jamaica. The opposing positions in that debate had initially been staked out by Fernando Henriques and Leonard Broom but were redefined and amplified by Lloyd Braithwaite and myself within the competing theoretical frameworks of Talcott Parsons and J. S. Furnivall. For Parsons,

social stratification is a generalised aspect of the structure of all social systems; and Stratification in its valutional aspect... is the ranking of units in a social system in accordance with the standards of the value system

Unfortunately, as far as I know, until 1963 neither Parsons, his colleagues, nor his students ever considered social stratification except in its "valuational aspect," and it is of course pure tautology to say that any order of ranking or evaluation presupposes some agreed scale of values. Nonetheless, despite its roots in the writings of Durkheim and Weber, this basic postulate of Parsonian theory, namely, that human society is impossible without normative consensus, made too many
contemporary societies and developments unintelligible for me to accept.\textsuperscript{14}

Since neither Lloyd Braithwaite, myself, nor Raymond Smith, who later joined the debate \textsuperscript{15} set much store on Marxist doctrine, and since Talcott Parsons' theory of social action was then predominant, it was appropriate and perhaps inevitable that we disputed the nature of Caribbean societies and their stratification within that framework.

After World War II, Lloyd Braithwaite read sociology at the London School of Economics under Edward Shils, Talcott Parsons' distinguished colleague, and studied with him the theories of Durkheim, Max Weber, Pareto, Simmel, and other founding fathers of the discipline. In social anthropology, which I studied at University College London, the rival functionalisms of Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown dominated theoretical discussion. However, before returning to Jamaica in 1952 to join the ISER, I spent nearly two years in Northern Nigeria among the pagan Kadara and Kagoro and their neighbours the Muslim Hausa, whose language served as the lingua franca, and whose society was larger, more complex, and stratified. Despite their great differences those tribal societies—the Muslim Hausa, and English society—all differed so sharply from Jamaica in structure and character\textsuperscript{16} that I slowly came to see how different Jamaica was from any society I knew or had read of in anthropology. Accordingly, I "groped about" for some alternative societal model\textsuperscript{17} until Daryll Forde advised me to read Furnivall, after I had compared Jamaica to South Africa as a "compound society" following Radcliffe-Brown.\textsuperscript{18}

Furnivall's sketch of plural societies in the colonial Far East cannot be faulted. He described them as medleys of people, since

\begin{quote}
Each is in the strictest sense a medley, for they mix but do not combine. Each holds by its own culture and language, its own ideas and ways. As individuals they meet, but only the market-place, in buying and selling. There is a plural society, with different sections of the community living side by side, but separately, within the same political unit. Even in the economic sphere, there is a division of labour along racial lines.\textsuperscript{19}
\end{quote}

Without a wasted word, that passage indicates the invalidity of consensual prerequisites and inadequacy of structural-functional models as universal paradigms of society.

Reflecting further on the characteristics of plural societies, and recalling World War II developments in Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, New Guinea and Borneo, Furnivall stressed that such societies had been established as units by external force and lacked a common will:

\begin{quote}
In each section, the sectional common will is feeble, and in the society as a whole there is no common will... Few recognise that, in
fact, all the members of all sections have material interests in common, but most see that on many points their material interests are opposed. 20

[In such circumstances,] All wants that all men want in common are those they share in common with animal creation. 21

Furnivall's thesis was thus the diametrical opposite of Talcott Parsons: which, though based on the teachings of Durkheim and Weber, was contradicted by Ibn Khaldum, Karl Marx and Herbert Spencer, among others. To any committed Parsonian, such flamboyant heresy as pluralism à la Furnivall was like a red rag to a bull. Accordingly, at Vera Rubin's seminar in 1959, in a splendid paper Lloyd Braithwaite argued with conviction and elegance for the universality of common values even in those Caribbean societies like Trinidad that most resembled the colonial Far East. 22

Despite the utter indifference shown by natives of Far Eastern European colonies to their seizure by Japanese in World War II, following Parsons, Braithwaite insisted that "no society can exist without a minimum sharing of common values, without a certain amount of 'social will'." 23 He accordingly criticised Furnivall for stressing too heavily the economic aspects of colonialism, "and too little . . . the necessary existence of sentiments favourable to the metropolitan power" 24 i.e., the imperial state. However, colonial struggles for independence during and after World War II in Palestine, India, Indonesia, Indochina, Kenya, Algeria, Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, Namibia, Guinea-Bissau, Zaire, Angola and Mozambique, scarcely demonstrated their "favourable sentiments." Neither did the subsequent struggles by subject peoples against local ruling groups in Ruanda, Burundi, Sudan, Uganda, Ethiopia and Zanzibar display such sentiments for those rulers. Nor more recently do the protests against Russian rule in Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Moldavia, Lithuania and other parts of the U.S.S.R.

As one result of the argument between Lloyd Braithwaite, Raymond Smith and myself over the issue of normative consensus in British West Indian colonial societies, perhaps only in the Caribbean was that fundamental axiom of Parsonian theory ever operationalised and tested in a detailed study of social stratification 25 designed explicitly to investigate the opposing theses of Parsons and Furnivall.

On the issue of common values, I had argued that, given their institutional diversity, in plural societies:

The distribution of status within each cultural section rests on common values quite specific to the group, and this medley of sectional values systems rules out the value consensus that is prerequisite for any status continuum. Thus the plurality is a
discontinuous order, . . . while its component sections are genuine status continua, distinguished by their differing systems of value, action, and social relations.²⁶

My study of stratification among the Grenadian elite confirmed these remarks, and demonstrated:

a substantial divergence of values among the Grenadian elite. The strata that hold different values differ also in institutional practices and commitments. . . . These two value-sets challenge and clash with each other. Their co-existence at different levels of the elite hierarchy represents dissensus rather than the prevalence of a common system of values²⁷

To trivialise the finding that institutionally distinct sections of the Grenadian elite held different values, Burton Benedict chose to ignore the concordant divergence of values and institutions among those elite sections, and claimed that on my analysis, "all stratified societies are plural,"²⁸ which is clearly not the case. Moreover, though most plural societies are also stratified, some are not.²⁹ Stratification and pluralism differ in their nature and bases,³⁰ and vary independently, as we shall see.

Since we can never observe values directly, we can only infer their existence from observable events that we assume express them. Hence, as explanations of social action or structure, value interpretations proceed teleologically post hoc proper hoc, but attributing whatever values the analyst prefers as determinant or action. Demonstration of common or dissimilar values in any social context or process is therefore unreliable and beset with uncertainty, as the inherently indeterminate variables, coupled with the unsatisfactory procedures used to demonstrate them clearly open the way to conflicting interpretations of social situations and events, as our law courts illustrate daily.

In a rare attempt to clarify the concept and reduce these problems Parsons and Shils identified "common values" as follows:

A person is said to have 'common values' with another when either (1) he wants the group in which he and the other belong to achieve a certain goal which the other also wants, or (2) he intrinsically values conformity with the requirements and goals laid down by the other.³¹

Unfortunately, without decisive independent data, we can never show that subordinates intrinsically value conformity with the wishes of their superiors, however convenient the postulate.

On adopting Furnivall's concept of plural societies, I had endorsed his claim that they lacked common will and common values that that presumed. Jamaica's long record of slave revolts and post-emancipation upheavals, like Grenada's history from
Fedon's revolt to 1951\textsuperscript{32} and since illustrate Furnivall's thesis. In those respects Grenada and Jamaica do not differ radically from other West Indian colonies. When I adapted Furnivall's theory to Caribbean societies\textsuperscript{33} that recension rested mainly on my knowledge of Grenada and Jamaica, and challenged the assumption that Caribbean societies shared common values derived from colonial rule. At Vera Rubin's seminar in 1959, I therefore addressed issues of social stratification and common values directly\textsuperscript{34} and warned against the "common sociological errors" of reducing "cultural and social pluralism to social stratification"\textsuperscript{35} of supposing that "the persistence of plural units due to the predominance of common values between their cultural sections."\textsuperscript{36} Against such assumptions I stressed that

\begin{quote}
Social quiescence and cohesion differ sharply, and so do regulation and integration but, if we begin by assuming that integration prevails, it is virtually impossible to distinguish these conditions. . . . It is especially difficult to isolate the positive effect of common values in culturally split societies that owe their form and maintenance to a special concentration of regulative power within the dominant group.\textsuperscript{37}
\end{quote}

In response, Lloyd Braithwaite also discussed the problems of social order and common values in Trinidad and other Caribbean societies.\textsuperscript{38} Following Parsons, he insisted that "there must be a certain minimum of common, shared values if the unity of the society is to be maintained"\textsuperscript{39} and claimed that "analysis in terms of social stratification serves the useful purpose of stressing the common values of the society."\textsuperscript{40} Nonetheless, he noted:

\begin{quote}
The fact that values are shared does not mean that they are common in the sense of being widespread; there may be common acceptance of a particular scale of values and a particular type of action, although the social groups that hold these values may not aspire to them\textsuperscript{41}
\end{quote}

As if to illustrate that situation, he said that in Trinidad,

\begin{quote}
the main common value element has been the sharing of the value of ethnic superiority and inferiority. . . . The fact that there was only one common value held by the whole society, of a type inherently productive of tensions, created a certain tendency to 'disintegration' within the social system, particularly when this main common value was challenged.\textsuperscript{42}
\end{quote}

How and why, if widespread, that "common value" was so divisive, granted the colonial acceptance of British superiority that Braithwaite claimed,\textsuperscript{43} is neither self-evident nor discussed, though he admits that, "with the breakdown of the system of integrative values that holds the subordinate community in
position, there are no other systems of integrative values to take their place. Others, such as Rubin and Ryan writing on Trinidad, present different views of the society. If its sole common value of racial or "ethnic" inequality generates tendencies to "disintegration" or conflict, it is difficult to see how that value by itself maintained the social unity of Trinidad. However widely shared, such a value as racial or ethnic inequality can only be held in common by diverse racial or ethnic stocks in a genuine caste system consensually based on those critics, which was neither the case in Trinidad nor any Caribbean colonial plurality.

To explain the consensual predominance in Trinidad of such ascriptive racial or ethnic values, Braithwaite claimed that Trinidadians accepted "the superiority, as such, of the superordinate system" that is, British society, of which the overwhelming majority knew little or nothing. On that point he argued,

"this process of acculturation implies the introduction and partial acceptance of universal and achievement values in spheres in which particularistic and ascriptive values were previously dominant."

However, since "the colonial system, far from placing economic considerations first, is in fact dominantly based on ascriptive ones" instead of "universal and achievement values," the British imposed ascriptive criteria of race and ethnicity on Trinidad, and apparently established them as its "sole common value." If so, then local regard for universalistic-achievement values above particularistic-ascriptive ones was perhaps neither as widespread nor as deep as Braithwaite optimistically supposed. Nonetheless, to account for the "intrinsic" acceptance of those values, following Parsons and Shils he claimed that:

"A major need of the individual in a subordinate social system whose particularistic-ascriptive values have been torn asunder would appear to be acceptance of another such set of values. Hence it comes about that the first reaction of many colonials is towards the acceptance of the superiority of the scale of values of the superordinate social system."

On that point Braithwaite differs from American Parsonians who, with conquest states and colonial societies in mind, only say that the "rank order must be legitimized and accepted by most of the members—at least by the important ones, if stability is to be maintained . . . Coercive sanctions and initiative must be vested in specific status positions." Such arrangements clearly illustrate the role "of common values in culturally split societies that owe their form and maintenance to a special concentration of regulative power within the dominant group." Indeed Braithwaite's teacher, Edward Shils, later attributed compliance
in such societies generically and tersely to "consensus" that is "coerced." However, despite the dissensus revealed by numerous revolts, Lloyd Braithwaite apparently felt that colonial submission was more willing and widespread than his fellow-Parsonians in the U.S.A.

Nonetheless, while rejecting the major thrust of Braithwaite's essay, his claim that "the theory of the plural society is logically unacceptable" and much else that he said then, I think he was basically correct in dismissing my account of pluralism at that date as theoretically inadequate. However challenging it may have seemed in 1959, my conception of plural society could not bear comparison with the action theory of Talcott Parsons, Edward Shils and their colleagues for several reasons. First, while Parsons had begun to lay the basis of action theory over twenty years before, plural society concepts first emerged when Furnivall and Morris discussed colonial societies. Second, while Parsons, a social theorist by inclination and training, based his social theory on the work of his great predecessors, looking at the impact of colonialism on subject native societies, Furnivall had little relevant theory as guide, and, though acutely perceptive, was neither theoretically inclined, nor concerned to generate social theory. As economist and administrator, Furnivall's preoccupations with the colonial Far East were intensely practical and structured his observations.

For my part, although convinced by the contrast between Caribbean societies and others I then knew of the relevance of Furnivall's concepts for Caribbean sociology, in 1959 I lacked both the necessary knowledge and experience to construct an adequate theory. For example, to explain the profound social and cultural cleavages that split Furnivall's plural societies, even though I had earlier documented their pivotal role in Caribbean slave societies, only in 1959, following Marion Levy, Nadal and Linton, did I try to derive their social and cultural divisions systematically from their institutional diversity. Thus while Braithwaite erred in dismissing my institutional analysis as biologically and culturally reductionist, I agree that, as then formulated, my model needed independent structural criteria to distinguish clearly between heterogeneous and plural societies, a point that Vera Rubin made cogently by asking, "When is a culturally heterogeneous society also pluralistic?"

Adapting the ideas of Nadal and Linton, in 1959 I contrasted a "society having one basic institutional system and a number of styles, or one basic system and a number of institutional alternatives and specialties" as "culturally and socially heterogeneous," with plural societies in which there is "formal diversity in the basic system of compulsory institutions" such as "kinship, education, religion, property and economy, recreations and certain socialities" to which we should add...
language. However, having distinguished pluralism from class differences "within a single institutional framework," following Furnivall, as before I dismissed differences among American whites as ethnic variations on common institutional forms which, "like class styles, may produce cultural and social heterogeneity, but do not involve pluralism."

At that time I had read little on the cultural and social life of such white American "minorities" as the Irish, Portuguese, Jews, Poles, or Italians, and only knew the United States superficially. Even so, I should have recognised that on my own criteria at least some of the cultural differences among U.S. whites were not mere "stylistic variations" but "incompatible" institutions which precluded the role equivalences prerequisite of free exchange of persons among such groups, even in such traditional roles as spouse, parent, neighbour or fellow-churchman. If so, then though smooth role exchanges are feasible between members of certain white American ethnic and religious groups, they are not between others. Even without detailed ethnographies, simply by comparing such roles as priest, layman, spouse, parent are affine among white American Protestants, Catholics, Jews, Muslims, and cognate ethnic groups, I could have seen that.

To illustrate, while Protestant priests may wed, and many in the U.S.A. are appointed by their congregations, Catholic priests are prescriptively celibate and appointed by bishops. While lay Catholics confess individually to priests who may than absolve their sins, Protestants do neither; and while Protestants may freely marry those of other faiths, practise birth control, divorce and remarry without pastoral permission, Catholics may not. Since some of these religious differences affect relations between spouses, they also affect co-parenthood, parental relations with children, domestic roles, affinal relations, the extended family, godparenthood and kinship. Thus at least some material and familial roles differ more deeply among American whites across congregational and ethnic borders than I perceived in 1959. Moreover, such institutional differences as first language or "mother tongue," religion, marriage and family, and perhaps also roles in such ethnic sodalities as the KKK, Mafia, and the Freemasons, are institutionally incompatible. We should therefore neither deny the cultural pluralism of white Americans as I did in 1959 nor evade the issues it raises by restricting the category of plural societies to those in which "the dominant cultural section constitutes a small minority wielding power over the unit as a whole" on the ground that "... It is this latter group that should be distinguished as plural societies." Both points were promptly questioned by Charles Wagley and Vera Rubin.
Like other shortcomings in that essay, those misinterpretations of the U.S.A. illustrate the degree to which, in 1959, Caribbean preoccupations determined my conception of pluralism and classification of societies as plural and/or heterogeneous, and so confirm Lloyd Braithwaite's reservations about my proposals. Nonetheless, even though I discussed Grenada's social crisis and the region's political prospects in 1961, as the record shows for years my thought on these issues did not advance.

Before proceeding, I wish to correct and clarify certain other points in my early statements on the nature of pluralism and plural societies. First, since some writers have raised the question, nothing I have written should be seen as prescriptive. While the first half of my 1959 paper tried to demonstrate the institutional bases of social and cultural pluralism, the remainder discussed the conditions and characteristics of pluralism and plural societies. However erroneous, that essay was intentionally analytic and theoretical, not programmatic.

Noting that I then defined societies as "territorially distinct units having their own governmental institutions," Sidney Mintz and Burton Benedict dismissed the concept of plural societies as definitional and vacuous. Others claim that, that definition identifies all societies as states, forgetting that acephalous or stateless societies are also "territorially distinct" and have their own "governmental institutions." Like nation-states, they also illustrate Nadel's functional criterion of distinct societies as "the relatively widest effective groups." Though I now distinguish societies by discontinuities of their corporate organisations, that criterion simultaneously delimits the "widest effective groups" as aggregates that share common kinds of "governmental institutions," whether the societies are acephalous and stateless like the precolonial Tiv, Tallensi, Ibo and Nuer or, like the Hausa, Ngonde, Tswana or Yoruba, consist of structurally and culturally similar chiefdoms. In 1959 however, persuaded by the divergent institutional cultures of the colonists and colonised, and by Furnivall's stress on conquest and colonialism as the bases of plural societies, I argued that in plural societies "the monopoly of power by one cultural section is the essential precondition for the maintenance of the total society in its current form" and claimed that "the dominant social section of these culturally split societies is simply the section that controls the apparatus of power and force." That was still my position in 1967 when, as related below, I wrote three essays for a seminar on pluralism in Africa that Leo Kuper and I later co-edited.

In my second essay for that seminar I reviewed the evidence of pluralism in pre-colonial Africa and identify several acephalous pluralities which rested "on the consensus of their
constituents”\textsuperscript{95} thus demonstrating that plural societies are not “always and everywhere characterised by dissensus and coercion”\textsuperscript{96} even though that is most often the case. Switzerland, the Hausa kingdom of Maradi in Niger\textsuperscript{97} which I had cited in 1959\textsuperscript{98} the Terik-Teriki society of Kavirondo in Uganda,\textsuperscript{99} Bwamba\textsuperscript{100}, Alur\textsuperscript{101} and the Kagoro of Northern Nigeria about a hundred and fifty years ago\textsuperscript{102} are plural societies based on consensus rather than conquest.

As noted above, on demographic grounds I had tried to restrict the category of plural societies to those conquest states or "colonies of exploitation" in which the rulers were small minorities, thus excluding such former "colonies of settlement" as the U.S.A and Brazil.\textsuperscript{103} However, as related below in 1967 I rejected those demographic criteria. Thus, neither do I now hold that all plural societies presuppose sectional domination, though that is empirically the norm, nor that the dominant sections in such societies are always numerical minorities. Neither, in my current view, are all plural societies characterised by normative dissensus, nor are they all maintained by force and fear. The U.S.A. nicely illustrates a consensual plurality in which the dominant political and cultural tradition is that of an overwhelming majority, which, despite deviations, is committed to the rule of law rather than domination by the rule of force. When a society incorporates most of all of its members universalistically or uniformly in its common public domain with equal juridical and political rights, then, whatever their institutional differences in other spheres, that society will have correspondingly broad consensual commitments to its public institutions and their defence.

Together those are the main points of my initial formulation\textsuperscript{104} that I tried to correct in 1967.\textsuperscript{105} Other developments are cited below.

II

From 1961 at the University of California in Los Angeles, over several years I gradually developed a framework of corporation theory.\textsuperscript{106} In 1966, when Leo Kuper asked me to organise with him a university seminar on pluralism in Africa that produced the book we co-edited, I applied the corporation theory I had developed in three essays I wrote for that volume, each of which advanced my understanding of corporations and pluralism. Together those essays provided the structural framework that my account of pluralism had lacked in 1959. In this section I shall therefore summaries those advances and try to carry them a little further.

That set of essays began by declaring that
Pluralism is a condition in which members of a common society are internally distinguished by fundamental differences in their institutional practice... (as) ... distinct aggregates or groups... Pluralism simultaneously connotes a social structure characterised by fundamental discontinuities and cleavages, and a cultural complex based on systematic institutional diversity...

Pluralism may be defined with equal cogency in institutional or in political terms... Specific political features of pluralism centre in the corporate constitution of the total society. Under these conditions the basic corporate divisions in the society usually coincide with the lines of institutional cleavage.

By corporations I mean any social units that are unique, firmly bounded, presumptively perpetual, and have determinate membership. While some corporations, such as kingships, presidencies, chiefships and other offices, can have only one member at any time, others must always have more. Some, such as ecclesia and modern nation-states, number many millions. Among such corporations aggregate, the most important difference is that between corporate categories such as acephalous societies, women, slaves, serfs and other closed collectivities which, because they lack the necessary organisation, are structurally incapable of united action, and those that can and do act jointly en bloc or through their representatives, such as states, churches, multinational firms, political parties, trade unions, universities, age-groups, lineages, associations, bands and many local communities. Corporations aggregate that lack the organisation requisite for coordinated action are corporate categories, while others that have the organisation needed to act as units are corporate groups. Thus, while states and centralised societies are corporate groups, such collectivities within them as women, racial stocks, and all without the vote, being each unique, closed presumptively perpetual, inert and with determinate membership, are corporate categories, like moieties or clans, whose status and boundaries are marked by disabilities.

When collectivities in a common society have the same rights and disabilities, that indicates their incorporation as formal equals, whether they are categories or groups. In some societies, however, collective incorporation is radically unequal, so that while some groups or categories suffer disabilities, others do not. In such societies, the differential incorporation of collectivities establishes a hierarchic order based on their systematic inequality in the society's public domain, that is, in its law, government, economy, education and other public institutions that regulate behaviour. By virtue of their differing relation to the common public domain, differentially incorporated social sections differ radically in their status, rights, opportunities, endowments and political institutions. In such milieux, to perpetuate its dominance the ruling section,
organised as a corporate group, acts collectively to ensure that its subordinates, who are generally inert categories, cannot effectively challenge its rule.

The egalitarian opposite of societies based on differential incorporation is one that treats all adults as citizens directly and equally, in fact as well as law, by their universalistic or uniform incorporation and guarantees their civil rights. Now the commonly accepted ideal and basis of liberal democratic society, if valid de facto, this mode of incorporation, without which pluralism à la Tocqueville cannot occur, excludes perduing collective inequalities in law, politics and other sectors of the public domain, by investing all citizens with identical rights and duties. Being strictly formal, such prescriptive equality does not exclude substantive differences of ability, wealth, power, class, education, occupation or income within the population, so long as all are equally free within the law to pursue their interests. Universalistic or uniform incorporation is therefore compatible with these and other institutional differences among those incorporated, provided that such differences do not affect their parity the public domain.

The main problem with universalistic incorporation is its practical validity. In many societies the de facto or actual distribution of legal and political rights diverges widely from that proclaimed by constitutional law for some social categories such as women, party members, the nomenklatura, the military, citizens, heathen, non-whites, and those of differing language. As Weber advised, whenever the conditions in which people live differ from the de jure conditions proclaimed by law or the constitution, while studying the nature and extent of that divergence, we should always give priority to the de facto or actual state of affairs, rather than the jural proclamations.

The third and final mode of incorporation unites collectivities as equivalent segments of an inclusive society or consociation, and may therefore be described as segmental, equivalent or consociational. Unlike universalistic incorporation, this segmental mode assumes the prior identification of individuals with the collectivities it incorporates, be they bands, clans, lineages, religions, cantons, chiefdoms or states; and unlike differential incorporation, which prescribes the political, jural and civic inequality of collectivities, segmental incorporation prescribes their formal equivalence, even though, as in Lebanon c. 1970 or Nigeria, 1961-66, they differ substantially in numbers, wealth, extend or power. Finally, unlike universalistic incorporation which formally prescribes differential incorporation within the population, under segmental incorporation, segments can incorporate their members differentially or otherwise at will, without thereby altering their own status.

To show how these diverse modes of incorporation structure empirical societies, let us look briefly at South Africa,
Switzerland and the U.S.A. By law South African apartheid differentially incorporates Whites, Indians, Coloureds and Blacks, while reserving political power and rights to whites. It also divides South African blacks segmentally by tribe, language, ethnicity and homeland, and allows tribes to incorporate their members differentially as royals, commoners, unfree people, or by ethnic status. South Africa's ruling whites also incorporate themselves segmentally, de facto though not in law, being split between Britons and Boers, each with their own language, religion, organisations and institutional cultures. By contrast, as a confederation the Swiss state rests on the segmental incorporation of its 21 cantons as units of equivalent status and rights. Until 1987, while Swiss women were differentially incorporated and denied political rights in some cantons, they could vote and contest elections in others. The cantons incorporated Swiss men universalistically and differentially incorporated all 'guest workers' or gastarbeiter. In the U.S.A., which incorporates whites both sexes universalistically in fact as well as law, even after the civil rights legislation of 1965, Blacks Chicanos and Amerindians were differentially incorporated de facto in many states, Amerindians being also incorporated segmentally de jure on tribal reservations.

At the structural level, U.S. political and social history can be most easily summarised and interpreted by reviewing the ways in which its corporate structure changed to accommodate or exclude differing social groups and categories. Unfortunately, though several scholars criticise my account of pluralism as essentially classificatory, static and useless for the study of change, space does not allow me to demonstrate the opposite by outlining that history here. Interested readers must therefore work it out for themselves.

The corporations in which a society organises its members and the relations between them constitute the corporate organisation or macro-structure that demarcates its boundaries and structures the public domain through which its people regulate their common affairs and activities of its people. Since those primary corporations control the society's resources and provide its regulative machinery and collective structure, their recruitment and membership rules and procedures are matters of great concern to all. So too are their interrelations, since corporations continuously compete for relative autonomy, resources, scope and range to preserve or extend their unit rights. Thus by their interrelations in all societies the major corporate units structure the public domain and regulate its processes.

In modern societies the public domain is that sector of social life, the test of structures and processes, through which the society regulates and transacts such matters of common concern as defence, external relations, legislation, policy,
property rights, social control, dispute settlement and justice, exchange, commerce, education, training, administration, and, in certain cultures, religion. Being of no great common interest, all else belongs to that sector of social life which, adapting a concept of Fortes, I call the private domain, where individuals are free within the limits of law to choose and pursue alternative goals and courses of action. In modern societies such options generally include religion, occupation, residence, movement, association, recreation, marriage, divorce, domestic language and much else.

Although in each society the public and private domains define one another, their boundaries and contents vary as effects of culture and the struggle between those who advocate and those who oppose reductions in the scope and range of the public domain, that is, in the nature and extent of public responsibilities, resources and power. In such institutionally homogeneous acephalous or stateless societies as the Tiv, Plateau Tonga, Trobriands, Nuer or Gusii, there was no discrete perduring public domain. Since, as effects of their organisation, those societies lacked the prerequisite central corporations having authority and power to regulate their populations, their primary corporations pursued their interests independently or jointly in ad hoc groupings that varied with the issue and situation. Yet even in those conditions, as Fortes showed, everyone distinguishes clearly those affairs, relations and activities that are properly domestic or private, being of no general concern, from others of a public kind that require politico-jural regulation and sanction. To reduce those occasions and coordinate its components, though acephalous, such an institutionally diverse consociation as the Terik-Teriki of the Kavirondo gulf in Uganda created a discrete and permanent regulative structure by incorporating men of both tribes in the same age-sets as segments.

In African lineage societies and such modern states as Ireland and Iran, marriage and religion are central politico-jural concerns of the public domain. In the U.S.S.R. today, Christian worship, once suppressed, is allowed as an activity in which individuals may engage freely without compromising their public status as citizens; that is, as a private matter of little interest to the state. In the U.S.A. and other countries, by contrast, matters of faith and worship, like family, marriage and descent, have long been treated de jure and de facto as private, open to individual choice, and, within the limits of law, free from public interference.

In consequence, since all who enjoy direct and equal access to a common public domain by virtue of their universalistic incorporation share the same political culture, status and set of public institutions, they can differ institutionally only in such relations and activities of the private domain as marriage and family, descent, home language, residence patterns, education,
religion, occupational choice and similar matters. For example, while the people of Denmark, Portugal, and Tonga are incorporated universalistically and institutionally homogeneous, such societies as France and Holland, like American whites, include collectivities that differ in their private domains. If those differences involve such basic institutions as kinship, marriage, family, religion, language or property, then, despite universalistic incorporation, like the society those collectivities display their cultural pluralism by diverse private institutions. If, on the other hand, its population practises the same set of basic institutions, a society cannot be institutionally plural. If its population has a single set of basic institutions and other institutional alternatives the society is institutionally heterogeneous.\(^{117}\) In neither case, provided their members are universalistically incorporated \textit{de facto}, do they constitute plural societies, even though their collectivities differ in basic private institutions. Thus cultural pluralism only occurs outside plural societies when collectivities incorporated universalistically in a common society differ in their basic private institutions. In plural societies such differences always involve institutions of the public domain. Societies that differentially incorporate one or more collectivities are thereby constituted as plural, as are those consociations whose segments differ institutionally or in the public status of their members.

Populations incorporated segmentally in common society may or may not differ institutionally. While such segmental societies as the Nuer, Tiv or Plateau Tonga are institutionally homogeneous, Malaysia, Nigeria, and the early U.S.A. incorporated collectivities that differed in their basic institutions. In such segmental pluralities as Cyprus, the Lebanon 1944-75, or Switzerland, each segment also has its own public domain which differed in form, scope or content from others, despite formal parity, as effects of their institutional differences. By incorporating such institutionally diverse segments as coordinates, those societies demonstrate their social pluralism.\(^{118}\)

Differentially incorporated populations are always institutionally plural, if only because, while one or more sections administer their societal public domains, the rest are excluded, and so lack the political institutions and culture of their rulers. Differentially incorporated social sections accordingly differ in their corporate organisation and political institutions; but they also generally differ institutionally in other ways, as India, Ulster and South Africa illustrate. In organisation, scope, resources and autonomy, the sections that control and direct the public domain of those societies differ structurally from those excluded, being always constituted as corporate groups, whereas their subordinate sections are often constituted as categories incapable of united action. Since corporations are most
elaborate and heavily institutionalised social units, differences in the corporate organisations of collectivities indicate corresponding differences in their public institutions. Whether, as often happens, such collectivities also differ in their private institutions, should be studied with care.

To illustrate, in Victorian England, like women, most men were differentially incorporated and lacked political rights. Many were also probably illiterate, and suffered juridical and civil abuses of various kinds. In consequence, they created such institutions as friendly societies, dame schools, chapels, trade unions and working men's clubs for their own use, while their rulers controlled the judiciary, parliament, the political parties, universities, established church, Inns of Court, Stock Exchange, public schools, chambers of commerce, armies, police, prisons, and apparatus of state. In consequence, as Disraeli, Dickens and Mayhew record, until World War I England remained a structurally plural society, though the differences between its social sections steadily diminished. Only with the creation of the welfare state after World War II, as T.H. Marshall showed, were the civic disabilities of the majority finally eliminated, to be renewed de facto shortly after for non-white Commonwealth immigrants. 119

By contrast, even when collectivities incorporated uniformly differ in such institutions as marriage, family, first language and religion, since they all share the common public domain, though the societies they constitute display cultural pluralism, they are not plural societies, which never incorporate institutionally diverse collectivities universalistically de facto.

It often happens that institutions differentially incorporate individuals, categories or groups in the social units they constitute. That has been the virtually universal experience of women in marriage, family, economy, polity and religion, irrespective of differences between industrial and tribal societies, whether pastoral or agrarian, and between such religions as ancestor worship, Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Shinto or Islam. While women now claim access to the priesthood despite strong opposition in Roman Catholic, Anglican, Orthodox and other Christian congregations, it is significant that they rarely try to do so in Judaism or Islam.

Likewise, in India Hinduism enjoins caste for all, including untouchables; yet though caste incorporates Hindus differently in the scale of purity and pollution that orders its hierarchy, despite Bralthwaite,120 Berreman,121 and others who regard Hindu caste as an instance of pluralism, like Hutton122 I hold it is not so, primarily because

Caste is an essential dimension and organisational framework of the religion and culture all Hindus share. It identifies and unites these Hindu communities by dividing them on sacred bases. This differentiation is prescribed by a religious framework, common to
all castes . . . The various castes accordingly share several common institutions in their common public domain.¹²³

Pluralism in India has bases other than caste, such as differences between Hinduism, Islam, tribal and other religions, and regional differences of language, institutional culture and ethnicity. In consequence, despite Hindu allegiance to caste, Indians dispute issues of religion, language, institutional culture and ethnic interests segmentally with one another.

Like Hindus who uphold caste while resenting their places in its regime, for millenia women have accepted their institutional roles as kin, wife, affine and mother with little collective protest, even when locked into lifelong marriages arranged against their will, and resenting their husband's superior authority and rights in public and private spheres. Nonetheless though differentially incorporated thereby, since women share and uphold those institutions with their menfolk, their situation excludes pluralism. Since pluralism presupposes differences in the basic institutions that people hold in common differentially incorporate them, as caste does for Hindus, and marriage, religion and government have always done for men and women, being shared and common, whose institutions do not involve pluralism.

In the same way, though universities differentially incorporate students as undergraduates or postgraduates, by their voluntary enrolment and participation those students legitimise their differential incorporation in those institutions, which are clearly shared and common, despite the differential incorporation of their members. Other associations such as the Poro of Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea, the Yorubas Ogboni, the Freemasons, Chinese Triads, Mafia and Camorra also incorporate their members differentially. Nonetheless, since they all participate in the same institution and share its culture, those units are neither structurally nor substantively plural.

By contrast, on and off their plantations, Caribbean slave states differentially incorporated masters and slaves as social sections, each separate and institutionally distinct. Like their plantations, those societies were hierarchic pluralities pervaded by structural pluralism. After the abolition of slavery, when they imported indentured East Indians as labour, the essential hierarchic structure and plural constitution persisted at societal and plantation levels, together with the social alignment of management and labour as institutionally distinct and differentially incorporated sections.

On the other hand, when men who otherwise share the same basic institutions are differentially incorporated, as in Victorian England, that condition automatically creates a plural society by denying one category access to the political, legal and civic structures of the public domain while reserving them for the
other. Since in all societies public institutions and affairs, civic, political, economic, religious and legal, have been managed by men, those denied access to such activities are institutionally distinguished from those who manage them in ways without parallel among women, since as a category women rarely took part in the public domain. Moreover, as we have seen, when men who otherwise share the same basic institutional culture are thus differentially incorporated, that condition generates further institutional differences among them, since the disenfranchised still have to manage their personal and common affairs, local, occupational and collective, to secure the shelter, subsistence and resources they need for themselves and their families, to educate their children, to worship and settle disputes among themselves, and to regulate their relations with outsiders, especially their masters. To those ends they must adapt their local, religious, work and kin relations, commission their leaders and organise factions, informal councils or other associations. Since women have always been and remain marginal to public institutions and affairs, whether attached to the rulers or ruled in hierarchic pluralities, neither does differential incorporation discriminate similarly between them, nor does it lead them to create new institutions. As second class citizens of the state, of their local communities and religious congregations, by their historic compliance women have positively endorsed the prescriptive disabilities they suffer in marriage, family, religion, economy, law and public affairs.

In short, only if collectivities incorporated together in a common society differ in such basic institutions as language, kinship, family, marriage, education, property, economy and religion, and their corporate organisation, will the society manifest pluralism. If the collectivities so differ but are de facto incorporated universalistically, the society will display cultural pluralism without corresponding disjunctions in the corporate organisation of its public domain.124 If the collectivities share common basic institutions, whether segmentally or universalistically incorporated, their society lacks pluralism of any kind. If the collectivities differ institutionally and are incorporated segmentally, such mutual exclusion transforms their cultural boundaries into social pluralism. If incorporated differentially, the institutionally diverse sections form a hierarchic plurality characterised by structural pluralism:

Structural pluralism subsumes social pluralism, though the latter does not entail it. Structural and social pluralism both assume and express cultural pluralism, but in differing forms and with differing intensities.125

If differentially incorporated without further segmentation, the society is a hierarchic plurality; but if de facto it incorporates collectivities differentially and segmentally at once, the plurality...
is complex. In short, without differences in the basic institutions of its collectivities, a society lacks cultural pluralism; and even if those collectivities differ institutionally in the private domain, without differences of collective access and participation in the public domain, it is not a plural society. In neither of these situations are the plural characteristics and structure of the society in any way influenced by its social stratification, whatever its form and content. Instead, by their modes of incorporation, the structural alignments and institutional cultures of its plural divisions together motivate and influence the responses, both individual and collective, that generate and sustain the evolution and character of the social stratification.

III

From the preceding it should be clear that pluralism in any mode denotes contexts in which institutionally distinct collectivities are incorporated together to form societies. Cultural pluralism obtains when universalistically incorporated collectivities differ in basic institutions, of the private domain, without affecting their members' status in the societal public domain. Social pluralism obtains when institutionally distinct collectivities are incorporated consociationally as coordinate segments in the public domain of a common society, de facto or de jure. Structural pluralism involves the differential incorporation of institutionally distinct collectivities with radically unequal status and rights in the common public domain. While cultural pluralism occurs outside of plural societies, social and structural pluralism constitute pluralities of diverse types, the segmental and the hierarchic; and their modes of incorporation, if combined, produce such complex pluralities as colonial Trinidad and Guyana, or contemporary South Africa and the U.S.S.R. With these criteria and models in mind, we an now consider the relation of pluralism to social stratification, however that is defined.

Borrowed from geology and archaeology, the concept of social stratification denotes the hierarchic arrangement of members of a society in strata of classes aligned empirically as superior and inferior. The categories so ranked may be distinguished by sex, age, race, ethnicity, religion, language, occupation or other conditions; but as currently used, concepts of social stratification or class structure usually denote social differentiation and ranking based on such criteria as wealth, income, occupation, descent, property or prestige, the criteria used and their relative weights varying widely between authors.126 Whichever criteria are chosen, the distribution that results, being societal in span and artifactual construct of an observer's will differ sharply from those the people themselves
make of their society as a whole, and of their own groups and strata.

As mentioned above, when contrasting pluralism and stratification in 1959, despite "their formal resemblance" I stressed that "pluralism is quite distinct from other forms of social heterogeneity such as class stratification in that it consists in the coexistence of incompatible institutional systems." To illustrate, I cited the complex plurality of colonial Suriname where

Javanese, Chinese, Indian and Negro sections . . . have parallel social status, . . . (and) cultural difference and social stratification vary independently. Thus they can neither be reduced to one another, nor can they be equated.

In reply, Lloyd Braithwaite criticised the concept of pluralism as leading to views of

the social system purely in terms of cultural institutions and of the adherence of the different groups to different institutions. The confusion in meanings which surrounds the term 'institutions is thus introduced into the confusion that surrounds the term 'plural society'

As an alternative, he suggested a sociological analysis that classified institutions as "core" or "peripheral" on such "structural-functional" criteria as Raymond Smith later used when he classified the occupational "system" of Caribbean societies as their "primary" structures of stratification, and racial, ethnic and political conditions as "secondary structural and cultural aspects of the stratification systems."

In a curious non sequitur Braithwaite also argued that although we usually "regard social classes as quasi-organized groups" whose roles are defined by their "place in a hierarchy", since each "class" is in a sense, a category created by the research worker "differences in social class must depend on a difference in the spread of certain values among different groups." As examples he claimed that in Trinidad, while certain values "were shared only by the middle and the upper classes, (and) yet others by the whole society except the upper class, and so on . . . , there was only one common value strongly held by the whole society namely, "ethnic superiority and inferiority."

In thus distinguishing social classes by the values they held, and stressing that "certain of these values are central and others peripheral to the social system," Braithwaite rested his case on the validity of Parsonian theories of social system and their stratification. However, Parsons' definition of social stratification as "the ranking of units in a social system in accordance with the standards of the value system," though
virtually unchallenged at that time, merely illustrates his idealistic, conservative view of societies as consensual normative systems, and has since been abandoned. To appreciate the nature of social stratification we must therefore look at other conceptions, including those of Marx who, following Rousseau, first drew attention to this dimension of society.

According to Marx, "the history of all existing society is the history of class struggle" classes being distinguished by their relations to the means of production. Production itself defined as the process by which men make goods or commodities, that is, material things for use or exchange. By that definition, most members of any society belong to no class, since most are not directly involved in production, whether as workers, owners or as entrepreneurs. In Marx's day, besides most women, that "unproductive" category of service workers included all men employed as professionals, teachers police, soldiers sailors, railwaymen, research workers, technicians, nurses, physicians, clerks, entertainers, civil servants, priests, lawyers, judges, artists, etc., that is, perhaps one half of the male labour force of the industrial societies in which he lived.

Marx's class model of society also errs in presuming as necessary a closer concordance of executive power and wealth in the direction of social affairs than the historical and ethnographic data support. By such economic criteria, in industrial societies he distinguished bourgeois or capitalists, large landowners, proletarians, petty bourgeois and peasants, analysed their conflictual relations, and theorised revolutionary transformations of society through class conflicts generated by contradictions in the modes of production that "determined" their formations.

To avoid these and other defects of Marx's theory, Max Weber, redefined classes by their relations with the market rather than the means of production, thus implicitly restricting class structures to societies with markets and all-purpose money. He then distinguished class, status or "honour," and power, or party, as analytically independent bases for the empirical ordering of individuals and groups in human societies, and stressed their variable relations. Overlapping, cross-cutting, or coinciding with that of economic class, Weber identified other scales of power and social honour in which populations are also distributed, and showed why it is essential to study their distributions on all three scales in order to formulate an adequate model of the social stratification:

Economic power may be the consequence of power existing on other grounds. Man does not strive for power only in order to enrich himself economically. Power, including economic power, may be valued for its own sake. Very frequently this striving for power is also conditioned by the social honour it entails. Not all power, however, entails social honour; the typical American boss, as well
as the typical big speculator, deliberately relinquishes social honour . . . Mere 'economic' power, and especially 'naked' money power, is by no means a recognised basis of social honour. Nor is power the only basis of social honour. Indeed, social honour, or prestige, may even be the basis of economic power, and very frequently has been.\textsuperscript{145}

Following Lloyd Warner's pioneer studies of American stratification in Yankee City,\textsuperscript{146} Western sociologists have treated occupation as the basis of status placements in industrial and preindustrial societies and equated their occupational rank orders with social stratification.\textsuperscript{147} Since most equations of occupational ranking and social stratification assume some value consensus that underlies those occupational rankings, and treats that as their basis, there was little protest in 1953 when Talcott Parsons virtually identified stratification as the ranking of individuals and social categories in accordance with "the common value system" of the society, thus diverting attention from the objective data on stratification to the nature and evidence of those "common values."

Parsons' thesis provided the basic axiom of functionalist theories of stratification and society\textsuperscript{148} as well as Lloyd Braithwaite's account of Trinidad,\textsuperscript{149} and his critique of Furnivall's thesis and my recension.\textsuperscript{150} However, whereas Marx distinguish classes by their objective relations to the means of production, and Weber identified stratification with objective distributions of power, social honour and market position, Parsons' view was essentially subjective, idealist, normative, and indifferent to objective conditions. By contrast, having identified plural societies as multiracial medleys that live "side by side, but separately, within the same political unit" Furnivall described the social basis of economic order in the colonial Far East tersely as follows: "Even in the economic sphere, there is a division of labour along racial lines,"\textsuperscript{151} much as there was in the West Indies before independence, and still is substantially.\textsuperscript{152} Unlike R.T. Smith,\textsuperscript{153} we cannot therefore regard such arrangements as "secondary," since they were fundamental to the colonial regime, "race differences" being "stressed in context of social and cultural pluralism."\textsuperscript{154}

In criticising my 1950 essay, Vera Rubin claimed that "difference in the family complex, education and occupation and . . . social class organization in the United States seem to parallel (M.G. Smith's) model for a pluralistic framework, point for point."\textsuperscript{155} She also cited "differences in material culture, associations, recreational patterns, types of crime, years of schooling and even apparently, the epidemiology of mental disorders"\textsuperscript{156} as illustrating "correlations between social class affiliations and cultural forms in the institutions"\textsuperscript{157} I had used to indicate pluralism. It hardly needs saying that neither
material culture, types of crime, nor mental disorders are social institutions; nor are average years of schooling, recreational patterns or class organisation. Although Rubin did not say what she meant by social class, she probably had in mind such familiar bourgeois concepts as the "upper, middle and lower or working classes," categories which, whatever their folk appeal, have little analytic value since, unlike Marxist notions, they conflate such criteria as occupation, wealth, income, education, residence, origin, descent, family, prestige and style of life in variable combinations.

In such institutionally plural societies as Trinidad, Jamaica and the U.S.A. separately or in diverse combinations, those criteria of class place some people who share common institutions in the same class or stratum with others who differ institutionally from them, and distribute members of each institutionally distinct collectivity in diverse classes or strata of the social hierarchy. For example, in Trinidad, despite their political and institutional differences and mutual exclusions, East Indians and Afro-Creoles are both prominent in the middle and working classes. Likewise in the U.S.A. before and after the civil rights legislation of 1965-8, despite their institutional differences and de facto differential incorporation, which the Federal Government tried to reduce by political reforms and affirmative action, blacks and whites of differing ethnic status were distributed, though unequally, in almost all social strata or classes based on the familiar bourgeois criteria. In South Africa also, despite their differential incorporation and institutional differences, Whites, Cape Coloureds, Indians, and Africans of diverse tribal background appear, however unequally, in all classes or strata defined by such criteria. Most notably, although heterogeneous, the criteria by which Western sociologists distinguish social strata and classes ignore such variables as language, institutional culture, race, sex, ethnicity, religion and juridical and political status. However, as my description of Jamaica in 1955 indicates, those criteria are absolutely central to the analysis of pluralism in societies of differing structure and type.

Despite his contrary view, Benedict's account of the development of Mauritius since World War II illustrates these points nicely. Having found that in multiracial Mauritius the same "class strata appeared within each ethnic section" namely, among Indians of Hindu and Muslim faith, Chinese, Europeans of French and British origin, and Afro-European or Afro-Indian Creoles, Benedict observed that, while "This did not at first necessarily diminish the pluralism of Mauritius, . . . It produced paralleled strata within each ethnic section" some of whom found that despite their racial and cultural differences, they shared common political and economic interests and collaborated to pursue them. How closely the criteria that
Benedict used and the social stratification he found in Mauritius corresponded with those of its institutionally distinct social sections, we cannot say, since he says little about those sectional criteria of status placement and models of Mauritian society.

Although Benedict\(^{161}\) seems to hold that those cross-cutting stratifications of racial or ethnic segments in colonial Mauritius demonstrate the inadequacy of pluralism as a cultural rather than structural framework,\(^{162}\) that is not so, since, besides their institutional dimensions, the three varieties of pluralism differ in their modes of incorporation and political structure. Benedict's data on the political evolution and changing stratification of colonial Mauritius\(^{163}\) illustrate this point nicely, since both sets of changes correlated and involved the progressive enfranchisement of non-white Mauritians on property franchises from 1831 until 1963, when adult suffrage took effect. Those processes redefined and realigned the racial and cultural categories of Mauritian society independently of its changing stratification by reducing and finally eliminating their differential incorporation, despite their persisting differences of institutional culture, language, religion, race and social organisation.

In 1963 Talcott Parsons' former student and colleague, Neil Smelser, in association with S.M. Lipset, redefined social stratification as the empirical distribution of advantages, resources, opportunities and sanctions within society,\(^{164}\) thus substituting objective criteria for the subjective valuations of Talcott Parsons', and simultaneously shedding the presumption that normative consensus legitimised the status order, however transparently oppressive it was. Though the strata that Smelser and Lipset distinguished broadly as upper, middle and lower occupy differing social situations and have different life chances, their omnibus concept of stratification as the distribution of advantages and sanctions conflates economic and political criteria with others that are biological, social and cultural, thus blunting its ability to discriminate between conditions of pluralism and social stratification or class.

To illustrate, though the U.S.A. still incorporates most non-whites \textit{de facto} differentially, it incorporates white Americans universalistically and prescribes their formal equality in the common public domain, despite differences of ethnicity, religion, marriage, family, language and other institutional practices. Even if, as conceived by Melser and Lipset, U.S. social stratification includes some members of all collectivities in every stratum, howsoever incorporated and whatever their race, ethnicity, religion and institutional culture, and even if it simultaneously distributes members of each plural division in several strata, since the disabilities and negative sanctions that non-whites experience as effects of their race, linguistic and
cultural differences and *de facto* differential incorporation are not commensurate with wealth, income, prestige, occupation, education and other indicators of material advantage and deprivation, they cannot appropriately be included in scales designed to collate and rank such differentials to yield a single distribution.

Whether we conceive the strata of American society on Marxist lines as economic classes, or following Weber, in terms of their market positions, power and prestige, they will subdivide its differentially incorporated racial blocs as well as the ethnic divisions of American whites, however unequally, today as before World War II. In South Africa likewise, where Parsonian postulates of normative consensus and common values can hardly be proclaimed, despite their differing institutional cultures and *de jure* differential incorporation, whites and blacks laboured together in the mines, though for different wages, and, like Indians and Coloureds, practised medicine and law, taught and studied at universities and schools, ministered to their flocks, owned shops, factories and other premises, and engaged, however unequally, in the diverse economic activities of Marx's bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie, and proletarians. In South African apartheid, as in the hierarchic plurality of colonial Jamaica, classes defined by economic criteria cross-cut racial and cultural divisions, and differentially incorporated collectivities together, despite their differing ideologies and political institutions.

In Switzerland, Lebanon, Nigeria, and Cyprus, as in Trinidad, Guyana, Belize and Suriname, institutionally distinct social segments are cross-cut by economic and other social criteria that identify social strata without reference to their institutional or corporate status, much as Benedict found to his surprise in Mauritius. Such divergence is inevitable since classes and social strata are distinguished within the institutionally diverse populations of plural societies, as well as the ethnic segments of universalistically incorporated whites in the U.S.A., without reference to institutional practices or modes of incorporation. Even in such hierarchic pluralities as contemporary Jamaica or Grenada, despite the *de facto* differential incorporation of their elite and folk sections and its apparent congruence with stratification by economic or social class, study will show that those criteria assign some members of all differentially incorporated and institutionally diverse social sections the same class status, and set them apart from others in their sections. In New Haven, Connecticut likewise, Italian and Irish Americans, the largest white ethnic groups, being incorporated uniformly, contest political dominance and official influence as *de facto* segments at elections under ethnic candidates of superior status, each chosen to mobilise the maximum vote and win office, following which, as opportunity
allows, benefits are distributed to supporters in their ethnic
groups. Almost always in contexts of segmental ethnic, racial or
cultural conflict and rivalry, the authoritative leaders of each
section or segment are men of high social status in that
collectivity, however widely its status criteria may diverge from
national norms.

While its de facto mode of incorporation prescribes the same
jural and political status for all in each section, irrespective of
their institutional uniformity or differences, such identical juru-
political rights and disabilities do not exclude differences of
occupation, education, prestige, economic or social resource,
opportunity, advantage or sanctions among them. It is therefore
necessary to rid ourselves of the idea that we should study
societies exclusively, either for their plural aspects and features,
or for their stratification, since by itself neither analysis can
provide an adequate or comprehensive account of the social
situation in all its complexity, whether its pluralism is merely
cultural, or, like contemporary Switzerland, Lebanon, Guyana or
Trinidad, segmental de jure or de facto, or like Grenada, de facto
hierarchic, or, like South Africa, the U.S.S.R and the U.S.A.,
complex, and so simultaneously segmental and hierarchic,
though in differing spheres and ways.

The stark contrasts between categorical differences of
institutional culture and juridical status on the one hand, and the
dissimilar distributions of individuals by wealth, occupation,
prestige, income, descent or education on the other, confirm the
conclusion of Marie Haug that "Pluralism is not simply another
form of stratification which can be subsumed under that
variable, but constitutes a special condition of diversity which
varies widely across societies."170 That conclusion holds
whether the institutionally diverse collectivities are
incorporated differentially, segmentally or universalistically, and
whether the associated pluralism is structural, social or merely
cultural. It follows from the fact that, though all varieties of
pluralism presume collective differences of basic institutions
and differ as effects of the conditions of collective incorporation,
whether defined by Marxists, Weberians or others, concepts of
class and social stratification always ignore collective
differences of institutional culture and mode of incorporation in
favour of criteria that differentiate and rank persons by other
variables, such as wealth, income, education, occupation, power,
descent, prestige and style of life, or by their relations with the
market or means of production.

Whereas the institutional and political differences that
constitute pluralism and identify plural units de facto or de jure
are categorical, corporate and collective, the criteria than rank
people in classes or social strata differentiate individuals and
families, irrespective of their categorical status or institutional
culture. For that reason, adequate accounts of plural societies
and others characterised by pluralism require detailed studies of their stratifications to complement accounts of their corporate organisation and institutional divisions. To represent the stratification of such societies adequately and correctly, besides distributing their members in strata by the criteria listed above, those studies should also include detailed accounts of the status criteria specific to each of the institutionally distinct corporate sections in the plurality, indicating their relative significance and the diverse models of each section's stratification and of the total society. Only then shall we really be able to see whether and how closely the models of societal stratification based on observers' criteria correspond to those the people have of their own sections, of one another, and of the inclusive society, based on their diverse sectional cultures and experience.

NOTES


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35 --, *op. cit.* 155, 1951.

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40 ---, ibid, 830, 1960.
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83 ---, op. cit. 1965b.
84 ---, ibid, 766, 1960a.
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91 ---, ibid. 772, 1960a.
92 ---, ibid. 772, 1960a.
94 ---, ibid, 91-151, 1969.
96 ---, ibid, 159, 1984a.
98 ---, op. cit. 774, 1960a.
100 Winter, E. H., op. cit. 1956.
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105 ---, op. cit. 1965a.
110 ---, op. cit. 27, 1969a.
111 ---, op. cit. 91-100, 176-180, 1974a.
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133 ---, ibid, 53
135 ---, ibid, 823.
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139 Parsons, Talcott, op. cit. 1952.
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149 Braithwaite, Lloyd, op. cit. 1953
150 Smith, M. G. op. cit. 1953.
151 Furnival, J. S., op. cit. 304, 1948.
153 Smith, R. T., op. cit. 52-64, 1970.
154 Smith, M. G., op. cit. 775, 1960a.
155 Rubin, Vera, op. cit. 782, 1960.
156 ---, ibid, 782.
157 ---, ibid, 782.
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160 —, ibid, 38.
161 —, ibid, 37-40.
162 —, ibid, 37.
169 Dollard, John, Caste and Class in a Southern Town, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1937.
172 Smith, M. G., op. cit. 162-175, 1965a.
173 —, op./ cit, 1974b.
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177 Haug, Marie R., Social and cultural pluralism as a concept in social system analysis, American Journal of Sociology, 73, 304, 1967.
ERRATA

p.3, line 3: change 'Caribbean countries' to 'Trinidad & Tobago'.

p.5, line 21: change dashes to commas to read: '... those tribal societies, the Muslim Hausa, and English society, all differed so sharply from Jamaica....'

" line 33 (quote from Furnivall): insert 'in' to read 'but only in the market-place...'

p.6, line 8: Change 'Ibn Khaldun' to 'Ibn Khaldun'

" one line from bottom: change 'sectional values systems' to 'sectional value-systems'

p.7, line 24: change to read 'by attributing whatever values the analyst prefers as determinants of action.'

" line 28: Replace omitted line to read: '... uncertainty. As the theoretically postulated bases of social order and integration, such inherently indeterminate variables, coupled with the unsatisfactory procedures used to "demonstrate" them ...'

p.8, line 11: Insert comma after 'stratification'35', change 'of' to 'or' and insert 'is' to read '... to social stratification'35, or supposing that "the persistence of plural units is due to...'

p.10, 8 lines from bottom: Spell 'Nadel' correctly.

" bottom line: change 'socialities' to 'sodalities'

p.11, line 20: change 'are' to 'and' to read '..parent and affine among white American...'

p.12, 9 lines from bottom: Insert comma after 'in its current form,'

" 6 lines from bottom: Close quotes after '... of power and force."

" one line from bottom: change 'identify' to 'identified'

p.13, line 5: insert comma after '..cited in 1959,'

" 3 lines from bottom: change to read '...I shall therefore summarise' not 'summaries'

p.14, line 14: delete dash to read '... membership' not 'member-ship'

p.16, third line from bottom: change 'test' to 'set' to read '... the set of structures and processes..'

p.18, line 25: insert 'a' to read: '... segmentally in a common society ...'

" bottom line: insert 'the' to read: '... corporations are the most elaborate ...'

p.20, line 29: delete 's' in 'Yorubas' to read '... Yoruba Ogboni, ....'

p.22, last 2 lines: change to read '... in span and an observer's artificial construct, will differ ...

p.24, line 9: insert 'Marx' to read 'Production itself Marx defined as ...'

" line 44: correct spelling of 'contradictions'

p.25, 9 lines from bottom: change 'difference' to 'differences'

p.26, line 12: insert comma after 'U.S.A.'

p.27, 7 lines from bottom: Change 'Melser' to 'Smelser'

p.28, line 24: Remove comma after '... racial and cultural divisions'

" line 7: separate 'its' from 'de facto' (probably the effect of the Italic style)

" 4 lines from bottom: change 'than' to 'that' to read 'the criteria that rank ...'

p.30, note 3: Change 'Kumper' to 'Kuper'

p.31, note 15: Correct 'Smith, R.T.'

" note 29: Change 'Bwanda' to 'Bwamba'

" note 29: Correct to 'The diffusion of age-group organisation...'

p.32, note 57: Correct spelling of 'Furnivall'

" note 79: Correct spelling of 'Wagley'

" note 85: Correct spelling of 'Mintz'

p.33, note 93: Correct spelling of 'Kuper'

p.35, note 165: Correct spelling of 'van den Berghe'